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7 Foreword
One	of	the	most	striking	global	phenomena	seen	over	the	last	decade	has	been	the	swift-
ness	with	which	changes	penetrate	the	Arctic.	The	winds	of	change	are	blowing	in	this	
part	of	the	world	and	the	Arctic	is	moving	from	a	rather	isolated	to	an	accessible	geopo-
litically	central	part	of	the	world	–	and	in	a	far	more	positive	way	than	during	the	Cold	
War.	The	future	of	the	Arctic	will	be	radically	different	to	the	reality	we	know	today.
The	main	driver	for	change	is	climate	change.	Global	warming	is	happening	faster	
in	the	Arctic	than	in	any	other	place	on	earth	with	profound	consequences	for	global,	
regional,	national	and	local	societies	while	at	the	same	time	presenting	new	challenges	
and	opportunities.	Another	important	driver	here	is	globalisation	the	consequences	of	
which	have	now	embraced	the	Arctic	and	will	have	significant	implications	for	Arctic	
societies	and	their	peoples.
The	purpose	of	this	book	is	to	draw	attention	to	the	most	important	changes	–	the	
mega	trends	–	presented	by	a	number	of	scientists.	In	the	long	run	it	is	not	enough	to	
confirm	that	the	ice	is	melting.	We	have	to	move	forward,	if	we	are	to	secure	the	future	for	
our	Arctic	world	and	ensure	that	developments	happen	in	accordance	with	the	wishes	
and	priorities	of	the	societies	in	the	Arctic.
Lene	Espersen
Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs

9Executive summary
The	current	pace	of	global	change	has	already	had	
a	decisive	impact	on	the	Arctic.	To	understand	the	
current	and	likely	future	situation	in	the	Arctic	it	is	im-
portant	to	acknowledge	the	pre-conditions,	challenges	
and	tendencies	at	work	here.	
Some	of	these	developments	should	be	characterised	
as	megatrends	because	they	overarch	and	impact	on	
everything	else.	They	are	trends	deemed	so	powerful	
that	they	have	the	potential	to	transform	society	across	
social	categories	and	at	all	levels,	from	individuals	and	
local-level	players	to	global	structures,	and	eventually	
to	change	our	ways	of	living	and	thinking.
We	have	identified	the	nine	megatrends;	
1. Increased urbanisation – a global trend also 
including the Arctic 
Urbanisation	is	a	process	where	society	is	transformed	
from	predominantly	rural	characteristics	in	terms	of	
economy,	culture	and	lifestyle,	to	one	which	can	be	
characterised	as	urban.
It	leads	to	a	further	concentration	of	the	Arctic	popula-
tion	on	fewer	and	larger	places	–	with	increased	diver-
sification	of	the	economy,	social	relations,	and	cultural	
activities.	
It	entails	a	complex	set	of	processes,	not	only	in	where	
people	live	and	what	they	produce,	but	in	who	they	are,	
how	they	live	in	terms	of	economic	well-being,	political	
organisation	and	the	distribution	of	power,	demograph-
ic	structure	and	social	relations.
The	pace	may	differ	in	different	parts	of	the	Arctic,	but	
the	trend	is	the	same!
megatrends
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2. Demographic challenges – the old stay 
while the young leave 
A	decline	in	birth	rates	leads	to	a	reduction	in	the	
number	of	people	in	the	active	workforce.	This,	com-
bined	with	a	general	ageing	of	the	population,	results		
in	increased	old	age	dependency	rates.	
Stagnating	or	declining	predominantly	rural	regions	
are	experiencing	the	temporary	out-migration	of	young	
persons	seeking	educational	opportunities,	usually	
resulting	in	the	permanent	out-migration	of	young	and	
well-trained	persons.
As	relatively	more	women	than	men	leave,	this	has	a	
profoundly	negative	effect	on	the	social	life	and	the	
economy	through	opportunities	for	marriage,	mainte-
nance	of	family	life	and	family	relations	etc.,	as	well	as	
through	the	loss	of	educational	skills.	
A	few	municipalities	–	basically	the	urban	ones	–	can	
show	a	positive	net	in-migration,	most	of	them	in	rela-
tion	to	either	new	economic	activities	creating	jobs,	or	
educational	opportunities	attracting	youth	segments.
3. Continued dependency on transfers and the 
exploitation of natural resources will continue to 
dominate the Arctic economies
The	Arctic	continues	to	be	a	region	of	economic	con-
trasts.	The	international	economy	supports	modern	large	
scale,	capital	intensive	production,	while	the	traditional	
economy	exists	in	small	individual	or	family	groups.
Growing	global	competition	combined	with	the	over-
exploitation	of	natural	resources	creates	structural	and	
economic	crisis	in	many	Arctic/Northern	communities.	
Exploited	to	the	limit,	these	living	resources	are	not	
expected	to	provide	the	necessary	economic	surplus	to	
enable	further	welfare	development.	In	addition,	“tra-
ditional”	activities	remain	vulnerable	to	international	
opinion		
in	relation	to	the	environment	and	animal	welfare.
Growth	in	the	Arctic	tourist	industry	will	continue	with	
an	increasing	emphasis	on	large	vessels	and	land-based	
tourism.
Future	extraction	of	the	vast	land-based	resources	of	the	
Arctic	will	increasingly	be	based	on	“company-towns”	
generating	few	jobs	in	established	communities.
The	most	significant	shift	in	the	economy,	however,	is	
from	primary	and	secondary	towards	tertiary	sector	jobs	
funded	through	transfers	from	royalties	and	govern-
ments.	
The	Arctic	will	remain	a	high	cost	production	region	be-
cause	it	is	located	far	from	markets,	it	is	sparsely	populat-
ed	and	it	is	situated	in	a	harsh	environment.	In	most	parts	
of	the	region	development	occurs	along	“frontiers”	with	a	
limited	infrastructure	and	with	few	available	workers.	
Executive summary
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4. Continued pollution and ongoing climate 
change will have a significant impact on the 
nature and environment of the Arctic.
The	future	will	see	challenges	such	as	increasing	tem-
peratures,	melting	of	sea	ice	and	glaciers,	sea-level	rise	
and	probably	also	increased	precipitation	in	some	areas	
and	drought	in	others.
Whether	or	not	they	are	fatal	themselves,	anthropo-
genic	forces	add	to	the	stress	on	local	ecosystems.	Their	
combined	effects	can	be	cumulative	with	substantial	
causality.	In	some	cases	innovative	approaches	might	
reduce	the	impact	of	these	processes.
Biological	diversity	could	be	significantly	impacted	if	
climate	change	continues	at	its	current	pace,	though	
the	new	composition	of	species	is	likely	to	be	based	on	
heat-tolerant	fast	adapters,	resulting	in	patterns	where	
these	“invasive	species”	will	tend	to	re-structure	local	
ecosystems.
Management	of	renewable	resources	is	a	complex	and	
highly	advanced	exercise,	with	several	different	layers	
and	players.	The	challenge	here	is	to	provide	manage-
ment	systems	such	as	co-management	approaches	
where	the	different	levels	of	interest	meet	in	order	to	
provide	a	means	of	regulatory	control	and	follow	up	
schemes	while	at	the	same	time	remaining	open	to	out-
side	involvement.	
Especially	in	the	Arctic,	where	cross-boundary	interests	
between	nations,	regions,	and	communities	are	often	
involved,	it	seems	obvious	that	resource	management	
could	benefit	from	such	experiences.
While	pollution	from	outside	the	Arctic	is	a	recognised	
problem	which	may	increase	with	rising	levels	of	activity	
in	the	Arctic,	pollution	from	internal	Arctic	activities	
needs	also	to	be	addressed.
5. The Arctic needs to generate more Human 
Capital by investing more in its people 
The	advent	of	what	is	often	characterised	as	the	“knowl-
edge	economy”	requires	the	enhancement	of	human	
skills	and	talents	which	will	be	the	key	to	the	next	devel-
opment	process.	As	education	has	a	leading	role	to	play	
new	initiatives	are	needed	to	enable	communities	to	take	
charge	of	their	own	development	processes.
The	service	sector,	providing	wage	work	in	administra-
tion,	education	and	social	services,	has	become	the	
main	income	source	for	most	families	in	the	Arctic.	
These	sectors	serve	as	the	economic	mainstay	for	local	
communities	and	are	also	increasingly	necessary	for	
the	maintenance	of	many	of	the	traditional	renewable	
resource	activities.
Ensuring	the	availability	of	educational	opportunities	
and	the	jobs	that	enable	young	people	to	remain	in	the	
community,	or	at	least	in	the	region.
Establishing	job	opportunities	for	women	is	impor-
tant	as	they	tend	to	be	the	main	source	of	an	educated	
workforce	in	most	of	the	Arctic,	and	already	tend	to	be	a	
primary	source	for	labour	in	the	public	sector’s	service	
activities,	while	unskilled	or	technical	jobs	tend	to	be	
taken	up	by	incomers.	
megatrends
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6. Changes in the nature of interaction between 
the public and private spheres will impact devel-
opment
While	most	of	the	Arctic	is	still	characterised	by	a	large	
public	sector	with	state	authorities	involved	in	most	
regulation	and	planning	measures,	processes	support-
ing	the	delegation	of	power	and	responsibility	to	lower	
administrative	structures	have	been	widely	introduced,	
promoting	and	maintaining	strong	local	autonomy	and	
democratic	accountability.
Of	similar	importance	is	the	fact	that	the	private	sector	
is	now	gradually	moving	into	fields	which	used	to	be	
dominated	by	the	public	sphere,	most	prominently	in	
retail	sale,	housing	and	professional	services.
Access	to	natural	resources	has	long	been	subject	to	
such	a	process.	In	fisheries	Individual	Transferable	
Quotas	and	Community	Quotas	have	turned	into	forms	
of	private	ownership.	And	most	prominently,	Russia	has	
experienced	a	process	where	privatisation	has	entered	
into	a	broad	spectrum	of	basic	economic	activities	such	
as	mining	and	smelter	industries.	
Due	to	the	high	costs	of	establishing	infrastructure	and	
maintaining	connections	in	the	Arctic,	however,	the	
public	sector	will	prevail	as	the	major	provider	of	such	
services.	
7. Renewable energy will contribute to a “green-
ing” of the economy.
The	Arctic	has	major	potential	in	terms	of	developing	
non-fossil	fuel	based	local	energy	resources	including	
substantial	freshwater	sources	which	may	be	the	basis	
for	further	development.
Energy	is	a	key	component	for	development,	and	a	major	
challenge	here	is	that	the	Arctic	is	among	the	most	
sparsely	populated	areas	in	the	world	and	with	obvious	
difficulties	in	establishing	energy-related	infrastruc-
tures.
The	current	impetus	to	“green”	the	economy	reflects	
three	major	concerns:	the	need	to	tackle	climate	
change	and	other	environmental	problems;	the	desire	
to	strengthen	energy	security	by	reducing	dependence	
on	oil	and	gas;	and	the	need	to	stimulate	job-creation	
through	local	renewable	energy	production	in	many	
rural	areas.
The	inflow	of	consumer	goods	to	the	Arctic	in	combina-
tion	with	a	more	urban	lifestyle	generates	a	substantial	
amount	of	waste	material.	Increasingly,	the	regeneration	
and	re-use	of	some	products	and	increased	use	of	recy-
clable	materials	will	provide	a	new	approach	to	waste	
management,	while	other	non-recyclable	materials	are	
converted	into	energy.
Executive summary
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8. Increased accessibility provide opportunities 
as well as new risks
The	much	predicted	easier	ocean	access	to	transport	and	
resources	in	the	region	will	generate	increased	shipping,	
but	also	create	new	risks	for	the	environment.
It	may	provide	inhabitants,	at	least	some,	with	better	
connections	to	other	parts	of	the	world,	but	the	costs	
may	still	be	a	limiting	factor.
It	will,	however,	provide	the	cruise	liner	industry	with	
easier	access.	This	may	not	however	be	of	particular	
benefit	to	small	Arctic	communities	as	they	have	only	
a	minimal	ability	to	benefit	from	mass	tourism.	The	
necessary	infrastructure	costs	–	port	facilities	and	hotel	
beds	–	are	prohibitive	and	the	risk	that	they	are	never	
able	to	prove	their	economic	viability	remains	great	as	
such	communities	would	be	at	the	economic	mercy	of	
the	cruise	line	companies.	
Ubiquitous	low	cost	communications	technology	will	
change	the	relationship	between	citizens	and	states.	
In	some	areas,	however,	uneven	capacities	and	prob-
lems	over	access	due	to	socio-economic	limitations	will	
undoubtedly	remain	an	issue	due	to	charging	systems	
based	on	the	amount	of	traffic.
The	compound	effects	of	the	impact	of	numerous	inter-
related	components	raise	the	question	of	whether	this	
is	voluntary	or	forced.	Globalisation	has	a	penetrating	
effect.	
9. The Arctic as a new player in the global game
The	Arctic	is	no	longer	an	isolated	or	remote	region.	It	
is	a	member	of	the	global	society,	often	at	the	centre	of	
global	attention	and	fundamentally	influenced	by	global	
changes,
Increased	global	interest	is	however	a	potential	source	
of	tension	between	the	need	for	exploration	and	the	re-
quirements	of	conservation.	This	balancing	act	requires	
effective	governance.	Resource	development,	therefore,	
ought	to	be	conducted	in	the	framework	of	“steward-
ship”,	with	a	greater	emphasis	placed	on	sustainability	
and	the	principle	of	inter-generational	equity.
The	complexity	and	rapidity	of	the	changes	experienced	
require	that	substantial	effort	is	made	to	maintain	a	
proper	“stewardship”	in	and	among	the	Arctic	states	
and	that	concern	for	this	fragile	area	of	vital	importance	
includes	relevant	stakeholders	and	global	society	more	
generally.	
In	this	context	however,	the	need	for	new	data,	knowl-
edge,	and	information	is	required	for	a	further	in-depth	
understanding	of	the	interaction	between	the	different	
systems	and	in	order	to	fully	understand	current	and	
potential	future	changes.
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Introduction
The	world	is	changing,	with	many	major	trends	at	work,	
each	contributing	to	the	shaping	of	the	basic	framework	
of	development	in	the	Arctic.	Some	of	these	developments	
may	best	be	characterised	as	megatrends	because	 they	
overarch	and	impact	everything	else.	
Climate	 change	 is	 a	 recognised	 reality.	 Perhaps	 the	
most	 obvious	 consequences	 of	 this	 are	 the	 ongoing	
changes	 in	 the	accessibility	of	 the	Arctic	region	and	its	
resources.	This	will	have	a	future	global	impact	as	well	as	
a	“local”	Arctic	one.	
The	 new	 situation	 in	 the	Arctic	 is	 increasingly	 high-
lighted	 both	 in	 the	 scientific	 literature	 and	 in	 the	 eve-
ryday	 life	experiences	of	 local	people	with	 the	 issue	of	
future	environmental	consequences	at	the	centre	of	both	
debates.	Moreover,	while	some	see	these	changes	as	rep-
resenting	a	challenge	to	traditional	lifestyles	others	envi-
sion	the	embracing	of	the	new	opportunities	they	afford.
In	the	economic	field	new	development	options	will	
bring	 significant	 change.	 For	 example,	 the	 current	
prevailing	system	of	wages	and	contracts	could	gradu-
ally	be	replaced	by	one	built	around	transfer	payments	
based	on	royalties.	This	might	lead	to	new	types	of	so-
cial	stratification,	 inequity	 in	wealth	distribution	and	
eventually	 to	 a	 change	 in	 perceptions	 of	 deprivation.	
The	 informal	 economy,	 encompassing	 subsistence	
activities	such	as	 individual,	 family-	and	community-
based	 hunting	 and	 fishing,	 will	 however	 continue	 to	
play	an	important	role.	
Parallel	to	these	Arctic-focused	issues	a	number	of	glo-
bal	processes	of	importance	can	also	be	identified.	Inter-
est	in	the	Arctic	region	has	intensified	with	the	economic	
prospects	afforded	by	the	melting	ice,	thus	granting	in-
creased	access	to	the	region	and	its	resources.	
Economic	 and	 social	 life	 in	 the	 Arctic	 will	 continue	
to	be	exposed	 to	 the	 likely	 impacts	associated	with	 in-
creased	access	to	the	rich	mineral	and	energy	resources	
stored	there.	But	as	most	of	these	activities	are	promoted	
by,	and	in	need	of,	support	from	external	sources	of	capi-
tal,	they	can	quickly	become	subject	to	decisions	made	by	
outsiders	with	very	limited	influence	exercised	by	local	
communities.	
Challenges and Dimensions
To	understand	the	current	state	of	Arctic	affairs,	it	is	of	the	
utmost	 importance	 to	outline	 the	 set	of	pre-conditions,	
challenges	and	tendencies	that	 influence	contemporary	
and	future	issues	in	the	region.	Arctic	geopolitics	is	inter-
twined	with	a	number	of	developments.	
Environmental	 changes	 in	 the	 Arctic	 are	 caused	 by	
various	mechanisms	 including	 climatic	 change,	 global	
warming,	environmental	pollution	and	hazards	 includ-
ing	 Persistent	 Organic	 Pollutants	 (POPS),	 Arctic	 haze,	
heavy	metal	poisoning,	and	the	 impact	of	global	Green	
House	Gas	(GHG)	emissions.
A	variety	of	consequences	emerge	in	relation	to	these	
human-induced	actions.	One	set	of	questions	here	relates	
megatrends
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to	the	exploitation	and	management	of	current	and	poten-
tial	resources	of	alternative	and	fossil	fuel	energy.	Others	
concern	terrestrial	and	marine	resources,	sea-transport	
and	increasing	tourism.	
The	 shifting	 geopolitical	 interests	 of	 the	 Arctic	 and	
some	non-Arctic	states	have	been	characterised	through	
the	development	of	new	geo-strategies	and	approaches	to	
multi-	and	bi-lateral	diplomacy	involving	dialogue,	part-
nerships	and	international	cooperation.	At	the	same	time	
“struggles”	 for	 geopolitical	 advantage	 and	 new	 objec-
tives	for	dealing	with	the	new	geo-strategic	dynamics	and	
with	the	various	available	responses	to	emerging	security	
threats	and	risks	have	become	central	to	the	policy-mak-
ing	process	and	are	thus	now	fundamentally	important	
for	the	stability	of	the	region.
These	processes	have	been	accompanied	by	the	trans-
formation	of	the	region’s	knowledge-generating	capacity	
and	its	ability	to	share	and	accumulate	knowledge	about	
the	Arctic	and	rapidly	exchange	and	disseminate	it.	We	
can	clearly	see	here	a	growing	emphasis	on	the	need	for	
the	integration	of	science,	diplomacy,	public	policy	and	
the	 evaluation	of	 the	Arctic	 as	 a	new	 intellectual	 fron-
tier	 that	 lays	 the	 groundwork	 for	multi-disciplinary	 re-
search,	 innovation	in	science,	“know-how”,	technology	
and	policy.	“Tools”	such	as	tele-medicine,	long-distance	
education,	 video-conferencing,	 satellite	 operation	 pos-
sibilities,	digital	democracy	and	nano-technologies,	etc.,	
could	all	play	a	part	here.	Thus	far,	however,	few	of	these	
have	actually	been	used;	their	mere	existence	neverthe-
less	indicates	the	potential	inherent	in	such	new	ways	of	
cooperating	or	influencing	the	shaping	of	the	Arctic’s	geo-
political	framework.	
Generalisations	are	not	always	plausible	as	each	case-
study	or	specific	aspect	of	geopolitical	dynamics	requires	
a	detailed	analysis	and	may	present	its	own	particulari-
ties.	It	is	undeniable,	however,	that	the	impact	of	external	
factors	such	as	environmental	disasters	–	combined	with	
the	 indeterminate	 consequences	 of	 global	warming	 on	
the	Arctic	and	the	current	fluctuations	in	terms	of	world	
market	prices	for	raw	materials	–	creates	unrealistic	ex-
pectations	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 desire	 for	 fiscal	 independ-
ence.	This	is	particularly	so	when	seen	in	the	light	of	the	
still	 prevailing	 dependence	 on	 external	 transfers.	 This	
again	 has	 a	 profound	 influence	 on	 political,	 economic	
and	geostrategic	behaviour.
Scope of the book
This	book	is	limited	to	a	discussion	of	some	of	the	areas	
that	shape	 the	major	 trends	 in	 the	Arctic	and	 in	so	do-
ing	it	mainly	relies	on	existing	scholarship,	documents,	
reports	and	other	official	materials.	The	forecast	of	ma-
jor	mega-trends	 is	 limited	 to	 the	de facto	developments	
which	are	already	in	place	or	may	come	to	the	fore	in	the	
near	future.	
We	have	identified	the	following	trends:
•	 increasing	urbanisation
•	 increasing	demographic	challenges
•	 fundamental	changes	in	the	nature	of	Arctic	econo-
mies
•	 changing	environments	and	changes	in	the	way	
these	are	dealt	with
•	 increasing	resource	exploitation	pressures	and	the	
emergence	of	more	robust	protective	measures	to	
counter	them
•	 the	continuing	need	for	access	to	human	capital
•	 the	increasing	importance	of	public-private	solu-
tions
•	 the	emergence	of	renewable	energy	and	green	
economy	scenarios
•	 renewed	questions	over	accessibility
•	 wider	acknowledgement	of	the	Arctic’s	position	in	
the	new	global	system	
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The	impact	of	unforeseen	global	processes	or	unexpected	
developments	should	also	however	be	taken	into	consid-
eration.	Thus,	major	trends	in	Arctic	geopolitics	have	to	
be	seen	through	the	prism	of	Arctic	particularities	where	
the	Arctic	is	seen	as	a	distinct	region.	Arctic	diversity	and	
the	specifics	of	the	“High	Arctic”	environment	compared	
to	that	of	 the	southern	parts	of	 the	Arctic	states	should	
also	be	acknowledged	here.
It	 is	 hoped	 that	 this	 book	will	 be	 useful	 for	 policy-
makers	 from	across	 the	 region	and	beyond.	Hopefully	
dissemination	of	 the	 state	 of	 knowledge	 and	 informa-
tion	on	the	various	processes	of	transformation	connect-
ed	with	policy,	governance	and	physical	and	economic	
evolution	 in	 the	Arctic	will	 also	benefit	 other	parts	 of	
the	globe.	
What are MEGATRENDS?
Identifying MEGATRENDS is about identifying the devel-
opment processes that will have a major impact on the fu-
ture of Arctic societies in a mid- to long term time perspec-
tive.
In	a	situation	where	the	future	cannot,	in	principle,	be	
predicted	it	makes	sense	then	to	try	to	identify	trends	in	
terms	of	developments	over	the	next	five	years	and	meg-
atrends	attempting	to	characterise	what	 is	presumed	to	
hold	for	the	next	10	to	15	years.	Politicians	may	however	
make	 decisions	 that	 alter	 the	 fundamental	 conditions.	
Demographic	projections	may	be	revised	by	rapid	chang-
es	 in	 the	 economic	 fundament	 or	 due	 to	 fundamental	
environmental	 changes.	 Countervailing	 actions	 to	 the	
process	of	globalisation	may	centre	around	an	increasing	
focus	on	local	values.	Economic	reform	processes	based	
on	increased	“marketisation”	–	the	“triumph”	of	market	
forces	–	may	be	met	with	the	demand	for	commercialisa-
tion	to	stop.	
Thus	by	combining	more	general	development	trends	
with	expected	as	well	as	perceived	major	events	which	
may	influence	the	development	paradigm	it	is	possible	to	
identify	and	outline	general	trends	which	can	be	deter-
mined	with	varying	degrees	of	confidence.	
Megatrends	 then	 represent	 what	 we	 can	 term	 rela-
tively	safe	development	directions	that	will	undoubtedly	
change	society.	They	are	trends	that	are	deemed	so	pow-
erful	 that	 they	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 transform	 society	
across	social	categories	(politics,	economics,	technology,	
culture,	 etc.,)	 and	at	 all	 levels	 from	 the	 individual	 and	
local	players	to	global	structures.	They	will	change	our	
ways	of	living	and	thinking.	
Some	trends	tend	to	be	quite	obvious.	Worldwide	–	as	
well	as	in	the	Arctic	–	the	ageing	of	the	population	is	a	
well	described	phenomenon	leading	to	an	increasing	fo-
cus	on	 the	problems	 caused	by	 increasing	dependency	
ratios.	But	does	ageing	automatically	lead	to	increasing	
dependency	on	pensions,	and	thus	on	transfer	payments?	
Or	will	the	ongoing	shift	from	manual	to	a	greater	empha-
sis	on	intellectual	and	social	labour	raise	the	level	of	de-
mand	for	other	aspects	of	life	such	as	acquired	knowledge	
over	a	lifetime	of	experiences?	
Simply	 attempting	 to	 extrapolate	 empirically	 deter-
mined	 development	 trends	 may	 result	 in	 projections	
that	are	misleading.	It	has	been	shown	time	and	again	
that	predictions	about	future	development	paths	–	even	
by	 think-tanks	and	knowledgeable	 individuals	–	have	
been	proven	wrong	primarily	 because	 of	 the	 inability	
to	predict	or	foresee	major	shifts	in	technological	para-
digms.	
Other	trends	are	less	dependent	on	empirically	recog-
nisable	patterns	and	rather	more	on	imaginative	“outside	
the	box”	thinking.	Trends	and	megatrends	are,	to	a	great-
er	or	lesser	extent,	time-bound.	They	are	not	as	ephem-
eral	as	cultural	fads	but	over	time	they	can	nevertheless,	
potentially,	change	the	focus	of	development.	
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Identifying megatrends
How	can	we	distinguish	between	“real”	megatrends	and	
more	or	less	random	events	which	may	at	any	particular	
moment	in	time	look	important,	but	in	the	longer	perspec-
tive	turn	out	to	be	just	“small	ripples	in	the	water”?	A	gen-
erally	accepted	approach	to	this	problem	is	to	acknowl-
edge	that	no	one	definition	of	megatrends	exists,	while	in	
addition,	it	is	clear	that	there	is	no	simple	way	of	reaching	
a	commonly	accepted	position.	It	depends	very	much	on	
the	type	of	questions	asked.	
The	more	or	less	acknowledged	procedures	can	be	sum-
marised	like	this:
•	 A	good	kick-off	point	is	a	mind-mapping	procedure	
providing	a	start-up	overview.	
•	 A	second	step	can	be	a	structural	analysis	focusing	
on	long	term	empirical	trends.	This	serves	as	a	basis	
for	identifying	the	internal	and	external	elements/
factors	determining	mechanisms	of	change	and	
adaptation.	
•	 Thirdly,	we	require	a	qualitative	analysis	of	expert’s	
statements	on	drivers	and	hypotheses	regarding	
future	development	within	specific	fields.	
•	 The	mind-mapping	approach	serves	as	a	fourth	step	
where	multiple	threats	are	rationalised	into	key	
points	and	trends.	
•	 And	finally,	a	fifth	step	generalises	these	trends	into	
megatrends.	
The process
The	approach	utilised	in	the	context	of	this	analysis	is	a	
combination	of	the	above-mentioned	methods	(see	vol.	2	
for	details).	It	is,	on	the	one	hand,	based	on	the	empirical	
identification	 of	 the	major	 development	 characteristics	
and	processes	of	change	of	recent	decades	in	order	to	fa-
cilitate	an	analysis	of	the	dynamics	which	have	caused	
the	 changes	 and	 thereby	 to	 evaluate	 the	 likelihood	 of	
events	similarly	happening	in	the	future.	
At	the	same	time	major	expectations	regarding	the	fu-
ture	of	the	Arctic	which	have	been	identified	in	research	
reports,	government	documents	and	through	the	working	
groups	of	the	Arctic	Council	provide	the	other	main	input	
to	the	analysis.	The	documented	as	well	as	perceived fu-
ture	development	trends	each	provide	an	important	con-
tribution	to	the	analysis.	
A	 third	 vital	 input	 comes	 from	a	group	of	 scientists	
who	are	 internationally	recognised	specialists	 in	their	
fields,	and	who	have	provided	their	individual	percep-
tions	of	 future	development	paths	based	on	 their	own	
research.	 Their	 contributions	have	been	 cooperatively	
transformed	 into	 the	 format	 of	 this	 report.	 They	 have	
also	been	involved	in	the	drafting	of	the	report’s	conclu-
sions.
The entire story… or illustrative cases?
It	is	impossible	in	a	megatrend	setting	to	try	to	cover	all	
possible	aspects	of	life	in	the	Arctic.	Major	inputs	already	
exist	as	fragments	and	more	or	less	completed	overviews,	
such	as	the	Climate Assessments,	 the	Arctic Human De-
velopment Report	and	the	report	on	Arctic Social Indica-
tors.	Similarly	 the	findings	 from	the	 International Polar 
Year 2007–2008	are	important	as	more	recent	inputs	to	
the	discussion.	
This	 surfeit	 of	 information	 undoubtedly	 however	
causes	confusion	and	is	not	conducive	to	the	develop-
ment	 of	 a	 precise	 understanding	 of	 the	 background	
mechanisms	driving	the	processes	and	the	changes	that	
are	emerging.	Many	aspects	left	out	of	the	analysis	may	
be	considered	by	the	reader	to	be	important	if	not	vital	
to	fully	understanding	the	development	process	and	its	
implications.	But	as	noted	previously,	the	intention	here	
is	not	to	predict	 the	details	but	rather	to	try	to	outline	
some	of	the	major	trends	that	may	impact	many	–	and	
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in	some	cases	most	–	aspects	of	life.	In	this	context	an	
approach	which	opts	for	a	narrower	focus	on	a	limited	
number	of	cases	will	be	more	important	than	one	which	
attempts	 to	 include	a	 large	variety	of	 cases	 in	a	 futile	
search	for	“comprehensiveness”	
It	is	through	the	analysis	of	the	cases	presented	that	the	
role	of	specific	trends	appears,	and	by	combining	these	
emerging	trends	with	other	findings	taken	from	the	scien-
tific	literature,	public	documents,	working	group	reports	
and	conference	presentations,	 that	 the	megatrends	can	
be	identified.	
The	case	studies	have	been	chosen	in	such	a	way	that	
each	 reflects	 several	 important	aspects	of	 future	devel-
opment	 in	 the	Arctic,	 including	 the	environmental,	 the	
social,	the	economic	and	the	cultural	dimensions	of	de-
velopment.	
In	 several	 cases	 the	 involvement	 of	 external	 compe-
tence	is	included	by	means	of	researchers	from	the	Nordic	
and	neighbouring	countries.	The	contributors	are	listed	
at	the	beginning	of	the	report	with	their	original	contribu-
tions	included	in	Volume	II	of	the	report.	
Generalising the trends/megatrends
In	order	 to	move	from	the	 individual	cases	 to	a	consid-
eration	of	the	general	characteristics	of	the	megatrends	
the	cases	were	originally	arranged	into	a	number	of	over-
arching	themes	and	in	this	final	overview	of	megatrends	
included	as	cases	in	the	relevant	places	by	means	of	two	
processes:	
Exploratory;	by	using	past	and	present	trends	leading	
to	the	description	of	likely	futures
Anticipatory;	 by	 analysing	 predetermined	 visions	 of	
the	future,	based	on	the	identification	of	the	drivers,	ac-
tors	and	trends	in	the	studied	system,	while	by	outlining	
the	megatrends	consisting	of	the	definition	of	the	hypoth-
eses,	a	cross-consistency	analysis,	and	the	selection	and	
validation	of	the	megatrends	can	be	implemented.	
From Nordic Cooperation to the Circumpolar North
Much	of	the	Nordic	land	area	and	its	surrounding	marine	
waters	is	situated	in	the	Arctic	region.	The	Nordic	coun-
tries	work	together	to	improve	living	conditions	for	popu-
lations	 in	 the	northern	areas	and	 to	 support	 the	Arctic	
population’s	social	and	cultural	development.	This	coop-
eration	also	includes	work	on	protecting	the	fragile	and	
unique	 Arctic	 natural	 endowment,	 aiming	 at	 ensuring	
the	region’s	resources	are	being	exploited	in	a	sustainable	
way	while	conserving	biodiversity.	
Nordic	 cooperation	 is	 therefore	 fundamentally	 invol-
ved	 in	 issues	 that	 relate	 to	 this	 unique	 and	 vulnerable	
part	of	the	world.	The	starting	point	for	the	identification	
and	presentation	of	megatrends	should	therefore	be	the	
policies	of	the	Nordic	countries.	This	approach	does	not	
seek	to	omit	the	rest	of	the	Arctic,	but	it	does	mean	that	the	
presented	cases	etc.,	will,	primarily	be	based	on	exam-
ples	from	the	Nordic	countries,	and	then	supplemented	
with	 examples	 from	 across	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 circumpolar	
north.		

Urbanisation
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Urbanisation	refers	to	the	process	through	which	society	
is	transformed	from	one	with	predominantly	rural	char-
acteristics	in	terms	of	economy,	culture	and	lifestyle,	to	
one	which	can	be	characterised	as	urban.	It	usually	also	
includes	a	process	of	territorial	reorganisation,	leading	to	
a	shift	in	the	location	of	inhabited	areas	while	impacting	
both	population	size	and	the	types	of	economic	produc-
tion	processes.
Urbanisation	is	a	global	trend	which	will	significantly	
contribute	to	the	shaping	of	human	life	in	the	future.	The	
Arctic	region	is	no	exception.	According	to	the	UNEP	half	
of	the	world’s	population	now	lives	in	urban	areas,	draw-
ing	most	of	their	food	and	natural	resources	from	the	sur-
rounding	rural	areas.	And	by	2050,	eight	out	of	ten	people	
on	the	planet	are	expected	to	be	living	in	cities.	
Since	the	1960s,	most	of	the	population	growth	in	the	
Arctic	has	occurred	in	urban	centres	tied	to	industrial	ac-
tivities,	social	services	and	public	administration.	More	
recently	however,	since	the	early	1990s	in	fact,	there	has	
also	been	a	marked	change	in	this	pattern	of	human	con-
centration.	As	indicated	in	MAP	1,	growth	in	total	popu-
lation	has	slowed	in	North	America	and	Greenland,	and	
population	has	declined	across	Arctic	Fennoscandia	and	
particularly	 in	Russia.	The	concentration	of	population	
to	urban	settings	has	however	continued,	as	illustrated	
by	 the	 colours	 on	 the	map.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 settlement	
structure	in	a	“step-by-step”	process	we	have	seen	peo-
ple	gravitate	towards	ever	larger	places.	Differences	are	
marked,	however,	with	major	parts	of	the	population	liv-
ing	in	settlements	above	50,000	inhabitants	in	several	of	
The map provides an overview of all 
settlements in the Arctic, with a focus 
on population change during the period 
1990–2010. All settlements with less 
5,000 inhabitants are shown as dots 
while settlements with 5,000 or more 
inhabitants are shown as circles with 
an area equivalent to the population 
number. The colours indicate the chang-
es, with yellow showing places where 
no changes have taken place, while red 
indicates those places with a declining 
population, and blue places with a popu-
lation increase. The insert shows a map 
of the northern part of Scandinavia (plus 
Finland and the Kola Peninsula) where 
the settlement density is highest. 
 The map highlights the complex 
nature of the pattern of change and, in 
addition, that there is a marked divide 
between regions. 
Most of the smaller places in Fennos-
candia and Russia have been declining 
markedly in size while a substantial 
number of the larger places have also 
suffered the same fate. Changes in the 
demographic parameters especially in 
terms of declining birth rates have been 
a major factor here though out-migra-
tion from smaller to larger places, and 
continued migration out of the region as 
a whole have also been important here.
 The places which have experienced 
major growth in Fennoscandia and NW 
Russia are places where educational 
opportunities are available. Similar 
patterns are shown in the North Atlantic 
region where Thorshavn, Nuuk, Sisimiut 
and Thorshavn have been the big receiv-
ers, while most of the smaller places 
have experienced a decline.
In the Western part of the Arctic a few 
of the smaller places and most of the 
larger places have experienced popula-
tion growth while the remainder of 
smaller places have experienced either 
moderate growth or decline. There are 
differences in the reasons for growth. In 
Alaska in-migration is an important fac-
tor, just as the still relatively high birth 
rates contribute to growth in even the 
smaller settlements in spite of the fact 
that out-migration plays an important 
role here also. A similar situation is 
experienced in the Canadian territories, 
although with a different weight on the 
various parameters involved; Yukon 
and NWT with in-migration contributing 
while high birth rates remain important 
for Nunavut, Nunavik and Labrador.
MAP 1: POPULATION CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC SETTLEMENTS IN 1990–2010
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the	Nordic	Countries,	north-western	Russia	and	Alaska,	
while	still	essentially	rural	populations	predominate	in	
Eastern	 Russia,	 the	 Faroe	 Islands,	 Greenland	 and	 the	
Eastern	 Arctic	 regions	 of	 North	 America,	 as	 shown	 in	
Map	2.	The	latter	map,	however,	uses	5,000	inhabitants	
as	the	dividing	line	between	urban	and	rural	places.	In	
reality	the	larger	segments	of	the	population	in	the	these	
regions	are	however	clearly	to	be	found	in	urban	settle-
ments	according	to	the	available	national	classifications.	
Although	 the	 indigenous	 population	 has	 grown	 at	 a	
rate	of	about	1.5%	annually,	its	share	of	total	population	
has	declined.	Consequently,	indigenous	peoples	have	be-
come	ethnic	minorities	in	all	Arctic	regional	government	
jurisdictions	 except	Greenland	and	portions	of	Canada	
(Nunavut	and	the	Northwest	Territories—NWT).	It	is	ex-
pected,	however,	that	non-indigenous	population	growth	
in	NWT	could	soon	make	indigenous	peoples	a	minority	
there,	 too,	probably	within	a	decade	or	 so.	And	as	dis-
cussed	in	box	2,	there	are	various	reasons	why	newcom-
ers	may	prefer	to	stay.	Previously	the	choice	of	settlement	
–	urban	or	rural	–	used	to	differ	between	indigenous	and	
non-indigenous	groups,	among	other	things	due	to	differ-
ences	in	the	choice	of	vocation	and	economic	activities.	
The	current	trend	of	concentration	in	urban	settings	has	
now	become	common	for	both	groups,	just	as	economic	
activity	tends	also	to	lead	to	homogenisation.
Urban	life	remains	one	of	 the	distinctive	characteris-
tics	of	Russia’s	 settlement	pattern	 in	 its	 far	north,	with	
nearly	80%	of	the	country’s	northern	population	living	
in	urban	environments.	Other	countries	exhibit	similar	
trends,	often	with	sharp	disparities	by	age	and	gender.	
The	pace	may	differ	in	different	parts	of	the	Arctic,	but	the	
trend	is	the	same!
People	move	for	many	reasons,	often	attracted	by	the	
promise	of	work,	higher	salaries	and	a	better	social	life,	as	
urban	areas	usually	offer	better	opportunities,	a	diversity	
of	economic	activities	and	more	options	for	education	and	
social	networks.	At	the	same	time	cities	are	often	charac-
MAP 2: POPULATION IN CITIES AND RURAL SETTLEMENTS IN 2010
The map provides an overview of the 
role of different settlement sizes in 
the Arctic. The settlements have been 
subdivided in groups of less than 10,000 
inhabitants, 10,000–50,000 inhabitants, 
and more than 50,000 inhabitants, with 
shades of blue indicating these three 
groups. At the same time settlements 
with less than 5,000 inhabitants and 
not defined as a regional centre are 
characterised as rural population. The 
size of the circles is relative to the total 
population in the regions.
 While Alaska, NW Russia, Fennos-
candia and Iceland are characterised by 
cities with more than 50,000 inhabit-
ants constituting a substantial part 
of the total population, the NE part of 
Russia, Canada and the remaining parts 
of the North Atlantic region  have no 
settlements of that size. The highest 
concentration of population in large set-
tlements is in Iceland, followed by the 
Kola Peninsula and Alaska. In the other 
regions with this size of cities the share 
is around 25%. 
 In the regions without larger settle-
ments the share of rural population is 
instead very high. The largest share 
of rural population is in Sakha and 
Nunavik, between 80 and 90%, but it is 
also very high in Nunavut, Greenland, 
the Faroe Islands and Chukotka. These 
regions are instead characterised by a 
relatively large part of the population 
living in rural environments, Sakha with 
around 90% of the population, followed 
by Nunavik with around 80% in such 
circumstances. In Nunavut, Greenland, 
the Faroe Islands and Chukotka the rural 
population constitutes more than 50% 
of the total population according to the 
definition used. 
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terised	by	social	stratification.	While	they	can	be	viewed	
as	 hubs	 in	 the	 economic	 development	 of	 their	 regions	
they	also	potentially	foster	social	inequality.	In	addition,	
worldwide,	cities	consume	two-thirds	of	the	world’s	total	
energy	output	and	produce	over	 70%	of	global	 energy-
related	CO2	emissions.
BOX 1: DEFINING URBAN AREAS
• In Norway a densely populated area is 
a settlement with more than 200 peo-
ple and less than 50 metres between 
the houses. An agglomeration with 
more than 200 people is registered as 
an urban settlement. 
• In Sweden a locality consists of a group 
of buildings normally not more than 
200 metres apart from each other, and 
having at least 200 inhabitants. 
• In Finland all clusters of buildings with 
at least 200 inhabitants where the 
distance between buildings does not 
exceed 200 metres are defined as sta-
tistical localities. In defining localities, 
residential, business, office and other 
buildings used as workplaces are taken 
into account. Administrative regional 
divisions do not influence the definition 
of localities. 
  The problem of determining the 
precise boundary of settlements has 
meant that, since 1989, statistics for 
settlements have not been gener-
ated. Instead municipalities have been 
divided into three categories: 
 – Urban municipalities where at least 
90% of the population lives in urban 
settlements or where the population of 
the largest urban settlement is at least 
15,000. 
 – Semi-urban municipalities have at 
least 60% but less than 90% of the 
population living in urban settlements. 
The population of the largest urban 
settlement is at least 4,000 but less 
than 15,000.
 – Rural municipalities, where less 
than 60% of the population lives in 
urban settlements. The population of 
the largest urban settlement should be 
less than 15,000. Also included in rural 
municipalities are those where at least 
60% but less than 90% lives in urban 
settlements and in which the popula-
tion of the largest settlement is less 
than 4,000.
• In Iceland the Urban nucleus is a town, 
village or other area within a municipal-
ity where inhabitants live in houses 
standing in the vicinity of one another. 
The urban nucleus either has its own 
name or is considered one in the area. 
Urban nuclei with 50 persons or more 
are accounted for. Also urban nuclei 
which previously had 50 persons or 
more or may reach 50 persons in the 
foreseeable future will be included. 
Distinguishing between rural and urban 
The	two	concepts	–	rural	and	urban	–	are	often	used	with-
out	precise	definitions.	In	many	cases	it	is	also	difficult	to	
determine	whether	an	area	could	be	considered	urban	or	
rural.	The	contrasts	of	high	versus	low	population	den-
sity	are	of	course	considered	indicative,	but	what	actually	
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To comply with statistics in the other 
Nordic countries, in 1960, Statistics 
Iceland introduced the notion of the 
degree of urbanisation. Localities with 
200 inhabitants were urban if nothing 
else was specified. 
• Greenland has no clear definition of 
urban versus rural as all people are 
live in settlements of different sizes. 
There is a difference between towns 
and villages, which was based on their 
functions. All municipal centres were 
towns and all other settlements were 
villages, independent of size. Conse-
quently some of the minor towns were 
smaller than the largest villages. After 
the recent municipal reform where the 
previous 18 municipalities have been 
clustered into 4, places which used to 
be characterised as towns have main-
tained their definition in spite of the 
fact that they are no  longer municipal 
centres.
• In Russia, people residing in cities/
towns and urban-type settlements are 
considered to be “urban”. The city/
town/urban-settlement designation 
means that the majority of the popula-
tion is employed in areas other than 
agriculture. The exact definitions vary 
from one federal subject to another.
• Canada consider urban to be continu-
ously build-up areas having a popula-
tion concentration of 1,000 or more and 
a population density of 400 or more per 
square kilometre. To be continuous, 
the built-up area must not have a dis-
continuity exceeding two kilometres. 
Commercial, industrial and institution-
al areas can also be considered urban 
even if they do not meet the population 
and density requirements, including 
railway yards, airports, parks, golf 
courses and cemeteries. Rural areas 
are sparsely populated lands outside 
urban areas, i.e. outside places of  
1,000 people or more, or outside 
places with population densities of 400 
or more people per square kilometre.
• Alaska follows the U.S. Census Bureau 
definition of an urban area as: “Core 
census block groups or blocks that 
have a population density of at least 
1,000 people per square mile (386 per 
square kilometre) and surrounding cen-
sus blocks that have an overall density 
of at least 500 people per square mile 
(193 per square kilometre).”
constitutes	a	high	density	here?	This	very	much	depends	
on	 the	overall	 situation,	and	often	 relates	 to	 the	activi-
ties	taking	place.	Three	types	of	criteria	generally	distin-
guish	between	 rural	 and	urban	 situations:	 the	number	
of	inhabitants;	the	ratio	of	inhabitants	to	open	land;	and	
the	type	of	economic	activity	being	undertaken.	Looking	
more	closely	at	the	pan-Arctic	situation,	however,	a	prob-
lem	 clearly	 emerges	 in	 that	 different	 statistical	 criteria	
for	rural	and	urban	populations	are	in	use.	In	the	Arctic	
countries	various	demographic	criteria	are	used	with	the	
main	definitions	outlined	 in	box	1,	all	according	 to	 the	
national	statistical	offices.
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As	indicated	in	the	definitions	of	urban	versus	rural	ar-
eas	the	settlement	characteristics	in	demographic	terms	
is	the	most	common	approach	used.	in	the	case	of	Russia	
other	issues	also	need	to	be	taken	into	account,	includ-
ing	the	economic	structures	that	characterise	the	place	in	
question.	 In	distinguishing	between	places	 issues	such	
as	cultural	characteristics,	service	functions,	education	
opportunities	and,	last	but	not	least,	the	question	of	dif-
ferences	in	lifestyle,	are	important.
Settlements	depending	on	land	use	activities	related	to	
the	exploitation	of	renewable	resources	and	with	limited	
industrial	activities	may	be	perceived	as	rural.	Contrary	
to	this	the	availability	of	industries,	a	variety	of	services,	
access	to	childcare,	kindergartens,	schools,	medical	in-
stitutions	and	universities	and	research	centres	are	indi-
cators	of	urban	settlements.	
In	 the	 current	 context	 the	notion	of	urban	and	 rural	
seems	 to	be	 changing	 rapidly.	While	 rural	 societies	 of-
ten	are	stereotyped	in	terms	of	their	strong	adherence	to	
farming,	 fishing	 and	hunting,	 and	marked	with	 a	high	
regard	for	 tradition,	 this	may	be	contrasted	with	urban	
areas	often	typified	by	alleged	impersonal	bureaucracy,	
rationalised	 specialisation	 and	 mechanisation,	 at	 the	
same	time	however	they	are	also	characterised	by	indi-
viduals	 involved	 in	 different	 social	 networks,	with	 the	
option	to	choose	between	different	jobs	and	the	ability	to	
enjoy	a	larger	variety	of	cultural	opportunities.	And	this	
is	contrasted	by	the	perception	that	the	rural	perspective	
may	be	bleak	and	without	significant	options	for	choice	
and	individual	behaviour.	
Agricultural,	 hunting	 and	 fishing	 communities	 are	
shrinking	in	terms	of	population	while	their	economic	
and	cultural	relevance	is	slowly	vanishing	(See	box	3).	
In	 many	 instances	 immigrants	 are	 hired	 to	 keep	 the	
fishing	and	agriculture	 industries	alive.	 In	 their	place	
many	new	economic	initiatives	are	developed	based	on	
enclave	arrangements,	for	instance	in	connection	with	
the	establishing	of	mining	and	other	extractive	activi-
ties,	either	with	the	population	staying	for	a	defined	and	
finite	period	of	time,	or	through	on/off	working	arrange-
ments,	generally,	two	weeks	on/	two	weeks	off	(See	box	
2).	In	these	circumstances	the	old	notion	of	“the	rural”	
as	 culturally	 pure	 and	nationally	 original	 quickly	 be-
comes	obsolete.	At	the	same	time	economic	rationality	
and	 the	 “technologisation”	 of	 the	 human	 condition;	
international	 pop-culture,	 mass	 media,	 the	 Internet;	
genetic	technologies	increases.	The	transition	from	ur-
ban	to	rural	is	not	abrupt,	but	gradual	(the	rural-urban	
fringe).	And	while	the	above	criteria	may	be	helpful	in	
order	to	separate	distinct	urban	and	rural	societies,	they	
are	not	sufficient	for	societies	in	the	rural-urban	fringe,	
just	as	increased	mobility	and	access	to	communication	
adds	to	creating	more	equal	characteristics	of	lives	in	ur-
ban	and	rural	settings.	This,	for	instance,	applies	to	so-
cieties	where	we	both	have	people	making	a	living	from	
traditional	rural	occupations	and	people	commuting	to	
jobs	in	urban	areas.
Another	 example	 is	 societies	 which	 due	 to	 centrali-
sation	 and	 urbanisation	 processes	 have	 experienced	
growth,	with	 a	 corresponding	 expansion	 in	 labour	 op-
portunities	due	to	the	expansion	and	decentralisation	of	
some	public	services	and	institutions,	which	in	turn	has	
led	to	a	strengthening	of	local	trade	and	industries.	Here	
we	can	 talk	of	ongoing	urbanisation	processes	 in	 rural	
societies.	
Iceland,	and	the	Arctic	fringe	of	Norway,	Sweden	and	
Finland	 as	well	 as	 parts	 of	Alaska	 and	western	Russia	
may	 be	 characterised	 as	 rural	 regions	with	 urban	 and	
rural-urban	 enclaves.	 Accessibility	 and	 interaction	 are	
keywords	 in	 this	 connection	while	 the	notion	of	urban	
fringe	areas	is	also	central.	
In	other	parts	of	the	Arctic	–	for	instance	parts	of	Rus-
sia	and	Alaska,	Canada,	and	Greenland	–	the	settlements	
are	more	or	 less	 islands,	year	 round	only	accessible	by	
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The settlement of Fermont in North-
ern Quebec is a place named after the 
economic activity, namely the mining of 
iron. Created initially by a mining com-
pany to house its employees, Fermont 
is very special due to the main building 
– the wall-screen – built to protect the 
town from the northern winds. Actually, 
the building is more than one mile long. 
Protected by the large  construction one 
finds a whole village for 1,600 employ-
ees and their families, swimming pool, 
school, restaurants, sports facilities 
etc. Basically it permits residents to 
live most of their 7-month winter life 
indoors. The designers of Fermont 
were inspired by similar projects in 
Svappavaara iron ore mining town by 
architect Ralph Erskine, close to Kiruna 
in Sweden. 
	 Québec	Cartier	Mining	Company was 
founded in 1957 with their first open 
pit mine at Lac Jeanine. To accom-
modate the workers and their families 
they established the town of Gagnon in 
1963. In 1973, they started operating in 
Mont Wright, Quebec, where they built 
Fermont. It is located 25 kilometres east 
of the mine. The company also has op-
erations at Port Cartier. The two places 
– one in inland Quebec, and the other on 
the north shore of the Saint Lawrence 
River – are connected by one of the big-
gest private railroads in Canada, the 400 
km Cartier Railway. 
 In the 1980s Gagnon was closed, 
the mine no longer profitable, and 
the population moved to Fermont and 
Port-Cartier. A similar development was 
supposed to take place in Fermont. The 
original plans showed an expected clo-
sure in the late 1990s with the popula-
tion to be resettled. Objections from the 
inhabitants, however, created second 
thoughts among the administrators! In 
2006,  ArcelorMittal (the world›s largest 
steel maker) purchased Quebec	Cartier	
Mines and decided to maintain the iron 
activities.
 Fermont has, due to its very special 
construction, become an attraction in 
itself as indicated on the advertisement 
below:
 “ArcelorMittal	Mines	Canada (Mine 
de Mont-Wright) Fermont, Region: Du-
plessis; Category: Industrial tour. This 
mining company invites you to explore 
the fascinating world of the Mont-
Wright mine, the largest open-pit mine 
in Québec. Discover the secrets of iron 
ore extraction and the concentration 
process and see up close the mechanical 
giants used to survey the deposit and 
experience an amazing outdoor adven-
ture!”  (http://members.virtualtourist.
com/m/p/m/f4bbe/)
BOX 2: WHEN PEOPLE DON’T WANT TO LEAVE 
megatrends
30
Kangeq is a former settlement in the 
Sermersooq municipality in south 
western Greenland. It has, on-and-off, 
been inhabited based on the availability 
of hunting resources. At the beginning of 
the 20th century it was established as a 
fishing village, but abandoned in the late 
1960s. The reason was to a large extent 
connected to the expansion of com-
mercial fisheries and the establishment 
of the fishing industry in the nearby 
town of Nuuk. It was an example of the 
first wave of urbanisation in Greenland, 
based on the colonial governments’ 
intention to modernise the economy 
and the housing conditions. Most of 
the houses in Kangeq are still standing. 
Some of them have been renovated and 
serve as leisure-houses for some of the 
inhabitants in Nuuk. Through this the 
once abandoned village of Kangeq may 
be in the process of being revitalised.
The village of Qoornoq further into the 
fjord area around Nuuk is another such 
example. The village was established 
in the 19th century and expanded with 
the thriving cod stock after the warming 
period took off in the 1920s. The village 
was formally abandoned in 1971, but al-
ready in 1972 the place was made into a 
summer settlement with houses to rent. 
In this way the houses were maintained. 
The organisation “Qoorngoq’s Friends” 
was established in 1991 with the goal 
of restoring and maintaining the houses 
worthy of preservation. Qoornoq church 
had had most of its interior removed 
when the building was abandoned, 
and was not being maintained until the 
Municipality of Nuuk gave permission to 
restore it in 1993. 
BOX 3: ABANDONED AND RESTORED VILLAGES
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airplane	or	boat	thus	generating	an	altogether	different	
notion	of	rural	versus	urban	attributes.
Consequences of urbanisation
Even	if	definitions	of	what	is	and	what	is	not	“urban”	dif-
fer	from	one	country	to	another	the	interpretation	of	what	
the	designation	urban	implies	remains	quite	similar.	It	is	
clear	that	urbanisation	entails	a	complex	set	of	process-
es,	not	only	in	where	people	live	and	what	they	produce,	
but	in	who	they	are,	how	they	live	in	terms	of	economic	
well-being,	political	organisation	and	the	distribution	of	
power,	demographic	structure	(e.g.	 fertility),	and	social	
(and	family)	relations.	All	this	adds	to	the	distinguishing	
characteristics	 separating	 urban	 and	 rural	 lives	 in	 the	
Arctic,	not	as	an	abrupt	change	from	one	day	to	the	next,	
but	evolves	through	a	time	span.	Often	the	changes	in	de-
mographics	are	characterised	as	a	“demographic	transi-
tion”.	A	similar	model	may	be	applied	to	the	differences	in	
demographic	structures	and	urbanisation	in	the	Arctic,	
as	illustrated	in	box	4.	
Families	are	becoming	smaller	as	fertility	rates	decline.	
The	proportion	of	smaller,	non-traditional	households	is	
growing	and	is	transforming	societal	organisations,	the	
role	of	the	family,	demographic	structures,	the	nature	of	
work	and	the	way	lives	are	now	lived.	It	also	redefines	the	
concepts	of	 individual	and	social	 responsibility,	and	 is	
frequently	related	to	a	change	in	the	status	of	the	family,	
and	with	the	proliferation	of	non-traditional	family	forms	
and	new	types	of	households.	
Large	 families	 have	 long	 been	 a	 hallmark	 of	 Arctic	
communities	and	for	decades	the	pattern	prevailed	in	the	
urban	settings.	But	during	the	last	decade	families	have	
become	smaller	quite	quickly,	not	only	because	parents	
have	fewer	children	on	average,	but	also	because	the	ex-
tended	family	typical	of	rural	settings	 is	becoming	less	
common	in	urban	areas.	And	with	the	younger	popula-
tion	moving	 to	 cities	 the	 result	 tends	 to	be	 similar	pat-
terns	in	the	villages.	These	changes	have	been	promoted	
by	many	causes,	including	rising	incomes,	higher	divorce	
rates,	lower	marriage	rates	and	alternative	lifestyles.
And	 in	 the	 urban	 setting	 the	 highest	 propensities	 to	
form	 separate	 households	 are	 to	 be	 found	 within	 two	
principal	groups:	the	young	and	the	elderly.	The	former	
includes	 young	 people	 looking	 for	 education,	 later	 on	
forming	families,	but	seldom	resulting	in	single	parents.	
And	in	the	case	of	the	elderly	separate	households	have	
been	 facilitated	 by	 increased	 longevity	 and	 improved	
health	 and	 social	 benefits	 (See	 again	 box	 4).	While	 in	
previous	generations	–	and	still	in	many	rural	societies	
–	many	of	these	individuals	would	have	shared	accom-
modation,	in	the	Arctic	often	as	part	of	extended	family	
groupings.	 Again,	 however,	 mobility,	 accessibility	 and	
longevity	as	well	as	being	economically	and	socially	ac-
tive	contribute	to	the	new	patterns.
The	result	is	that	average	family	size	is	now	less	than	
four	persons	while	average	household	size	is	fewer	than	
three,	a	pattern	that	resembles	most	of	what	is	character-
ised	as	“the	developed	world”.	Moreover,	due	to	the	out-
migration	of	the	younger	people	from	the	smaller	villages	
to	 the	 towns	 the	 average	 household	 size	 has	 declined	
even	further	in	the	smaller	places.
The	composition	of	families	and	households	influences	
the	changing	well-being	of	the	individuals	in	households	
as	well	as	 the	occupational	status	of	 its	members.	This	
diversity	in	living	arrangements	and	family	composition	
contributes	to	the	linkages	between	living	arrangements	
and	work,	not	least	due	to	changes	in	economic	activity.	
Historically	women	always	had	full-time	jobs	in	pre-ur-
ban	societies	related	not	only	to	maintaining	the	house-
hold	but	also	to	ensuring	the	basic	economic	survival	of	
the	family	such	as	the	preparation	of	skin	for	clothing,	for	
sale,	etc.	With	the	shift	in	the	economy,	often	ascribed	to	
the	urban	situation,	however,	much	of	that	work	became	
marginalised	as	domestic	 (and	unpaid)	work.	And	as	a	
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In recent decades the population struc-
ture in the Arctic has experienced dra-
matic changes. Longer life expectancy, 
reduced birth rates, and the concentra-
tion of the population in larger settle-
ments are among the most important 
changes here. The first three pyramids 
show characteristics from different 
parts of the Arctic, but at the same time 
also different steps in the process the 
Demographic Transition. While the first 
pyramid shows regions with a greater 
percentage of children and a smaller 
percentage of older people, the second 
pyramid indicates the situation where 
a decline in births and an increase in 
the older population shows a transition 
towards the third situation – an age bal-
anced population. While the first pyra-
mids show a situation characterising the 
smaller and more isolated settlements 
with larger families, the last stage is 
a common characteristic of the urban 
population. A high level of outmigration 
of younger people, is illustrated by the 
fourth pyramid
BOX 4: AGEING POPULATION AND CHANGING HOUSEHOLDS
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tions,	a	stable	food	supply	and	increased	access	to	a	wide	
variety	 of	 goods	 combined	with	 a	 decrease	 in	morbid-
ity	and	mortality	from	various	diseases	due	to	improved	
health	services.	At	the	same	time,	however,	the	globali-
sation	of	the	Arctic	economies	has	been	accompanied	by	
improvements	in	the	Arctic	transportation	infrastructure	
which	has	increased	the	general	level	of	vulnerability,	for	
instance,	to	many	infectious	diseases	such	as	influenza,	
SARS	and	multi-drug	 resistant	 tuberculosis.	Also	 envi-
ronmental	pollutants	such	as	mercury	and	other	heavy	
metals,	PCBs,	DDT	and	other	organo-chlorines	and	diox-
ins	which	originate	in	the	mid-latitude	industrial	and	ag-
ricultural	areas	of	the	globe,	are	increasingly	being	con-
centrated	 in	 the	Arctic	as	a	 result	of	atmospheric,	 river	
and	ocean	transport.	
These	substances	appear	in	local	food	sources	being	a	
substantial	part	of	the	diet	in	rural	areas.	
As	in	most	of	the	developed	world	also	in	the	Arctic	so-
called	“lifestyle”	health	problems	have	increased.	Add-
ing	to	this	has	been	the	change	from	economies	that	are	
highly	dependent	on	subsistence	hunting	and	gathering	
to	a	more	Western-oriented	diet	as	well	as	smoking,	alco-
hol	and	drug	abuse	associated	with	increases	in	modern	
diseases	 such	 as	 obesity,	 diabetes,	 cardiovascular	 dis-
ease,	and	cancer.	Also	increasing	rates	of	child	abuse,	al-
cohol	abuse,	drug	abuse,	domestic	violence,	suicide	and	
unintentional	 injury	 contribute	 to	unsatisfactory	 living	
conditions,	 especially	 for	 the	 vulnerable	 groups	 of	 the	
population	such	as	women,	children,	and	often	also	the	
elderly.	
As	a	consequence,	life	expectancy	is	lower	and	infant	
mortality	higher	in	the	Arctic	than	in	Western	Europe	and	
North	America,	especially	for	the	Arctic’s	indigenous	res-
idents.	In	recent	decades	modern	lifestyle-related	health	
problems	 have	 however	 been	 met	 –	 especially	 by	 the	
younger	and	wealthier	part	of	the	population	–	with	an	
increased	focus	on	healthier	habits	such	as	consumption	
consequence	the	participation	rate	of	the	population	in	
the	labour	force	has	increased.	
The	decline	 in	average	household	 size	has	 tended	 to	
disperse	the	incomes	of	consuming	units	among	several	
individuals	 instead	 of	 retaining	 them	within	 extended	
family	 groups,	 resulting	 in	 a	 situation	 where	 there	 is	
more	than	one	wage	earner	per	household	–	and	very	of-
ten	more	than	one	wage	earner	needed	in	order	to	ensure	
coverage	of	the	family’s	living	costs.	As	a	consequence	of	
these	changes	in	family	composition	and	in	the	structure	
of	the	labour	market	there	is	now	a	risk	of	deeper	polari-
sation	in	economic	well-being	among	urban	populations,	
for	example	between	households	with	two	or	more	work-
ers	and	those	with	none.
These	labour	market	and	household	changes	are	inter-
related	with	 the	 social	 relations	both	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
community	and	with	shifts	in	domestic	relations	inside	
the	household	and	the	family.	It	is	most	obvious	how	the	
changes	have	impacted	the	lives	of	women,	both	in	rela-
tion	to	the	labour	market,	and	in	their	economic	position	
within	the	family.	Women	have	however	gained	greater	
autonomy	in	terms	of	decision	making,	which	is	perhaps	
among	the	most	important	factors	in	the	present	develop-
ment	of	settlements.	For	many	women,	however,	the	chal-
lenge	 of	 balancing	work,	 domestic	 responsibilities	 and	
the	imperatives	of	everyday	urban	life,	have	increased,	
not	decreased!	It	has	also	been	emphasised	how	the	dis-
persion	of	extended	families	in	contemporary	urbanised	
societies	have	added	to	the	reduction	of	the	level	of	kin-
ship	 support	 systems	 available	 to	 these	women,	 estab-
lishing	 the	need	 for	other	alternatives,	as	 illustrated	 in	
box	5.
Health challenges 
It	is	generally	recognised	that	the	health	of	the	Arctic	pop-
ulations	has	greatly	improved	over	the	last	50	years.	This	
is	 based	on	a	 combination	of	 improved	housing	 condi-
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According to the 2004 General Social 
Survey (GSS) in Canada, residents of the 
territories were three times more likely 
than provincial residents to experience 
violent victimisation such as sexual as-
sault, robbery or physical assault. Police 
reported crime rates in the territories 
to be substantially higher than rates in 
the rest of Canada. Specifically, in 2005, 
crime rates in the North were over four 
times higher than rates in the provinces.
The statistics also clearly show a gender 
divide in experiences with violence. 
Between 1975 and 2004, spousal homi-
cide rates in Nunavut, when calculated 
as a rate per 100,000 couples, were 7.3 
for women and 3.6 for men, the highest 
of all three territories (GSS 2004). Ac-
cording to the Statistics Canada report 
Measuring Violence against Women: 
Statistical Trends 2006, rates of violence 
experienced by women in the three 
territories were 12% compared to 7% in 
the rest of Canada. In order to protect 
the victims of abuse shelters have been 
established in many of the larger towns.
The report also found that:
• Some 54% of aboriginal women report 
the most severe and potentially life 
threatening forms of violence, com-
pared with 37% for non-aboriginal 
women;
• Where the rates of spousal violence 
are much higher in the territories than 
in the rest of Canada, the severity and 
impacts of spousal violence are also 
greater;
• 28% of women in Nunavut are victims 
of spousal violence compared to 7% in 
the provinces;
• Police report higher rates of violent 
crimes in the territories, including 
sexual assaults and spousal homi-
cides;
• Per	capita rates of shelter use are 
much higher in the territories than in 
the provinces, with Nunavut having 
the highest shelter usage: shelter use 
in Nunavut on a single day was a stag-
gering 10 times higher than in any of 
the provinces.
The 2004 Nunavik Inuit Health Survey 
reveals a significant sexual violence 
problem in that region. Some 32% 
of adults stated they were forced or 
had faced attempts to force them to 
perform a sexual act during childhood 
or adolescence, and 20% stated they 
encountered the same problem as an 
adult. Among women, half indicated 
they had been victims of sexual assault 
or the victim of attempted sexual assault 
when they were a minor and one-quarter 
had encountered the same problem as 
an adult. The report adds that “Violence 
against men must not be ignored: 16% 
had encountered this problem when 
they were minors and 13% as adults.”
In the northern Canadian town of Iqaluit, 
women are eight times more likely to be 
victims of domestic violence than the av-
erage of Canada. The following web link 
provides readers with further insight 
into how Arctic women are supporting 
each other at Qimaavaik (Inuktitut for 
“A Place to Run To”) — a safe haven for 
abused women and children. Through 
peer support and counselling, they 
are building self-esteem and healing 
wounded spirits.
http://www.explore.org/videos/player/
arctic-a-place-to-run-to
BOX 5: URBAN SHELTERS
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of	local	and	imported	organic	products	and	reduction	in	
smoking	and	drinking	as	well	as	increases	in	exercise	and	
other	sporting	activities	(see	box	6).
Climate change impact on urban/rural communities
Climate	change	affects	many	Arctic	 rural	communities.	
Even	if	data	is	scarce	we	nevertheless	seem	to	be	witness-
ing	 an	 increasing	 number	 of	 extreme	 weather	 events	
which	 can	 impact	 health	 and	 mortality.	 These	 events	
include	storms,	floods,	and	unexpected	changes	in	tem-
perature.	
A	further	problem,	however,	is	connected	to	the	chang-
es	 in	bacteria	due	 to	changes	 in	 temperature,	 resulting	
in	situations	where	traditional	methods	of	conservation	
in	respect	of	meat	and	fish	may	be	inappropriate.	In	ad-
dition,	the	possibility	of	mutations	in	bacterial	and	viral	
diseases	may	result	in	the	constraining	of	access	to	qual-
ity	water	sources.	This	may	lead,	especially	in	connection	
with	sanitation	failures,	where	changes	in	the	permafrost	
and	through	storm	surges	may	be	responsible	for	damage	
that	eventually	impacts	the	living	environment	including	
the	 traditional	 food	supply	chain,	eventually	 to	greater	
human	exposure	to	such	risks.	Moreover,	there	are	indi-
cations	that	the	projected	warming	may	affect	the	trans-
port,	distribution	and	behaviour	of	contaminants,	which	
may	eventually	lead	to	further	threats	to	the	safety	of	the	
population.	
Rising	 temperatures	 are	 already	 changing	 the	Arctic	
coastline	and	more	drastic	changes	are	expected	to	have	
a	significant	impact	over	the	coming	century,	especially	
in	those	settlements	unprepared	for	such	changes.	It	has	
already	been	recorded	how	reduced	sea	ice	allows	strong-
er	waves	to	form,	increasing	shore	erosion.	This	may	not	
have	been	a	problem	previously	but	thawing	permafrost	
and	 rising	 sea	 levels	 now	 clearly	 entail	 significant	 im-
pacts.	
In	 recent	 years	 the	 impact	 of	 warming	 along	 Arctic	
coastlines	has	been	reported,	bringing	forward	examples	
of	towns	and	industrial	facilities	which	are	already	suf-
fering	severe	damage	and	facing	relocation.	Among	these	
examples	highlighted	by	the	press	are	the	Alaskan	village	
of	Nelson	Lagoon	where	sea	defences	were	built	to	protect	
the	shore	from	storms.	But	with	the	increasing	tempera-
tures	 the	shore	 ice	has	melted	and	 the	protective	walls	
have	 repeatedly	been	destroyed	by	 increasingly	violent	
coastal	storms.	
Similar	 experiences	 can	be	 related	 from	Shishmaref,	
a	village	on	an	 island	off	 the	coast	of	northern	Alaska,	
where	the	rising	temperatures	have	reduced	sea	ice	and	
melted	the	coastal	permafrost.	In	consequence,	the	coast	
has	been	exposed	to	erosion	by	storms	which	have	even-
tually	come	to	threaten	homes,	the	water	system,	and	oth-
er	infrastructure	appliances,	as	well	as	access	to	hunting	
grounds.	
In	 the	Canadian	 town	of	 Tuktoyaktuk,	which	 is	 the	
only	 permanent	 settlement	 on	 the	 low-lying	 Beaufort	
Sea	coast,	erosion	has	threatened	cultural	and	archae-
ological	sites	 just	as	 it	has	 forced	the	abandonment	of	
an	 elementary	 school,	 housing,	 and	 other	 buildings.	
How	bad	 the	situation	may	become	 is	yet	 to	 seen,	but	
as	warming	continues	and	the	rise	in	sea-levels	acceler-
ates,	some	expect	the	place	ultimately	to	become	unin-
habitable.	
And	finally,	at	Varandei,	a	barrier	island	in	the	Pecho-
ra	Sea,	an	oil	storage	facility	has	been	damaged	due	to	
coastal	erosion	which	has	accelerated	recently,	suppos-
edly	due	to	changes	in	climate.	This	has	resulted	in	the	
site	becoming	more	vulnerable	to	storms	and	rising	sea	
levels.	
The	above	examples	illustrate	how	sites	related	to	hu-
man	activity	may	be	more	vulnerable	 to	 the	 impacts	of	
climate	change,	and	would	require	preventive	measures	
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to	be	taken	in	order	to	avoid	damage	that	may	become	life	
threatening	for	the	population.	
While	 smaller	villages	 seldom	have	 the	means	 to	es-
tablish	such	measures,	the	larger	settlements	may	be	in	
a	 better	 position	 in	 relation	 to	 access	 to	 the	 necessary	
means,	 including	 funding.	But	 this	does	not	 take	away	
the	seriousness	of	the	situation	and	the	fact	that	both	ur-
ban	and	rural	lives	are	exposed	to	the	risks	caused	by	a	
changing	climate!
Self-sufficiency and self-reliance have 
been a traditional part of the Arctic food 
supply process. Changes to consumption 
patterns started when the Europeans 
invaded the region. During the 1950s 
and 1960s a much larger variety of food 
products were introduced. In particular, 
the introduction of supermarkets during 
the 1970s had serious consequences for 
consumption patterns. The main items 
available in the supermarkets are in many 
parts of the Arctic only imported food, 
and the abundance and relative variety 
in supply has over time supplanted many 
of the traditional food items. Restrictions 
on the commercialisation of country/local 
food have limited its distribution as well 
as its availability to households that for 
BOX 6: URBAN LIVES WITH OR WITHOUT A LINK TO TRADITIONS
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one reason or another do not take part 
in subsistence activities. In places where 
traditional products have been made 
available in the shopping centres these 
local products have become very popular 
and have replaced imported food prod-
ucts of more limited nutritional quality. 
For instance whale meat hunted in the far 
north by means of the commercial system 
has been made available and valued also 
in villages and larger urban settlements 
further south. In addition the local prod-
ucts are also available in local market-
places or sold outside the supermarkets 
as an important supplement to incomes.  

The demographic 
challenges
megatrends
40
Major	shifts	in	the	demographic	structures	of	the	Arctic	
are	currently	taking	place	and	indeed	have	been	under-
way	 already	 for	 a	 number	 of	 decades.	 Birth	 and	 death	
rates	as	well	as	changes	in	migration	patterns	are	clearly	
influencing	the	development	perspectives	for	many	com-
munities.	Moreover,	the	impact	of	globalisation	on	every-
day	life	simply	adds	to	the	complexity	involved	in	predict-
ing	future	population	trends.	The	combination	of	ongoing	
changes	 in	age	group	dependencies,	which	see	an	ever	
diminishing	number	of	people	 in	 the	active	workforce,	
a	generally	ageing	population,	 and	 the	ever	 increasing	
number	of	qualified	persons	–	especially	women	–	look-
ing	 for	 job	opportunities	 in	 the	non-traditional	 sectors,	
constitutes	 a	 serious	 problem	 for	 many	 communities.	
While	map	3	highlights	the	primary	challenge	–	societal	
ageing	–	map	4	illustrates	the	dynamics	behind	this	phe-
nomenon.	On	the	one	hand	a	general	pattern	of	decline	
in	the	younger	age	groups	can	be	discerned	while	at	the	
same	time	a	marked	increase	in	the	older	age	groups	can	
also	be	seen.	
An	increasing	level	of	interaction	with	labour	markets	
outside	 the	Arctic	has	however	been	developed.	 In	 the	
European	Arctic	male	workers	arrive	from	East	European	
countries	 and	 Poland	 in	 particular.	 In	 Russia,	 Canada	
and	 Alaska	 the	 new	 males	 come	 from	 the	 “south”.	 In	
terms	of	female	workers	the	majority	come	from	Thailand	
and	 Indonesia.	 This	 creates	 a	much	 higher	 level	 of	 di-
versity	in	community	structures.	There	is	also	a	need	for	
management	approaches	able	to	cope	with	more	diverse	
social	situations	including	questions	of	indigenous/non-
indigenous	and	permanent/temporary	inhabitants.
Changes	 in	 demographic	 structures	 worldwide	 are	
among	the	major	forces	influencing	the	restructuring	of	
societies	and	are	among	the	most	important	factors	in	the	
Arctic	context	likely	to	precipitate	change	in	the	coming	
decades.	Some	of	the	factors	were	discussed	in	the	AHDR	
The map shows the share in percentage 
terms of the population above the age 
of 64 years as of 2006, and the colours 
subdivide data into five intervals: the 
lowest interval showing regions where 
this age group is below 5% and the 
highest interval where this age group  
is above 14% of the population. 
 The map illustrates an important 
trend in the Arctic, namely the ageing 
of the population. Due to longer life ex-
pectancy as a consequence of better liv-
ing conditions, improved housing, better 
medical services, improved accessibility 
to hospitals and policlinics, a still larger 
part of the population are moving into 
what is often considered as the pension 
age. The largest share is to be found in 
the Nordic Countries where this process 
of ageing has been part of the political 
agenda for the last decade. In parts of 
NW Russia, for example Krasnoyarsk, 
this process has also been ongoing for 
some years while Nunavik and Labrador 
show levels at the high end of the scale, 
Nunavik above 14% is similar to North-
ern Sweden and Finland.
 A number of regions, however, remain 
at the low end. The lowest level – below 
5% – is to be found in Nunavut and NWT 
in Canada, as well as in the Yamalo 
Nenets region in Russia. Even though 
these low level regions can still be 
found, the general trend of ageing will 
undoubtedly become something of a 
common characteristic for the Arctic in 
the years to come, thus also becoming  
a potentially significant economic chal-
lenge due to the increases in depend-
ency rations, i.e. how many persons 
in an increasingly large group outside 
the labour force should be covered by 
incomes generated by an increasingly 
smaller group of persons in work.
MAP 3: POPULATION OVER 64 YEARS IN THE ARCTIC REGIONS


The demographic challenges
43
(Arctic	Human	Development	Report),	and	in	identifying	
the	social	indicators	(Arctic	Social	Indicators)	that	it	is	im-
portant	to	monitor	in	order	to	get	a	good	idea	of	the	likely	
parameters	of	social	change.	An	important	element	here	
is	the	level	of	infant	mortality,	as	this	helps	illustrate	dif-
ferent	aspects	of	the	ongoing	social	changes	experienced,	
namely,	changes	 in	economic	performance	and	the	 im-
pact	on	reproduction	rates.	
The	paths	which	seem	to	be	being	followed	in	the	Arc-
tic	point	in	the	same	direction,	only	the	speed	of	change	
differs	 depending	 on	where	 the	 regions	 are	 situated	 in	
relation	to	what	is	referred	to	as	the	“demographic	tran-
sition”.	The	net	results	seen	in	the	perspective	of	recent	
decades	 are	 not	 too	 promising,	 as	 indicated	 in	 box	 7	
showing	the	evolution	of	 the	population	during	the	pe-
riod	1990–2010.	Parts	of	the	Arctic	display	a	stable	situa-
MAP 4: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ARCTIC
The map consists of four sub-maps, 
each providing important information in 
relation to the demographic characteris-
tics of the Arctic.
 The upper left corner map show the 
young age dependency ratio, i.e. how 
many persons below the age of 20 are 
there, per person, in the workforce, here 
defined as persons in the age group 
20–64 years. Often a selected dividing 
age between young persons and those 
in the workforce would be 15 years, but 
due to the fact that many young people 
now pursue an education they will be 
dependent on others for a longer time. 
By means of the differences in colour 
five groups are distinguishable. At the 
high end in dark green are those with a 
young age dependency ratio of above 
60, meaning that for each 100 persons 
in the workforce aged between 20 and 
64 there are 60 or more youngsters 
dependent on them.  At the low end the 
ratio is down to 20–30, meaning that the 
group of children and young people is 
very small, primarily due to drastic de-
clines in birth rates witnessed in recent 
decades. 
 As indicated on the map there is a 
clear divide between North America and 
the rest of the Arctic, with only minor ex-
ceptions existing to this general rule. As 
birth rates are still high, and in-migra-
tion to Alaska contributes to the group 
of young persons, the dependency rates 
are still very high. The exception from 
this pattern is Yukon with a dependency 
rate similar to Fennoscandia. In Russia, 
Fennoscandia and Greenland  birth rates 
have declined considerably in recent 
decades, resulting in marked lower 
dependency rates compared to North 
America. Deviations from the pattern 
can be seen in Iceland, parts of Norway, 
and Sakha. 
 The mechanisms behind the dif-
ferences are partly seen on the lower 
left map, showing the evolution of the 
population below 20 years old for the 
period 1991 to 2006. No regions have 
experienced an increase in the relative 
share of this age group, and the highest 
level of decline has taken place in NWT 
with an annual decline of between 4 and 
5%. So the most drastic declines have 
been experienced in some of the regions 
with the highest young age dependency 
rates. The map shows that in spite of the 
current marked differences in depend-
ency rates, the process of change is 
moving in the direction of rather similar 
patterns in the Arctic in this respect. 
The upper right hand map shows the old 
age dependency rates as of 2006. As 
noted previously the numbers indicate 
how many persons above the age of 64 
are dependent on those in the work-
force, i.e. in this case persons from 20 
up to 64 years of age. While most parts 
of the Arctic are in more or less similar 
situations, the Nordic Countries, NW 
Russia and Yukon in particular find 
themselves already in situations with 
rather high dependency ratios. As is 
the case with young age dependencies, 
the process in the Arctic contributes to 
changes moving the Arctic region as 
such much closer to the prevailing situa-
tion in the Nordic countries.
The latter is confirmed by the fourth 
map in the lower right hand corner 
showing the evolution of changes in the 
population aged 65 and above. Contrary 
to the situation with the young age 
group where all regions experienced 
decline, almost all regions are experi-
encing increases here – and for some 
quite high levels of increase – in this age 
group. The only regions with decreases 
are those in Norway. 
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used	in	the	context	of	the	map.	In	regions	where	newer	
data	is	available	the	process	seems	not	only	to	be	continu-
ing	apace	but	basically	it	is	clear	now	that	most	regions	
have	either	a	stable	or	declining	population.
The	Nordic	countries,	including	the	Faroe	Islands	and	
Greenland,	are	clearly	moving	into	the	final	stages	of	the	
process	of	decreasing	mortality,	while	also	witnessing	de-
clining	birth	rates,	leading	to	a	low	natural	reproduction	
tion	–	all	regions	marked	with	yellow	–	which	of	course	
could	be	interpreted	positively.	The	problem	(discussed	
below)	is	however	the	reality	of	an	ageing	population	and	
the	drastic	decline	of	numbers	in	the	younger	age	groups	
which	may	expose	substantial	parts	of	the	Arctic	to	severe	
problems	in	the	future.	Most	of	the	regions	show	a	marked	
decline	 in	population	(in	red)	while	a	 few	marked	with	
blue	show	population	increases	during	the	15	year-period	
BOX 7: NATURAL REPRODUCTION OF POPULATION
As described in the text, changes in 
population size and structure reflect the 
dynamics of births and deaths (together 
defining “natural increase” or decrease), 
and of in- and out-migration (together, “net 
migration”). Many societies experienced 
a demographic transition as they modern-
ised, shifting from an older pattern of high 
birth and death rates; through a transition-
al state with falling death rates, still-high 
birth rates, and hence rapid population 
growth; and ultimately to a modern stable 
state of low death rates and low birth rates. 
The theory of demographic transition is 
however rendered less powerful when we 
look at real places.  For northern places, the 
complications involve high net migration 
– people either pulled in by resource and 
industrial development, or pushed away as 
resources are depleted or better oppor-
tunities open up elsewhere. Differential 
out-migration by women led to skewed 
sex ratios in many northern communities, 
just as out-migration by more ambitious 
or skilled adults, or college-bound young 
people, also limited the prospects for 
future development. Apart from industrial 
megaprojects such as new mines or energy 
development, the flow of migration in the 
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rate	balancing	out	the	net	out-migration.	 In	other	parts	
of	the	Arctic,	for	instance	in	parts	of	Arctic	Canada,	birth	
rates	remain	relatively	high	in	many	places,	leading	to	a	
positive	growth	rate	in	spite	of	a	net	out-migration	while	
in	parts	of	Arctic	Russia	birth	rates	are	so	low	that	this	
alone	gives	the	regions	negative	growth	rates.	Out-migra-
tion	further	amplifies	these	trends.
Changes	in	population	size	and	structure	are	particu-
larly	visible	for	the	communities	of	the	circumpolar	north.	
Many	societies	experienced	a	demographic	transition	as	
they	modernised,	shifting	from	an	older	pattern	of	high	
birth	and	death	rates;	 through	a	 transitional	state	with	
falling	death	rates,	still-high	birth	rates,	and	hence	rapid	
population	 growth;	 and	 ultimately	 to	 a	 modern	 stable	
state	of	low	death	rates	and	low	birth	rates.	
The	notion	of	demographic	transition	however	becomes	
North tends to be out of small places, and 
toward larger communities to the south 
or in regional centres that provide wider 
choices for education, jobs and life. This 
net out-migration flow leads to popula-
tion decline, however, only where natural 
increase is not high enough to offset it. In 
some North American Arctic regions, for 
example, high birth rates lead to popula-
tion increase despite net outmigration. 
So by just looking at average numbers 
for larger geographical units a lot of 
significant information is lost. In order 
to provide further detail, the attached 
map shows the complexity that appears 
when geographic details are added. 
The map takes a circumpolar look at 
recent population trends, based on data 
from the AON-SI project (Hamilton and 
Lammers 2011). Details from Canada in 
particular show the major difference be-
tween places identified as incorporated 
(i.e. urban/urbanised) shown as squares, 
and the un-incorporated (i.e. dispersed 
population not included in one of the 
settle ments) part of the population.
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increasingly	problematic	as	we	turn	our	focus	to	real	plac-
es.	For	northern	places,	 the	complications	 involve	high	
net	migration	–	people	either	pulled	in	by	resource	and	
industrial	 development,	 or	 pushed	 away	 as	 resources	
are	depleted	or	better	opportunities	open	up	elsewhere.	
Population	changes	in	the	small	communities	of	north-
ern	Alaska	are	dominated	by	large	year-to-year	shifts	in	
net	migration.	Renewable	resource-based	regions	of	the	
northern	Atlantic	show	many	examples	of	out-migration	
following	changes	in	stock.	
In	the	case	of	Greenland,	net	in-migration	by	Danes	in	
connection	with	development	plans,	or	 later	periods	of	
out-migration	by	both	Danes	and	Greenlanders,	contrib-
uted	substantially	to	periods	of	growth	or	stability,	while	
natural	increase	maintained	upward	pressure.	Differen-
tial	out-migration	by	women	has	also	resulted	in	skewed	
sex	ratios	in	many	northern	communities.	Out-migration	
by	 more	 ambitious	 or	 skilled	 adults,	 or	 college-bound	
young	people,	also	limits	the	prospects	for	future	devel-
opment.
Apart	 from	 industrial	 mega-projects	 such	 as	 new	
mines	or	energy	infrastructure	developments,	the	flow	
of	migration	in	the	Arctic	north	tends	to	be	out	of	small	
places,	and	toward	larger	communities	to	the	south	or	to	
regional	centres	that	provide	wider	choices	in	terms	of	
education,	employment	and	lifestyle.	This	again	leads	
to	 population	 decline,	 however,	 only	 where	 natural	
increase	is	not	high	enough	to	offset	it.	 In	some	North	
American	Arctic	regions,	for	example,	high	birth	rates	
lead	 to	population	 increase	despite	net	out-migration.	
Whether	population	flow	to	regional	or	administrative	
centres	depopulates	small	places	or	not	it	will	inevitably	
have	a	qualitative	effect	as	source	communities	dispro-
portionately	lose	younger	and	more	ambitious	residents.	
Like	 the	discovery	or	depletion	of	a	mine,	problems	
in	 the	 fisheries	 industry	 have	 broad	 social	 effects	 on	
resource-dependent	northern	communities.	From	1996	
to	 2005,	 the	 North	 Atlantic	 Arc	 (NAArc)	 project	 con-
ducted	 comparative	 research	 on	 adaptive	 strategies	
and	outcomes	among	fishing	communities.	The	NAArc	
project	 results,	 together	with	 research	 by	 others,	 sug-
gest	 a	 number	 of	 theoretical	 propositions	 that	 could	
have	broad	relevance	to	the	study	of	ecological	and	so-
cial	change.	And	besides	the	obvious	role	of	changing	
marine	ecosystems,	migration	and	demographic	change	
as	well	 as	 individual	 and	 community	 adaptations	 are	
among	the	major	factors.
Basic parameters
Three	basic	factors	are	crucial	in	the	demographic	devel-
opment	process:	Fertility,	mortality	and	the	reproduction	
rate.
In	general,	high fertility	is	based	on	a	number	of	socio-
economic	factors,	and	high	birth	rates	often	relate	to	four	
main	factors.	
Firstly,	where	a	relatively	high	proportion	of	the	popu-
lation	is	to	be	found	in	the	most	fertile	age	groups;	this	
used	 to	 be	 clearly	 the	 situation	 in	 Arctic	 Canada	 and	
Greenland,	just	as	it	has	been	the	case	in	the	more	dense-
ly	populated	areas	of	Iceland	and	parts	of	Russia.	Region-
ally	it	is	the	prevailing	situation	in	what	could	be	charac-
terised	as	“the	periphery”,	i.e.	regions	characterised	by	
relative	isolation,	and	a	slower	rate	of	urbanisation.
A	second	important	factor	in	creating	this	situation	is	
the	influx	of	population	in	the	fertile	age	group,	usually	
looking	 for	work	or	 educational	 opportunities.	 Conse-
quently	there	is	a	close	connection	here	to	the	general	
migration	pattern.	Also	here	 the	 regional	centres	 turn	
out	to	be	located	at	the	high	end	of	the	scale,	while	re-
gions	characterised	by	out-migration	show	the	reverse	
pattern.	
A	 third	 factor	 relates	 to	specific	 regional	characteris-
tics	connected	to,	for	instance,	cultural	or	religious	tradi-
tions.	These	situations	are	especially	significant	again	in	
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more	remote	areas	where	local	traditions	are	maintained,	
while	the	processes	of	globalisation	influence	more	cen-
trally	located	places.	
Finally,	a	fourth	factor	 is	 the	process	of	urbanisation	
and	urban	lifestyle	where	there	may	be	lesser	interest	in	
establishing	 larger	 families,	 easier	access	 to,	and	more	
knowledge	of,	contraception	and	abortion.	In	addition	to	
these	four	factors	special	situations	in	some	regions	may	
also	apply,	for	instance,	the	role	of	the	influx	of	a	tempo-
rary	workforce	in	connection	with	the	starting	up	of	large	
new	construction	sites	such	as	power	stations,	mines	and	
large	industrial	plants.
High	mortality	 rates	 are	 generally	 related	 to	 the	 age-
ing	characteristics	of	the	population	thus	high	values	are	
closely	connected	to	municipalities	which	are	stagnating,	
not	necessarily	in	the	economic	sense,	but	in	relation	to	
the	demographic	dynamic.	Stagnation	occurs	for	various	
reasons,	for	instance	low	reproduction	rates	or	in	relation	
to	situations	where	migration	patterns	show	high	levels	of	
out-migration	(of	young	people).	This	pattern	is	increas-
ingly	becoming	the	case	in	many	Arctic	regions.	As	is	the	
situation	with	birth	rates,	the	highest	 level	of	mortality	
rates	are	clearly	 found	 in	 the	more	remote	and	 isolated	
regions.
The	natural	reproduction rate	in	this	connection	(birth	
rate	minus	death	rate)	gives	an	idea	of	the	ability	of	a	re-
gion	to	reproduce	itself	population-wise.	In	this	context	
the	Arctic	 regions	are	generally	positioned	very	differ-
ently	where	the	three	dominant	factors	are:	birth	rates,	
death	 rates,	and	 the	net	 reproduction	 rate.	The	Nordic	
countries	generally	 experience	a	balanced	or	negative	
reproduction	 rate,	 for	 instance	 Finland	 is	 situated	 ex-
actly	on	zero.	The	western	Nordic	regions	however	enjoy	
a	more	positive	result,	with	the	Faroe	Islands	(5.0%),	Ice-
land	(7.5%)	and	Greenland	(8.7%)	showing	reproduction	
rates	in	the	absolutely	highest	positive	part	of	the	Nordic	
range.	
As	noted,	the	eastern	and	the	western	parts	of	the	Arctic	
show	marked	differences.	The	general	trend	in	the	North	
American	part	of	the	region	shows	positive	net	reproduc-
tion	 rates,	 these	 are	 lowest	 in	Yukon,	with	Alaska	 and	
Northwest	Territories	at	intermediate	levels,	while	Nuna-
vut	is	situated	at	the	high	end	of	the	scale.	In	Russia	the	
opposite	situation	is	the	case	where	several	regions	show	
negative	net	reproduction	rates,	for	instance	Murmansk	
Oblast down	to	-1.3	while	other	regions	such	as	Sakha	wit-
ness	the	highest	scores	in	the	Russian	north.	
Even	though	marked	differences	remain	between	the	
regions	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 general	 trend	
across	all	regions	has	been	one	of	decline	in	the	net	re-
production	rate	in	recent	decades,	and	that	the	ongoing	
changes	in	lifestyle,	as	discussed	in	connection	with	the	
process	of	urbanisation,	are	likely	to	deliver	the	situation	
in	most	regions	into	balance.	And	while	positive	natural	
reproduction	has	managed	to	maintain	a	relatively	bal-
anced	situation	for	many	communities	experiencing	net	
out-migration,	this	cannot	be	expected	to	remain	the	situ-
ation	in	the	future.	
	
Age structures
One	of	 the	clearest	general	 social	characteristics	of	 the	
Arctic	region	is	the	relatively	high	proportion	of	children	
and	 young	 people	 it	 contains.	 Several	 regions	 are	 still	
characterised	by	a	population	distribution	with	the	clas-
sic	 pyramid	 or	 cone	 shape	 associated	 with	 developing	
countries	in	the	second	phase	of	demographic	transition.	
Birth	rates	are	still	higher	in	many	parts	of	the	Arctic.	This	
pattern	has	however	undergone	a	number	of	significant	
changes	over	the	last	decade	thus	creating	a	new	situa-
tion!	
While	 in	 several	 regions	 of	 the	 Arctic	 in	 the	 early	
1990s	more	than	15%	of	the	population	was	in	the	age	
groups	below	15	years	today	levels	are	generally	below	
10%	and	decreasing.	In	part	the	explanation	for	this	is	of	
megatrends
48
course	the	general	ageing	of	the	population	in	the	Euro-
pean,	Russian	and	the	North	American	parts	of	the	Arc-
tic.	And	one	of	the	most	important	factors	in	this	proc-
ess	has	been	that	of	urbanisation	and	changes	in	family	
structures	which	see	only	one	to	two	children	instead	of	
the	previous	situation	with	three	or	more	as	the	general	
pattern.
On	the	surface	there	are	very	clear	regional	differences	
in	the	Arctic.	The	average	numbers	from	the	regional	level	
however	hide	the	fact	that	each	of	the	regions	is	charac-
terised	by	 the	existence	of	marked	differences	between	
urban	and	rural	settings.	
In	Greenland,	especially	the	capital	region	which	is	by	
far	the	largest	urban	area,	the	family	structure	is	gener-
ally	rather	similar	to	the	average	for	the	Nordic	countries.	
Marked	differences	however	emerge	 in	 the	eastern	and	
northern	parts	of	Greenland	where	the	young	aged	popu-
lation	is	still	much	higher	than	the	national	average.	Sim-
ilarly,	in	the	Faroe	Islands	the	process	of	de-populating	
several	of	the	rural	areas	has	taken	its	toll	especially	on	
the	young	aged	group	which	has	moved	to	the	capital	re-
gion.	Thus,	contrary	to	Greenland,	the	more	rural	areas	
of	the	Faroes	are	experiencing	a	comparative	reduction	
in	the	young	age	group	where	the	decline	is	most	marked	
in	the	capital	area.
In	Iceland	the	drop	in	the	number	of	young	people	is	
substantial	all	over	the	country,	but	especially	in	the	east-
ern	and	north-western	parts	of	the	country.	The	reason	is	
similar	to	that	in	the	Faroe	Islands,	namely,	the	out-mi-
gration	of	younger	persons,	while	the	older	persons	stay	
behind.	The	young	group	move	to	the	capital	region,	es-
pecially	Reykjavik,	where	a	relative	decline	in	the	young	
group	has	been	registered	as	well,	but	is	not	comparable	
to	the	situation	in	the	more	remote	regions.	
In	Fennoscandia	the	situation	is	characterised	by	many	
years	of	out-migration	by	young	people	while	a	general	
ageing	of	 the	population	has	 led	to	a	 low	proportion	of	
persons	in	the	age	groups	below	20	years.	Attempts	to	try	
to	retain	some	of	them	in	the	region	when	the	situation	
was	first	recognised	back	in	the	1970s	by	establishing	re-
gional	universities	and	colleges	have	however	had	some	
success.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 approach	 has	 not	managed	
to	 fundamentally	address	 the	problem	of	out-migrating	
youth	which	is	once	again	on	the	rise.	Similar	situations	
can	be	witnessed	across	the	rest	of	the	Arctic	where	edu-
cational	opportunities	tend	to	attract	the	youth	elements	
thus	maintaining	birth	rates	and	contributing	to	popula-
tion	reproduction.	
A	key	 issue	 in	 relation	 to	 the	age	 structure	 is	 the	 in-
creasing	ageing	of	the	population.	From	situations	in	the	
early	1990s	where	the	share	of	population	over	64	years	
was	generally	well	below	10%,	and	in	many	regions	was	
substantially	 lower,	 the	 situation	 today	 is	 close	 to	 10%	
and	above.	Also	with	the	old	age	part	of	the	population	
internal	 differences	 within	 regions,	 primarily	 between	
urban	and	rural	areas	emerge.	While	the	younger	part	of	
the	population	is	more	mobile	an	increasing	proportion	
of	the	workforce	is	now	concentrated	in	the	larger	settle-
ments,	providing	a	situation	where	the	share	of	 the	old	
age	group	is	on	the	decline	in	urban	areas	and	on	the	rise	
in	rural	ones.	The	situation	in	the	Faroe	Islands	in	many	
ways	provides	a	model	for	this	process,	illustrating	a	clear	
pattern	of	ageing	in	the	remote	and	rural	regions,	while	
the	capital	region	has	maintained	a	relatively	low	level	of	
older	age	groups	due	to	the	high	in-migration	of	younger	
persons.
In	Greenland	the	ageing	process	is	of	course	also	ongo-
ing,	but	here	the	option	of	better	old	age	services	in	the	
larger	 settlements	where	 their	 children	 and	 grandchil-
dren	have	settled	becomes	a	reason	for	moving.	Another	
reason	 is	 the	out-migration	of	older	people	 to	Denmark	
which	generally	reduces	the	size	of	the	older	age	group	
as	on	retiring	many	Greenlanders	simply	chose	to	move	
to	Denmark	where	their	children	and	grandchildren	live.
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Dependency and gender
Instances	 of	 high	 young	 age	 dependency	 reflect	 two	
very	different	 situations.	On	 the	one	hand	we	have	 the	
situation	of	stagnating	or	declining	regions	where	high	
birth	 rates	 in	 combination	with	 the	high	 out-migration	
of	 younger	 persons	 seeking	 educational	 opportunities	
show	a	relatively	high	number	of	children,	and	thereby	a	
high	dependency	rate.	In	some	situations	the	children	are	
left	behind	with	their	grandparents	while	their	parents	–	
sometimes	single	mothers	–	look	for	better	opportunities	
in	another	 region.	Often	 the	children	are	only	 reunited	
with	their	parents	when	they	have	settled	with	jobs,	hous-
ing	and	suitable	social	conditions.	
On	the	other	hand	a	high	young	age	dependency	rate	
also	 includes	 regions	 with	 high	 in-migration	 of	 young	
parents	 and	 their	 children	 to	 regions	 undergoing	 eco-
nomic	 expansion.	As	already	noted	 the	 limited	 change	
in	Greenland	has	 less	 to	do	with	 stagnation	 in	 old	 age	
characteristics	and	rather	more	to	do	with	out-migration	
as	a	strategy	for	many	older	persons,	eventually	leading	
to	the	maintaining	of	the	dependency	rate.	The	situation	
in	Iceland	has	for	many	years	been	more	or	less	the	oppo-
site,	namely,	an	influx	of	young	Icelanders	which	to	some	
extent	has	compensated	for	the	general	ageing	pattern	in	
the	country.
One	of	the	most	striking	features	of	most	peripheral	
and	semi-peripheral	regions	in	the	Arctic	is	the	deficit	of	
women,	both	in	balanced	or	declining	population,	pri-
marily	due	to	out-migration,	and	further	the	very	high	
proportion	of	women	with	a	higher	education	(See	box	
9	 for	 further	 explanations	 and	 trends).	 Northern	 and	
rural	areas	are	dominated	by	a	medium	to	high	deficit	
of	women,	while	those	municipalities	with	a	surplus	of	
women	are	predominantly	 to	be	 found	 in	urban	areas	
and	in	the	more	densely	populated	areas.	The	very	ex-
treme	female	deficit	areas	are	usually	those	connected	
to	highly	specialised	male	activities,	previously	fisher-
ies,	agriculture,	forestry	and	mining,	but	also	military	
installations.	
These	marked	regional	gender	differences	have	been	
a	characteristic	of	 the	region	for	several	decades,	but	
have	 evolved	 further	 over	 the	 last	 10–15	 years,	 char-
acterised	 by	 an	 out-migration	 of	 women	 especially	
from	rural	areas.	Among	the	consequences	of	this	is	a	
situation	where	women	have	become	dominant	 in	re-
lation	 to	high	and	higher	 education,	 a	pattern	which	
has	emerged	in	most	of	 the	developed	countries,	and	
relates	 to	 some	 general	 tendencies	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
gendered	division	of	labour.	
Comparative	 research	 from	a	number	of	northern	 re-
gions	(Alaska,	Greenland,	the	Faroe	Islands,	Newfound-
land	 and	 Iceland)	 seems	 to	 indicate	 very	 similar	 pat-
terns	 regarding	 affinity	 to	 rural	 community	 life.	 Some	
details	regarding	these	differences	are	discussed	in	box	
9.	Compared	to	males,	more	females	consider,	and	also	
eventually	tend,	to	migrate	permanently	away	from	their	
home	community	and	region,	primarily	to	look	for	job	op-
portunities	which	better	fit	their	qualifications	and	thus	
provide	opportunities	outside	those	traditional	economic	
activities	in	these	communities.	
This	 is	 not,	 however,	 only	 a	 “northern”	 issue.	 Even	
though	the	processes	of	globalisation	have	different	ef-
fects	on	various	rural	areas	a	general	pattern	has	emerged	
in	the	context	of	the	restructuring	and	decline	of	the	ag-
riculture	sector,	the	growth	of	the	service	sector	and	an	
increasing	emphasis	on	technology.	These	economic	and	
social	changes	fundamentally	affect	women.
Rural	 areas	 experience	 marked	 demographic,	 social	
and	cultural	changes,	and	as	the	process	of	change	in	the	
dependency	 structures	becomes	more	evident	 through-
out	the	Arctic,	affecting	rural	areas	 in	particular,	areas	
where	women	predominate	as	 the	providers	of	primary	
care	 for	 children	and	other	dependent	people.	 In	addi-
tion,	women	tend	to	experience	negative	short-term	and	
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long-term	consequences	in	terms	of	careers,	earnings	and	
pensions,	and	this	has	significant	consequences	for	mi-
gration	patterns.
All	these	changes	contribute	to	the	continuing	out-mi-
gration	of	young	and	well-trained	persons	from	regions	
which	 are	 predominantly	 rural.	 As	 a	 majority	 among	
those	who	leave	are	women,	this	creates	profound	nega-
tive	effects	on	the	social	life	of	that	rural	area	and	on	the	
The process of urbanisation in the Arctic 
has resulted in a situation where the 
traditional gender based division of 
labour has begun to disappear and has 
been replaced by a situation where the 
social and economic role of individuals 
increasingly becomes determined by 
individual interest and qualification.
As a consequence more females tend 
to migrate permanently away from 
their home community and region. 
Gender-based differences in choice are 
nothing new in the Arctic. In connection 
with large scale resource development 
projects, young and middle-aged males 
in search of work have chosen to become 
migrant workers, leaving their commu-
nities for a shorter or longer period of 
time. Seldom, however, have they left 
the community permanently. Only if the 
job turned out to be of a more perma-
nent character, or generated substantial 
incomes, did they arrange with their 
families to follow them and settle in the 
new town or village. Females, however, 
seem to migrate more permanently away 
from the North. 
 The accompanying map show the 
ratio of women to men in percent of the 
national average. So the map does not 
necessarily show whether, in absolute 
numbers, there are more or less men or 
women in the regions, but rather to what 
extent the differences in numbers devi-
ate from the national averages. 
BOX 8: THE GENDER IMBALANCE
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rural	economy	for	instance	though	opportunities	for	mar-
riage,	 the	maintenance	 of	 family	 life	 and	 family	 struc-
tures,	while	it	also	has	a	significant	influence	on	various	
other	 cultural	 activities.	 Furthermore,	 it	 contributes	 to	
the	 deterioration	 of	 the	 institutions	 of	 the	 social	 infra-
structure	and	to	the	decline	of	services	of	public	interest,	
eventually	leading	to	a	loss	of	population	and	to	observ-
 At the provincial level most provinces 
and territories in Canada have an excess 
of males. The exceptions, however, are 
Yukon with a ratio females/males of 0.99, 
Alberta 0.98 (due to the oil industry), 
with NWT  down to 0.97, and Nunavut at 
0.96. All figures are from the 2006 Census 
(Statistics Canada 2006). 
 The 2006 census data from Alaska 
(Alaska Department of Labour and 
Workforce Development), gives Juneau a 
females/males ratio of 1.00, Anchorage 
0.98, and Fairbanks a ratio of 0.94. The 
average for Alaska is 0.95, but several 
boroughs and census areas are sub-
stantially lower, such as Haines (0.93), 
Valdez-Cordova (0.89), Kodiak Island and 
North Slope (0.93), Bristol Bay (0.85) 
and the Aleutians (0.51 and 0.55 for East 
and West respectively). Some of the low 
figures have to do with the presence of 
military bases etc. In Greenland, it is only 
the larger towns, including the capital 
Nuuk, which are close to an even gender 
distribution. Smaller towns typically have 
a female deficit of around 20%.  In the 
villages two out of three have a deficit of 
women exceeding 20%. In fact several 
villages show a female deficit exceeding 
40% or more.  
 The Second World War continues to 
have a remarkable impact on the popula-
tion structure of Russia. In 1950 six out of 
10 persons were females, and even today 
females are still 54% of the population, 
compared, for instance, to the Nordic 
countries (DK: 50.5%, FI: 51.1%, Isl: 
49.8%, NO: 50.4%, SW: 50.4%) and 
North America (Canada: 50.5%, USA: 
50.8%). Moreover, in the Russian North 
the proportion of females is generally  
at a higher level.
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 A Greenland related survey on the 
question of mobility, conducted in 2008, 
revealed substantially different con-
cerns for the future in relation to young 
men and women. Many more women 
than men pointed to education – for 
themselves as well as for their children 
– as the most important reason to move 
to another place. Questions related to 
family and networks were also among 
the major drivers for moving. There are 
far more men than women who point to 
career and jobs as the major reason to 
move. Men are more fixed on the physi-
cal and infrastructural opportunities a 
new living-place has to offer, such as 
public transport, housing etc. The major 
drivers are shown in the table, subdivid-
ed into those preferred by women versus 
those preferred by men. 
BOX 9: WHY STAY? WHY MOVE? WHAT ARE THEY LOOKING FOR?
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ably	lower	fertility	rates	thus	endangering	the	medium	to	
long-term	development	of	these	regions.	
The	relatively	high	number	of	women	employed	in	the	
service	sector	has	been	argued	to	represent	“an	escape	
valve”	away	from	the	traditional	rural	structure	based	on	
agriculture	which	 has	 become	 highly	mechanised	 and	
masculine,	 towards	 a	 new,	more	 diversified	 socio-eco-
nomic	structure	in	which	women	participate	and	receive	
both	a	salary	and	social	protection.	Furthermore,	it	is	also	
stressed	here	 that	women	often	 initiate	 the	diversifica-
tion	of	the	rural	economic	realm	by	creating	businesses,	
thereby	generating	both	income	and	jobs.	
These	 patterns	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 being	 connected	 to	 a	
number	of	gender-related	differences	in	aspirations	and	
approaches	to	change.	Firstly	in	relation	to	the	question	
of	 work	 and	 work-related	 activities	 the	 perception	 of	
customary	male	activities	related	to	renewable	resource	
exploitation	seems	 to	be	“sticky”,	 in	 the	sense	 that	 the	
male	discourse	–	or	perhaps	the	prevailing	discourse	in	
respect	of	males	–	has	difficulty	in	moving	on	from	what	
once	were	key	activities,	but	now	constitutes	only	a	mi-
niscule	percentage	of	the	available	jobs.	Contrary	to	this,	
the	 females	 in	 their	 upbringing	 are	 socialised	 into	 col-
lective	activities,	more	attentive	 to	 the	needs	of	others,	
and	consequently	much	more	open	to	change.	As	a	result,	
they	become	 less	 limited	by	specific	 job	characteristics	
and	less	determined	by	what	are	considered	to	be	“tradi-
tional”	and	“acceptable”	activities.	
To	 use	 an	 analogy,	males	 seem	 to	 be	 socialised	 into	
path-dependency,	creating	difficulties	in	accepting	other	
paths	and	changes,	while	females	tend	to	be	socialised	
into	situations	where	adjustment	and	change	are	required	
leaving	 them	prepared	 to	move	between	 job	 categories	
and	 job	 options.	Only	 jobs	 related	 to	 (new)	 technology	
have	become	status-providing	alternatives	for	males.
Consequently,	 the	 adaptation	 to	 change	 through	 the	
educational	 system	fits	much	better	with	 the	 socialisa-
tion	of	girls,	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	girls	are	constantly	
underrated	and	underrepresented	when	it	comes	to	fill-
ing	high-ranking	positions,	both	in	academia	and	in	ad-
ministrative	affairs.	Finally,	 the	economic	needs	of	 the	
family	and	also	their	greater	need	for	social	recognition	
motivates	women	to	look	for	work	within	the	rural	area,	
which	 creates	 social	 networks	more	 frequently	 than	 in	
larger	urban	centres,	and	when	this	is	not	possible,	the	
only	option	will	be	to	look	for	opportunities	outside	their	
communities	of	origin.	
Gender and education
The	question	of	“better	opportunities”	mentioned	above	
has	a	 lot	 to	do	with	 the	marked	changes	 in	patterns	of	
education	which	have	taken	place	during	the	last	10–15	
years.	Already	in	the	1990s	women	had	become	a	major-
ity	group	in	relation	to	higher	education,	but	by	the	late	
1990s	basically	not	only	the	Nordic	countries	but	most	of	
the	Arctic,	had	moved	towards	this	situation.	In	absolute	
terms	on	the	country	scale	there	is	no	doubt	about	female	
dominance	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 regional	 consequences	 of	
this	development.	The	most	obvious	characteristic	is	that	
there	are	very	few	municipalities	with	a	majority	of	males	
with	 a	 higher	 education	 background,	marked	 in	 green	
on	the	map.	And	in	many	cases	this	has	to	do	with	the	
existence	of	specific	male	activities,	for	instance	in	rela-
tion	to	the	military,	heavy	industry,	resource	extraction,	
or	the	existence	of	a	technical	university	dominating	the	
community.	In	communities	with	a	generally	high	level	of	
persons	with	high	and	higher	education	–	first	of	all	the	
urban	areas	with	one	or	more	higher	education	institu-
tions	–	female	dominance	is	limited	to	a	few	percentage	
points.	The	high	level	of	dominance	appears	in	munici-
palities	 representing	 small	 towns	 and	 other	 urban	 set-
tings.	This	is	the	case	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	it	is	in	these	
same	communities	 that	 the	highest	deficit	 in	respect	of	
women	can	be	seen.
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Education	 is	 a	 key	 component	 in	 the	 drive	 towards	
the	“knowledge	economy”	with	the	pattern	being	quite	
clear;	the	general	level	of	education	is	closely	connected	
to	two	factors,	on	the	one	hand	to	the	population	concen-
tration	offering	qualified	work	opportunities,	and	on	the	
other,	towns	and	cities	offering	higher	education	oppor-
tunities.	These	places	are	“sticky”,	tending	to	be	attrac-
tive	to	industries	relying	on	access	to	a	continuous	sup-
ply	of	qualified	persons.	And	as	women,	as	described	
above,	have	predominant	in	terms	of	medium-high	and	
higher	education	this	also	has	important	regional	con-
sequences.	
It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 the	 tendencies	 towards	 gen-
dered	 regional	 structures	may	 diminish	 over	 time	 and	
that	 the	high	migration	 level	of	women	to	urban	areas,	
which	has	increased	their	involvement	in	jobs	requiring	
this	 level	 of	 qualification,	 may	 eventually	 be	 reversed	
or	at	 least	evened	out.	Developments	over	 the	 last	dec-
ade	have	not	however	given	much	 indication	of	 such	a	
change	 occurring.	And	 in	 reality	 the	 situation	 is	much	
worse	than	that	indicated	by	the	raw	numbers,	as	a	much	
more	marked	deficit	in	most	cases	can	be	found	in	the	age	
group	from	15	to	35	years,	compensated	in	the	regional	av-
erage	through	a	small	surplus	of	women	in	the	age	group	
50	 and	 above.	 The	 important	 age	 group	 which	 should	
secure	reproduction	and	maintain	a	high	 level	of	skills	
and	knowledge	is	diminishing,	while	the	old	age	group	
dependant	on	social	services	and	pensions	is	increasing.	
The	only	exceptions	here	are	the	capital	regions	and	the	
university	towns.	
The	tourism	industry	is	clearly	dominated	by	women,	
and	this	adds	to	the	number	of	jobs	available,	for	instance	
as	tour	guides,	tour	arrangers,	company	managers	etc.,	
which	combines	social	skills,	 language	knowledge	and	
education,	something	characterising	many	of	the	ambi-
tious	women	in	the	mid-	sized	towns	and	communities.	
Many	 of	 the	 more	 routine	 jobs	 such	 as	 servants	 and	
housekeepers	at	the	hotels	and	restaurants	are	however	
increasingly	 being	 taken	 by	 immigrants	 or	 temporary	
workers	from	Asia,	predominantly	from	Thailand	and	the	
Philippines.
Migration
Another	 key	 issue	 –	 and	 probably	 the	 most	 critical	 in	
terms	of	these	ongoing	changes	–	is	that	of	changing	mi-
gration	patterns	and,	in	relation	to	the	viability	of	these	
communities,	the	net	out-migration	rate.	The	groups	rep-
resent	 very	 different	 demographic	 dynamics	 and	 thus	
very	different	development	potentials	as	well	as	marked	
challenges.	A	 few	municipalities	 –	 basically	 the	urban	
ones	–	can	show	a	positive	net	in-migration,	most	of	them	
in	relation	to	either	new	economic	activities	creating	jobs,	
or	educational	opportunities	attracting	youth	segments.	
But	the	general	trend	is	clearly	one	of	out-migration	from	
rural	 areas.	And	 in	general	 the	out-migrants	 are	 either	
younger	people	 looking	for	or	already	possessing	skills	
and	qualifications	relating	to	new	economic	opportuni-
ties,	or	persons	of	working	age	looking	for	jobs.	
Generally,	mobility	in	the	region	is	substantially	higher	
than	the	average	situation	in	the	Nordic	countries.	This	
has	partly	to	do	with	the	limited	level	of	services	avail-
able	in	smaller	communities,	for	instance	access	to	edu-
cational	opportunities	or	 special	medical	 services,	and	
partly	also	to	do	with	accessibility	where	commuting	may	
be	limited	due	to	the	distances	involved	and	the	quality	of	
the	infrastructure.
Global	migration	is	having	an	increasing	influence	on	
the	region	with	a	number	of	groups	emerging	as	key	to	the	
development	process.	Two	groups	–	the	Thais,	predomi-
nantly	females,	and	the	Poles,	predominantly	males	–	are	
discussed	in	Box	10,	and	will	be	an	“issue”	to	which	we	
will	return	later	in	the	book.
The demographic challenges
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The attached graph shows the distri-
bution of the top 10 groups of foreign 
citizens with residential status in the 
North Atlantic region as of January 1. 
2009. In the case of Greenland and the 
Faroe Islands this leaves out the largest 
group of foreigners, namely Danes, as 
all three groups – Danes, Greenlanders, 
and Faroese are registered as being 
Danish citizens. Similarly it leaves out 
Norwegians from the list in the case of 
Svalbard. 
 Two groups are important to empha-
sise here: The East Europeans – Poles, 
former East Germany, Romanians, 
Latvians, Lithuanians and Russians, and 
South East Asians such as Thais and 
Filipinos. 
 From 1998 to 2009 the total number 
of Thai citizens settled in the Nordic far 
north, i.e. Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe 
Islands and Svalbard increased from 356 
to 824. In Norway Thais increased from 
1987 persons in 1998 to 7884 persons 
in 2009. Also in Greenland and Svalbard 
the Thais are the largest groups of per-
sons with foreign citizenship, while they 
are number 4 in the Faroe Islands and 
number 8 in Iceland.
 In Iceland and Norway the Poles 
are by far the largest group of immi-
grants. This is linked to the building 
and construction of larger industrial 
sites in the two countries. In Norway for 
instance with the Snöhvit gas project in 
the Barents Sea, and in Eastern Iceland 
in relation to the construction of the 
new aluminium smelter. Similarly the 
construction of hydropower plants in 
Greenland has attracted workers from 
Poland. 
 Further information on the Thais and 
Poles in the North Atlantic region is 
provided in boxes 26 and 27.
BOX 10: NEWCOMERS

Fundamental changes 
in the nature of Arctic 
economies
megatrends
58
The	future	Arctic	economy	will	probably	be	recognisable	
to	anyone	familiar	with	today’s	Arctic	and	when	looking	
back	on	the	changes	twenty	years	from	now	one	will	prob-
ably	be	able	to	say	that	the	economy	still	portrays	many	
of	these	characteristics	but	now	they	are	simply	more	pro-
nounced	than	ever.
Notwithstanding	 this	 however	 a	 number	 of	 distinct	
changes	 are	 clearly	 discernable.	 The	 major	 trends	 are	
shown	in	Maps	5	and	6,	both	related	to	the	divisions	of	
the	economy	 into	 the	 three	 sectors	 relating	 to	primary,	
secondary	and	tertiary	activities.	While	map	6	shows	the	
changes	 relating	 to	 the	 three	sectors	characterising	 the	
Arctic	regions,	the	fourth	map	shows	how	large	a	segment	
of	 the	working	age	population	 is	actually	active	on	 the	
labour	market.	The	graph	and	colours	on	map	5	show	how	
the	different	regions	are	situated	in	relation	to	economic	
activity.	While	the	primary	and	secondary	sectors	used	
to	be	the	dominant	activities	it	is	obvious	that	the	terti-
ary	sector	is	now	dominant.	No	region	has	less	than	50%	
of	its	working	population	involved	in	the	tertiary	sector	
while	 several	 regions	are	characterised	by	much	 larger	
percentages.	
The	Arctic	economy	contains	three	distinct	but	related	
parts,	 the	 international	 resource	 economy,	 the	 transfer	
economy,	and	the	traditional	economy.	The	international	
economy	serves	worldwide	markets	producing	resources	
The triangle below the map shows the 
colour coding used in the map. Along  
the lower axis the primary sector – hunt-
ing, fishing, and mining – is subdivided 
in percentages from 0 to 40%. The axis 
to the right shows the secondary sec- 
tor – processing, production, construct-
ing – starting from 0 to 30%. And finally 
the axis to the left shows the tertiary 
sector – generation of services such 
as health care, teaching, retail and 
wholesale, administration, etc., but also 
including receivers of services such as 
social benefits, pensions etc. This axis 
shows values from 50 to 100%. The 
division of the axes reflects the fact that 
there are no regions with more than 
40% employed in the primary sector, no 
region with more than 30% employed 
in the secondary sector and no region 
where there are less than 50% em-
ployed/involved in the tertiary sector. 
 The region with the highest employ-
ment in services is Nunavik (88%) 
followed by Nunavut (93%) indicated 
through the red colours. The lowest 
shares are to be found in Krasnoyarsk 
and Archangelsk regions in Russia, both 
at levels around 58%. 
 The secondary sector is rather high in 
several of the Russian regions, indicated 
by the blue colours, but also well repre-
sented in the Swedish and Finnish part 
of Northern Fennoscandia, as well as in 
Iceland and the Faroe Islands. There is a 
marked difference in activities, however, 
as Iceland and the Faroe Islands are 
characterised by high employment in 
fish processing industries, while the 
Russian, Swedish, and Finnish indus-
tries are related to processing of miner-
als, heavy industries and the processing 
of products from the forestry sector. 
The primary sector is again high in sev-
eral Russian regions shown with green 
colours, as it also is in Labrador. This 
relates to mining and energy produc-
tion but forestry is also as an important 
component here. 
 What the map shows is that even 
though many perceive the Arctic to be 
primarily related to hunting and fishing 
the reality is that the economic activities 
carried out in this region are diverse and 
complex. Generally however, almost all 
regions have less than 10% of employ-
ment in primary sector activities; Most 
of the regions have between 10 and 20% 
of employment in relation to the second-
ary sector and all regions have more 
than 50% of their activities connected to 
the tertiary sector. More than half of the 
regions indeed have more than 75% of 
the activities connected to this sector. 
MAP 5: CLASSIFICATION OF THE REGIONS ACCORDING TO THEIR PROPORTIONS IN PERCENTAGE TERMS OF 
EMPLOYEES IN THE THREE MAIN SECTORS, IN 2006
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tional	economy	supports	modern	large	scale,	capital	in-
tensive	production	while	the	traditional	economy	occurs	
in	small	individual	or	family	groups	and	mixes	modern	
and	traditional	methods	of	production.	
The	economy	of	the	circumpolar	north	is	surprisingly	
large.	GDP	for	the	region	was	estimated	to	$225	billion	in	
2003.	This	was	comparable	with	that	of	Malaysia	or	Swit-
zerland.	While	the	Arctic	accounted	for	a	small	share	of	
the	world’s	GDP	at	that	time	–	less	than	one	half	of	one	
percent	–	this	was	more	than	twice	the	region’s	share	of	
the	world’s	population.	
such	as	diamonds,	gold,	zinc,	oil,	natural	gas,	and	fish.	
The	traditional	economy	is	also	centred	on	resource	pro-
duction,	but	here	the	production,	through	fishing,	hunt-
ing,	herding	and	gathering,	is	for	local	consumption.	Fi-
nally,	the	transfer	economy	brings	funds	into	the	region	
from	other	 levels	of	government.	The	 transfer	economy	
supports	services	generate	benefits	and	also	contributes	
to	incomes	of	many	Arctic	dwellers.	
Structure of the economy
The	Arctic	is	a	region	of	economic	contrasts.	The	interna-
The four maps included here provide 
further details in relation to economic 
activity in the Arctic. 
 The top left map shows the proportion 
of employees working in the primary 
sector. Very low percentages are appar-
ent for Nunavut, Nunavik and Yukon, 
while recent developments in relation to 
energy and mineral resources have add-
ed to employment levels in this sector 
in NWT. In most of the other regions of 
the Arctic the primary sector is of some 
importance, with the highest number 
in Labrador (minerals) and the Nenets 
regions (oil and gas). There are impor-
tant differences however which are not 
shown on the maps, namely differences 
between regions where the activities are 
connected to renewable resources such 
as fisheries, for instance in Iceland, the 
Faroe Islands, Norway, Greenland and 
Alaska, and then regions where the ex-
traction of mineral resources and energy 
are the most important activities in this 
sector. 
 The upper right hand map shows 
activities connected to the secondary 
sector where both Russia and the Nordic 
Countries are characterised by high 
values. Once again however the map 
cannot portray the entire situation. Dif-
ferences in resource-based activities ex-
ist, with Norway and Faroe Islands and 
to some extent also Greenland primarily 
engaged in the processing of renewable 
resources while Russia is primarily en-
gaged in industrial activities connected 
to the processing of non-renewable 
resources. Iceland is positioned some-
where in between – a lot of activities 
connected to the processing of fish 
and fish products, but at the same time 
industrial production such as aluminium 
smelters and a few other production 
activities.
 The map in the lower left corner 
shows the activities connected to the 
third sector, i.e. the production and 
consumption of services, including 
public services, schools, health care, 
administration, trade etc., but also 
receivers of social benefits, pensions 
and the like. The North American part 
of the Arctic is characterised by a very 
high level of these activities, except for 
Labrador, where the level is comparable 
to that shown for most parts of Russia. 
 The last map in the lower right hand 
corner shows the labour market partici-
pation in the working age group (20-64 
years) as of 2006. The level is generally 
high indicating that most of the Arctic’s 
inhabitants depend on wage work, 
salaries, unemployment support and 
other types of payments whereby indi-
viduals are registered as being active 
on the labour market. The average level 
is between 80 and 90% of the working 
age group, with Yukon, NWT, Greenland, 
Iceland and the Nenets region having a 
level above 90%.
MAP 6: EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPATION
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The	value	of	 the	 total	northern	economy	output	 is	 in	
fact	even	greater,	since	such	estimates	do	not	include	pro-
duction	in	the	important	traditional	or	subsistence	sector.	
The international resource economy	accounted	for	31%	
of	Arctic	GDP	in	2003.	The	sector	produces	both	renew-
able	and	non-renewable	resources	primarily	for	export;	
see	e.g.	Box	11	showing	where	 the	major	activities	 take	
place	in	relation	to	energy	and	minerals.	In	terms	of	val-
ue,	petroleum	is	the	North’s	most	important	resource;	in	
2002	over	 16%	of	 the	world’s	petroleum	and	about	one	
quarter	of	the	world’s	natural	gas	were	produced	in	the	
Arctic.	More	 than	 10%	 of	 the	world’s	 supply	 of	 nickel,	
cobalt,	palladium,	apatite	and	platinum	came	from	the	
Arctic.	Production	 in	Canada	and	Russia	accounted	 for	
20%	of	the	world’s	industrial	and	25%	of	the	world’s	gem-
quality	diamonds.
In	2002	the	Arctic	also	produced	over	10%	of	the	world’s	
catch	of	wild	fish	and	over	5%	of	 the	crustacean	catch.	
The	 region	also	has	significant	aquaculture	production	
resources.	
This	northern	resource	economy	is	not	evenly	spread	
across	the	region.	Alaska	and	Russia	accounted	for	over	
three-quarters	of	the	Arctic’s	GDP	in	2003.	The	high	value	
and	significant	production	of	oil	and	gas	in	these	two	are-
as	explains	this	concentration.	In	2003	Russia	accounted	
for	similar	shares	of	the	Arctic’s	GDP	and	population.	All	
areas	of	Alaska	and	Arctic	Russia	did	not	share	natural	
resource	production	evenly.	Almost	half	of	Russia’s	Arc-
tic	production	took	place	 in	only	one	of	 its	 thirteen	cir-
cumpolar	regions.	The	distribution	of	natural	resources,	
the	value	of	these	resources,	past	development	and	infra-
structure	all	explain	the	distribution	of	natural	resource	
production	in	the	Arctic.
The traditional economy	 is	 local	 and	 spread	out.	The	
North’s	 small,	 scattered	 communities	 are	 an	 efficient	
mode	of	production	when	local	natural	resources	are	har-
vested	by	small	local	groups	for	their	own	consumption.	
BOX 11: THE ARCTIC IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
RESOURCE ECONOMY
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The north provides a significant 
share of many of the natural 
resource products used in the 
global economy. In terms of 
value, petroleum is the North’s 
most important resource, and 
already in 2002 more than 16% 
of the world’s petroleum and one 
quarter of the world’s natural 
gas came from the Arctic. More 
than 10% of the world’s produc-
tion of nickel, cobalt, palladium, 
apatite, and platinum is also 
from the Arctic. Production in 
Canada and Russia accounted for 
20% of the world’s industrial and 
25% of the world’s gem-quality 
diamonds. In 2002 the Arctic pro-
duced over 10% of the world’s 
catch of wild fish and over 5% 
of the catch of crustaceans. The 
region also has significant aqua-
culture production resources. 
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Small	 communities	 are	 significant	 in	 the	 north.	 It	 has	
been	estimated	that	more	than	80%	of	Arctic	communi-
ties	outside	Russia	had	fewer	than	1,000	people.	
Subsistence	 hunting,	 fishing,	 and	 herding	 provide	
real	 income	 to	northern	communities,	 see	e.g.	Box	12.	
As	 late	 as	 the	mid-1980s	 the	 real	 income	provided	 by	
harvesting	and	trapping	was	more	important	in	the	in-
digenous	communities	of	northern	Canada	than	wages	
through	 employment.	 Even	 though	 the	 situation	 has	
Many economic transactions take place 
outside the formalised economy. Lo-
cal market sales of products and local 
rendering of services are important in the 
Arctic, often facilitated through public 
services. And last, but not least, subsist-
ence still plays a crucial role in the Arctic, 
particularly in small settlements, but not 
confined to such settlements.
 The informal sector, or the informal 
economy, is that part of subsistence ac-
tivity which is sold or exchanged for their 
money value, either on a local market 
or between people, but not registered 
by the formal authorities such as the 
taxation-authorities. It is somewhere in 
between subsistence, i.e. hunting and 
fishing for own or family survival, and 
the formal economy where products from 
hunting and fishing are sold to registered 
and registering authorities. 
 The informal sector can be seen as cre-
ating a linkage between the two sectors 
and reflecting that the traditional distinc-
tions between subsistence and cash-
based economic sectors are more or less 
artificial and meaningless, because the 
two sectors are thoroughly inter-woven 
and in Greenland municipality authori-
ties take care of the establishment and 
maintenance of a market place open for 
the sale of products from local hunters 
and fishermen. 
 The local markets – the Kalaalimin-
erniarfik – in Greenland emerged in the 
18th century to meet the needs of the 
employees of the church, the KGH (Royal 
Greenland Trade Company). The local 
markets were used as a kind of leveller, 
evening out differences in access to im-
BOX 12: INFORMAL ECONOMY AND LOCAL FOOD
changed	 considerably	 since	 the	 1980s,	 the	 traditional	
economy	is	still	important,	in	particular	for	the	produc-
tion	of	meat.
However,	 the	 overall	 tendency	 for	most	 of	 these	 tra-
ditional	small	communities	is	growing	relative	poverty.	
This	is	why	so	many	of	these	communities	become	“send-
ing”	regions.	More	people	are	moving	out	than	moving	in.	
The	 “transfer”	 economy is	 important	 for	most	Arctic	
communities. These	transfers	are	both	national	and	re-
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ported goods between Greenlandic hunt-
ers and their countrymen working for the 
colonial authorities. The market worked 
as a redistribution channel through which 
hunters were able to get the necessary 
funding to buy European goods, while 
Greenlandic and Danish salaried employ-
ees were able to get access to valued 
country foods and locally produced items 
of clothing and other goods. 
 Without the local market, a clearer 
separation might have developed be-
tween subsistence and the commercial 
activities. Through the local market the 
two systems have been integrated. In ad-
dition, the market serves as a solution for 
many in the Arctic to soften the effects of 
economic crises by providing cash income 
needed in contemporary everyday life. 
gional	 and	 create	 jobs	while	 also	 providing	 service	 in-
comes.	Public	sector	spending	accounted	for	20	to	30%	of	
all	economic	activity	in	most	Arctic	regions,	but	the	real	
numbers	may	be	much	higher	 in	many	places.	 In	areas	
with	little	access	to	natural	resources	this	transfer-sector	
can	account	for	probably	up	45–50%	of	all	economic	ac-
tivity.	
One	of	 the	main	elements	of	 the	 transfer	economy	 is	
welfare	 payments,	 unemployment	 compensation	 and	
pensions.	 In	 addition,	 transfers	 may	 also	 help	 to	 cre-
ate	jobs	in	the	community	directly	through	government	
employment	 or	 indirectly	 by	 subsidising	 private	 devel-
opment.	 Finally,	 transfers	 provide	 goods	 and	 services	
to	people,	schools	etc.,	in	the	form	of	food	assistance	or	
housing.	 In	addition	 to	direct	public	 support,	Coopera-
tives,	as	discussed	in	box	13,	have	been	another	contribu-
tor	to	the	continued	maintenance	of	sparsely	populated	
regions	in	the	Arctic.	
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Renewable resources and Ecological Change
Fisheries,	 especially	modern	 ones,	 generate	 systematic	
changes	 in	 the	 exploited	marine	 ecosystems.	Currently	
the	 percentage	 of	 fully	 exploited	 or	 over-exploited	 fish	
stocks	is	approaching	~80%,	up	from	~60%	in	1970.	The	
removal	 of	 fish	 can	 have	 cumulative	 effects	 on	 whole	
ecosystems,	 reducing	 their	 productivity	 and	ultimately	
changing	 the	 lives	of	 the	people	and	communities	 that	
depend	on	fishing.	Certain	kinds	of	ecological	changes	
appear	widespread:
Reduction	in	the	biomass	of	target	species,	and	of	other	
species	taken	as	bycatch	are	affected	by	benthic	habitat	
disruption,	downward	shifts	in	the	size	distributions	of	
caught	 fish,	 due	both	 to	 the	progressive	 elimination	 of	
older	age	classes,	and	evolutionary	reductions	in	size-at-
age,	and	the	reduction	in	numbers	of	large	predator	spe-
cies,	 leaving	room	for	expansion	by	smaller	and	 lower-
trophic-level	species.
One	 consequence	 sometimes	 seen	 from	 these	 trends	
has	been	to	shift	the	mean	trophic	level	closer	to	primary	
production,	a	process	called	“fishing	down	food	webs”.
Historical	overfishing	events,	in	retrospect,	often	show	
a	characteristic	outline	called	 the	“killer	spike”:	a	 time	
when	the	fishing	industry	became	technologically	capa-
ble	of	catching	all	the	fish,	and	did	so.	The	20th	century	
collapse	of	both	Atlantic	herring	and	cod	fisheries	result-
ed	not	simply	from	overfishing	but	from	the	interaction	
between	overfishing	and	adverse	environmental	change.	
The	herring	 collapse	 in	North	 Iceland	was	precipitated	
by	a	killer	spike	that	coincided	with	a	pulse	of	cold,	low-
salinity	Arctic	water.	Either	one	could	have	drastically	re-
duced	the	resource.	Together	they	ended	it,	with	little	in	
the	way	of	recovery	in	sight	one	human	generation	later.	
The	towns	of	Siglufjörður	in	North	Iceland	and	Neskaup-
staður	in	East	Iceland	experienced	significant	socioeco-
nomic	effects	from	the	collapse	of	herring	stocks	and	the	
later	cod	decline.
A	similar	story	of	major	fisheries	collapse	triggered	by	
the	combination	of	overfishing	and	adverse	environmen-
tal	conditions	involves	Newfoundland’s	Northern	Penin-
sula	and	its	cod	fishing	industry	in	the	Northern	Gulf	of	St.	
Lawrence.	These	North	Atlantic	stories	of	long-term	dis-
aster	emanating	from	the	combination	of	over-aggressive	
fishing	and	climate	variation	should	stand	as	a	warning	
for	future	fisheries	management	in	an	era	of	accelerating	
environmental	change.
Fisheries	 (or	 fisheries	 plus	 climate)	 induced	 changes	
tended	to	undercut	fishing	of	demersal	species	based	on	
large	predators	such	as	cod	and	haddock.	To	adapt,	fisher-
men	target	alternative	species,	which	may	have	increased	
in	either	relative	or	absolute	abundance.	Switching	to	al-
ternative	 species	however	precipitates	 further	 changes.	
Some	alternative	species	are	comparatively	scarce	(e.g.,	
lumpfish),	or	slow-growing	(e.g.,	Greenland	halibut),	and	
hence	less	able	to	withstand	sustained	fishing	pressure.	
Other	 shorter-lived	 species,	 including	 shrimp,	 herring	
and	capelin,	are	periodically	quite	abundant	but	volatile	
and	 subject	 to	 great	 swings	 in	 population.	 In	 addition	
they	 themselves	 are	 food	 for	 the	demersal	 species.	 Re-
ductions	in	biomass,	size	distributions	and	bycatch	spe-
cies	are	thus	the	inevitable	consequences	of	the	change	
in	target	species.
Alternatives	 can	 replace	 the	 value	 lost	 by	declining	
groundfish	resources,	but	in	so	doing	they	often	benefit	
different	groups,	with	different	capitalisation,	licenses	
and	location	–	providing	a	link	here	between	ecosystem	
and	social	system	change.	The	changes	in	the	structure	
of	the	fishing	industry	in	the	Faroe	Islands	(box	14)	show	
some	of	the	current	trends	and	characteristics	of	these	
processes,	 emphasising	 some	 of	 the	 challenges	 faced	
by	 these	 small	 economies.	 Moreover,	 the	 alternatives	
sometimes	 require	 new,	 distant	markets,	 and	 thereby	
increase	the	vulnerability	to	changes	in	foreign	econo-
mies.
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Food flow contributes directly or indi-
rectly to supplying the residents of the 
North. In Canada the cooperative system 
has, until now, played a fundamental 
role in social and economic development 
within Inuit communities. They were 
introduced in the Canadian Arctic by 
officers of the Department of Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada, who saw in the 
cooperatives a culturally adapted way 
to introduce aboriginals to the market’s 
economy. However according to Thibault 
Martin, they did not have the desired 
effect because they did not play the in-
termediary role between traditional and 
modern development models. Indeed, 
Inuit peoples used cooperatives as a 
tool for economic-political emancipation 
and as a means of transmitting recipro-
cal values, inherent to their way of life. 
 The success of Inuit cooperatives 
can be seen in various ways. First that 
individualism and the quest for gains 
were, until recently, notions which were 
not embraced; Second  that there were, 
until recently, few economic opportu-
nities and a lack of capital that could 
have made possible the development of 
private enterprises
 During the last decade however coop-
erative organisations have been losing 
ground because municipalities and 
public institutions such as, for instance, 
the Nunavut Government, Kativik have 
become involved in the creation of jobs 
and in the development of community 
services such as childcare centres, 
leisure activities, technical and health 
services, etc., which, in the past, were 
acquired through informal networks.
 At the same time the will of entrepre-
neurship and leadership which used 
to be essentially involved in coopera-
tives, this spirit now sees them starting 
their own commercial enterprises. 
Aboriginals today create more indus-
tries proportionally than the rest of the 
Canadian population. This is even more 
apparent in the Province of Quebec, 
where aboriginal groups’ signatory of 
political treaties, such as the James Bay 
and Northern Quebec Agreement and 
others, have access to investment funds 
and are now at the head of prosperous 
businesses in various domains, notably 
in the sectors of air transport and tour-
ism.
BOX 13: NEW BUSINESS INITIATIVES
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In recent decades the Faroe Islands have 
experienced a profound socio-economic 
transformation. Growing global competi-
tion combined with over exploitation of 
natural resources, mainly due to over 
capacity, created a structural economic 
crisis in the Faroe Islands similar to that 
experienced in many other Northern and 
Arctic communities based on natural 
resource exploitation, e.g. fisheries. 
 Even though many communities have 
learned to diversify their economies 
BOX 14: DILEMMAS IN SMALL ECONOMIES
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resource exploitation still remains at 
the core of their economic survival. In 
addition, international competition is 
hard, as the Faroe islands know only too 
well having experienced several crises.  
The economy has thus developed from 
small scale activities based on linkages 
between fisheries and on-shore process-
ing, to large scale off-shore activities 
concentrated on very few companies, 
and with the main activities done off-
shore. 
 The most promising potential for 
future development, however, is still to 
be found within fisheries/fish process-
ing, aquaculture, alternative natural 
resource exploitation and finally in the 
oil industry. Thus far the two most im-
portant business sectors in terms of  ex-
ports are fisheries/fish processing and 
aquaculture. But if resource exploitation 
is to remain a core economic activity in 
the future there is a need for fundamen-
tal change. To secure their long term 
survival these communities need to 
restructure their resource exploitation in 
such a way as to meet both the demand 
for profitability in a global economy and 
at the same time attach their economic 
activities to the local community. They 
will not employ as many people as be-
fore, but they will be able to “earn hard 
cash” for the import of necessities and 
they might facilitate other activities/
production via forward and backward 
linkages to suppliers. 
 The options are outlined in the at-
tached table, and the solutions are 
discussed below. 
 A different strategy for solving the 
Faroese import-export dilemma is to 
become less dependent on imports. 
Most imported necessities cannot be 
replaced by domestic products. But one 
of the most important import articles, oil, 
can potentially be reduced. By explor-
ing natural energy forms like water, 
wind, geothermal heat, tidal power etc., 
combined with a general reduction in con-
sumption, the Faroe Islands can reduce 
its consumption of oil by about 10–15% in 
the foreseeable future. In addition its citi-
zens are well-educated and the workforce 
is highly skilled. The infrastructure is 
well developed; the standard of living is 
relatively high with a welfare system very 
similar to the Nordic Welfare Model.
 With a population of less than 50,000 
inhabitants, the Faroese economy is a 
mini-economy with a limited workforce 
and a limited potential for specialisation. 
In a globalised world, with a growing 
international division of labour, speciali-
sation becomes increasingly important 
and global competition becomes harsher. 
This means that the Faroese have to be 
careful about what kind of businesses 
they specialise in. They need to be some-
thing which other (larger) nations cannot 
do better, since they have the advantage 
of size/scale.
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In	the	context	of	future	climate	change	we	can	expect	
northern	Atlantic	or	Pacific	fish	species	to	move	into	the	
Arctic	creating	new	alternative	fisheries	grounds.	Where	
primary	 production	 can	 support	 new	 fisheries,	 these	
would	likely	be	far	from	settlements	with	any	tradition	
of	 fishing,	 accessible	 mostly	 to	 long-distance,	 capital-
intensive	 vessels.	 Northern	 deepwater	 ports	 such	 as	
those	of	northwest	Russia,	northern	Norway	or	Iceland	
would	have	the	most	direct	access	to	new	Arctic	fisheries.	
Because	the	Arctic	Ocean	will	be	a	cold	and	seasonally	
dark	place	even	under	reduced	ice	conditions,	we	could	
assume	that	predatory	fish	species	would	most	likely	be	
slow-growing	and	long-lived,	as	they	are	in	deep	water	
to	the	south.	Such	resources	could	quickly	be	overfished	
beyond	their	capacity	to	reproduce	and	the	risk	of	over-
fishing	 would	 likely	 be	 exacerbated	 by	 jurisdictional	
questions	and	the	industrial	nature	of	fishing	in	Arctic	
waters.
Because	the	fishing	industry	operates	in	complex	envi-
ronments	where	many	things	change	at	once	conflicting	
explanations	can	almost	always	be	proposed	for	a	target	
species’	decline.	Natural	explanations,	such	as	environ-
mental	 factors	 or	 predation	by	marine	mammals,	 have	
political	appeal	because	neither	regime	management	nor	
the	fishing	industry	is	blamed.	Environmental	variation	
and	species	interactions	probably	do	play	roles,	although	
not	necessarily	dominant	ones,	in	many	fisheries	crises.	
The	direct	ecological	effects	of	the	fishing	activities	listed	
above,	 can	 have	 indirect	 consequences	 by	 increasing	
the	 vulnerability	 of	 fish	 populations	 to	 environmental	
change.
This	 last	 point	 is	 important.	 For	 example,	 removing	
most	of	the	large,	older	individuals	(especially,	the	high-
fertility	older	females)	undercut	cod	populations’	natural	
adaptation	 to	 their	 variable	 northern	 Atlantic	 environ-
ments.	Similarly,	removal	of	food	species	makes	ecosys-
tems	less	resilient.	Ecological	change	might	involve	either	
wild	swings	or	regime	shifts	to	a	new	stable	state,	in	the	
worst	case	 trending	toward	one	 in	which	the	dominant	
animals	 are	 Cnidaria	 and	 other	 invertebrates	 without	
economic	value.
Growing	global	competition	combined	with	 the	over-
exploitation	of	natural	resources,	mainly	due	to	over-ca-
pacity,	has	created	a	structural	(economic)	crisis	in	many	
Arctic/northern	communities	based	on	natural	resource	
exploitation,	e.g.	fisheries.	Even	though	many	communi-
ties,	e.g.	the	Faroes,	have	learned	to	diversify	their	econ-
omies,	resource	exploitation	still	remains	at	 the	core	of	
their	economic	survival.	
If	 resource	exploitation	 is	 to	 remain	a	core	economic	
activity	in	the	Arctic	however	fundamental	change	is	re-
quired.	To	secure	their	long	term	survival	these	commu-
nities	need	 to	 restructure	 their	 resource	exploitation	 in	
such	a	way	as	to	meet	both	the	demand	for	profitability	in	
a	global	economy	and	at	the	same	time	anchor	economic	
activity	in	the	local	community.	
Another shift in the attraction of the North
Tourism	development	 in	 the	Arctic	mirrors	 the	 general	
trend	towards	the	increasing	popularity	of	nature-based	
tourism	worldwide.	Vast	wilderness	and	seemingly	pris-
tine	areas,	the	feeling	of	solitude	and	sublime	peaceful-
ness	has	an	ever	larger	attraction	value	to	affluent	trav-
ellers.	 Tourism	 is	 in	 itself	 an	 activity	 penetrating	 new	
frontiers.	 In	 the	 worldwide	 geography	 of	 tourism	 and	
travel	 there	 is	a	saying	that	 the	next	 frontiers	are	outer	
space	 (Virgin	 Space	 services),	 sub-sea	 excursions	 and	
the	 polar	 regions	 (particularly	 the	 North).	 Predictions	
of	 future	 growth	 in	 the	Arctic	 tourist	 industry	 indicate	
that	most	categories	will	increase—such	as	large	vessels	
and	land-based	tourism—whereas	only	the	categories	of	
smaller	vessels	(carrying	fewer	than	fifty	passengers)	and	
yachts	respectively	will	remain	consistent	or	increase	just	
slightly.	
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An	 important	 and	 enabling	 factor	here	 besides	more	
demographic	 and	 economic	 aspects	 is	 definitely	 the	
projected	extension	of	the	navigation	season	causing	an	
awareness	 of	 the	 increased	 interest	 in	 growing	marine	
transport	(including	passenger	vessels)	and	access	to	re-
sources.	The	projection	first	widely	disseminated	in	the	
ACIA	report	published	in	2004	where	that	the	season	for	
the	Northern	Sea	Route	was	projected	to	increase	from,	at	
the	time	20–30	days	a	year	to	around	150	days	a	year	in	
2080.	The	minimum	ice	extent	in	2010	indicates	that	the	
acceleration	rate	of	the	ice	melting	has	speeded	up.	
In	recent	decades	tourism	has	become	a	major	industry	
in	some	areas	of	 the	Arctic	 region.	 In	relation	 to	cruise	
tourism	it	is	necessary	to	emphasise	Arctic	destinations	in	
a	global	context,	since	Arctic	and	sub-Arctic	destinations	
are	merely	routes	in	the	itineraries	of	the	cruise	lines.	In	
some	cases	the	passengers	decide	not	to	disembark	but	
stay	in	their	cabins	or	enjoy	amenities	onboard	while	the	
ship	stays	in	port.	The	cruise	vessel	is	itself	a	destination	
and	can	be	in	direct	competition	with	the	land-based	des-
tination,	however	exotic	these	destinations	may	be.	
As	 pointed	 out	 by	 several	 sources	 the	 supply	 of	 rec-
reation	and	shopping	onboard	the	vessels	has	increased	
significantly	in	the	last	decade,	resulting	in	passengers	
staying	and	spending	their	money	onboard	rather	than	
on	 land.	 Other	 studies	 have	 indicated	 that	 cruise	 pas-
sengers	are	to	an	ever-larger	extent	a	more	varied	group	
than	those	of	previous	decades.	In	general,	 the	opposi-
tion	towards	mass	sailing	with	thousands	of	passengers	
on	board	has	grown.	The	people	who	oppose	this	mass	
tourism	 are	 experienced	 cruise	 tourists.	 According	 to	
most	studies	on	cruise	and	passenger	vessel	traffic	in	the	
North,	and	particularly	in	the	Arctic,	a	larger	proportion	
of	passengers	are	travelling	on	what	market	analysts	term	
“niche”	cruises.	These	are	a	combination	of	expedition	
cruises	 based	 on	 the	 Lindblad	model	 and	 include	 ice-
breakers	and	specially	tailored	tours	where	lecturers	and	
libraries	 are	 more	 important	 than	 luxurious	 on-board	
amenities.	The	common	belief	 that	cruise	 liners	are	al-
ways	looking	for	new	destinations	and	new	harbours	is	
true	in	some	respects.	The	cruise	liner	company’s	inter-
ests	lie	in	the	possible	profit	at	the	destination,	the	possi-
ble	cost,	and	the	possible	profit	on	board	before	and	after	
arrival	at	the	harbour.
Along	 with	 increased	 rate	 of	 tourism	 comes	 market	
segmentation,	welcomed	by	most	 tourist	authorities	as	
it	delivers	 increased	diversity	of	 tourist	supply	and	de-
mand	 in	 the	regions.	An	 illustration	of	 the	diversity	of	
tourist	activities	in	“wilderness	areas”	may	be	illustrated	
by	the	“World	Ice	Golf	Championship”	in	Greenland,	sup-
posed	to	be	“the	only	golf	tournament	in	the	World	where	
golfers	play	between	huge	icebergs.”	From	that	perspec-
tive	tourism	will	reinforce	conditions	of	living	in	many	
remote	places	where	development	of	this	sort	 is	 taking	
place	and	complementing	other	more	 traditional	or	 in-
dustrial	activities.	By	that	same	token,	as	long	as	it	is	fo-
cused	on	new	ways	of	promoting	tourism	and	supporting	
sustainability,	it	is	a	positive	development	in	the	Arctic	
economies.	
Another	important	factor	is	the	assessment	of	tourism’s	
contribution	to	social	and	economic	development	related	
to	cultural	continuity.	Many	studies	have	focused	on	the	
transformational	 power	 of	 tourism	 within	 regions	 and	
rural	areas.	This	is	relevant	for	the	Arctic	as	it	is	the	most	
sparsely	populated	and	predominantly	rural	region	of	the	
world.	These	sparsely	populated	destinations,	unlike	the	
variable	capacity	of	cruise	vessels,	can	be	quickly	over-
whelmed	by	mass	tourism.	
The	 small	 communities	 where	 rural	 cultures	 and	
lifestyles,	 including	 subsistence,	 may	 be	 disrupted	 by	
tourism	are	also	the	communities	that	most	lack	job	op-
portunities.	Research	on	small	business	development	in	
Alaska	found	that	small	rural	communities	near	scenic	
areas,	especially	national	parks,	had	a	greater	quantity	
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and	diversity	of	small	business	development	and	commu-
nity	income.	
This	 tension	within	 the	notion	of	 tourism,	providing	
opportunities	 for	community	development	while	simul-
taneously	disrupting	cultural	and	community	cohesion	
and	 environmental	 quality,	 is	 well	 documented.	 Com-
munities	prefer	 tourism	 scenarios	which	 increase	 local	
employment	without	bringing	large	numbers	of	tourists	
into	the	community	but	in	only	a	very	few	cases,	due	to	its	
seasonal	and	conjuncture-sensitive	nature,	has	it	formed	
the	basis	for	community	development.	Most	of	the	people	
concerned	 visited	 areas	 by	 cruise	 passenger	 excursion	
over	the	short	tourism	period;	the	feeling	of	“invasion”	
among	local	inhabitants	is	however	rising.	
What	can,	however,	be	predicted	with	some	certainty	
is	 that	 the	regional	effects	of	 tourism	will	differ	signifi-
cantly	between	areas.	Some	regions	will	experience	no	
additional	 tourist	 activity,	 others	 small	 scale/cultural	
tourism	complementing	activities	in	other	sectors,	while	
will	experience	the	addition	of	year-round	tourism	due	to	
significantly	improved	access	by	sea	and	road,	whereas	
yet	 others	will	 experience	 large	 scale	 tourism,	 coupled	
with	the	increased	risk	of	the	social	and	environmental	
stress	of	natural	habitats,	wildlife	and	communities.
Though	ownership	issues	were	beyond	the	scope	of	this	
study	it	is	worth	noting	that	several	studies	illustrate	its	
importance.	Well	documented	in	a	series	of	 tourism	re-
search	articles,	the	ownership	of	tourism	resources	influ-
ence	residents‘	perceptions	and	attitudes	towards	recrea-
tion	and	the	impacts	of	tourism	development	as	well	as	
visitor	satisfaction.	This	is	critical	knowledge	for	tourism	
developers	and	planners.	Research	on	tourism	develop-
ment	and	neo-colonialism	and	enclave	economies	shows	
the	social	and	cultural	 impacts	of	tourism	asset	owner-
ship	 patterns.	 Many	 studies	 have	 recently	 argued	 that	
tourism	is	a	“hyper-globaliser”	which	if	not	well	managed	
can	pose	a	threat	to	local	resident’s	sense	of	“fate	control”.	
One	of	the	shortcomings	of	prediction	is	the	limited	
knowledge	 of	 tourism’s	 effects	 on	 individual	 regions	
and	 communities.	 Better	 knowledge	 and	 monitoring	
of	 the	 rate	 of	 growth	 or	 decline	 in	 tourism	activity	 is	
therefore	needed.	Furthermore	it	is	necessary	to	gain	an	
overview	of	how	tourism	activities	affect	the	well-being	
of	people	 living	 in	 the	circumpolar	north,	 if	 and	how	
tourism	activities	are	expanding	with	climate	change,	
especially	as	this	pertains	to	the	opening	of	the	north-
ern	sea	route	as	a	result	of	the	loss	of	sea	ice.	In	gaining	
that	overview	it	is	important	also	to	study	the	particu-
larities	of	places.
Determinants, Patterns and Trends
Current	optimism	over	the	future	of	the	Arctic	economy	is	
based	on	three	observations.	First,	the	north	has	always	
been	a	storehouse	for	the	world’s	natural	resources.	We	
have	long	known	that	vast	reserves	of	natural	resources	
lie	under	the	lands	and	off	the	coasts	of	the	earth’s	north-
ern	regions.	According	to	the	USGS	the	Arctic	holds	about	
30%	of	the	world’s	natural	gas,	13%	of	the	worlds’	natural	
gas	liquids	and	approximately	22%	of	the	world’s	conven-
tional	oil.	
The	 potential	 for	 opening	 this	 vast	 storehouse	 of	 re-
sources	has	been	increased	by	the	rapid	rise	in	commod-
ity	prices	 the	world	 is	currently	experiencing.	This	 rise	
stems	 from	the	huge	growth	 in	demand	 from	emerging	
nations	like	China.	
Proposed	resource	development	projects	in	the	Arctic	
include	oil	and	mineral	planning	and	include	a	number	of	
exploration	projects	in	Greenland.	The	potential	for	iron	
ore	projects	in	Canada’s	Nunavut	territory	has	attracted	
the	attention	of	numerous	international	mining	compa-
nies.	British Petroleum’s	recent	joint	venture	with	one	of	
Russia’s	main	energy	firms	was	expressly	to	exploit	po-
tentially	huge	oil	and	gas	deposits	on	the	Russian	Arctic	
shelf.	
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The	final	element	of	Arctic	optimism	reflects	the	pro-
spective	effects	of	global	warming	in	the	Arctic.	Warming	
will	 free	much	of	the	Arctic	of	 ice	and	snow	cover	for	a	
greater	period	of	time	each	year.	It	is	suggested	that	this	
warming	will	allow	ice	free	travel	in	Arctic	seas	and	lower	
the	cost	of	access	and	development	to	the	Arctic’s	resourc-
es.	Access	by	sea	will	allow	lower	cost	delivery	of	supplies	
and	less	expensive	shipment	of	the	resources	to	markets.	
This	optimistic	view	fits	neatly	into	a	major	determin-
ing	relationship	for	future	natural	resource	development	
in	the	Arctic.	While	in	the	past,	some	resource	develop-
ment	occurred	for	strategic	or	national	purposes,	it	is	like-
ly	that	most	Arctic	development	in	the	future	will	have	to	
meet	the	market	test.	The	governments	of	Arctic	nations	
are	unlikely	to	have	the	financial	resources	to	subsidise	
the	high	cost	of	development	in	the	Arctic.	Resources	in	
the	far	north	will	be	developed	for	the	international	re-
source	markets	only	when	market	participants	expect	the	
development	to	be	profitable.	This	relationship	will	deter-
mine	the	future	pattern	of	Arctic	resource	development.	
The	optimistic	view	of	the	future	of	northern	resource	
development	 sees	 the	 predicted	 changes	 in	 resource	
prices	and	costs	as	encouraging	for	development.	Rising	
prices	 and	 falling	 costs	 will	 undoubtedly	 increase	 the	
profitability	of	northern	development.	Recent	changes	in	
the	world	economy	and	the	long	term	forecast	of	global	
change	provide	the	conditions	which	increase	the	prob-
ability	that	known	and	unknown	resource	deposits	will	
be	developed	throughout	the	Arctic.	Unfortunately	for	the	
optimists	there	are	several	reasons	why	it	would	perhaps	
be	prudent	 to	curb	 the	enthusiasm	a	 little	 in	respect	of	
future	Arctic	resource	development.	
The	 first	 is	 that	 the	 effects	 of	 global	warming	 in	 the	
Arctic	 are	not	 always	beneficial	 to	development.	While	
warming	may	open	the	Arctic	seas	for	transportation	and	
the	continental	shelf	for	development,	there	is	evidence	
that	climate	change	may	make	it	more	costly	to	develop	
resources	on	land.	Changes	in	flooding,	permafrost,	and	
snow	cover	will	 increase	the	cost	of	production	even	in	
areas	with	significant	current	resource	activity.	Warming	
may	shorten	the	period	during	which	ice	roads	allow	ex-
ploration	and	development	activity	on	the	tundra.	Moreo-
ver,	the	thawing	ground	may	destabilise	existing	systems	
of	roads	and	pipelines	and	other	industrial	infrastructure	
installations	in	the	north.	This	will	impose	costs	on	ex-
isting	Arctic	activity	as	well	as	 increasing	 future	costs.	
Even	 with	 warming,	 the	 sea	 ice	 will	 be	 unpredictable	
which	adds	an	element	of	risk	to	the	development	of	the	
capital-intensive	investment	required	for	Arctic	resource	
production.
The	second factor	tempering	the	optimism	for	the	fu-
ture	 of	 the	 Arctic	 economy	 is	 that	 the	 recent	 dramatic	
increase	 in	 commodity	prices	 is	not	 likely	 to	 be	 a	 long	
run	trend.	The	world	has	experienced	high	and	rapidly	
increasing	prices	for	periods	in	the	past,	but	over	the	long	
run	most	resource	prices	have	fallen	in	real	terms.	Some	
recent	analyses	have	suggested	that	the	current	period	is	
different	from	the	past	with	some	prices	diverging	from	
previous	 trends.	 Increased	 volatility	 in	 resource	 prices	
and	increases	in	real	oil	prices	are	patterns	that	have	been	
predicted.	The	suggested	cause	here	is	the	recent	indus-
trialisation	of	the	world’s	emerging	economies.	
Historically,	 high	 prices	 for	 any	 resource	 have	 pro-
vided	 the	 incentive	 for	 exploration	 to	 find	more	 of	 the	
high	 price	 resource	 and	 innovation	 to	 find	 technologi-
cal	substitutes	for	the	resource.	The	north	has	seen	new	
technology	replace	existing	northern	production	starting	
with	petroleum	replacing	whales	and	continuing	through	
the	development	of	fish	 farming	as	a	competing	source	
of	northern	fish.	For	Arctic	oil	and	gas	this	includes	the	
development	of	techniques	to	produce	oil	and	gas	from	
unconventional	sources.	These	new	techniques	in	North	
America	have	resulted	in	what	the Economist	magazine	
called	“An	Unconventional	Glut”	describing	the	market	
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for	natural	gas.	The	new	unconventional	gas	may	be	one	
reason	for	the	postponement	of	the	Shtokman	field	devel-
opment	 in	the	Barents	Sea.	Similar	 technology	is	being	
introduced	to	open	up	previously	out	of	reach	oil	in	the	
continental	USA.	
In	addition	to	the	new	technology	high	prices	encour-
age	consumers	to	substitute	the	high	cost	resource	in	con-
sumption.	This	“consumption	effect”	will	be	reinforced	
by	the	policies	of	governments	around	the	world	as	they	
attempt	to	reduce	their	consumption	of	fossil	fuels.	Taxes	
and	restrictions	on	fossil	fuel	use	and	subsidies	to	encour-
age	the	use	of	alternative	energy	sources	will	strengthen	
the	natural	effects	of	the	market.
Together	these	effects	suggest	that	high	and	rising	pric-
es	of	Arctic	resources	may	not	be	a	long	term	phenomena.	
They	are	 likely	 to	 face	 the	 long	 run	pattern	of	 resource	
prices	which	is	declining	real	prices.	Two	further	effects	
of	price	changes	will	limit	Arctic	development.	The	new	
volatility	in	resource	prices	increase	the	risk	and	there-
fore	will	decrease	the	potential	for	investment.	Further-
more	any	long	run	increase	in	resource	prices	is	likely	to	
create	 inflation	 in	 the	 cost	of	producing	 resources.	The	
production	cost	effect	will	work	against	any	lowering	of	
costs	from	global	warming.	In	spite	of	these	conditions,	
new	activities	are	taking	off,	in	some	cases	in	compliance	
with	the	involved	communities,	and	in	others	affected	by	
the	objections	to	new	activities	taking	place,	potentially	
damaging	the	environment	and	living	conditions	in	the	
region.	Box	15	highlights	a	case	where	a	new	activity	is,	
on	one	hand,	embraced	by	one	community,	while	another	
clearly	rejects	it.	
A	third	reason	which	suggests	Arctic	resource	develop-
ment	will	be	more	limited	than	the	optimists	believe	is	the	
fact	that	the	north	remains	a	high	cost	region	of	produc-
tion.	Costs	are	high	because	it	is	far	away,	it	is	empty	and	it	
is	situated	in	a	difficult	environment.	In	most	parts	of	the	
north	development	occurs	on	a	frontier	with	limited	in-
frastructure	and	few	available	workers;	providing	these	
imposes	 large	costs	on	development.	Historically,	 large	
bonanza	scale	resource	deposits,	like	Alaska’s	Prudhoe	
Bay,	were	required	to	open	up	a	region	to	development.	
There	 are	 several	 reasons	 for	 high	 cost	 development	
in	the	Arctic.	They	include	harsh	winters	requiring	spe-
cial	designs,	poor	soil	condition	requiring	additional	site	
preparations;	 potentially	 damaging	 ice	 pack	 in	 Arctic	
seas;	long	supply	lines	which	require	large	inventories	of	
parts;	limited	transport	access;	and	higher	wages	and	sal-
aries	required	to	induce	personnel	to	work	in	the	region.	
Of	these	only	transport	costs	will	be	positively	affected	
by	warming.	Bad	weather	and	variable	conditions	may	
also	result	in	the	delay	of	Arctic	projects.	Extended	and	
uncertain	 schedules	 increase	 the	 cost	 and	 uncertainty	
surrounding	development.	This	potentially	explains	why	
15	oil	and	gas	fields	have	been	discovered	in	the	Arctic	but	
none	have	been	developed.
Previously	a	portion	of	the	costs	were	assumed	by	vari-
ous	public	or	semi-public	organisations.	Public	services	
and	 cooperatives	 remain	 important	 types	 of	 organisa-
tions	in	this	context.	But	increasing	limitations	on	public	
involvement	(see	box	16)	add	to	the	complexity	of	main-
taining	the	same	types	of	services.	These	changes	may	be	
beneficial	in	the	sense	that	they	are	based	on	local	initia-
tives	and	the	building	of	local	capital	that	might	sustain	
some	of	the	impacts	of	global	change.	But	they	also	render	
some	processes	of	change	rather	uncertain.
The	fourth	reason	for,	at	best,	limited	optimism	for	the	
Arctic	economy	is	the	governments	themselves.	Govern-
ment	 can	 affect	 the	 cost	 of	 development	 through	 taxes	
and	 regulation.	This	 is	not	 to	 suggest	 these	are	always	
bad	but	they	do	affect	development	prospects.	A	more	im-
portant	effect	of	government’s	role	in	development	might	
be	limits	to	access.	Access	to	the	North’s	resources	may	be	
impaired	or	denied	by	government	policy.	Environmental	
concerns	and	conflicts	with	other	users	of	the	land	may	
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increase	the	cost	of	development	through	delay	or	remove	
the	resources	from	consideration.	Shell’s	current	attempt	
to	drill	in	the	Arctic	seas	off	Alaska	has	become	costly	be-
cause	of	regulation,	court	fights,	and	government	delays	
which	 have	 increased	 the	 cost	 of	 development.	 Future	
concerns	about	fossil-fuel	dependence	and	global	warm-
The existence of iron-ore in Pajala has 
been known about since 1918. The 
rights to extract it were previously 
owned by LKAB, the Swedish state 
company. Now they have been taken 
over by the private company, North-
land	Resources, which is registered in 
Canada. The largest shareholders are 
however Norwegians. Right now the 
project is in its detailed planning phase 
to start production in Tapuli, Stora Sa-
havaara and Pellivuoma. The confirmed 
findings of iron-ore at the three sites are 
close to 200 million tons, but these are 
just what have already been confirmed.  
The total estimated amount in the field 
often called the Pajala-shield, can reach 
volumes equivalent to what has  been 
produced in Kiruna, i.e. around 1 billion 
tons. 
 The Kolari–Pajala and Sokli mining ar-
eas combined would create a significant 
number of new job opportunities in Lap-
land. The construction phase has been 
estimated to 12,000 man-years. In the 
production phase, the mining projects 
could create over 3,600 permanent jobs. 
Community attitudes towards the 
projects, however, differ considerably. 
While the population in Pajala is very 
enthusiastic about the new possibilities, 
the communities across the border in 
Kolari in Finland display an altogether 
different attitude to the situation. In 
Pajala they have never experienced the 
effects of such large projects, while on 
the Finish side of the border the popula-
tion is more hesitant due to previous 
experiences with similar projects.
BOX 15: NEW MINING ACTIVITIES
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ing	may	result	in	further	restrictions	on	Arctic	develop-
ment.
International	economic	sovereignty	may	also	limit	de-
velopment	if	it	increases	the	uncertainty	facing	develop-
ers.	 A	 number	 of	 countries	 have	 overlapping	 claims	 to	
areas	of	the	Arctic	Ocean.	Boundary	disputes	in	this	new	
frontier	may	also	delay,	 increase	 the	cost,	and	possibly	
even	eliminate	development	opportunities.	
In	addition	the	question	of	alternatives	to	resource	ex-
ploitation	may	be	rather	bleak.	Even	if	the	expansion	of	
the	tertiary	sector	has	been	remarkable	in	some	parts	of	
the	Arctic	(discussed	in	Box	16)	the	content	of	the	activi-
ties	may	very	well	be	meagre.	The	third	sector	is	depend-
ing	 on	 human	 capital	which	 tends	 to	 leave	 the	 region.	
Consequently	there	may	be	troubles	in	finding	the	niches	
where	activities	in	the	Arctic	may	become	in	demand	by	
the	world	market.	Innovation	and	creativity	are	keywords	
in	this	context.	An	idea	of	what	this	may	include	is	dis-
cussed	in	box	17,	using	Russia	as	an	example.	
A	fifth	reason	centres	on	the	questions	of	influence	and	
of	 the	 ownership	 of	 the	 resources	 and/or	 rights	 to	 use	
them.	Most	Arctic	communities/nations	only	have	local	
or	 regional	 authority,	 they	 are	 primarily	 sub-national	
entities,	 and	 they	 are	 parts	 of	 states	 where	 the	major-
ity	of	 the	population	are	non-Arctic	and	whose	 interest	
therefore	might	 not	 always	 correspond	with	 the	 Arctic	
communities/nations	themselves.	Consequently	the	Arc-
tic	communities	have	little	or	no	formal	influence	on	an	
international	scale.	They	are	considered	“non-powers”.	
This	 lack	 of	 influence	 combined	 with	 the	 growing	
international	 interest	 in	 the	Arctic	 from	other	nations,	
both	Arctic	and	non-Arctic,	from	supranational	entities,	
e.g.	EU,	and	from	transnational	corporations	makes	the	
questions	of	influence,	rights	and	ownership	even	more	
important.	If	the	Arctic	communities	are	to	benefit	from	
the	 exploitation	of	non-renewable	 resources	 they	need	
to	address	at	least	two	factors.	First,	they	need	to	secure	
their	own	rights	 in	connection	with	the	exploitation	of	
resources	 in	their	continental	shelf.	Second,	 they	need	
to	come	to	terms	with	and	define	their	own	involvement	
in	their	future	exploitation	(e.g.	should	it	be	royalties	or	
should	they	be	indirectly	or	directly	involved	in	the	ex-
ploitation?
These	 factors	do	not	mean	 that	 resources	will	not	be	
developed.	An	evolving	understanding	of	 the	nature	of	
potential	reserves,	changing	resource	prices,	and	Arctic	
warming	may	in	fact	positively	affect	development.	Nev-
ertheless,	 as	 today	 the	 North’s	 international	 economy	
will	likely	be	dominated	by	resource	production.	
The	resources	that	are	produced	are	most	likely	to	be	
concentrated	 in	 regions	 that	 offer	 low	 cost	 production.	
Existing	 production	 regions	will	 see	 continued	 growth	
since	existing	infrastructure	and	technology	are	availa-
ble	to	lower	the	cost	of	new	projects.	Resource	production	
is	also	likely	to	occur	in	areas	close	to	tidewater	which	re-
duces	transport	costs.	Finally,	areas	in	states	with	low	tax	
rates	and	efficient	regulation	are	also	likely	to	be	regions	
of	potential	development.	
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In many parts of the Arctic government 
jobs are the main source of full-time 
wage employment, providing jobs in the 
health, education, and social services 
sectors. In most cases also infrastruc-
ture, water supply, sewage and energy 
supply are included on the municipal or 
government payroll. The advantage of 
full-time government positions is that 
they provide a substantial injection 
of cash into the community. The map 
shows the role of this tertiary sector in 
the Arctic, with the size of circles show-
ing the absolute number of employees in 
this sector, while the colours illustrate 
the changes from 1991 to 2006, red 
colours showing regions with rela-
tive increases, blue colours indicating 
regions with a relatively balanced situa-
tion, with yesllow colours also showing 
regions with a relatively reduced role for 
the service sector. Most regions have 
experienced increased (11) or balanced 
(5) situations, while a similar number (6) 
have experienced a decline.
 The regions with relative decline are 
NWT and Labrador in North America, 
Chukotka, as well as The Nenets Au-
tonomous Okrug in Russia, and Troms 
and Nordland in Norway. The decline 
is not because the absolute number of 
persons involved in the service sector 
has declined, but rather, because the 
increase in other activities has been of a 
larger magnitude. 
BOX 16: THE SERVICE SECTOR AND THE FUTURE
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BOX 17: THE ROLE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS
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The researcher Alexander Pelyasov has 
emphasised the need for new creativity 
to be developed in the Arctic in order to 
cope with the economic challenges with 
an emphasis on human creativity. For 
many small communities across the Arctic 
the lack of job opportunities has led to 
population decline. There are also exam-
ples of communities, however, where a 
combination of local entrepreneurship, 
engaged political leaders, and govern-
ment initiatives have created more hope-
ful situations, where thriving businesses 
as well as cultural revival gives people a 
meaningful way of life and thus gives the 
community viability. In order to do this, 
those creative persons who might choose 
to leave should be given the opportunity 
to develop their qualities locally, and in 
addition to this, new talents should be 
attracted. 
In summary: 
It is needed to fight more energetically to 
attract talent to every Arctic region, and 
that labour contracts should be adjusted 
to better correspond to the needs and 
values of those with talent from outside.
 It is critical to strengthen the view 
of the Arctic as a land of discovery; 
adventure territory and as a magnet for 
researchers such that the cities of the 
Arctic can be concentrations of talents 
from across the world.
 Balance of push and pull factors for 
talent is currently negative for the Arctic.
Key barriers to attracting talent to the 
Arctic are:
General decline in the Arctic population 
over the last couple of decades;
Female flight due to the fact that educa-
tion tends to prepare them for more 
urban types of jobs, increasing both the 
attraction of cities, and the likelihood 
that an individual can successfully adapt 
to life there;
 Greater community involvement means 
a creative answer to the challenges of the 
climate change.
 The key features of Arctic communities 
should be tolerance openness, both of 
which are essential strengths in the new 
knowledge economy.

Responding to changing 
environments and  
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Non-scientists,	 experiencing	 the	 weather,	 sometimes	
mistake	its	fluctuations	for	climate	change.	If	the	average	
drifts	up	or	down	over	decades	and	centuries,	we	have	cli-
mate	change.	Climate	is	more	predictable	than	weather.	
Both	types	of	variations,	however,	whether	it	is	short	term	
on	weather	or	long	term	on	climate,	require	to	be	taken	
into	account,	resulting	in	a	re-thinking	of	how	to	plan	for	
the	future.
Natural and human-induced environmental change
It	is	generally	accepted	that	climate	change	and	its	effects	
in	the	Arctic	may	be	the	most	serious	environmental	is-
sue	 threatening	 these	 northern	 environments.	 Discus-
sions	 continue	on	 the	 speed	and	exact	direction	of	 the	
changes,	but	it	is	clear	that	average	annual	temperatures	
in	the	Arctic	have	increased.	Again	there	are	different	in-
terpretations	 regarding	 the	precise	social,	environmen-
The map shows protected areas clas-
sified according to the IUCN Protected	
Area	Management	Categories. Use of 
these categories reflect very different 
protection strategies in relation to types 
of protection as well as national dis-
courses on how to perceive what should 
be protected, and how. 
 According to IUCN a protected area is:	
“A clearly defined geographical space, 
recognised, dedicated and managed, 
through legal or other effective means, 
to achieve the long-term conservation 
of nature with associated ecosystem 
services and cultural values”.  
 Major areas in Quebec/Nunavik are 
categorised as Natural	Monuments, 
a category that is absent in other 
parts of the Arctic except a few spots 
in other parts of Canada and Alaska.  
This category includes protected areas 
managed mainly for the purposes of the 
conservation of specific natural features  
and would typically be “areas containing 
one, or more, specific natural or natural/
cultural feature which is of outstanding 
or unique value because of its inherent 
rarity, representative or aesthetic quali-
ties or cultural significance”.
 In Russia and Alaska the category 
Wilderness	Areas is very common, but is 
rarely found in other parts of the Arctic.  
This category includes protected area 
managed mainly for wilderness protec-
tion and includes “large area of unmodi-
fied or slightly modified land, and/or 
sea, retaining its natural character and 
influence, without permanent or signifi-
cant habitation, which is protected and 
managed so as to preserve its natural 
condition”.
 In Russia a very frequent form of 
this type is the Protected	Areas	with	
Sustainable	Use	of	Natural	Resources, a 
category also present in Fennoscandia 
and Iceland, but absent in other parts 
of the Arctic. This definition entails 
protected area managed mainly for the 
sustainable use of natural ecosystems 
containing “predominantly unmodified 
natural systems, managed to ensure 
long term protection and maintenance 
of biological diversity, while providing 
at the same time a sustainable flow of 
natural products and services to meet 
community needs.” 
 The Categories Strict	Nature	Reserve	
and National	Parks are among the most 
common forms existing in the whole 
circumpolar area. The Strict Nature Re-
serve includes protected area managed 
mainly for science and entails areas of 
land and/or sea “possessing some out-
standing or representative ecosystems, 
geological or physiological features 
and/or species, available primarily for 
scientific research and/or environmental 
monitoring.” The National Park category 
covers protected areas managed mainly 
for ecosystem protection and recreation 
including “natural areas of land and/or 
sea, designated to (a) protect the eco-
logical integrity of one or more ecosys-
tems for present and future generations, 
(b) exclude exploitation or occupation 
inimical to the purposes of designation 
of the area and (c) provide a foundation 
for spiritual, scientific, educational, 
recreational and visitor opportunities, 
all of which must be environmentally 
and culturally compatible.”
MAP 7: PROTECTED AREAS IN THE ARCTIC.
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tal,	economic	and	health	impacts	which	may	follow.	For	
the	Arctic’s	 inhabitants,	however,	 the	 future	will	prob-
ably	 include	 challenges	 such	 as	 higher	 temperatures,	
melting	sea	ice	and	glaciers,	sea-level	rise,	and	probably	
also	 increased	precipitation	 in	some	areas	and	drought	
in	others.
The	 current	 discussion	 about	 the	 impacts	 of	 climate	
change	in	the	north,	however,	is	often	one-dimensional,	
identifying	very	simple	cause-effect	relations	and	point-
ing	 to	 a	 unique	 situation	 thus	 tending	 to	 ignore	 other	
mechanisms	and	potentially	disruptive	climate	scenari-
os.	It	also	ignores	historical	and	pre-historical	evidence	
demonstrating	 that	 the	 earth’s	 climate	 has	 repeatedly	
shifted	abruptly	and	dramatically	 in	 the	past,	 that	 it	 is	
capable	of	doing	so	 in	 the	 future,	and	 in	addition,	 that	
these	 climate	 shifts	 do	 not	 necessarily	 have	 universal,	
global	effects.	
While	the	question	of	establishing	protected	areas	 in	
the	Arctic	as	shown	on	map	7	 tends	to	be	generally	ac-
cepted	as	long	as	it	does	not	have	too	serious	implications	
for	 the	 access	 to	much	needed	 resources,	 the	potential	
impact	of	the	exploitation	of	these	resources	(map	8)	may	
create	 consequences	 far	beyond	what	has	been	experi-
enced	in	the	Arctic	thus	far.	
Human-induced	environmental	changes	include	habi-
tat	 fragmentation	 caused	 by	 roads,	 transmission-	 and	
pipelines,	easy	access	 to	remote	areas	by	boat,	off-road	
vehicles	and	airplane.	Overfishing	and	hunting,	by-catch	
problems,	disruptive	techniques	(the	effect	of	trawling	on	
the	seabed)	as	well	as	the	introduction	of	new	species	and	
diseases	–	a	problem	which	seems	to	be	accelerating	due	
to	climate	change	and	increasing	traffic	–	are	all	“human-
induced”.	
The map illustrates the complexity sur-
rounding the future of the Arctic Ocean 
area particularly in respect of access to 
resources, primarily based on the Arctic 
Council Arctic	marine	Shipping	Assess-
ment	2009	Report. This report empha-
sises that the regions where there are 
currently high concentrations of Arctic 
marine activity include the North At-
lantic ocean, the Barents sea and along 
the coasts of northwest Russia. The 
increase in cruise ship activity in ice-
laden waters however sees an increased 
level of risk of accident as many of these 
ships are not built for Arctic waters. In 
addition it is argued that the conducting 
of more research activities in the central 
part of the Arctic Ocean may also consti-
tute a risk. The major concern, however, 
concerns what is going to happen in the 
the coming decades as the sea ice re-
treats, opening the way for a significant 
potential increase in maritime activity.
The map shows where these new activi-
ties are expected to take place and the 
sea routes that may become important 
in relation to these future activities in 
the region. While most of the activities 
so far have been conducted by the Arctic 
states themselves, primarily by Russia, 
based on long experience of dealing 
with the special conditions of working 
in ice covered waters, it is expected that 
in the future marine activity in the Arctic 
will include many non-Arctic stakehold-
ers who may not necessarily however be 
as aware of, or prepared for, these types 
of problems or situations. 
The report emphasises that activities 
during the first decade will be charac-
terised by destination-based more than 
trans-Arctic activities. This implies a 
lack of major ports, except for places 
where activities have been frequent for 
decades, such as northern Norway and 
northwest Russia. As has been empha-
sised in the main text on the question 
of accessibility, the establishment of a 
larger port structure in the Arctic Ocean 
requires significant backup support in 
terms terrestrial connections. Such an 
infrastructure is currently almost wholly 
absent (see map 15), and is extremely 
expensive to put in place. 
MAP 8: ZONES OF MARINE ACTIVITY IN THE ARCTIC
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In	addition,	many	basic	commodities,	wrapping	mate-
rials,	chemicals	and	other	consumer	goods	are	imported	
from	the	south	and	eventually	end	up	as	garbage.	Sew-
age	 is	pumped	directly	 into	 the	sea	and	fossil	 fuels	are	
necessary	for	all	types	of	boats	and	vehicles,	and	in	many	
places	for	heating	too.	Added	to	this	picture	of	local	pol-
lution	come	the	so-called	trans-boundary	contaminants.	
Energy	 extraction,	 oil	 and	gas	pipelines,	 some	occa-
sionally	rusting	and	leaking,	all	impact	large	tundra	ar-
eas	as	has	been	the	case	with	recent	leaks	from	Russian	
oil	pipelines	raising	questions	about	their	reliability	and	
safety.	Moreover,	as	the	Exxon Valdez	incident	in	Alaska’s	
Prince	William	Sound	in	1989	illustrates	the	dangers	of	
transporting	oil	by	sea.	while	clear-cut	logging	is	chang-
ing	ecosystems,	causing	erosion,	impacting	the	speed	of	
permafrost	melting.	
The	fact	that	populations	throughout	human	existence	
have	 often	managed	 to	 cope	with	 change	 and	 through	
ingenuity	 and	 insight	 adjusted	 to	 the	new	 situations	 is	
however	often	ignored	in	the	debates	on	this	issue.	Sev-
eral	natural	processes	are	working	in	parallel	here,	some-
times	enhancing	and	sometimes	counteracting	each	oth-
er.	While	one	process	may	be	predictable,	the	interaction	
between	 different	 processes	 will	 usually	 be	 unpredict-
able.	The	multitude	of	possible	human	actions	only	adds	
to	the	complexity.	The	possible	adverse	effects	of	human	
activities	should	however	be	clearly	emphasised.	Human	
activities	influence	the	environment	and	reduce	the	value	
of	forests,	tundra	and	the	sea	in	terms	of	original	biodi-
versity	and	habitat.
The basic processes
Most	scientists	who	study	climate,	ice	and	oceans	agree:	
the	earth’s	climate	 is	 changing.	 In	 the	past,	 significant	
but	often	gradual	changes	occurred	due	to	natural	forces	
such	 as	 solar	 and	 orbital	 variations,	 the	 movement	 of	
land	masses,	the	intensity	of	volcanism	and	so	forth.	No	
natural	forces	have	been	found	to	explain	the	uneven	but	
relatively	rapid	rise	in	average	global	temperatures	since	
the	early	20th	century.	Instead,	it	appears	most	likely	that	
this	modern	warming	 results	 from	 the	 increasing	 con-
centration	of	CO2	and	other	greenhouse	gases	–	so-called	
because	 they	 are	 transparent	 to	 visible	 light	 bringing	
heat	from	the	sun	to	earth,	but	tend	to	absorb	the	infrared	
heat	the	earth	radiates	back	towards	space,	thus	trapping	
more	heat	on	earth	–	in	our	atmosphere.	
The	pace	and	regional	details	of	future	climate	change	
remain	areas	of	uncertainty	and	active	research.	While	
critics	point	to	scientific	uncertainty	as	a	reason	to	delay	
fossil	fuel	reductions,	scientists	note	that	uncertainty	has	
two	sides:	change	might	come	faster	than	expected.	Arc-
tic	change	in	particular	seems	to	be	moving	faster	than	
the	IPCC	projected	just	a	few	years	ago.
Taking	a	long	view	of	central	Greenland	climate,	show-
ing	3,000	years	of	temperature	estimated	from	ice	cores,	
the	Vikings	reached	Greenland	around	985	CE	during	the	
Medieval	 Warm	 Period,	 which	 corresponds	 to	 an	 out-
standing	temperature	peak.	An	earlier	and	even	warmer	
time	in	Greenland	can	be	seen	to	have	peaked	around	100	
BCE.	 The	 ice	 core	 temperature	 reconstruction	 extends	
only	up	to	1,855	CE,	however	–	a	point	overlooked	by	many	
non-scientists	who	have	mistaken	its	most	recent	values	
for	the	“present,”	and	concluded	that	the	ice	cores	show	a	
Medieval	Warm	Period	warmer	than	now.	In	fact,	all	that	
this	ice-core	shows	by	itself	is	that	central	Greenland	was	
probably	warmer	during	the	Medieval	Warm	Period	than	
it	was	in	1855,	when	that	region	was	still	gripped	by	the	
Little	Ice	Age.	
For	a	better	comparison	with	more	recent	values	aver-
age	temperature	over	the	period	1987–1999	measured	by	
automated	 weather	 stations	 at	 Summit	 Greenland,	 the	
same	location	as	the	ice	core	show	that	the	1987–1999	av-
erage	is	more	than	1°	C	warmer	than	the	medieval	peak.	In	
the	decade	since	these	measurements	were	taken	Green-
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land’s	temperature	has	warmed	further.	Large	areas	of	the	
ice	sheet	even	in	North	Greenland	are	now	losing	mass.
Large	 ice	sheets	melt	 in	 timescales	measured	 in	dec-
ades	or	centuries.	Their	contribution	to	rising	sea	levels	
is	 small	 at	 present,	 although	 that	 may	 change.	 Arctic	
Ocean	sea	 ice,	on	 the	other	hand,	melts	on	seasonal	 to	
yearly	scales	and	has	emerged	as	the	most	prominent	sign	
of	global	change.	Because	this	sea	ice	is	floating,	its	fate	
has	little	effect	on	sea	levels,	but	it	is	highly	visible	from	
space	and	has	broad	implications	for	transportation,	eco-
systems	and	weather	–	and	for	the	thermal	properties	of	
the	planet.	
Since	1979,	the	era	of	satellite	observation,	the	Septem-
ber	minimum	extent	has	declined	by	about	810,000	km2	
per	decade.	Less	complete	observational	data	from	sub-
marines	and	satellites	confirms	a	decline	going	back	to	
the	1950s.	Although	the	Arctic	was,	in	the	distant	past,	
ice-free	 indirect	measurements	 suggest	 that	 the	 recent	
decline	is	unmatched	for	at	least	several	thousand	years.	
Decreasing	sea	ice	affects	the	earth	system	in	complex	
ways	including	decreased	albedo	or	greater	heat	absorp-
tion	in	summer,	loss	of	thermal	protection	for	permafrost	
and	glacial	ice	onshore,	changing	atmospheric	and	ocean	
circulation,	and	ecosystem	effects	that	harm	ice-adapted	
species.	Some	of	the	potentially	important	effects	(such	as	
thawing	permafrost	to	release	CO2	and	methane)	involve	
positive	feedback	whereby	Arctic	warming	could	further	
accelerate	the	pace	of	global	warming.	Impacts	on	ocean	
and	atmosphere	circulation,	including	recent	snowy	mid-
latitude	winters,	are	currently	also	under	study.
The	past	four	Septembers	have	seen	the	lowest	ice	ex-
tent	of	the	satellite	period.	Although	declines	in	the	Sep-
tember	minimum	have	been	most	dramatic,	the	ice	extent	
has	also	significantly	declined	 in	every	other	month	of	
the	year.	Rising	air	temperatures	account	for	some	of	this	
decline,	especially	 in	spring	and	summer	melting.	Arc-
tic	penetration	of	warmer	Atlantic	or	Pacific	water	also	
plays	a	role	and	can	limit	ice	from	below	even	in	the	dark	
winter	months.	Although	the	2007	IPCC	report	projected	
a	seasonally	ice-free	Arctic	Ocean	for	the	second	half	of	
the	21st	century,	many	Arctic	specialists	now	believe	we	
will	 see	 this	before	 2020.	By	 “seasonally	 ice	 free”	 they	
generally	mean	a	September	minimum	extent	 reaching	
below	about	1	million	square	kilometres	(about	15%	of	its	
1980s	average).	The	projected	changes	in	the	Arctic	due	
to	climate	change	in	2090	are	shown	in	Box	18,	indicating	
what	may	be	expected.	In	those	conditions	weather,	ma-
rine	ecosystems,	transportation	and	the	flow	of	surface	
waters	would	be	among	the	many	things	changed.	Arctic	
glaciers	and	the	Greenland	ice	sheet	melting	would	likely	
accelerate,	 contributing	 to	 rising	 sea	 levels.	Permafrost	
thawing	would	challenge	 infrastructure	and	shorelines	
in	northern	Alaska,	Canada	and	Russia,	while	terrestrial	
ecosystems	could	change	character	significantly.	
So	climate	change	appears	to	be	well	underway.	Green-
house	gas	concentrations	continue	 to	 increase,	already	
passing	levels	not	seen	in	15	million	years	and	apparently	
heading	much	higher.	The	consequences	of	our	global-
scale	experiment	will	emerge	over	the	course	of	the	21st	
century,	 and	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 surprising,	 with	 rates	 of	
change	increasing	instead	of	hitting	a	new	plateau.	Re-
garding	the	marine	food	webs	that	support	fisheries,	im-
pacts	already	observed	 include	decreased	productivity,	
altered	dynamics,	reduced	abundance	of	habitat-forming	
species,	 shifting	species	distributions	and	a	greater	 in-
cidence	of	disease.	Although	there	is	much	uncertainty	
about	 the	 spatial	 and	 temporal	details,	 climate	 change	
is	 fundamentally	 altering	 ocean	 ecosystems.	 The	 level	
of	 uncertainty	 involved	 here	 nevertheless	 argues	 for	 a	
strongly	precautionary	approach	to	be	taken	to	fisheries	
management.
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BOX 18: TEMPERATURE VARIATIONS / CHANGE IN TEMPERATURE
If the changes which have occurred in 
recent decades continue the projected 
climate situation in 2090 might look sim-
ilar to presented on this map. The data 
shown is based on calculations by the 
NCAR-CCM3 model due to averages 1–5 
for the SRES A2 experiment, while the 
ice and permafrost are from the ACIA. 
 Sea ice has already declined con-
siderably over the past half century. 
Additional declines of roughly 10–50% 
in annual average sea-ice extent are 
projected by 2100. Loss of sea ice during 
summer is projected to be consider-
ably greater than the annual average 
decrease, projected to be more than a 
50% decline by the end of this century. 
Other models are showing the near-com-
plete disappearance of summer sea ice. 
The projected reductions in sea ice will 
increase regional and global warming 
by reducing the reflectivity of the ocean 
surface.
Snow cover extent over arctic land areas 
has decreased by about 10% over the 
past 30 years, with the most visible 
change being an earlier disappearance 
of snow in spring, in some places the 
snow cover end date has shifted to 
about one month earlier over the past 
50 years.
 And for vegetation a situation where 
forests will overtake tundra while 
present tundra is projected to move into 
polar deserts might be a consequence. 
These changes will result in a darker 
land surface, amplifying warming by 
absorbing more of the sun’s energy and 
creating a self-reinforcing feedback 
loop. 
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Other Large-Scale Marine Changes
Although	atmospheric	changes	could	eclipse	other	en-
vironmental	 shifts	 before	 the	 end	 of	 the	 century,	 hu-
man	activities	are	also	affecting	oceans	on	shorter	time	
scales.
These	anthropogenic	forces	include:
•	 Ocean	acidification,	another	by-product	of	our	fossil	
fuel	consumption,	is	viewed	by	some	experts	as	
potentially	more	damaging	than	climate	change.	As	
CO2	from	the	atmosphere	dissolves	in	sea	water,	it	
forms	bicarbonate	(HCO3–)	and	hydrogen	(H+)	ions,	
lowering	the	pH	of	the	water	to	almost	acidic	levels	
(pH	below	7.0).	With	atmospheric	CO2	steadily	rising,	
ocean	pH	has	already	dropped	lower	than	it	has	
been	for	20	million	years.	Moreover,	it	is	changing	
at	an	unprecedented	pace.	Coral	and	other	shell-
forming	marine	organisms	may	find	it	increasingly	
difficult	to	survive.
•	 Excess	nutrient	inputs	and	pollution	likewise	are	
rapidly	altering	the	biogeochemistry	of	oceans	and	
coastal	areas.	Fertilizer	runoff	and	nitrogen	deposi-
tion	from	fuel	use	contribute	to	hundreds	of	low-
oxygen	(hypoxic)	areas	in	coastal	waters,	in	extreme	
cases	becoming	“dead	zones”	fatal	to	fish	and	
invertebrates.	Industrial	pollutants	such	as	methyl	
mercury	and	persistent	organic	pollutants	have	
spread	globally,	and	bio-accumulate	in	the	tissues	
of	marine	organisms.	They	tend	to	concentrate	up	
the	food	chain,	so	that	mammals,	seabirds	and	the	
predatory	fish	favoured	by	fisheries	take	on	burdens	
hundreds	of	times	above	ambient	levels.	At	the	top	
of	northern	food	chains,	people	too	can	accumulate	
metal	and	organic	pollutants.
•	 Excess	nutrients	also	support	harmful	algal	blooms	
such	as	red	tide.	Invasive	species	including	bacteria	
can	be	spread	in	the	ballast	water	of	ships,	as	dis-
cussed	below	in	relation	to	tourism.
•	 Garbage,	not	only	in	large	chunks	but	increasingly	
as	dispersed	microplastics,	spread	widely	in	the	sea.	
Seawater	samples	have	been	reported	in	which	the	
plastic	content	outweighed	zooplankton	by	as	much	
as	6:1.	Larger	pieces	of	garbage	pose	well	publicised	
physical	risks	to	marine	vertebrates.	Ecological	
effects	and	even	the	destinations	of	vast	quantities	
of	toxin-containing	microplastics	remain	largely	
unknown.
•	 Oceans	have	also	grown	much	noisier,	a	change	
that	impacts	heavily	on	whales	and	dolphins.	Naval	
exercises	using	sonar	have	been	linked	to	whale	
deaths	and	beaching	etc.	Oil	exploration	ships	using	
air	guns	for	soundings	also	produce	noise	heard	by	
equipment	thousands	of	miles	away,	with	unknown	
effects	on	marine	life	nearby	(Malakoff	2001).	
Individually	less	loud,	but	collectively	far	more	so,	
shipping	traffic	creates	pervasive	mechanical	noise	
underwater.
Whether	or	not	they	are	fatal	themselves,	these	anthro-
pogenic	forces	stress	marine	organisms	and	food	webs.	
Their	combined	effects	could	be	cumulative	with	a	cau-
sality	that	is	hard	to	understand	even	in	retrospect.	And	
they	may	require	innovative	approaches	by	the	popula-
tion	in	order	to	respond	to	the	consequences.	Box	19	pro-
vides	 an	 example	 of	 how	 a	 fisheries	 dependent	 region	
may	respond	to	these	challenges.	
Terrestrial impacts
It	is	generally	agreed	that	further	climate	change	may	be	
inevitable	and	will	therefore	require	adaptation.	Similarly	
most	scientists	also	think	that	the	pace	of	climate	change	
can	be	slowed	by	substantially	reducing	greenhouse	gas	
emissions.	If	this	is	the	case,	it	might	give	governments,	
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When fisheries decline, out-migration 
becomes one of the first options iden-
tified by individuals and families. This 
may solve the problem for the smaller 
group, but at the same time reduce op-
tions for the communities they leave 
behind. 
 This happened in the Faroe Islands 
in the late 1980s and the beginning of 
the 1990s. During the 1970s success-
ful skippers managed to accumulated 
capital and invested in new trawlers, 
filleting plants etc. Soon, however, the 
success turned to failure and decline, 
due to combination of overfishing and 
environmental variations. From here 
major Faroese banks went bust and 
foreign debt mounted, fish processing 
plants were closed and the Faroese 
economy was put under administra-
tion. 
Massive emigration followed and the 
population of the Faroe Islands de-
clined from 48,000 to 42,000 (approx.) 
due to net out-migration during the 
1980s and 1990s.  
 Most of the people leaving the 
Faroe Islands went to Denmark. Partly 
because they had relatives there 
who could provide them with a much 
needed network, when looking for 
jobs. Some who had connections to 
fisheries and the fishing industries 
could find similar jobs in Denmark. The 
fisheries town of Esbjerg in Southwest 
Jutland became their preferred desti-
nation.
BOX 19: MIGRATION AS A RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES
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businesses,	 and	 ecosystems	more	 time	 to	 respond	 and	
adapt	to	climate	change	as	well	as	reducing	the	overall	
severity	of	climate	change-related	impacts.	
Across	a	wide	range	of	climate	scenarios	analysed	in	
both	national	and	international	assessments,	it	appears	
that	modest	warming	 could	 result	 in	 increased	 carbon	
storage	and	forest	productivity	in	most	forest	ecosystems.	
Plants	and	animals	that	live	in	the	forest	will	undoubt-
edly	be	affected,	both	by	changing	habitat	and	in	direct	
response	 to	 temperature	 increases	and	changes	 in	pre-
cipitation,	fire	regimes,	and	storm	events.	
Yet,	under	some	warmer	scenarios,	forests	could	experi-
ence	the	reverse	effect,	namely	drought-induced	losses	of	
carbon.	Added	to	this	may	be	further	loss	due	to	increased	
fire	disturbance	as	fires	may	become	more	frequent.	The	
amount	of	forest	area	burned	might	increase	by	25	to	50%,	
especially	as	projected	increases	in	productivity	produce	
large	amounts	of	brush	and	other	fuels	and	subsequent	
droughts	combine	to	increase	fire	occurrence.
In	 some	 areas	 increased	 forest	 productivity	may	 de-
crease	 the	 water	 that	 flows	 from	 forests	 into	 rivers,	
streams	and	reservoirs	because	forests	play	a	major	role	
in	the	water	cycle.	In	areas	where	forest	ecosystems	suf-
fer	 from	 increased	disturbances,	one	consequence	may	
be	that	water	quality	could	be	affected	by	increased	soil	
erosion	and	contamination.	And	as	a	consequence	both	
municipal	and	regional	water	systems	which	are	depend-
ent	upon	healthy	forest	ecosystems	to	catch	and	filter	rain	
and	snow,	may	be	severely	affected.	
As	plant	growth	is	dependent	on	the	intake	of	CO2,	an	
increase	in	the	atmosphere	may	even	act	as	a	fertilizer	for	
plants,	enabling	them	not	only	to	produce	more,	but	also	
to	use	water	more	efficiently.	As	a	consequence	forest	pro-
ductivity	seems	to	increase	with	increased	atmospheric	
CO2,	while	at	the	same	time	local	conditions	such	as	mois-
ture	stress	and	nutrient	availability	strongly	temper	these	
results.	
A	key	nutrient	 for	plant	growth	 is	Nitrogen	oxide,	a	
substance	which	 is	generated	 through	 fossil	 fuel	com-
bustion	 and	 therefore	 increases	 in	 this	 nutrient	 will	
eventually	 add	 to	 forest	 growth.	 There	 is	 however	 a	
downside	to	 this	as	adding	Nitrogen	oxides	 to	 the	soil	
and	 streams	 has	 the	 effect	 of	 acidification	 (acid	 rain)	
which	will	 increase	the	risks	to	 lake	fish	and	even	de-
crease	forest	health	when	soil	and	leaves	are	affected.	
The	air-pollutant	 therefore	 tends	 to	cause	a	decline	 in	
forest	health	and	productivity.	
It	is	unknown	as	yet	whether	biological	diversity	would	
be	reduced	if	climate	change	occurred	at	a	fast	rate,	but	
the	new	composition	of	species	is	likely	to	be	one	of	heat-
tolerant	fast	adapters,	resulting	in	patterns	where	these	
“invasive	 species”	 tend	 to	 re-structure	 the	 ecosystems,	
an	issue	that	is	discussed	in	box	20.	
Wildlife	has	been	able	 to	adapt	 to	changing	climates	
for	millions	of	years.	But	unlike	previous	climate	change	
periods,	 roads,	 development	 and	 other	 changes	 to	 the	
natural	 environment	 now	 block	 their	 migration	 routes	
or	 otherwise	 impede	 their	 adaptations.	 Parks	 and	 na-
ture	reserves	established	to	protect	certain	species	may	
no	longer	be	hospitable	to	those	species.	In	other	words,	
appropriate	 climates	 for	 currently	 protected	 forest	 eco-
systems	may	only	exist	outside	protected	areas.	In	many	
cases,	these	areas	will	already	be	developed	and	wholly	
unsuitable	for	new	forests.	
Another	 consequence	 of	 climate	 change	 is	 the	 effect	
that	the	changes	may	have	on	the	recreational	and	tour-
ism	industries.	While	summer	recreational	opportunities	
may	increase	in	some	northern	and	mountainous	areas,	
the	 question	 of	 accessibility	may	 hamper	 these	 oppor-
tunities,	while	downhill	skiing	is	very	likely	to	decrease	
with	fewer	cold	days	and	reduced	snowpack.	
Management	 to	 help	 forests,	 and	 those	 dependent	
upon	them,	adapt	to	climate	change	must	be	integrated	
with	other	human	activities	like	agricultural	and	urban	
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Invasive species are alien species whose 
introduction will or is likely to cause eco-
nomic or environmental harm or harm 
to the natural and human environment. 
It will most commonly be non-native 
plant, animal or other organism that 
influences – eventually dominates – the 
encountered ecosystem whereby it 
influences its function and structure by 
posing serious threats to local biodiver-
sity and causing adverse environmental, 
economic or public health effects. It is 
often the lack of a natural competitor in 
this new ecosystem that allows invasive 
species to be successful and resistant 
enough to survive in a foreign environ-
ment. 
 Humans have been responsible for 
most changes, as natural ecosystems 
usually adjust to environmental changes 
over thousands of years, while spread-
ing alien species for instance through 
tourism may have a much more immedi-
ate effect. Consequently there are a lot 
of worldwide examples showing the 
role of human activities. It is expected, 
however, that climate change could trig-
ger the expansion of invasive species 
into wider ranges. A warmer climate 
with rising average world temperatures 
could mean more foreign species could 
find their way into the Arctic and result 
in environmental impacts which could 
have a profound influence on species’ 
geographical ranges.
 While most immigrant species do no 
harm to their new environment, a small 
number do disproportionate damage. 
Consequently invasive species may 
disrupt ecosystems, primarily by preying 
on local species and competing with 
native species over limited resources. 
The effect on native biodiversity can be 
severe. 
 Already now the rate of marine inva-
sion has been increasing, primarily by 
crustaceans and molluscs. These obser-
vations may have significant relevance 
for future marine invasive risks to 
Arctic waters. Studies of polar shipping 
operations have demonstrated that 
the external hull and ballast tanks of 
vessels operating in ice-covered waters 
can support a wide variety of non-native 
marine organisms.
BOX 20: THE CHALLENGE OF INVASIVE SPECIES
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encroachment	on	forest	lands,	the	impacts	of	multiple	use	
on	forests,	and	air	pollution.	Commercial	forestry	adapta-
tions	could	include	salvaging	dead	and	dying	timber	and	
replanting	species	appropriate	to	a	new	climate.
Environmental effects of tourism
Ocean	pollution	 is	a	 threat	 to	 the	biosphere	and	 in	 the	
long	run	it	is	estimated	to	threaten	inhabitants	across	the	
northern	hemisphere.	The	state	of	systematic	monitoring	
between	areas	in	the	Arctic	and	North	Atlantic	varies	con-
siderably.	In	Iceland	generally	very	little	is	known	about	
the	situation	of	the	ocean	biosphere	or	that	of	fjords	and	
the	coastal	zones.	The	interplay	between	physical	and	en-
vironmental	factors	is,	according	to	a	status	report	made	
by	the	State	environmental	institute	in	Iceland,	however	
addressed.	This	is	further	confirmed	in	a	number	of	re-
ports	on	sub-sea	mining.	
This	report	states	that	knowledge	on	the	biosphere	and	
the	effects	of	various	interventions	are	not	well	known.	
Sand	and	mining	activities	affect	benthic	communities,	
fisheries,	the	ecology	of	the	sea,	archaeology	etc.	Given	
the	limited	knowledge	of	the	ecology	and	biotopes	of	the	
benthic	milieu in	the	shallow	sea	surrounding	Iceland,	all	
licenses	given	to	mine	sub-sea	areas	should	be	carefully	
reviewed.
Information	 on	 the	 biosphere	 in	 the	 ocean	has	 been	
collected	for	over	a	century,	but	when	placed	into	a	scale	
perspective	–	a	total	area	of	the	exclusive	zone,	an	area	
covering	738,000	km2,	or	seven-fold	the	territory	of	dry	
land	mostly	concealed	by	sea	at	great	depths	–	it	becomes	
clear	that	the	project	is	both	expensive	and	difficult.	The	
main	emphasis	in	research	has	been	aimed	at	collecting	
data	on	the	most	important	fish	stocks	as	well	as	the	fac-
tors	most	crucial	for	the	economic	aspects	of	fisheries	and	
the	state	of	commercialised	stocks.	
Numerous	reports	on	the	importance	of	pollution	mon-
itoring	 particularly	 of	 cruise	 ships,	 however,	 have	 not	
agreed.	Despite	this	Alaska	is	the	only	Arctic	territory	to	
systematically	monitor	the	changing	chemical	composi-
tion	of	the	sea	in	the	light	of	cruise	ship	traffic	its	science	
advisory	panel	assesses	the	importance	of	environmental	
harm	caused	by	the	cruise	traffic.	They	focus	in	particular	
on	the	chemical	effects	on	the	molluscs/blue	mussels	etc.,	
in	relation	to	stunted	growth.	However	one	of	the	pros-
pects	put	forward	in	the	ACIA	report	is	the	rising	threat	
posed	by	oil	transport	by	sea	as	an	effect	of	increased	ac-
cess	due	to	the	ice	sea	melting	in	the	north.	Possible	oil	
pollution	will	pose	greater	risks	and	become	much	more	
complicated	to	deal	with	in	icy	waters	than	for	example	
the	effects	of	the	Exxon Valdes	accident	in	Prince	William	
Sound,	Alaska.	
Larger	and	larger	cruise	vessels	are	being	constructed	
and	sailed	in	northern	waters	but	the	accumulated	knowl-
edge	in	respect	of	the	threat	from	oil	spills,	the	scale	and	
scope	of	dumping,	and	where	it	is	practiced	by	the	cruise	
liners,	nevertheless	remains	limited.	Not	much	is	really	
known	 about	 the	 cruise	 ships’	 contribution	 to	 oceanic	
pollution	or	of	the	pollution	impacts	of	ports.	The	main	
sources	 of	 pollution	 from	 ships	 are	 based	 on	 oil,	 solid	
waste,	sewage,	grey	and	black	water,	emissions	and	the	
dumping	of	bilge	water.	The	key	problem	according	to	the	
OSPAR	commission	report	 is	the	lack	of	general	knowl-
edge	about	 the	Arctic	 region’s	waters.	 Furthermore	 the	
monitoring	 sites	 for	 different	 environmental	 problems	
and	 their	 prospects	 are	 very	 limited	 shedding	 light	 on	
only	a	few	places.	
Geographers	monitoring	 the	extent	of	 the	 sea	 ice	be-
tween	 Greenland	 and	 Iceland	 do	 occasionally	 observe	
tracks	 of	 something	 on	 the	 ocean	 surface	 after	 cruise	
ships	 pass	 by	 on	 satellite	 pictures	 taken	 in	 relation	 to	
the	sea	ice	monitoring.	However	no	systematic	monitor-
ing	is	currently	being	undertaken	on	the	extent	or	scale	
of	pollution	 sources	and	development	due	 to	 increased	
shipping	traffic,	both	passenger	vessels	and	commercial	
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vessels.	With	increased	shipping	traffic	and	regular	bilge	
water	 dumping,	 the	 threat	 of	 aquatic	 invasive	 species	
(AIS)	increases.
AIS	are	defined	as	aquatic	animals	or	plants	that	have	
either	accidentally	or	intentionally	been	released	outside	
their	traditional	range	and	with	the	ability	to	survive	and	
establish	a	 lasting	population,	 resulting	 in	undesirable	
or	unwanted	consequences.	In	most	of	the	areas	around	
the	North	Atlantic	only	sporadic	examples	of	 this	have	
been	acknowledged	by	the	authorities.	Atlantic	Canada	
has	been	most	blunt	about	the	serious	consequences	of	
nine	known	AIS	introduced,	harming	ecosystems,	aquac-
ulture	and	reducing	populations	of	native	species	around	
i.e.	the	maritime	provinces	as	well	as	affecting	the	econ-
omy	of	those	communities	reliant	on	aquatic	industries.	
As	 a	 consequence	 some	 carrying	 capacity	 problems	
have	for	almost	a	decade	now	been	obvious	in	some	of	the	
most	visited	attractions,	scenic	spots	that	are	most	visited	
in	 the	short	peak	season	 in	addition	show	clear	visible	
decay.	One	of	the	only	areas	posing	a	limit	to	a	number	of	
tourists	annually	is	Svalbard.	About	40,000	tourists	visit	
Svalbard	each	year,	and	a	comprehensive	set	of	regula-
tions	was	 recently	 developed	 to	 protect	 the	wilderness	
there	from	the	adverse	impacts	of	tourism.	
Management of resources at the proper geographical level
A	new	generation	of	approaches	to	monitoring	trends	and	
changes	in	natural	resources	include	locally-based,	par-
ticipatory	monitoring	methods.	These	methods	appear	ef-
fective	in	incorporating	evidence-based	assessments	into	
decision-making	at	the	local	level	and	provide	a	means	to	
encourage	local	involvement	while	opening	up	local	con-
trol	of	the	resources.	
Often,	however,	there	are	two	conflicts	which	have	to	be	
considered.	First,	many	Arctic	species	of	mammals	and	
birds	are	migrating	species,	and	as	such	they	visit	several	
local	 human	 communities	 each	 year.	 Second,	 conflicts	
exist	between	local	communities	and	public	authorities	
–	between	state	interests	and	community	interests.	One	
reason	for	these	conflicts	is	that	the	management	of	re-
newable	resources	is	a	complex	and	highly	advanced	sci-
entific	exercise,	with	several	different	layers	and	players.	
The	challenge	here	is	to	provide	management	systems	
such	as	co-management	approaches	where	the	different	
levels	of	interests	meet	in	order	to	provide	a	means	of	reg-
ulatory	control	and	follow	up	schemes	while	at	the	same	
time	remaining	open	to	outside	involvement.	Especially	
in	 the	 Arctic,	 where	 cross-boundary	 interests	 between	
nations,	regions,	and	communities	are	often	involved,	it	
seems	obvious	that	resource	management	could	benefit	
from	such	experiences.
This	 would	 be	 a	 natural	 development,	 as	 the	 Arctic	
States	are	already	involved	in	joined	monitoring	projects,	
and	to	a	large	extent	have	the	same	objectives	in	terms	
of	sustainable	use	and	are	members	of	the	same	interna-
tional	 agreements	 on	biodiversity,	 sustainable	use	 and	
environmental	protection.
The	 redistribution	 of	 influence	 occurs	 not	 only	 be-
tween	 companies	 and	 the	 state	 but	 also	 between	 na-
tional/federal	and	regional	powers.	Very	often	it	is	done	
by	defining	formal	ecological	and	social	restrictions	for	
corporate	structures.	One	such	example	could	be	that	of	
the	 Khanty-Mansi	 Autonomous	 Okrug	 in	 Russia.	 Here	
the	 regional	 authorities,	 after	 a	 period	 of	 experiencing	
a	weakening	of	 their	powers	 in	 the	area	of	 sub-surface	
management	due	to	the	transfer	of	the	main	control	func-
tions	to	the	federal	level,	approved	(in	2004)	new	maxi-
mum	permissible	aquatic	pollution	quotas	for	oil	and	gas	
companies.	Although	 it	had	been	necessary	 to	 toughen	
ecological	standards	earlier,	the	region	introduced	them	
only	when	it	had	lost	real	rights	of	control	over	and	direct	
influence	on	the	companies’	behaviour.	
The	main	tool	of	state	policy	in	the	Russian	part	of	the	
Arctic	is	becoming	the	separating	of	strategic	industries	
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(fuel	 and	 energy	 complex,	 transportation,	 communica-
tion)	into	the	area	of	first-priority	state	control	and	regu-
lation.	This	also	occurs	through	the	formation	and	con-
solidation	of	 large	business	structures,	centralising	 the	
rights	of	control	over	most	valuable	assets	of	the	territory.	
For	example,	in	Republic	Sakha-Yakutia,	JSC	“ALROSA”	
has	become	such	a	“super	organisation”.
Another	important	–	and	positive	–	change	for	the	fu-
ture	of	Arctic	resource	development	is	the	trend	toward	
local	 ownership	of	 the	North’s	natural	 resources.	 Land	
claims	movements	in	Alaska	and	Canada	as	well	as	the	
evolving	 political	 situations	 in	 Greenland,	 Finnmark,	
and	northern	Canada	have	increased	the	role	of	local	resi-
dents	in	decisions	over	resource	development.	
Most	importantly	these	changes	increase	the	share	and	
certainty	 of	 rewards	 from	 resource	 development	 in	 the	
Arctic.	While	 local	 residents	may	 suffer	 environmental	
loss	or	damage	to	existing	economic	activity,	ownership	
gives	 them	 compensation.	 This	 should	 reduce	 conflict	
over	development	and	result	in	increased	access	to	north-
ern	resources.	This	shift	in	ownership	increases	the	share	
of	the	resource	rents	that	stay	in	the	north.	This	provides	
a	base	for	activity	in	the	local	Arctic	economy.	The	addi-
tional	income	encourages	the	growth	of	the	local	popula-
tion	and	supports	service	activities.	
Over	the	last	twenty	years	or	so	the	rise	of	 the	indig-
enous	movement	and	the	concomitant	policies	of	decolo-
nisation	have	had	clear	effects	on	resource	management	
policies	in	Norway.	Steps	in	this	process	are	outlined	in	
Box	21.	A	devolution	trend	in	management	power	is	also	
currently	 ongoing,	 though	 the	 public	 discourse	 is	 still	
focused	 on	 top-down	management.	 Similarly	 a	 change	
in	 the	 development	 of	 cross-border	 co-management	 ar-
rangements	 has	 clearly	 occurred	 since	 1997.	 The	 en-
croachment	pressure	creating	land-use	changes	and	dis-
turbance	is	serious	and	increasing.	An	overall	Eurasian	
evaluation	 asserts:	 “Potential	 threats	 facing	 reindeer	
populations	of	Eurasia,	and	reindeer	herding	as	a	liveli-
hood,	 include	 rapid	 land	 use	 change,	 excessive	 preda-
tion,	climate	change,	and	ongoing	institutional	conflicts”	
(Forbes	2010:86).
From	a	long-term	perspective	the	combined	effects	of	
land-use	change	and	climate	change	appear	to	be	quite	
serious.	The	question	remains,	to	what	extent	can	devolu-
tion	and	local	resistance	put	the	brakes	on	and	modify	the	
effects.	Diverse	forms	of	land-use	changes	in	combination	
with	climate	change	effects	continue	then	to	be	the	main	
threats	 both	 for	 reindeer	 herding	 and	 other	 traditional	
forms	of	resource	utilisation	important	for	the	sustenance	
of	Sámi	culture.	
If	 the	Sámi	of	Finland	and	Sweden	manage	 to	create	
momentum	and	engage	in	real	dialogue	with	their	gov-
ernments	to	achieve	significant	progress	for	Sámi	rights	
this	will	add	to	the	progress	achieved	by	the	Sámi	in	Nor-
way	and	will	become	a	powerful	tool	with	which	to	slow	
land-use	change	processes.	
Devolution of management power
In	Norway	the	devolution	process	begun	three	decades	
ago,	initiated	by	ethno-political	mobilisation	and	actions	
taken	 against	 the	 hydropower	 regulation	 of	 the	 Alta-
Kautokeino	River	in	its	northernmost	county	of	Finnmark.	
To	put	an	end	to	the	actions	the	government	agreed	to	the	
granting	of	core	Sámi	claims	by	initiating	a	process	lead-
ing	both	to	political	and	land	rights’	reforms	through	the	
setting	up	of	a	Sámi	Rights	Commission	(SRC).	The	SRC	
was	established	in	1980	and	presented	its	first	report	in	
1984	providing	the	basis	for	the	passing	of	Constitution	
Amendments	and	a	Sámi	Act	in	1987	and	the	establish-
ment	of	the	Sámi	Parliament	(SP)	in	1989.	The	SP	executes	
a	cultural	autonomy	and	is	also	the	formal	representative	
of	the	Sámi	people	in	Norway.	
A	 recent	 additional	 outcome	 of	 the	 reforms	 is	 the	
Finnmark	Act	(2005),	which	has	become	the	basis	for	the	
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BOX 21: CASE FROM SAMI AREA 
From the Middle Ages Sápmi was an area 
of competitive expansion for the Nordic 
states (Riseth, 2005, Sandberg, 2008). 
By the final colonisation and border 
establishment in 1751 an addendum to 
the border convention between Denmark-
Norway and Sweden-Finland, later named 
“The Lap Codicil” was set up to guarantee 
the future of the Sámi people. Sámi indi 
viduals were required to become citizens 
of one of the states, but had guaranteed 
rights of cross-border land-use such as 
for reindeer herding, hunting and fishing.
 Changes in the governments’ ideas 
of Sámi rights led to the undermining of 
cross-border co-management arrange-
ments by border closures between 
Norway/Finland (1852) and Sweden/
Finland (1889), followed by a series of 
border conventions between Norway and 
Sweden which gradually reduced cross-
border reindeer herding throughout the 
20th century (Pedersen, 2006, Norberg 
2007).
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 Today a specific Sámi area has been 
defined in Finland and Norway. The Sami 
native region of Finland (Sámiid ruovttu-
guovllu in Northern Sámi) consists of the 
municipalities of Enontekiö, Utsjoki and 
Inari as well as a part of the municipality 
of Sodankylä. The area is defined in and 
protected by the Finnish constitution (17 
§ and 121 §) to be autonomous on issues 
relating to the Sámi culture and language. 
In Norway the Sámi area has been de-
fined as the application area of the Sámi 
Parliament subsidy schemes for business 
development that accounts for around 
50 per cent of the area in Norway north 
of Saltfjellet, or 26 municipalities where 
10 of those is only partly included. The 
Sámi area can also be defined through 
language. Altogether there are 30 munici-
palities in Finland, Norway and Sweden 
where Sámi languages have an official 
status guaranteed by law (Seurujärvi-Kari 
2011).
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transfer	of	state	property	(of	a	size	similar	to	Denmark’s	
land	area)	 to	 the	 local	people,	as	a	first	 step	 through	a	
collective	private	body	called	the	Finnmark	Estate.	The	
passing	of	the	ILO	Convention	on	Indigenous	and	Tribal	
Peoples	 (C169)	 in	 1989,	 adopted	 by	 Norway	 1990,	 also	
required	that	the	regime	of	the	Finnmark	Act	had	to	be	
recognised	 by	 the	 Sámi	 Parliament	 before	 final	 adop-
tion.	Moreover,	this	act	led	to	a	consultation	agreement	
which	provide	the	Sámi	at	different	levels	with	a	right	of	
consultation	with	the	government	and	its	branches.	Fur-
ther	 land	reforms	are	proposed	for	 the	remaining	parts	
of	Northern	and	Middle	Norway.	A	proposed	reform	se-
curing	local	fishermen’s	fishing	rights	on	the	coast	(NOU	
2008:5)	is	not	however	expected	to	be	adopted	as	it	threat-
ens	powerful	fisheries	interests.
Norwegian	 reindeer	 husbandry	 legislation	 in	 the	
1980s	 and	 1990s	was	 based	 on	 a	 top-down	 command	
and	 control	 approach,	 but	 with	 an	 outcome	 differing	
due	 to	 regional	 geographic	 and	 cultural	 differences.	
New	legislation	however	recognises	that	resource	man-
agement	power	in	the	first	instance	now	resides	with	the	
local	collective.
In	 Sweden	 and	 Finland	 the	 Sámi	 have	 not	managed	
to	challenge	the	government	and	the	political	establish-
ment	to	take	an	active	stand	on	basic	questions	as	regards	
relations	between	the	Sámi	and	the	majority	society	and	
thus	achieve	a	 real	dialogue.	 In	Sweden	 the	discourse,	
moreover,	show	signs	of	conflict	while	in	Finland	critics	
assert	 that	 the	 government	 practices	 double	 standards	
maintaining	an	image	of	being	a	defender	of	indigenous	
rights	abroad	while	doing	nothing	to	improve	Sámi	rights	
at	 home.	 One	 factor	 working	 against	 success	 for	 Sámi	
rights	in	Sweden	and	Finland	is	that	the	forestry	indus-
tries	have	prominent	economic	positions	 in	both	coun-
tries.	However,	in	Finland	a	serious	dispute	about	logging	
in	winter	pasture	areas	has	recently	been	settled.	
Both	 countries	 have	 Sámi	 Parliaments	 but	 have	 not	
adopted	the	C169	thus	far.	The	expert	proposal	for	a	Nor-
dic	Sami	Convention	in	2005	are	still	under	governmental	
consideration,	and	can	–	if	adopted	–	further	add	to	the	
pressure	on	these	governments.	In	Finland	its	implemen-
tation	would	require	that	the	position	of	reindeer	herding	
as	a	Sámi	source	of	livelihood	and	a	basis	of	Sámi	identity	
and	culture	be	strengthened.	And	finally,	the	UN	Declara-
tion	on	the	Rights	of	Indigenous	Peoples,	2007	could	rein-
force	Sámi	rights	further	in	all	Nordic	countries.	
Ongoing	climate	change	requires	increased	flexibility	
as	opposed	to	a	development	based	on	unchangeable	reg-
ulations	and	land-use	conflicts.	In	the	wake	of	a	possible	
Nordic	Sámi	Convention	the	question	of	re-establishing	
cross-border	reindeer	herding	between	Norway	and	Fin-
land	may	actually	become	a	real	possibility.	
In	the	case	of	reindeer	management	in	the	Sapmi	area	
this	is	very	formal	and	centrally	controlled	by	the	two	gov-
ernments	through	a	convention,	i.e.	a	bilateral	intergov-
ernmental	agreement.	The	current	status	of	the	relation-
ship	is	that	the	Grazing	Convention	was	signed	by	the	two	
countries’	governments	over	a	year	ago.	In	autumn	2010	
the	agreement	was	circulated	for	comment	before	ratifi-
cation	takes	place.	A	novelty	of	the	Convention	is	that	it	
creates	 an	 intergovernmental	“reinbeitenemd”	with	 the	
decision-making	authority	and	an	“overprøvningsnemd” 
as	the	appealing	body.	With	Finland	arrangements	thus	
far	only	include	a	deal	on	a	border	fence.	
Informal	 cultural	 cooperation	 across	 the	 border	 has	
had	an	impact	especially	because	Sami	dialect	and	cul-
ture	follow	major	river	valleys.	Further	details	are	avail-
able	 in	Box	20.	As	an	illustration	from	Sweden	one	has	
both	groups	of	Lule	and	Pitesameralso	in	Norway	and	the	
people	are	related	to	each	other,	sometimes	quite	closely,	
as	documented	through	recent	Interreg	projects	such	as	
“Inside	the	Sami	room”	in	the	South	Sami	area.	
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A	 citation	 from	 the	 Department	 of	 Agriculture	 and	
Food’s	 homepage	 illustrates	 the	 current	 situation	 and	
considerations:	 “The	 new	Norwegian-Swedish	 reindeer	
Convention	 is	circulated	with	a	deadline	of	October	 15,	
2010.	The	 theme	of	 the	hearing	 is	whether	 the	Conven-
tion,	as	it	exists,	could	be	altered	through	the	ratification	
of	subsequent	implementation	in	the	two	countries.	The	
Reindeer	Convention	between	Norway	and	Sweden	from	
1972	ceased	to	apply	in	2005.	Negotiations	this	time	have	
been	carried	out	between	the	two	countries	on	a	new	Con-
vention	on	Trans-boundary	Reindeer.	These	negotiations	
were	 concluded	 on	 24	 February	 2009.	 The	 Convention	
was	signed	by	the	Minister	of	Agriculture	and	Food	and	
the	Swedish	Minister	of	Agriculture	on	7	October	2009.	
With	this,	the	two	countries	mutually	agreed	to	a	follow-
up	 to	 ratification	and	entry	 into	 force.	After	 ratification	
the	Convention	is	finally	now	binding.	The	Convention’s	
mission	is	to	promote	and	develop	cooperation	between	
countries,	grazing	districts	and	cities,	as	well	as	between	
the	individual	reindeer	herders,	so	that	the	reindeer	pas-
ture	can	be	utilised	in	a	way	that	provides	a	long-term	ba-
sis	for	an	ecologically,	economically	and	culturally	sus-
tainable	pastoralism	in	both	countries.	The	Convention	
contains	provisions	to	regulate	trans-boundary	reindeer	
husbandry	providing	bodies	that	can	take	the	necessary	
decisions	in	respect	of	implementation.	The	protocol	also	
specifies	the	areas	that	can	be	used	respectively	by	Nor-
wegian	and	Swedish	reindeer.”
Experiences	 with	 cross-border	management	 are	 also	
drawn	 from	other	parts	of	 the	Arctic,	 for	 instance	with	
the	management	of	the	porcupine	caribou	herd.	An	im-
portant	driver	for	the	initiatives	was	the	interest	in	the	oil	
potential	of	the	De	Cho	(Mackenzie)	Delta	and	the	Yukon	
North	Slope	during	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s	due	to	
the	potential	impacts	from	development.	The	user	com-
munities	were	insistent	that	they	become	fundamentally	
involved	in	the	conservation	and	management	of	the	cari-
bou	herd	which	had	always	been	the	basis	of	their	culture	
and	economy.	Negotiations	on	the	co-management	of	the	
porcupine	caribou	herd	however	soon	reached	something	
of	an	impasse	which	was	not	concluded	until	1985.	Differ-
ent	levels	of	delegation	of	responsibility	are	presented	in	
Box	22.	
A	more	recent	co-management	agreement	comprising	
members	from	Canadian	federal,	Yukon	and	Northwest	
Territories	 governments,	 as	 well	 as	 aboriginal	 govern-
ment	officials	was	expected	to	be	concluded	in	2010.	The	
harvest	management	plan	calls	 for	hunting	restrictions	
based	on	the	number	of	caribou	in	the	herd.	The	Porcu-
pine	Caribou	Management	Board	remains	a	useful	ave-
nue	for	outreach	and	communication	about	issues	related	
to	the	porcupine	caribou	herd,	which	has	long	been	an	
important	food	source	for	aboriginal	peoples	in	northern	
Yukon,	the	Northwest	Territories	and	Alaska.	
Once	a	new	management	plan	is	in	place	it	is	difficult	
to	 determine	 what	 the	 board’s	 role	 will	 be.	 And	 even	
though	expectations	are	high	in	connection	with	the	co-
management	arrangements,	an	analysis	of	 two	caribou	
management	systems	in	Alaska	and	Canada,	focusing	on	
the	 relationship	 between	user	 involvement	 in	manage-
ment	and	management	effectiveness,	has	shown	mixed	
results.	While	expectations	were	that	the	involvement	of	
users	in	a	joint	management	board	would	produce	greater	
cooperation	and	agreement	in	the	Canadian	setting	than	
the	Alaskan	hierarchical	system,	the	results	showed	that	
government	managers	are	more	sensitive	and	responsive	
to	user	concerns	while	direct	user	involvement	in	a	joint	
management	board	does	not	increase	the	likelihood	that	
users	at	the	village	level	will	cooperate	with	management	
actions.	
User-manager	boards	do	not	appear	to	be	a	substitute	
for	a	frequent	and	continued	presence	of	biologists	in	tra-
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ditional	user	communities	when	it	comes	to	establishing	
trust	in	management	information	and	supporting	tradi-
tional	community-based	decision	making.	
The	 historical	 relationships	 between	 people	 and	 a	
changing	environment	in	Sápmi,	and	other	parts	of	the	
Arctic	 alike,	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 social-ecological	 systems.	
These	systems	for	hunting/gathering,	pastoralism,	peas-
antry	and	local	fisheries	were	based	on	“timescapes”	fol-
lowing	natural	divisions	of	landscape	and	its	resources	as	
well	as	nature’s	rhythms	in	their	exploitation,	organised	
through	culturally	based	institutions	such	as	Siida.	The	
enclosure	 regulations	 in	connection	with	border	estab-
Rapid changes in both societies and the 
environment require closer relations 
between communities and governments 
within the natural resource management 
arena. Co-management arrangements 
are usually considered. This is the in-
volvement of a variety of stakeholders to 
devolve some decision-making to other 
levels of government and stakeholder 
groups.
 The role of each stakeholder can be 
defined differently, as indicated by the 
graph and the table below, depending 
on the political and cultural situation, 
but in all cases based on the idea that 
full access to information on relevant 
issues and options should be available. 
 The system needs to be able to 
compensate for traditional approaches 
in relatively closed systems where 
resources were managed through 
complex interplays of reciprocities and 
solidarities. Co-management therefore 
describes a range of collaborative ar-
rangements from stakeholders simply 
having a consultative role to a partner-
ship arrangement between stakeholders 
and government.
 The benefits of co-management 
include the more equitable, appropriate, 
and efficient management of natural 
resources recognising that stakeholder 
groups have varying interests in the 
resources (see box 30 on community 
quotas and box 21 on reindeer manage-
ment), while alternatives to co-manage-
ment involve either government being in 
charge, or private ownership (see box 29 
for ITQ).
BOX 22: DELEGATING RESPONSIBILITY
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lishments	provide	a	major	example	of	how	the	adminis-
trative	division	of	land	and	resources	make	sustainability	
difficult	in	many	regions.	One	of	the	outcomes	is	recogni-
tion	of	the	lack	of	winter	pastures	for	reindeer	in	Norway	
and	a	lack	of	summer	pastures	in	Sweden	and	Finland.	
The	latter	is	the	more	serious	as	Finland	also	uses	natu-
ral	winter	pastures	for	summer	grazing	making	reindeer	
herding	increasingly	dependent	on	supplementary	feed-
ing	in	winter.	
Since	the	1980s	the	Norwegian	government	has	tried	to	
regulate	Finnmark’s	reindeer	herd	size.	Current	 legisla-
tion	recognises	that	governance	systems	need	to	be	based	
on	basic	 trust	 to	be	 effective.	Accordingly,	 possibilities	
for	better	regulation	and	to	react	to	rapid	environmental	
change	due	to	climate	change,	primarily	warming,	are	in-
creased.	There	is	also	a	tendency	here	for	knowledge	to	be	
more	valued	in	resource	management.	
Land-use	competition	and	changes	have	increasingly	
promoted	pasture	 land	 fragmentation	and	 irreversible	
changes	 due	 to	 encroachments	 from	 infrastructural	
and	industrial	development	in	particular.	This	includes	
railways,	roads,	mines,	power	plants,	modern	forestry,	
secondary	homes,	 tourism,	but	also	general	urbanisa-
tion.	In	Finland	and	Sweden	forestry	is	particularly	im-
portant.	
Such	encroachments	have	many	implications,	includ-
ing	that	the	more	grazing	lands	are	cut	up	into	an	un-
even	patchwork	the	more	difficult	it	becomes	to	stabilise	
the	reindeer’s	movement.	Further,	in	addition	to	the	di-
rect	loss	of	pasture	land,	disturbance	by	human	activ-
ity	leads	to	disturbance	effects	in	large	areas.	This	has	
relevance	not	only	for	encroachments	but	also	for	areas	
of	nature	conservation	due	to	the	so-called	“attraction	
effect”.	
One	 side-effect	 of	 conservation	 efforts	 such	 as	 those	
associated	 with	 the	 Bern	 Convention	 is	 that	 reindeer	
herders	 are	 no	 longer	 allowed	 to	manage	 predators	 as	
was	previously	the	case.	Currently,	predators	raise	seri-
ous	problems	for	reindeer	herding	in	Finland	as	well	as	
in	Sweden	and	Norway,	in	some	regions	herders	are	close	
to	giving	up.	These	questions	are	highly	contested	and	
can	be	understood	as	part	of	a	centre-periphery	conflict	
where	 herders	 and	 peasants	 have	 to	 “pay	 the	 bill”	 for	
urban	 dwellers’	 often	 ill-informed	 concern	 for	 nature.	
In	Norway	there	is	now	the	beginning	of	a	recognition	of	
the	seriousness	of	the	predator	issue	among	national	and	
local	politicians,	and	Sámi	and	other	rural	people	have	
banded	 together	 organising	 a	 recent	 demonstration	 in	
Oslo	mustering	some	1,500	to	2,000	participants.	
New	trends	also	exist	in	respect	of	encroachments	that	
are	both	serious	and	important.	Due	to	an	increasing	level	
of	demand	for	mineral	resources	there	is	currently	a	new	
wave	of	mining	efforts	being	undertaken	over	large	parts	
of	Sápmi.	The	expected	decline	of	the	petroleum	industry	
also	has	two	different	effects.	One	is	the	expansion	north-
wards	into	the	Arctic	as	more	areas	become	ice	free	as	an	
outcome	of	rising	temperatures.	In	Sápmi	this	increases	
the	pressures	for	new	encroachments	on	the	coasts.	The	
second	 issue	 here	 is	 the	 expansion	 of	 windmill	 farms	
which	also	create	large	encroachments.
Dealing with complexity
The	cautionary	tales	of	the	20th-century	North	Atlantic	
cod	and	herring	fisheries	highlight	the	risks	facing	21st-
century	fisheries	in	a	time	of	global	change.	Our	technol-
ogy	 remains	 capable	 of	 catching	 too	 many	 fish,	 while	
at	the	same	time	fish	and	their	ecosystems	face	unprec-
edented	 threats	 and	 stresses	 from	other	 anthropogenic	
sources.	Climate	 is	 shifting	 toward	a	generally	warmer	
world,	but	with	details	of	timing,	circulation	and	regional	
effects	that	resemble	weather-	more	than	climate-change	
in	being	difficult	to	predict.	Species	could	adapt	to	new	
environments	over	tens	of	thousands	to	millions	of	years,	
but	the	rapidity	of	current	change	far	exceeds	the	normal	
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pace	 of	 evolution.	 Species	migration	 and	hybridisation	
might	offer	faster	routes	to	adaptation.	Interdependence	
among	species	(such	as	fish	reproduction	depending	on	
the	timing	of	phytoplankton	blooms)	could	reduce	their	
adaptive	 flexibility.	 Moreover,	 fisheries	 pressure	 itself,	
through	 the	 direct	 removal	 of	 target	 species	 and	 their	
prey,	habitat	disruption	and	the	truncation	of	older	age	
classes,	may	constrain	the	ability	of	fish	stocks	to	adapt.	
At	 the	 same	 time	 various	 forms	 of	 pollution,	 algae	
blooms	or	hypoxia	due	to	excess	nutrients,	and	invasive	
species	raise	other	ecological	challenges.	Classic	single-
species	management	practices,	or	calculations	of	maxi-
mum	sustainable	 yield,	will	more	 likely	 than	not	 yield	
new	disasters	when	applied	to	rapidly	changing	environ-
ments.	Future	fisheries	declines	will	come	at	a	time	when	
humanity	can	ill	afford	the	loss	of	protein,	let	alone	fish-
eries	income.	In	this	complex	setting	attempts	to	delegate	
responsibilities	 to	 different	 stakeholders,	 for	 instance	
to	 the	private	sector	by	means	of	 ITQ’s	and	community	
quotas,	 is	 a	 question	 which	 will	 be	 dealt	 with	 further	
in	 the	boxes	29	and	30.	There	may	be	both	advantages	
and	 disadvantages	 in	 such	mechanisms,	 but	 the	main	
requirement	 would	 be	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 systems	 are	
open	to	change	when	important	background	issues	–	for	
instance	climate,	demographic,	biology	and	economics	–	
are	changing.
Many	of	the	trends	described	in	this	chapter	are	part	
of	 the	broader	“megatrends”	outlined	previously	 in	 the	
sense	that	their	patterns	occurred	repeatedly	in	20th	cen-
tury,	for	instance	in	terms	of	fisheries,	showing	the	force	
of	human	ecology	behind	contingent	variations	in	local	
history.	But	whereas	20th-century	fishing	had	the	tech-
nical	capability	to	transform	biological	marine	systems,	
in	 the	21st	century	we	see	 the	steady	 transformation	of	
physical	marine	systems	as	well.	The	fish	and	the	fisher-
ies	now	struggle	to	coexist	not	just	with	each	other,	but	
with	rapid	physical	changes	in	ocean	climate	and	chem-
istry.
Meanwhile	 on	 land,	 the	 concentration	 of	 amenities,	
necessities	 and	 choices	 in	 regional	 or	 larger	 centres	
draws	mobile	elements	of	the	population	there	too,	at	the	
expense	of	more	dispersed	and	historically	resource-de-
pendent	places.	Voluntary	migration	has	generally	been	
selective	for	younger	age	and	higher	ambition,	to	the	det-
riment	 of	 source	 communities	 left	 behind.	 Around	 the	
circumpolar	North	in	recent	decades,	we	have	also	seen	
migration	selective	for	gender	–	women,	more	often	than	
men,	voting	with	their	feet	about	the	relative	attractions	
of	rural	vs.	urban	life.	It	is	not	possible	for	any	government	
to	provide	an	urban	range	of	services	in	each	small	com-
munity,	along	coastlines	with	many	such	places.	In	times	
of	windfall	income	(like	an	oil	boom)	they	might	try,	but	
the	same	services	must	then	be	cut	back	as	income	ebbs.	
Consequently,	 the	 concentration	 of	 population,	 not	
necessarily	just	to	the	largest	places	but	to	those	offering	
a	balance	of	opportunities	and	amenities	(such	as	univer-
sities,	the	new	growth	engine;	but	of	course	also	housing	
and	more	attractive	 jobs),	 appears	 to	 comprise	another	
megatrend.	In	this	complex	setting	the	younger	genera-
tions	are	trying	to	find	their	own	ways	of	coping	with	the	
challenges,	recognising	the	fact	that	climate	change	may	
be	an	important	part	of	the	framework,	but	at	the	same	
time	not	necessarily	the	factor	that	would	be	decisive	for	
their	choice	for	the	future,	something	which	is	illustrated	
in	box	23.	
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The warmer climate has had a posi-
tive impact on Greenland’s economic 
possibilities and development. The ice 
conditions in South Greenland have 
improved, and as a consequence access 
to the towns and villages is becoming 
easier. Moreover, the return of the cod to 
Greenland has stimulated local econo-
mies, enabling communities that were 
hit severely by the disappearance of the 
fish during the 1980s to regain some 
hopeful economic opportunities. 
 First and foremost, the farmers in the 
southwest of Greenland are looking for-
ward to longer summers and less severe 
winters, providing new opportunities to 
grow a variety of crops and to further 
expand their farming activities, first 
established back in 1905.
 These farming initiatives have made 
an important contribution to the local 
economy in South Greenland. Today 
new opportunities are appearing all the 
time. The introduction of better equip-
ment, tractors, cutting machines, and 
equipment for fodder production can 
provide for further activities including 
the growing of vegetables. Today, most 
vegetables are very expensive, as they 
are imported. The film “Green Land” 
provides insight into the perspectives of 
young people in southern Greenland: 
www.nordregio.se/films/green_land
BOX 23: GREENLAND’S YOUTH EXPERIENCE CLIMATE CHANGE IN SOUTH GREENLAND
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The	Arctic	has	always	been	dependent	on	human	resourc-
es.	While	skills	in	terms	of	hunting	and	fishing	were	once	
absolutely	decisive	for	survival	in	the	Arctic	environment	
the	question	of	education	has	now	become	paramount.	
It	is	often	emphasised	how	many	Arctic	residents	have	
a	well	developed	and	highly	sophisticated	grasp	of	mat-
ters	important	to	their	well-being.	On	the	other	hand	it	is	
also	stressed	that	their	knowledge	does	not	necessarily	
translate	into	high	scores	in,	for	instance,	adult	literacy	
and	school	enrolments.	Looking	into	the	goals	and	meth-
ods	of	educational	systems	it	becomes	clear	that	the	state,	
the	regional	authorities	and	Arctic	 residents	now	share	
a	common	understanding	of	what	should	be	relevant	in	
terms	of	education	policy.	
The	current	characteristics	of	 the	 formal	educational	
systems	in	the	North	reflect	a	broader	range	of	identified	
societal	as	well	as	cultural	goals.	At	 the	same	time	 the	
divergence	 between	 society’s	 expectance	 level	 and	 the	
individual	 youth’s	 response	 tends	 to	 increase.	 The	 dif-
ferences	 clearly	 appear	when	highlighting	 the	 share	 of	
population	with	 a	post-secondary	 education	 as	 in	Map	
9	or	with	a	 tertiary	 level	education	as	 in	Map	10.	What	
the	maps	do	not	show	 is	 that	differences	are	more	pro-
nounced	than	actually	indicated	due	to	differences	in	the	
definitions	of	content	and	in	the	objectives	of	the	various	
educational	systems.	
Knowledge economies and the demand for human  
resources
The	 economic	 prosperity	 and	 functioning	 of	 a	 nation	
depends	on	its	physical	and	human	capital	stock.	While	
the	focus	used	to	be	on	physical	resources,	the	advent	of	
what	we	now	characterise	as	the	“knowledge	economy”	
has	drawn	attention	to	factors	affecting	the	enhancement	
of	human	skills	and	talent	as	key	issues	in	the	develop-
ment	process.	
This	 is	 also	 the	 reality	 for	 the	 Arctic,	 as	 indicated	
through	 the	 role	 of	 the	 3rd	 sector	 in	 the	 various	Arctic	
economies.	And	this	is	parallel	to	the	situation	where,	ac-
cording	to	the	OECD,	more	than	50%	of	Gross	Domestic	
Product	(GDP)	in	the	major	OECD	economies	is	now	based	
on	the	production	and	distribution	of	knowledge.
While	technology	used	to	be	an	undisputed	key	factor	
of	production,	intimately	connected	to	general	economic	
development,	the	de-coupling	of	economic	performance	
and	simple	measures	such	as	energy	consumption,	how-
ever,	 is	no	 longer	an	 indicator	of	economic	success.	 In-
stead	access	to	knowledge	has	become	the	key	factor.	
Regional differences in response to the 
educational challenges faced by the 
region as a whole are illustrated in map 
9 showing the distribution of the share 
of population with a post-secondary 
education. The differences in level are 
in many cases due to very different 
historical legacies of post-secondary 
education, leading to a situation where 
the Russian North and the Nordic Coun-
tries have a relatively high proportion 
of the population with post-secondary 
education, while parts of Northern 
Canada and Alaska show a relatively low 
level. As emphasised in the report on 
Arctic Social Indicators, post-secondary 
education has been emphasised as an 
important tool in connection with both 
regional and minority development in 
Russia and in the Nordic Countries. A 
similar trend, however, has been his-
torically absent, and has emerged only 
quite recently in substantial parts of the 
North American continent. An important 
issue in this context is the availability 
(or otherwise) of educational opportuni-
ties that allow young people to stay in 
their own communities. 
MAP 9: SHARE OF POPULATION WITH A POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION
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Moreover,	with	 the	 increasing	mobility	 of	 the	 global	
workforce	and	of	the	flow	of	information,	knowledge	and	
expertise	can	instantaneously	be	transported	around	the	
world,	leading	to	a	situation	where	advantages	gained	by	
one	company	can	be	eliminated	by	competitive	improve-
ments	from	one	day	to	the	next.	Consequently,	among	the	
only	comparative	advantages	a	company	may	enjoy	in	the	
not	too	far	future	will	be	its	innovative	capacity.	
It	has	often	been	emphasised	how	what	can	be	termed	
“the	 death	 of	 distance”	 has	 developed	 in	 tandem	with	
globalisation.	As	will	be	discussed	further	in	chapter	8,	
the	growth	of	the	Internet	and	other	related	new	technolo-
gies	has	undoubtedly	become	an	important	catalyst	in	the	
creation	of	“knowledge	economies”.	The	new	information	
and	communication	technologies	have	contributed	to	the	
development	of	global	markets	for	these	types	of	goods	
and	services	and	thus	it	is	often	stated	that	we	becoming	
an	 information	 society	 in	a	knowledge	economy	where	
the	effective	management	and	distribution	of	knowledge	
is	essential.
Human	 capital	 represents	 the	 investments	 that	 peo-
ple	 and	 their	 communities	 make	 in	 themselves	 which	
enhance	their	economic	productivity.	Education	adds	to	
the	productivity	 and	efficiency	of	human	beings	by	 in-
creasing	the	level	of	cognitive	stock	and	qualities	of	eco-
nomically	productive	human	capabilities.	Consequently,	
formal	education	can	be	seen	as	a	productive	investment	
in	human	capital	eventually	becoming	resources	which	
affect	the	rate	of	adaptation	to	change.	It	is	quite	clear	how	
developed	countries	have	been	able	to	take	advantage	of	
the	new	global	markets	turning	knowledge	and	informa-
tion	into	GDP	growth.	
A	key	issue	is	empowerment.	There	are	two	factors	of	
importance	here.	On	the	one	hand	we	have	the	empower-
ment	of	the	individual	where	a	proportion	of	students	are	
able	to	continue	past	primary	through	secondary	school	
graduation,	and,	in	an	increasing	number	of	cases,	fur-
ther	on	to	post-secondary	institutions	and	technical	col-
leges.	Individuals	may	be	empowered	to	fulfil	important	
functions	 in	 the	 community	 and	 their	 education	 may	
provide	them	with	a	reason	for	staying.	But	such	quali-
ties	may	also	empower	them	to	start	looking	for	other	op-
portunities,	and	eventually	 to	 leave	the	community.	As	
is	often	said:	“Education	can	bring	the	outside	 into	the	
Based on the interpretation of the map 
on the share of population with a terti-
ary level education a rather contrasted 
picture is revealed compared to that of 
post-secondary education. The North 
American part turns out to be at the very 
high end in this context compared in 
particular to Russia, but also to Eastern 
Canada and parts of the Nordic Coun-
tries. Here, however, a number of issues 
add to the complexity of the picture. 
First of all the differences between the 
traditions in the educational systems in 
the Nordic Countries and Russia, com-
pared to the prevailing North American 
approaches are important. While most 
of the students in North America leave 
universities after graduating with a 
bachelor’s degree after 2-3 years of 
study – the ratio between bachelors and 
master’s degree is around 4:1 – the tra-
ditions in the Nordic Countries and Rus-
sia have been based on graduation after 
a full master’s degree, i.e. studies of 5 
years or more. Typically, ratios of 1:3 ex-
ist between the number of persons who 
have obtained bachelors and masters 
degrees respectively. Consequently the 
participation rate in what is classified 
as tertiary level education from  a bach-
elor’s degree and above would show 
these differences. Over the last decade 
an attempt has been made to harmonise 
the systems but it will take time for 
people to adjust to these changes. 
MAP 10: SHARE OF POPULATION WITH A TERTIARY LEVEL EDUCATION
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community”,	but	if	the	social	system	is	not	able	to	accom-
modate	this,	it	may	simply	lead	to	the	“bringing	the	edu-
cated	out	of	the	community	to	the	outside.”
In	this	context	it	is	clear	that	empowerment	is	a	multi-
dimensional	concept	with	often	divergent	consequences.	
Empowerment	 may	 strengthen	 communities,	 making	
them	able	to	resist	the	pressure	from	the	outside,	at	least	
for	 a	while.	 It	may,	 however,	 be	 less	 responsive	 to	 the	
marked	differences	in	both	gender	and	generational	foci	
in	relation	to	the	development	process,	which	may	even-
tually	result	in	unexpected	and	unwanted	out-migration	
patterns,	 and	 thus	 the	 loss	 of	 the	 new	 human	 capital	
gained,	 for	 example,	 through	 the	 expansion	 of	 educa-
tional	opportunities.
As	such,	the	strategies	that	are	applied	need	to	respond	
to	national	and	global	policies	in	both	the	public	and	the	
private	sectors	while	also	responding	to	the	specific	char-
acteristics	of	the	involved	communities	and	taking	notice	
of	the	specific	social	and	political	institutions,	civic	cul-
ture,	and	traditions	characterising	the	individual	places	
concerned.	
These	ideas	suggest	some	propositions	about	the	adaptive	
paths	open	to	individuals,	enterprises,	and	communities:
•	 Those	with	greater	human	capital	have	a	larger	
field	of	possibilities	and	greater	ability	to	create	
alternative	economic	enterprises.	Social	capital	can	
enhance	the	acquisition	of	human	capital.
•	 Norms	of	trust	and	inclusive	social	institutions	
(social	capital)	improve	the	prospects	for	economic	
development.
•	 Communities	with	long-standing	habits	of	coop-
eration	and	participation	will	be	better	prepared	
to	develop	effective	resource	management,	in	part	
because	they	are	more	likely	to	have	sufficient	legiti-
macy	and	sanctioning	authority	to	control	individual	
behaviour	and	avert	free-riding	or	the	selfish	deple-
tion	of	common-property	resources.
•	 People	in	communities	where	outside	forces	–	such	
as	creditors	or	distant	government	bureaucracies	
–	control	access	to	resources	and	“the	rules	of	the	
game”	will	be	less	trusting	of	one	another	and	of	
outsiders.	They	may	lack	the	institutional	resources	
and	habits	of	decision	making	necessary	to	carry	out	
alternative	strategies.
•	 The	widely-accepted	dichotomy	between	“tradi-
tional”	and	“modern”,	for	instance	in	relation	to	the	
fisheries	sector	breaks	down	as	growing	differences	
in	education,	capital,	technology,	and	fishing	capac-
ity	emerge	within	the	formerly	traditional	small-boat	
sector.	Increasingly	sophisticated	fishing	technology	
creates	more	business-oriented	fishermen.
•	 Cohort	replacement,	by	younger	generations	with	
more	education	and	higher	expectations,	forms	a	
primary	mechanism	of	social	change.
The	 propositions	 above	 address	 the	 social	 and	 politi-
cal	 conditions	 that	 affect	 the	 success	 of	 adaptation	 to	
environmental	 change.	Understanding	 such	 conditions	
should	contribute	to	future	policy	discussions.	A	related	
issue,	 not	 formalised	 above,	 involves	 how	 individuals	
adapt.	 Sometimes	 apparently	 rational	 individual	 deci-
sions	turn	out	differently	than	policy	makers	expect,	and	
even	 work	 at	 cross-purposes;	 and	 rationalities	 change	
over	time,	as	illustrated	by	the	example	in	Box	24.	
The need for education 
It	is	generally	accepted	that	education	has	a	leading	role	
to	play	in	economic	and	social	development.	Moreover	it	
is	also	now	suggested	that	an	effective	anti-poverty	strat-
egy	should	 incorporate	 the	enhancement	of	education	
and	skills	among	households	as	well	as	individuals.	By	
creating	new	and	better	jobs	education	may	contribute	
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Around 62 % of all Faroese leave home 
to study. This is a high figure compared 
to the other Nordic countries. In Den-
mark, Norway and Finland 2–5% leave 
the country in order to pursue an educa-
tion, while between 10% and 25 % 
of Norwegian and Icelandic young 
people leave home for the same reason. 
The major reason for the relatively high 
Faroese figure is the limited supply 
of educational services in the Faroe 
Islands. 
 By choosing opportunities outside the 
Islands, the majority of young people 
continue in the footsteps of previ-
ous generations who headed towards 
Denmark. But a growing number of 
young people are now choosing to travel 
even farther away to countries such as 
England and Scotland which are ranking 
highest on the list of preferred colleges 
while the U.S., Australia and Poland are 
also popular. 
 The students have a strong global 
identity, and experience abroad cre-
ates people who challenge themselves 
and develop throughout life. But the 
question is whether this global identity 
is compatible with a life in the Faroe 
Islands. Recent studies suggest that it is 
not. Just a decade ago nearly 100% of all 
students moved back home after com-
pleting their education. But today the 
reality is different. Recent studies have 
shown that only 25–30% of Faroese 
students abroad are confident that they 
will settle down in the Faroes after they 
have finished their education. Phrases 
such as brain drain have been used to 
describe this situation.  
BOX 24: STAYING OR LEAVING
to	the	reduction	of	poverty	even	adding	to	the	social	sur-
plus	highly	needed	for	these	communities	to	take	charge	
of	their	own	development	process.	This	has	been	repeat-
edly	emphasised	in	theories	of	human	capital	where	the	
focus	on	education	as	a	capital	good	emphasises	that	the	
development	of	skills	is	an	important	factor	in	different	
levels	of	production	activities.	When	applied	at	a	macro	
level,	there	seems	to	be	a	clear	correlation	between	the	
levels	of	enrolment	and	GNP.	Contrary	to	this,	however,	
at	 the	micro	 level	poor	 children	and	particularly	girls	
have	traditionally	been	less	likely	to	enrol,	leading	to	a	
situation	which	sees	increased	segregation	produced.	In	
this	context	it	has	often	been	stressed	that	poverty	acts	
in	a	dual	manner;	on	one	hand	as	a	barrier	to	education,	
but	at	the	same	time	also	as	an	outcome	of	the	lack	of	
education.	
Very	 often	 poverty	 alleviation	 and	 gender	 equality	
strategies	are	not	something	emanating	from	private	ini-
tiatives.	Investment	in	education	is	usually	dependent	on	
government	action,	both	in	relation	to	financing,	and	in	
defining	what	minimum	 standards	 should	 be	 imposed	
on	the	communities.	So	as	a	tool	for	development	educa-
tion	can	be	used	in	developing	the	human	resources	that	
would	be	needed	to	generate	the	foundations	for	econom-
ic	and	social	transformation.	
This	is	in	many	ways	confirmed	by	the	Arctic	Human	
Development	Report	(2004),	which	emphasises	that	the	
most	critical	concerns	are	for	control,	relevance,	and	ac-
cess	to	education.	These	concerns	are	directly	impacted	
by	 the	acknowledgement	of	distributed	knowledge	and	
in	 that	context	 the	need	 to	adapt	education	services	so	
that	they	fit	better	with	local	needs	and	conditions.	“This	
requires	a	shift	from	viewing	knowledge	as	a	standard-
ised	commodity	to	seeing	it	as	a	distributed	resource	with	
decentralisation	 of	 control	 and	 decision	 making,	 local	
adaptations	of	curriculum,	and	increased	use	of	technol-
megatrends
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ogy	to	access	knowledge	from	any	place	at	any	time	(i.e.	
University	of	the	Arctic)”.	
Different approach to what is needed 
The	two	maps	presented	at	the	beginning	of	the	chapter	
(maps	9	and	 10)	 illustrate	 two	very	different	aspects	 in	
relation	to	education	in	the	North.	While	map	9	showed	
the	 general	 level	 of	 education	 in	 the	 North,	where	 the	
regional	and	national	governments	generally	decide	on	
content	and	structure,	this	reveals	that	The	Circumpolar	
North	 has	 been	 characterised	 by	 very	 different	 histori-
cal	 legacies	 in	 terms	of	post-secondary	education.	This	
has	 led	 to	a	situation	where	 the	Russian	North	and	the	
Nordic	Countries	have	evolved	into	a	situation	with	the	
population	with	post-secondary	education	being	a	rela-
tively	high	proportion,	while	parts	of	Northern	Canada	
and	Alaska	have	a	relatively	low	level.	
While	post-secondary	education	has	been	emphasised	
as	 an	 important	 tool	 in	 connection	with	 both	 regional	
and	minority	development	 in	Russia	 and	 in	 the	Nordic	
Countries	as	well,	a	similar	trend	has	either	been	entirely	
absent	or	has	emerged	only	quite	recently	in	substantial	
parts	of	the	North	American	continent.
What	 is	shown	on	 the	next	map	(10)	 is	a	marked	dif-
ference	in	relation	to	tertiary	level	education.	In	Finland	
the	level	 is	very	high	due	to	a	specific	focus	on	tertiary	
level	education	as	a	regional	development	tool,	and	as	a	
consequence	the	establishment	of	a	regional	university	
in	Rovaniemi.	 In	Russia	 as	well	 as	 in	 the	 other	Nordic	
Countries	the	emphasis	has	been	similar	to	that	in	Fin-
land,	but	due	to	the	existence	of	a	rather	large	population	
connected	with	large	scale	mining,	forestry,	and	industry	
development,	the	share	of	the	population	with	a	tertiary	
level	education	is	significantly	reduced.	
An	 important	difference	here	 in	 terms	of	educational	
traditions	is	that	in	both	the	Nordic	Countries	and	Russia	
a	minimum	of	five	year’s	study	(typically	a	master	thesis)	
is	viewed	as	being	 the	proper	accomplishment	of	a	 ter-
tiary	level	education.	This	is	very	different	to	the	North	
American	situation	where	the	major	part	of	the	tertiary-
level	education	process	relates	to	the	gaining	of	a	bach-
elor’s	degree	accomplished	after	2–3	years.	The	differenc-
es	 in	approach	show	up	clearly	on	the	map.	Significant	
differences	 in	 terms	 of	 accomplishments	 between	 the	
western	and	the	eastern	part	of	the	hemisphere	are	not	
mapped	here.	The	map	simply	reflects	the	differences	in	
traditions.	
What	is	common,	however,	is	the	trend	that	the	pursuit	
of	educational	opportunities	shows	that	the	existence	of	
a	 substantially	 higher	 proportion	 of	women	with	 post-
secondary	education	has	become	a	general	pattern	in	the	
Arctic.	
The	differences	in	gender	response	to	the	question	of	
“better	opportunities”	discussed	in	box	8	have	very	much	
to	do	with	the	marked	changes	in	patterns	of	education	
which	have	taken	place	during	the	last	10–15	years.	The	
pattern	shows	how	women	dominate	the	realm	of	educa-
tion	in	most	of	the	Arctic.	Already	in	the	1990s	women	had	
become	the	majority	group	in	relation	to	higher	education	
in	several	countries,	and	by	the	late	1990s	basically	all	
regions	in	the	Arctic	had	moved	into	this	situation.	Only	
parts	of	Canada	show	a	dominance	of	males	in	relation	
to	post-secondary	education.	But	this	divergence	reflects	
only	to	a	certain	degree	real	differences	in	the	aspirations	
of	the	populations	concerned.	
Another	contributory	factor	here	relates	to	the	fact	that	
young	women	pursuing	education	in	many	communities	
tend	to	leave	the	region	before	they	start	to	pursue	their	
educational	goals.	This	is	similar	to	the	situation	pertain-
ing	 in	 the	Faroe	 Islands	where	many	of	 the	women,	on	
completing	 their	 education	 tend	 to	 emigrate,	 predomi-
nantly	 to	 Denmark.	 There	 they	 pursue	 a	 career	 where	
they	are	able	to	take	advantage	of	their	acquired	skills.	
This	has	also	been	the	pattern	in	Greenland,	due	to	the	
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limited	 level	of	social	acceptance	 traditionally	afforded	
to	women	with	higher	qualifications.	In	recent	years	an	
increasing	number	of	positions	requiring	higher	educa-
tion	have	however	been	taken	up	by	women.	
In	communities	with	a	generally	high	level	of	persons	
with	high	and	higher	education	–	first	of	all	 the	urban	
areas	with	one	or	more	higher	education	institution	–	fe-
male	dominance	is	limited	to	a	few	percentage	points.	The	
high	level	of	dominance,	i.e.	a	women’s	share	of	56%	and	
more,	appears	in	municipalities	representing	small	town	
and	urban	settings.	This	is	the	case	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	
it	is	in	these	same	communities	where	the	highest	deficit	
of	women	appears.
The	 issues	 discussed	 above	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 being	 a	
number	of	gender-related	differences	in	aspirations	and	
approaches	 to	 change	 and	primarily	 to	 the	 question	of	
work	and	work-related	activities.	The	perception	of	cus-
tomary	male	activities	related	to	renewable	resource	ex-
ploitation	seems	to	be	“sticky”,	in	the	sense	that	the	male	
discourse	 –	 or	 perhaps	 rather,	 the	 discourse	 regarding	
males	–	has	difficulty	in	moving	on	from	what	once	were	
key	activities,	but	now	constitutes	only	a	small	percent-
age	of	the	available	jobs.	
In	the	upbringing,	pedagogy	and	training	of	boys	the	
focus	 is	 on	 individualism,	 with	 silently	 accepted	 be-
haviour	patterns	for	the	boys	such	as	disobedience	and	
non-acceptance	of	orders	and	correction.	This	promotes	
individualistic,	selfish,	self-centred,	self-promoting,	and	
status	seeking	behaviour,	as	these	qualifications	are	con-
sidered	to	be	the	true	characteristics	of	“real”	boys.	
Contrary	 to	 this,	 the	 females	 in	 their	 upbringing	 are	
socialised	 into	 collective	 activities,	 are	 more	 attentive	
to	other’s	needs,	and	consequently	much	more	open	 to	
change.	As	a	result,	they	become	less	limited	by	specific	
job	characteristics,	determined	by	what	may	be	consid-
ered	as	being	 “traditional”	and	“acceptable”	activities.	
To	 use	 an	 analogy,	 males	 seems	 to	 be	 socialised	 into	
path-dependency,	which	causes	them	great	difficulty	in	
accepting	other	paths	and	changes,	while	females	in	con-
trast	 tend	 to	be	socialised	 into	situations	where	adjust-
ment	 and	 change	 are	 constantly	 needed,	 leaving	 them	
prepared	to	move	between	job	categories	and	job	options.	
Only	jobs	related	to	(new)	technology	appear	to	constitute	
status	giving	alternatives	for	males.	
Consequently,	the	adaptation	to	changes	through	the	
educational	system	fits	much	better	with	the	socialisation	
of	girls,	despite	the	fact	that	girls	are	constantly	under-
rated	and	underrepresented	when	it	comes	to	filling	high	
ranking	positions,	both	in	academia	and	in	administra-
tive	affairs.	
The	current	situation	where	women	now	predominate	
in	the	pursuit	of	academic	careers	is,	however,	a	rather	
novel	 situation.	 In	 Greenland	 boys	 still	 dominated	 the	
educational	 system	 up	 until	 around	 1990	 with	 5–10%	
more	boys	than	girls	finishing	an	educational	diploma	or	
degree.	From	1991,	however,	a	marked	change	began	to	
appear.	During	the	1990s	and	the	first	half	of	the	2000s,	
between	 10	 and	 20%	more	 girls	 than	 boys	 finished	 an	
education,	and	since	2003	more	than	60%	of	the	persons	
finishing	an	education	have	been	girls.	Differences	also	
clearly	emerge	in	the	types	of	education	chosen.	Among	
the	boys	registered	as	active	students,	almost	70%	are	reg-
istered	in	vocational	training	and	30%	in	short	and	long	
term	academic	programmes.	Among	the	girls,	however,	
there	is	an	almost	equal	division	between	vocational	and	
academic	training	(53%	and	47%	respectively).	
Do these gender aspects matter?
Even	if	resource	exploitation	is	still	perceived	to	be	the	
main	economic	basis	for	communities	in	the	North	the	re-
ality	is	that	the	third	sector	–	the	service	sector	with	wage	
work	 in	administration,	 education,	 social	 services	 etc.,	
–	has	become	the	main	income	source	for	most	families.	
These	 incomes	 have	 become	necessary	 for	 the	mainte-
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nance	of	many	of	the	traditional	renewable	resource	ac-
tivities,	with	hunters	and	fishermen	also	having	supple-
mentary	wage	work,	and	especially	with	wives’	income	
becoming	the	main	income	source	for	many	families.	
In	Greenland	24%	of	hunters	and	fishermen	have	 in-
comes	 from	 other	 activities,	 and	 in	more	 than	 70%	 of	
households	the	wives	contribute	to	the	income,	typically	
from	work	in	schools,	kindergartens,	public	and	private	
administration,	cleaning	etc.,	while	in	more	than	50%	of	
families	the	major	income	source	is	now	generated	by	the	
wives	(Rasmussen,	2005).	
In	Greenland	–	as	in	most	of	the	Circumpolar	North	–	
households	with	professional	hunters	and	fishermen	are	
highly	dependent	on	incomes	from	other	sources.	These	
incomes	 are	 very	 often	 generated	 by	 the	 fishermen’s	
spouses.	This	leaves	young	unmarried	males	in	a	special	
risk	 group,	worsened	by	 the	 fact	 that	 household	 struc-
tures	are	changing.	
More	than	40%	of	households	in	villages	are	single	per-
sons	as	there	are	simply	not	enough	young	women	in	the	
villages	who	consider	living	the	life	of	a	wife	of	a	village	
hunter	and	fisherman	to	be	attractive.	Single	versus	mul-
tiple	person	households	is	a	good	indicator	of	the	viability	
of	small	communities.	The	large	number	of	single	persons	
limits	 the	possibility	of	 reproducing	the	households,	 in	
the	long	run	limiting	the	reproduction	of	the	settlement,	
and	eventually	limiting	the	reproduction	of	hunting	and	
fishing	in	general.
The	cultural	adaptation	process	is	viewed	as	a	response	
to	a	change	in	the	physical	environment.	However,	bio-
logical	 anthropologists	 and	 archaeologists	 concerned	
with	 changes	 in	 cultures	 as	well	 as	 cultural	 resistance	
suggest	that	adaptation	is	a	consequence	of	selection	act-
ing	on	variation	through	cultural	practices	(adaptations)	
which	have	historically	allowed	a	culture	to	survive.	
Cultural	practices	are	thus	equated	with	genetic	char-
acteristics	in	the	natural	sciences;	limited	by	a	Darwinian	
view,	a	group	which	does	not	have	adequate	methods	of	
coping	with	environmental	stress	will	not	be	able	to	com-
pete	for	scarce	resources	and	will	fail	to	continue.	From	
this	approach	to	the	term,	a	cultural	practice	is	an	adapta-
tion	only	if	it	developed	to	overcome	stress,	thereby	dis-
tinguishing	adaptations	from	adaptive	capacities	where	
societies	 function	 within	 their	 dynamic	 environments	
regardless	of	whether	or	not	 they	evolved	as	a	result	of	
selection.	
And what are the regional implications?
A	critical	issue	here	is	the	availability	of	the	educational	
opportunities	that	enable	young	people	to	stay	in	the	com-
munity,	or	at	least	in	the	region.	This	has	been	of	concern	
for	decades	and	the	Arctic	can	show	several	examples	of	
deliberate	 policies	 aiming	 to	 improve	 such	 situations.	
Box	 24	 highlights	 examples	 from	 the	 Nordic	 countries	
showing	the	density	and	accessibility	of	universities	and	
higher	education	units.	
Local	access	to	educational	opportunities	has	much	to	
do	with	“sensitive	ages”	in	the	life	cycle.	One	of	the	more	
important	is	the	age	when	young	people	make	decisions	
in	 respect	of	 forming	 families.	Establishing	 themselves	
as	 families	often	defines	where	 they	will	be	staying	 for	
at	least	a	certain	period	of	time	thereafter.	So	if	they	have	
to	 leave	the	region	 in	search	of	education,	 this	more	or	
less	automatically	results	in	a	situation	where	they	may	
decide	 to	 stay,	 not	 in	 the	 community,	 but	 at	 the	 place	
where	education	is	offered.	And	as	a	consequence	strate-
gies	for	providing	development	opportunities	in	northern	
regions	include,	as	Box	25	clearly	shows,	some	examples	
of	this	behaviour.
In	more	recent	social	science	work	it	is	recognised	that	
societies	 adapt	 to	 a	 range	of	 stimuli	 including,	 but	not	
limited	to,	environmental	stress.	Adaptive	capacities	rest	
i.e.	also	on	socio-institutional	relationships	of	exchange.	
Cultures	(or	societies)	which	are	able	to	respond	to	or	cope	
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with	 change	quickly	 and	 easily	 are	 considered	 to	have	
high	adaptability	or	a	high	capacity	to	adapt.
Even	without	climate	change	the	complexity	of	produc-
ing	a	viable	plan	for	sustainable	development	in	the	Arctic	
would	be	daunting;	but	the	added	uncertainty	of	climate	
change	makes	 this	 task	 simply	enormous.	The	 impacts	
on	infrastructure	inevitably	affected	by	climate	change,	
together	with	the	probable	lengthening	of	growing	sea-
sons	and	increasing	agricultural	effort,	opening	of	new	
sea	routes,	changing	fish	stocks	and	ecosystem	changes	
will	provide	many	new	opportunities	for	the	development	
of	Arctic	economies.	However	this	will	also	place	limits	
on	how	much	development	is	actually	sustainable	(IPCC,	
2007).
Sustainable	economic	development	will	be	even	more	
unlikely	if	the	gender	and	age	balance	of	communities	
continues	to	widen.	There	now	appears	to	be	an	increas-
ing	 level	 of	 understanding	 among	 governments	 and	
residents	 that	 environmental	 protection	 and	 sustain-
able	 development	 are	 two	 sides	 of	 the	 same	 coin.	 For	
that	purpose	a	forum	for	circum-Arctic	co-operation	has	
been	established	 in	 the	Arctic	Council	 involving	eight	
nations	and	six	indigenous	peoples’	organisations	and	
embracing	the	concept	of	sustainable	development	in	its	
mandate.
	
Newcomers
While	the	Arctic	communities	are	challenged	by	changes	
in	the	economic	focus	towards	knowledge,	but	still	rely	
on	some	activity	connected	to	resource	extraction,	the	in-
flux	of	a	skilled	labour	force	related	to	traditional	activi-
ties	has	become	an	important	trend.	Two	cases	from	the	
West	Norden	 region	 (Greenland,	Faroe	 Islands,	 Iceland	
and	Western	Norway)	illustrate	the	situation.	The	focus	
here	 is	on	 two	groups	of	people	 from	Poland	and	Thai-
land	respectively.	Further	details	are	provided	in	boxes	
26	and	27.	
The Poles
It	 is	 estimated	 that	 about	 70,000	 Polish	 workers	 were	
working	abroad	in	Europe	before	the	economic	crisis	had	
its	impact	on	the	economic	situation.	Most	of	them	work	
in	the	British	building	sector	and	in	large	scale	industries.	
They	have	also	become	frequent	 travellers	 to	 the	North	
Atlantic	region.	In	Iceland	as	well	as	in	Norway	the	Poles	
are	number	one	on	the	list	of	foreign	citizens	with	resi-
dential	status.	They	are	also	represented	on	the	top-10	list	
in	other	parts	of	West	Norden	–	number	3	 in	 the	Faroe	
Islands,	and	number	6	in	Greenland.	
Their	traditional	experiences	of	mining,	large	scale	in-
dustries	and	large	scale	construction	has	added	to	their	
mobility	with	a	surplus	of	skilled	workers	available	due	
to	the	severe	and	prolonged	crisis	for	many	of	these	ac-
tivities	in	Poland.	From	a	Polish	perspective	they	have	the	
skills	and	qualifications	while	from	the	receiving	coun-
tries	perspective,	this	is	exactly	what	they	need.
Large	scale	mining	and	industrial	projects	require	sig-
nificantly	more	workers	 during	 the	 construction	 phase	
than	they	require	during	the	production	phase	–	often	3–5	
times	as	many.	Therefore	in	the	construction	phase	expe-
rience	shows	that	the	effect	on	domestic	employment	is	
limited.	Foreigners	working	on	temporary	contracts	typi-
cally	account	 for	 three	quarters	of	 the	workforce	 in	 the	
construction	of	the	projects,	while	a	local	or	at	least	partly	
local	workforce	might	be	hired	for	the	operational	phase.
The	construction	of	the	Alcoa	Fjarðaál	smelter	in	East	
Iceland	which	started	in	July	2004	and	finished	in	June	
2007,	hired	more	or	less	continuously	2,200	workers.	Of	
this	20–25%	were	from	Iceland	while	75–80%	came	from	
various	countries	and	most	notably	from	Poland.
During	 the	 construction	 phase	 the	 town	 of	 Reyðar-
fjörður	had	the	highest	concentration	of	foreign	residents	
of	any	community	 in	 Iceland,	and	to	house	employees,	
the	company	erected	a	large	team	village	near	the	exist-
ing	village	of	Reyðarfjörður,	about	three	miles	from	the	
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Between the 1950s and 1970s economic 
growth and the emergence of welfare 
states were witnessed across the Nordic 
countries, and the expansion of tertiary 
education to new parts of the popula-
tion – and to new locations – became an 
essential foundation of these new welfare 
societies. The volume of students in 
tertiary education increased significantly. 
This meant not only that established 
universities had to set up branches in new 
regions; but also that entirely new higher 
education institutions had to be estab-
lished at new locations. In addition, a 
range of municipal and private higher ed-
ucation institutions were nationalised, so 
that tertiary education increasingly came 
under state control. Since the 1960s, 
higher education institution development 
has been presented as a regional policy 
tool which may boost regional develop-
ment in non-metropolitan areas.
 In Norway the policy in relation to 
remote areas – “Distrikspolitikk” – has 
been oriented to support for what is often 
characterised as “weak› regions thus 
retaining a more traditional stance in 
relation to equalisation issues. This ap-
proach sees a marked difference from the 
other Nordic countries where the need for 
a growth policy for the whole country is 
expressed. 
 The main goals of Norwegian Regional 
Policy have been to sustain the geo-
graphic pattern of settlement and the 
creation of value in the whole country 
with Regional Policy being designed to 
secure employment and welfare where 
people live. People should be able to live 
where they want. To promote this, new 
BOX 25: REGIONAL UNIVERSITIES IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES
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universities were established in Trond-
heim and Tromsø towards the end of the 
1960s. During the 1970s and 1980s, a 
new set of higher education institutions 
– specialised in regional public colleges 
– were established in selected regional 
centres that did not currently host 
universities to boost regional education 
capacities. The state university colleges 
were institutionalised as a new higher 
education institution category following 
the 1994 reform of tertiary education. In 
this way, 98 specialised public colleges 
and independent higher education insti-
tutions were merged into 26 new larger 
units – mostly with regional uptake areas.
In Iceland, the University of Iceland was 
founded in 1911, and by 1960 a few other 
colleges provided educational opportu-
nities also outside Reykjavik. The legal 
framework covering higher education in 
Iceland is the Higher Education Institu-
tion Act from 2006. This act applies to 
educational institutions providing higher 
education leading to a degree and which 
have been accredited by the Ministry 
of Education, Science and Culture. The 
ministry has also issued the National 
Qualification Framework for Iceland 
which is a systematic description of the 
structure of education and higher educa-
tion degrees that is specifically based on 
learning outcomes. All accredited higher 
education institutes in Iceland must fol-
low this framework.
 Icelandic regional policy has long had 
a major focus on decentralised activities. 
This is clearly reflected in more recent 
regional policies which have developed 
from three basic ideas: maintaining eco-
nomic vitality across the country, looking 
at growth areas as a driver, and connect-
ing to globalisation by strengthening the 
local level. 
 There are currently seven higher 
education institutions in Iceland that 
fall under the auspices of the Ministry 
of Education, Science and Culture. The 
University of Iceland and the University 
of Akureyri are public universities while 
the Agricultural University of Iceland 
and Holar University College are public 
universities that were formerly under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Reykjavik University, Bifröst University 
and the Iceland Academy of the Arts are 
private institutions that receive state 
funding and operate under structural 
charters approved by the Ministry of Edu-
cation, Science and Culture. The ministry 
concludes performance-related contracts 
with all higher education institutions 
under its administration.
 Establishing educational opportuni-
ties in the Faroe Islands has been an 
important issue since the islands gained 
their independent educational system in 
1979. There are 6 different types of upper 
secondary education, and the exams 
taken at these schools correspond to 
corresponding exams in Denmark. In the 
general higher Secondary Education a 
three year education at upper secondary 
school provides the student with the nec-
essary basic knowledge to access further 
or higher studies at all higher educational 
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institutions, e.g. universities. An alter-
native to this is a Higher Preparatory 
Course, a two year education, intended 
for adults wishing to pursue a delayed 
education. In relation to vocational 
training the Business College, the 
Technical College, the Fishery College, 
the College of Health Education and the 
Marine School all provide students with 
educational opportunities in relation to 
different choices of vocations. 
 The University of the Faroe Islands is 
an educational and research institution, 
and one of the smallest universities 
in the Western world. The University 
offers education of particular relevance 
to the Faroese community that cannot 
be found elsewhere. Recent regional 
developments in the Faroe Islands have 
led to local functional specialisation, as 
the settlements surrounding Tórshavn, 
Runavík and Klaksvík have taken on the 
characteristics of commuting areas with 
emphasis also on providing educa-
tional opportunities. The lack of choice 
in the educational system, however, 
still leaves most of the students with 
the only other option of leaving the 
islands in order to pursue the careers 
of their choice. Around 500 students 
are enrolled in the higher educational 
institutions on the islands, while more 
than 1,000 students study in Denmark. 
 The first attempt to establish educa-
tional opportunities in Greenland was 
through the establishment of a teacher 
training school in 1848 in Nuuk. The 
first formal vocational education was 
enabled in Greenland in 1946, when 
a polytechnic school was established 
in Holsteinsborg (Sisimiut) including 
a home for apprentices. Responsibil-
ity for the education system was taken 
over from the Danish government when 
Home Rule was established in 1979. The 
first political action was the enactment 
of a new school statute, in which it was 
stipulated that the language of instruc-
tion should be Greenlandic. A need for 
the introduction of a broader spectrum 
of educational opportunities resulted 
in the establishing of high schools and 
vocational training colleges in several 
of the larger towns, just as a university 
was established in Nuuk. 
 During the 1980s vocational educa-
tion was decentralised with the estab-
lishment of local vocational schools 
in individual towns. The intention was 
to ensure a more local orientation in 
vocational education and to establish 
better cooperation among school 
administrators and more training sites, 
thereby ensuring continuity in the career 
development of the country›s youth. The 
system was however abandoned after a 
number of years due to the limitations 
imposed on the quality of the training 
provided in the smaller towns. 
 The University of Greenland is the 
major institute of education in Green-
land. It is located in Nuuk and offers 
bachelor and masters’ degrees, as well 
as post-doctorate programmes. Most 
of the courses are taught in Danish due 
to limitations in qualified Greenlandic 
speaking teachers. Some courses are 
however taught in Greenlandic. The 
spectrum of courses includes econom-
ics, law, commerce, management, public 
administration, literature, and theol-
ogy, cultural and social history etc. The 
university offers both bachelor’s and 
master›s degrees.
 By far the larger proportion of univer-
sity students graduate from universities 
outside Greenland, mostly from Den-
mark where choice in the educational 
system provides most of the students 
with a larger variety of options even if it 
means that they have to leave in order to 
pursue their careers of choice.
smelter.	The	village	has	its	own	recreation	area,	dining	
area,	gym	and	internet	café.	By	2008	the	majority	of	the	
construction	workers	had	left	the	region,	looking	for	new	
construction	sites,	 some	 in	 Iceland,	others	 for	 instance	
in	Greenland,	while	still	others	have	returned	to	Poland.
In	Norway	the	construction	of	the	Snøhvit	gas	platform	
in	the	Barents	Sea	as	many	as	1,000	Poles	were	involved	
as	 welders,	 mechanics,	 insulators	 and	 painters	 in	 the	
construction	phase.	Similarly	the	welding	of	pipelines	in	
connection	with	the	Ormen	Lange	gas	project	 in	north-
west	Norway	also	involved	Polish	workers.
A	number	of	 companies	 in	Poland	specialise	 in	 link-
ing	industrial	contractors	with	Polish	workers.	Everet,	for	
instance,	situated	in	Lębork,	is	run	as	a	family	business	
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focused	on	developing	a	commonly	respected	brand	for	
recruitment	services	and	since	2005	has	cooperated	with	
a	Norwegian	business	Partner	in	the	recruitment	of	well-
trained	welders	and	fitters.	One	of	these	was	for	the	Nor-
wegian	company	Fosdalen	who	had	a	contract	 to	build	
racks	as	part	of	the	Ormen	Lange	Project.	
Mining	and	large	scale	industrial	developments	are	ex-
pected	to	contribute	significantly	to	changing	Greenland	
over	the	next	decade.	From	a	country	primarily	based	on	
fishing	and	hunting,	minerals	and	energy	may	very	well	
become	the	main	contributors	to	the	economy.	The	first	in	
line	may	be	an	aluminium	smelter	in	Maniitsoq	similar	to	
the	Alcoa	Fjarðaál	smelter	in	East	Iceland,	the	question	
of	the	influx	of	foreign	workers	and	especially	that	of	the	
future	mobility	of	the	Greenlandic	labour	force	will	thus	
become	of	vital	interest	to	the	authorities,	not	least	with	
regard	to	spatial	planning.
The	establishment	of	the	new	industrial	complexes	will	
probably	not	be	“doable”	based	on	Greenlanders	alone.	
In	 a	 country	with	around	56,000	 inhabitants	 it	will	 be	
impossible	 to	find	 the	4–8,000	skilled	workers	 that	are	
needed.	So	in	the	construction	phase	workers	from	out-
side,	probably	a	large	number	of	welders	and	construc-
tion	workers	from	Poland	will	be	invited.	In	the	produc-
tion	phase	however	the	group	of	workers	needed	will	be	
more	 limited	–in	 the	 range	of	about	600	persons	–	 the	
majority	will	probably	be	Greenlanders.	
The	 ongoing	 process	 of	 building	 a	 new	 Hydropower	
plant	 close	 to	 Sisimiut	 in	West	 Greenland	 is	 being	 un-
dertaken	by	the	Icelandic	company	Ístak.	A	substantial	
number	of	workers	here	also	come	from	Poland.	
The Thais 
From	1998	to	2009	the	total	number	of	Thai	citizens	set-
tling	in	the	far	north,	i.e.	Greenland,	Iceland,	the	Faroe	
Island	and	Svalbard	increased	from	356	to	824	persons	–	a	
total	increase	of	131%	over	11	years!
824	persons	may	not	sound	that	large,	but	in	Greenland	
as	on	Svalbard	the	Thais	are	the	largest	group	of	persons	
with	foreign	citizenship.	They	are	number	4	in	the	Faroe	
Islands	 and	number	8	 in	 Iceland.	 In	Norway	Thais	 are	
number	 10	on	 the	 list,	an	 increase	of	 297%,	 from	1,987	
persons	in	1998	to	7,884	persons	in	2009.	In	both	Iceland	
and	Norway	the	Poles	are	by	far	the	largest	group	of	im-
migrants.
In	gender	terms	of	the	situation	is	more	or	less	the	re-
verse	of	that	of	the	Poles.	Among	Thais	women	constitute	
almost	60%	in	Greenland	and	up	to	85%	in	Norway.	In	
Norway	the	role	of	marriages	with	Norwegian	men	 is	a	
key	factor	in	the	high	female	ratio.	This	is	a	pattern	that	
resembles	the	other	Nordic	countries,	where	the	in-migra-
tion	of	women	from	Thailand	has	helped	to	some	extent	
to	compensate	for	the	general	pattern	of	out-migration	of	
women	from	the	rural	areas.
Similarly,	marriages	have	been	an	important	element	
in	other	parts	of	the	North	Atlantic,	at	least	initially.	How-
ever,	the	possibilities	of	getting	good	jobs	in	the	service	
sector	–	hotels,	restaurants	and	hospitals	–	are	also	im-
portant	for	the	continued	influx	of	women.	Longyearbyen	
on	Svalbard	provides	another	example	of	this.	The	influx	
of	women	 is	 at	 a	 later	 stage	 is	 supplemented	 by	males	
often	leading	to	new	business	activities,	still	connected	
to	the	service	sector.	Thai	restaurants	can	now	be	found	
in	most	of	the	larger	places	in	the	North	Atlantic	region.	
In	Nuuk,	the	capital	of	Greenland,	with	a	population	of	
around	15,000	inhabitants,	the	Thai	restaurant	Charoen 
Porn	employs	16	persons	and	is	among	the	most	popular	
in	 the	 area.	 The	 Thai	 kitchen	 cooks	 with	 Greenlandic	
produce	and	is	considered	to	resemble	“the	best	of	both	
worlds”.	
The	 town	has	 two	shops	with	a	great	variety	of	Thai	
products	–	from	furniture	to	clothes	and	food,	primarily	
servicing	 the	 100	 Thais	 in	 town,	 but	 increasingly	 pro-
viding	 a	 service	 for	 all.	 Thais	 are	 recognised	 as	 being	
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Workers from Poland have been involved 
in many large scale projects in the North 
Atlantic region over the last decade. 
Usually they are there on contracts that 
are clearly temporary and they often 
live in camps that are established as 
temporary or semi-temporary units. In 
the case of the construction of the alu-
minium smelter at Fjarðal in East Iceland 
2,200 workers from Iceland (20-25%), 
Poland and other countries (approxi-
mately 75%, hired directly from various 
countries, most notably from Poland). 
At one point the town of Reyðarfjörður 
had the highest concentration of foreign 
residents of any community in the coun-
try. To house employees, the company 
erected a large team village near the 
existing village of Reyðarfjörður, about 
three miles from the smelter. The village 
had its own recreation area, dining area, 
gym and internet café. After construc-
tion ended most of the workers left and 
it is not clear what the buildings will be 
used for. In connection with the possible 
establishment of a similar smelter close 
to the town of Maniitsoq in Greenland a 
similar accommodation model will prob-
ably be considered.
 Net migratory trends tend, to some 
extent, to portray the regions as losing 
population, which may be interpreted as 
a sign of economic and social decline. 
But the reality is more nuanced, both 
in terms of the actual flows that occur 
and in their geographic patterns, as 
illustrated by the attraction of the 
region as seen from other parts of the 
world. Negative net migration figures 
in these areas should be related to the 
much larger and constant circulation of 
people in all regions and municipalities. 
While domestic net migration figures 
may be systematically negative the 
international net migration figures need 
to be taken into consideration. While the 
latter figures regarding the influx from 
other countries do not compensate for 
the national loss, they may be sugges-
tive of future trends. Among the ways of 
compensating for demographic losses 
resulting from domestic migrations from 
north to south and from the periphery to 
the core, international immigration has 
been considered a possible solution. It 
is however a major challenge to attract 
people with the appropriate competen-
cies and profile, to integrate them in 
small local communities and to encour-
age them to settle on a perennial basis. 
The two examples – attracting workers 
from Poland and Thailand – clearly show 
very different approaches. But they may 
nevertheless indicate potentials for the 
regions possessing a workforce with 
competencies within relevant sectors 
of activity, here e.g. mining, fishing, 
services, etc. The difficulties associated 
with predicting both short- and long 
term migration trends is however remain 
a major challenge, and this will undoubt-
edly be a major political issue for the 
future.  
BOX 26: THE POLES
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not	only	good	workers	but	also	a	very	stable	workforce.	
The	restaurant	the	chef	works	for	has	been	in	Nuuk	for	
14	years,	while	two	other	cooks	have	been	there	for	more	
than	10	years.
The	question	of	integration	in	the	community	is	often	a	
major	factor	when	it	comes	to	newcomers’	decisions	about	
staying	or	leaving.	Within	the	Thai	community	network-
ing	is	a	major	factor	in	stabilising	the	community.	Inter-
views	 with	 Thais	 in	 Longyearbyen,	 Svalbard,	 indicate	
that	integration	in	the	local	community	is	not	necessarily	
an	issue.	None	of	the	interviewed	persons	had	any	expec-
tations	in	this	regard.	Those	married	to	Norwegians	were	
however	expected	to	become	more	involved,	especially	in	
the	case	of	raising	children.	
Questions	of	integration	and	of	long-term	community	
involvement	did	not,	however,	appear	 to	be	decisive	 in	
relation	to	the	decision	to	stay	or	leave.	But	the	little	en-
clave	served	as	a	cultural	setting	for	them,	and	turned	out	
to	be	decisive	regarding	whether	or	not	to	stay.	They	had	
no	specific	strategy	in	respect	of	leaving	as	long	as	they	
had	good	income	opportunities	and	felt	accepted	by	the	
community.	
Similar	examples	to	those	already	mentioned	are	avail-
able	 from	other	parts	of	 the	Arctic.	 In	Alaska,	 the	fish-
ing	 industry	 is	highly	dependent	on	a	 temporary	work-
force	from	Asia.	The	men	and	women	doing	this	type	of	
work	are	mostly	seasonal	workers	from	the	Philippines.	
They	work	12	to	16	hour	days,	6	or	7	days	a	week.	Fish	is	
a	seasonal	and	fresh	product	which	has	to	be	processed	
as	soon	as	possible.	Temporary	workers	provide	both	a	
cheap	and	efficient	workforce	in	this	respect.	
megatrends
122
“I came to Greenland in 2002 on a 
two year contract to work in a grill bar 
in Ilulissat in North Greenland. I was 
employed by Master Meng, who came 
to Greenland in 1977. He owns different 
fast food restaurants around in Green-
land. I met Konrad in 2004, and it turned 
out that we became interested in each 
other, so we got married in the summer 
of 2005. Konrad was born in Paamiut and 
has worked in the fishing industry for 
several years, lately in connection with 
the processing of snow crabs. We have 
our own house, and we like living here in 
Paamiut with many of Konrad’s relatives 
and friends living nearby. By the way, 
we are both going to visit Thailand again 
next year. We love the country, have a lot 
of relatives and a good network there, 
and I am happy to be able to maintain my 
relations with my country of origin.”
 This is in short the story of Rutchana, 
one of the 100 citizens from Thailand 
presently living in Greenland. Her story is 
quite similar to that of many others in the 
North Atlantic region.
 Quite often the influx of women at a 
later stage is supplemented by males. 
And this very often leads to new business 
activities, still connected to the service 
sector. Thai restaurants are becoming 
increasingly common in most of the larger 
places in the North Atlantic region. In 
Nuuk, the capital of Greenland, with a 
population around 15,000 inhabitants the 
Thai restaurant employs 16 persons and 
is one of the most popular restaurants in 
town. The Thai kitchen with Greenlandic 
produce is considered to resemble “the 
BOX 27: THE THAIS
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best of both worlds”.  In addition the 
town has two shops with all kinds of Thai 
products – from furniture to clothes and 
food, first of all servicing the group of 100 
Thais in town, but increasingly becoming 
an important supplement to the shop-
ping opportunities for all in the town. 
The Thais are recognised as being not 
only good workers but also a very stable 
workforce. In the case of the restaurant 
the chef has been there for 14 years while 
two other cooks have been there for more 
than 10 years. 
 While the question of integration in the 
community is often a major factor when 
it comes to newcomers decisions about 
staying or leaving, the question of net-
working within the Thai community is a 
major factor in stabilising the community. 
Interviews with Thais in Longyearbyen, 
Svalbard, indicate that integration in the 
local community is not necessarily an is-
sue. None of the interviewed persons had 
any expectations in respect of becoming 
integrated into the community. Those 
married to Norwegians of course were 
expected to become involved in com-
munity activities, especially in the case 
of children. The question of integration 
and the question of long term community 
involvement, however, did not appear to 
be decisive in relation to staying or leav-
ing. But the little “enclave” served as a 
cultural setting for them, and turned out 
to be decisive in determining whether or 
not they would stay. They had no specific 
strategy regarding leaving as long as 
they had good income opportunities and 
felt accepted by the community.

Private – Public relations
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In	most	parts	of	the	Arctic	the	public	sector	still	tends	to	
dominate	the	economy.	The	reasons	for	this	often	differ	
–	geopolitical	considerations,	colonial	characteristics,	re-
gional	policies	etc	–	but	the	consequences	have	neverthe-
less	been	quite	similar:	a	large	public	sector	with	the	state	
and	regional	authorities	involved	in	most	regulation	and	
planning	measures.	Map	11	provides	a	good	illustration	of	
this	situation,	showing	the	distribution	of	jobs	between	
the	public	and	the	private	sectors.	
Parallel	to	this,	a	private	sector	has	recently	emerged	
and	has	to	some	extent	replaced	the	public	authorities	as	
the	main	provider	of	services.	In	addition	it	is	clear	that	
the	locus	of	political	power	formerly	held	by	the	central-
ised	public	authority	has	now	moved	towards	the	region-
al	and	municipal	level.	
In	Russia	these	changes	have	been	quite	explicit	but	to	
some	extent	they	are	taking	place	all	over	the	Arctic.	How	
privatisation	is	reflected	in	the	everyday	life	of	the	popu-
lation	is	illustrated	in	map	12	showing	the	level	of	owner-
ship	of	dwellings	in	the	Arctic.	It	is	an	overview	of	the	sta-
tus	as	of	2010,	and	as	will	be	explained	below,	reflects	the	
marked	changes	which	have	taken	place	in	Russia	over	
the	last	decade.	In	other	areas	the	process	has	been	much	
slower,	and	for	a	large	part	of	the	population	the	share	of	
dwellings	owned	by	the	dwellers	still	plays	a	minor	role.
In	between	these	public	and	private	sectors	coopera-
tives	have	also	become	important	players	in	the	develop-
ment	 process,	 and	 are	 now	 important	 players	 in	many	
parts	of	the	Arctic.	A	discussion	on	the	role	of	coopera-
tives	is	conducted	below	(see	box	28).	
As	some	of	 the	major	changes	over	 the	 last	 ten	years	
have	 occurred	 in	 Russia,	 followed	 by	 similar	 trends,	
across	other	parts	of	the	Arctic,	the	Russian	process	will	
be	the	starting	point	for	discussion	in	this	chapter.	
The process of privatisation in Russia
The	mandate	 to	privatise	 in	Russia	was	 taken	by	 the	
federal	government	following	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	
Union.	Until	1991	practically	everything	was	state-owned.	
The	 exception	 was	 cooperative	 enterprises	 (collective	
The map shows the distribution between 
employment in public versus private 
activities in the Arctic, and reflects the 
role of these two types of activities in 
the economics of the region. Accord-
ing to the OECD the public sector today 
represents between 5% and 28% of the 
workforce in most OECD countries, with 
the numbers  remaining rather stable 
over the last decade. 
 Looking at the Arctic there is around 
a 50/50 division between the two sec-
tors on average. The public sector has 
a huge influence on livelihoods in the 
Arctic simply by providing around half 
of all employment in the region. But as 
shown on the map marked differences 
exist. In NW Russia the public sector is 
slightly below 50%. This is similar to the 
situation in Fennoscandia  and the Faroe 
Islands. An exception here is Murmansk 
where the private sector is below the 
50% mark. Greenland is close to the 
50/50 mark, while Nunavik, Nunavut, 
Chukotka and Sakha are regions where 
the public sector contributes more than 
50% of the employed workforce, in the 
case of Chukotka this is substantially 
more. From NWT towards Alaska the 
public sector involvement declines, with 
Alaska being the part of the Arctic where 
the Public sector contributes least. What 
is not shown on the map however is the 
fact that public employment could be 
subdivided into government-related 
activities versus public (quasi-)corpora-
tions. While the first type dominates for 
instance in Fennoscandia, with only a 
small percentage of jobs in public corpo-
rations, the percentage is substantially 
higher in Canada and in Greenland. 
MAP 11: PUBLIC-PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT IN THE ARCTIC
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farms	and	consumers	cooperative	societies),	constituting	
5%	of	the	economy	at	most.	
In	1991–1992	a	number	of	regulatory	acts	were	issued,	
governing	the	process	of	the	privatisation	of	state	enter-
prises.	 The	 first	 stage	 involved	 dividing	 state	 property	
into	three	levels:	federal,	regional	and	municipal.
The	federal	level	included	mainly	military	enterprises	
and	entities	ensuring	the	security	of	the	country	as	well	
as	the	transport	and	energy	infrastructure.	Federal	prop-
erty	also	came	to	include	large	enterprises,	higher	edu-
cational	establishments,	 large	providers	of	utilities,	ag-
ricultural	enterprises,	etc.	However,	these	could	also	be	
transferred	to	the	regional	ownership.	
Regional	ownership	was	formed	on	the	leftover	princi-
ple	and	its	amount	depended	on	the	decisions	of	the	fed-
eral	government.	
The	 municipal	 level	 included	 housing	 enterprises,	
utilities,	shops;	healthcare,	culture	and	sports	facilities;	
consumer	services	enterprises,	etc.	Thus,	the	majority	of	
former	state	property	was	distributed	between	the	federal	
and	municipal	levels.	
Through	this	type	of	division	of	former	state	property,	
municipalities	obtained	both	properties	like	shops,	pro-
viders	of	consumer	services,	and	large	scale	utilities	in-
cluding	 hospitals,	 swimming-halls,	 gyms	 etc.	 Usually	
these	required	large	investments	and	were	more-or-less	
unprofitable.	 Only	 auxiliary	 enterprises	were	 as	 a	 rule	
transferred	into	regional	control.	
For	example,	 in	 the	Magadan	region	by	1993	 the	 in-
ventory	of	 regional	property	 included	only	45%	of	 the	
total	number	of	enterprises	that	might	have	been	trans-
ferred	to	the	regional	level.	The	40	mining	enterprises	
of	 the	 region,	which	were	 the	 bedrock	 of	 the	 region’s	
economy,	became	 federal	property.	Not	a	 single	enter-
prise	playing	a	significant	part	in	the	region’s	economy	
became	regional	property.	Such	a	distribution	of	prop-
erty	effectively	maintained	the	region’s	dependency	on	
the	federal	authorities.	
Just as public employment has been a 
trademark for the Arctic, also pub-
lic housing has made an important 
contribution to the improvement of 
housing conditions in the Arctic. Rented 
dwellings – apartments, terraced or 
semidetached houses as well as indi-
vidual houses – often in connection with 
employment and with favourable rental 
conditions as part of the employment 
contract, is still important in many 
regions. The current situation is shown 
on the map, and illustrates a divide be-
tween the regions – Greenland, Nunavik, 
Nunavut, NWT, Chukotka, Taimyr and 
Nenets – where most of the dwellings 
are rented, and the other regions where 
there is a dominance of owner-occupied 
dwellings. In the Faroe Islands almost 
all dwellings are privately owned. Only a 
few apartments are rented out and these 
are typically basement apartments 
rented by students or single persons.  
Nunavik, Nunavut and Greenland are 
among the regions where the major-
ity of dwellings are owned by public 
organisations, for instance in Greenland 
by the Greenland Government or the 
municipalities, or in a few cases by large 
companies. 
 Looking back just 15 years the picture 
would have been very different. In 
Russia where the majority  of dwellings 
today are privately owned, fifteen years 
ago most would have been either state 
owned or owned by cooperatives. And 
fewer dwellings in Greenland were also 
privately owned at that time. The proc-
esses toward privatisation in Russia and 
Greenland have been very different, in 
Russia the process occurred over a very 
short period of time, while in Greenland 
the process has been much more evo-
lutionary in nature. A similar process is 
only now taking off in the Eastern Arctic 
in Canada.
MAP 12:  HOUSING IN THE ARCTIC
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It has been estimated that the livelihood 
of half of the world’s population has been 
made secure by co-operative enterprise, 
and they provide more than 100 million 
jobs around the world which is 20% more 
than multinational enterprises. 
 Cooperatives are economic institu-
tions, for instance consumers coop-
eratives are formed to obtain improved 
products and services at better prices,  
retail businesses use them to gain 
benefits in terms of group purchasing or 
other shared activities while employees 
utilise the cooperative form of business 
to improve their income and equity posi-
tions in a company. Among the advan-
tages of cooperatives are that they build 
community assets, they usually stay in 
business longer, and they merge busi-
ness and community participation. At the 
same time cooperatives are usually lo-
cally owned and controlled, contributing 
to the strengthening of the local economy 
through employment and the ability to 
exercise some form of control over the 
economy.
 Cooperatives function within a broad 
spectrum of activities, including produc-
tion, consumer affairs, housing, insur-
ance and worker cooperatives plus credit 
unions. Most visible are the shops which 
are part of the core distribution system 
for consumer goods. 
 It is generally recognised that coopera-
tives have had a huge impact on develop-
ment in the Arctic even though there 
are substantial differences in approach 
between them. According to the Canadian 
Cooperative Association (CCA) there are 
over 10,000 cooperatives operating in 
Canada, with nearly 12 million members 
and assets totalling over $169 billion. 
BOX	28: THE ROLE OF COOPERATIVES IN THE ARCTIC
Later,	after	1996,	the	process	of	property	distribution	
continued,	although	less	actively.	This	mostly	dealt	with	
the	division	of	enterprises	into	smaller	units	and	the	re-
distribution	of	their	property.	
The	second	stage	was	the	process	of	“small”	privatisa-
tion	and	the	transformation	of	 large	and	medium-sized	
enterprises	into	joint	stock	companies.	This	was	the	proc-
ess	of	privatising	municipal	enterprises	like	shops,	cafes,	
hairdressers’	and	repair	shops,	etc.	This	process	peaked	
in	1992–1993.	By	1996	the	majority	of	these	facilities	had	
been	privatised.	The	main	method	of	“small”	privatisa-
tion	was	sale	of	enterprises	at	special	auctions.	Some	part	
of	the	municipal	property	was	however	transformed	into	
joint	stock	companies.	
The	 process	 of	 “small”	 privatisation	 was	 completed	
very	quickly.	Thus,	 in	 the	Magadan	region,	35	 formerly	
municipal	entities	(mainly	shops	and	consumer	services	
enterprises)	were	 privatised	 in	 1992,	 250	 in	 1993,	 75	 in	
1994,	69	in	1995	and	7	in	1996.	In	the	following	years	there	
were	very	few	further	instances	of	privatisation.
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In	Murmansk	region	this	process	unfolded	at	a	some-
what	 different	 pace.	 The	 aim	 of	 the	 privatisation	 pro-
gramme	was	 to	 privatise	 524	 such	 enterprises	 in	 1992.	
However,	only	126	municipal	enterprises	were	privatised	
with	a	further	109	in	1993.	The	municipalities	and	the	em-
ployees	in	these	enterprises	tried	to	avoid	privatisation.	
This	was	precipitated	by	the	desire	to	retain	their	income	
basis,	as	in	the	course	of	privatisation	they	lost	not	only	
enterprises,	but	virtually	the	entire	stock	of	real	estate	oc-
cupied	by	these	enterprises	at	the	time	of	privatisation.	
For	 the	 employees,	 entering	 a	 free	 market	 required	
marketing	efforts	to	retain	their	client	base.	At	the	same	
time,	being	a	municipal	enterprise	guaranteed	minimum	
wages,	irrespective	of	performance,	and	the	possibility	to	
operate	at	a	loss.	Everything	earned	by	such	enterprises	
above	the	minimum	income	determined	by	the	munici-
pality	was	appropriated	either	by	the	employees	or	their	
managers,	which	was	possible	in	the	context	of	the	gener-
ally	underdeveloped	state	tax	service.	As	a	result,	by	mid-
Northern regions compared to those in 
the South are much more involved in 
cooperative activities. The average north-
ern cooperative was larger ($4.3 million 
volume of business) than the southern 
cooperatives ($1.0 million volume of 
business) and the average northern 
cooperative employed 162. Within Arctic 
Canada there are also marked differ-
ences. According to the Government of 
Yukon Registrar there are six registered 
cooperatives in the territory while there 
are 21 in Nunavut and 8 in NWT.  
 In the Nordic Countries 19% of the dis-
tribution of consumer goods in Sweden 
is from cooperatives. The numbers for 
the other Nordic countries are: Norway – 
25%, Denmark 39%, and Finland – 43%. 
In Greenland around 30,000 persons are 
registered as members of “Brugsen”, the 
Greenlandic consumer cooperative. The 
first shop was established in 1963, and 
today 13 shops in all major towns are 
servicing the retail market. Besides retail 
sale the organisation also produces local 
products. 
 In Alaska different activities are or-
ganised through cooperatives, including 
telephone, electricity, and law related 
cooperatives, cooperative banks, sea-
food producers, and credit unions, and in 
24 towns across the state there are Con-
sumer Organisations and cooperatives. In 
Russian major changes in the ownership 
structure have taken place during the last 
15 years. Cooperatives used to be one of 
the most important forms of ownership 
besides state ownership. Some have 
been converted into private enterprises 
or acquired by the state. 
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1997,	in	Murmansk	region	only	406	municipal	enterprises	
had	been	privatised.	
Thus,	the	privatisation	of	municipal	enterprises	went	
rather	fast,	although	it	was	not	complete.	Practically	the	
entire	wholesale	and	retail	trade,	consumer	services	and	
public	catering	were	privatised.	
From	this	process	of	“small”	privatisation	emerged	the	
small	business	sector.	In	1994	the	number	of	small	busi-
nesses	in	Arctic	regions	exceeded	thirty	thousand,	many	
of	them	highly	unprofitable.	By	1998	the	number	had	been	
reduced	to	around	twenty	thousand,	primarily	 through	
liquidation.	It	was	only	by	2006	that	the	number	of	small	
businesses	in	the	Arctic	regions	once	again	reached	the	
level	of	1994.	
State	 owned	 enterprises	 (regional	 and	 federal)	 were	
transformed	into	joint	stock	companies	before	privatisa-
tion	began.	In	1993–1999	in	the	Arctic	regions	of	Russia,	
about	1,500	state	enterprises	were	changed	to	joint	stock	
companies,	in	2000–2009	another	300	followed	suit.
This	transformation	into	joint	stock	companies	was	an	
uneven	process.	In	1993–1994	in	the	Magadan	region,	111	
federal	 and	 regional	 enterprises	were	 turned	 into	 joint	
stock	 companies,	 constituting	 15%	of	 all	 enterprises	 at	
most.	The	peak	was	in	1996	while	1998–2001	saw	a	slump.	
By	the	end	of	the	2000s	all	large	and	medium-sized	fed-
eral	and	regional	enterprises	liable	for	privatisation	had	
become	joint	stock	companies.	
Through	1992–1996,	in	the	Murmansk	region,	152	joint	
stock	companies	were	established.	During	this	period	all	
large	enterprises,	forming	the	basis	of	the	regional	econ-
omy,	were	transformed	into	joint	stock	companies.	After	
that	the	process	was	frozen	until	the	mid-2000s.	From	the	
mid-2000s	on	the	process	of	transformation	continued	by	
means	of	the	transformation	of	state	unitary	enterprises.
The	third	stage	of	privatisation	was	the	floating	of	the	
shares	of	privatised	enterprises	on	the	open	market.	Over	
the	period	1992–1996	a	portion	of	the	shares	were	given	to	
the	employees	of	these	enterprises	for	free,	the	remainder	
were	sold	at	auction	by	the	state	property	fund	or	turned	
into	a	fixed	governmental	shareholding.	
During	 the	 period	 of	 transformation	 into	 joint	 stock	
companies,	 a	 “golden	 share”	was	 introduced,	 giving	 a	
casting	vote	at	a	 shareholders’	meeting	 to	 the	 state	au-
thority	for	a	certain	period	of	time.	In	1995	the	state	re-
tained	control	over	28%	of	enterprises	privatised	in	that	
year	in	the	Arctic	regions,	in	the	form	of	a	controlling	in-
terest	and/or	a	“golden	share”.	
On	average,	the	process	of	transformation	into	a	joint	
stock	 company	 and	of	moving	 from	 state	 ownership	 to	
mixed	ownership	and	then	into	completely	private	own-
ership	 took	 3–4	 years.	 In	 Murmansk	 region	most	 joint	
stock	companies	remained	in	mixed	ownership	until	the	
mid-1990s,	i.e.	the	state	retained	a	certain	shareholding.	
By	the	late	1990s,	the	state	retained	its	presence	in	only	
25%	joint	stock	companies	across	the	region.	
Regional	authorities	have	however	continued	to	retain	
major	 influence.	 In	 the	 Murmansk	 region	 Severonickel	
and	 Pechenganickel	 are	 enterprises	 formed	 by	 nearby	
towns	and	villages.	In	1998	the	owners	of	these	enterpris-
es	intended	to	close	them	down	because	of	the	prevailing	
situation	on	the	world	nickel	market.	This	would	have	led	
to	the	closing	of	the	settlements	themselves	and	to	unem-
ployment	for	about	thirty	thousand	people.	
The	regional	authority	interfered	actively	in	this	situa-
tion.	Under	its	influence	the	new	company	JSC (Kola Met-
allurgical and Mining Company)	was	created,	which	has	
continued	operating	up	to	the	present	time.	The	regional	
authority	used	indirect	leverage	over	the	company	own-
ers	as	the	state	was	not	a	shareholder	of	either	enterprises	
or	the	newly	created	company.	
The	difficult	situation	faced	by	numerous	enterprises	
after	privatisation	has	often	provided	the	basis	for	inter-
ference	from	the	state.	In	1996	the	state	returned	to	itself	
25%	of	the	shares	of	one	of	the	largest	enterprises,	the	JSC 
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Kovdorsky Mining Processing Plant, in	the	Murmansk	re-
gion	by	means	of	a	judicial	procedure	(breach	of	invest-
ment	conditions	of	privatisation).	The	enterprise	was	on	
the	verge	of	bankruptcy.
At	the	beginning	of	the	following	year,	1997,	21%	of	the	
shares	in	the	Kovdorsky Mining Processing Plant	were	re-
turned	to	municipal	ownership	to	the	city	of	Murmansk	
(within	 the	 framework	 of	 a	 pre-trial	 settlement).	 Thus,	
46%	of	shares	were	now	under	the	virtual	control	of	the	
regional	government,	which	ensured	full	control	over	the	
enterprise,	as	the	other	significant	shareholding	of	about	
30%	at	 that	 time	was	 scattered	 among	 the	 enterprise’s	
employees.	
The	regional	government	was	able	to	stabilise	the	oper-
ation	of	the	company,	organise	product	sales	and	achieve	
the	annual	profit	of	30	million	roubles	by	1999.	In	2001	the	
decision	was	made	to	sell	the	state	and	municipal	share-
holding.	The	private	mineral	and	chemical	company	Eu-
roChem thus	became	the	owner	of	the	JSC Kovdorsky Min-
ing Processing Plant.	
At	the	same	time,	the	regional	authorities	tried	to	re-
tain	influence	over	the	enterprises	located	in	their	terri-
tory.	The	reason	for	this	was	that	in	most	northern	regions	
enterprise	 assets	 are	 “stationary”,	 i.e.	 closely	 tied	 to	 a	
certain	space,	which	is	true	for	oil	and	gas,	metallurgical	
enterprises,	the	mining	industry	etc.	It	thus	became	im-
portant	who	controls	these	enterprises	–	trusted	business	
structures,	closely	cooperating	with	regional	and	munici-
pal	authorities,	or	“outsiders”,	who	are	hard	to	influence.	
Therefore,	 regional	 authorities	 interfered	 actively	 both	
with	the	process	of	the	initial	division	of	state	property	
and	with	the	following	periods	of	reorganisation,	seeking	
to	establish	either,	their	own	direct	control,	or	the	control	
of	trusted	owners	over	the	territory’s	assets.	
In	the	1990s	in	Komi	Republic	a	group	of	senior	region-
al	managers,	on	behalf	of	the	citizens,	obtained	control	
over	the	main	large	enterprises	of	the	region	and	subsoil	
plots	 with	 attractive	mineral	 reserves.	 The	 struggle	 by	
outside	private	capital	to	buy	up	regional	property	end-
ed	in	2001	when	the	regional	authority	changed	and	the	
main	 regional	 enterprises	were	 transferred	 into	private	
ownership.	
At	the	same	time	the	interaction	between	regional	au-
thorities	and	large	enterprises	is	retained	due	to	the	“mi-
gration”	of	regional	officials	into	the	managing	bodies	of	
the	enterprises	and	vice versa.	To	a	greater	or	lesser	extent	
this	happens	in	all	regions.	
The	state	restored	control	over	large	enterprises,	in	par-
ticular,	over	 the	power	giants,	by	placing	high-ranking	
officials	at	the	head	of	their	boards	of	directors.	Not	only	
does	 the	 Russian	 government	 promote	 the	 interests	 of	
leading	companies,	but	it	integrates	them	into	the	deci-
sion	making	process	–	sometimes	for	the	benefit	of	firms	
and	their	leaders	and	against	national	interests.	
In	the	mid-2000s,	the	federal	power	promoted	further	
privatisation	of	the	remaining	enterprises.	In	accordance	
with	the	law,	by	2009	the	local	governments	must	either	
privatise	or	transfer	into	the	state	ownership	the	property	
that	does	not	serve	to	ensure	the	performance	of	the	lo-
cal	 authorities’	 functions.	 To	 date,	 only	 social	 sphere	
enterprises	may	remain	as	municipal	property,	such	as	
schools,	kindergartens,	outpatient	clinics	and	hospitals.	
A	similar	decision	on	the	privatisation	of	state	property	
was	made	with	respect	to	enterprises	that	were	not	used	
for	 the	 performance	 of	 state	 functions.	 Since	 2005	 the	
state	has	sought	to	systematically	decrease	the	number	
of	 unitary	 enterprises.	Most	 of	 them	went	 through	 the	
transformation	into	joint	stock	companies	with	the	state	
retaining	100%	of	the	shares	in	its	ownership.	Then	they	
were	offered	for	privatisation.	
In	addition,	the	following	were	offered	for	privatisation:	
shareholdings	in	enterprises	owned	by	the	state,	not	ex-
ceeding	50%	of	the	statutory	capital;	any	shareholdings	
of	enterprises	in	the	fuel	and	energy	complex,	construc-
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tion	complexes,	civil	aviation,	transport,	etc.,	including	
those	 that	had	been	previously	categorised	as	strategic	
enterprises	and	had	not	been	liable	to	privatisation.	
During	 the	 economic	 transition	 period	 (1992–1999)	
over	6,000	enterprises	were	privatised	 in	 the	Arctic	 re-
gions.	During	the	period	2000–2009,	within	the	frame-
work	of	the	programme	of	selling	off	non-core	state	and	
municipal	property,	almost	800	enterprises	were	priva-
tised.	Notwithstanding	the	fact	that	these	seem	like	large	
numbers,	only	about	50%	of	the	enterprises	existing	in	
1990	have	as	yet	been	privatised.	A	considerable	number	
of	enterprises	still	 remain	 in	state	ownership,	although	
their	 organisational	 structure	 has	 changed,	 the	 others	
were	liquidated	or	reorganised	into	other	types	of	struc-
tures.	
As	 for	 the	 entire	 Russian	Arctic,	 by	 2007	 the	 federal	
government	 retained	 direct	 control	 over	 600	 enterpris-
es	 registered	or	operating	 in	 the	Arctic	 regions.	Among	
them	34	enterprises	with	100%	state	shareholding,	3	en-
terprises	with	50%	state	shareholding,	9	–	with	a	state	
shareholding	of	25–50%	and	8	with	a	state	shareholding	
of	less	than	25%	were	intended	to	be	further	privatised	
from	federal	property.	
In	part	these	were	the	enterprises	for	which	no	buyer	
had	been	found	(for	example,	the	failed	attempt,	in	2003,	
to	 sell	 the	 shares	 of	 JSC Sea Port Edvekinot	 located	 in	
Chukotka	 AO),	 and	 partly	 also	 the	 unattractiveness	 of	
enterprises	relating	to	 the	nuclear	 industry	and	the	old	
military-industrial	complex.	
The	 remaining	 non-privatised	 enterprises	 often	 re-
main	 in	state	ownership	as	 there	are	no	private	entre-
preneurs	willing	 to	 acquire	 them.	 By	 2007	 there	were	
80	enterprises	prepared	for	privatisation	however	only	
29	were	subsequently	privatised.	In	the	following	year	
the	state	attempted	to	privatise	an	even	larger	number	
of	enterprises	–	about	120,	but	only	39	were	privatised.	
These	failures	occurred,	in	addition	to	the	low	economic	
attractiveness	of	the	assets,	because	of	their	overrated	
auction	price	and	sale	in	a	single	lot.	It	is	now	planned	
to	 transfer	 into	 regional	 property	 this	 group	 of	 non-
privatised	 enterprises.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 planned	 to	 transfer	
into	regional	ownership	the	air-transport	companies	of	
Khanty-Mansi	and	Yamalo-Nenetsk,	servicing	remote	ar-
eas	and	field	camps.	
On	 the	whole,	 across	Russia,	 the	 share	of	 joint	 stock	
companies	fully	owned	by	the	state	has	been	increasing.	
One	can	assume	 that	 the	same	 tendency	 is	 true	 for	 the	
Arctic	 regions.	According	 to	 albeit	 incomplete	 data,	 by	
2010	 the	 federal	 government	 had	 retained	 control	 over	
more	than	200	enterprises	situated	in	the	Arctic	regions	
due	to	being	in	ownership	of	the	major	share	of	the	statu-
tory	capital	owning	about	400	unitary	enterprises.	
In	addition,	the	list	of	strategic	companies	in	the	Rus-
sian	 Federation	 (i.e.	 not	 liable	 to	 privatisation)	 still	 in-
cludes	about	12	enterprises	registered	or	operating	in	the	
Arctic	regions.	About	40	enterprises	formerly	included	on	
the	strategic	list	have	however	now	been	excluded	from	
it.	Exclusion	from	this	list	does	not	mean	that	all	of	them	
are	sure	to	be	privatised.	Most	will	be	transformed	into	
joint	 stock	companies	with	 100%	state	 shareholding	or	
included	in	state	corporations.	
On	the	whole,	one	may	speak	about	strengthening	state	
management	and	control	over	key	natural	resources.	It	is	
typical	for	Russia	that	the	state’s	portion	of	the	economic	
gain	from	the	recovery	of	oil	and	gas	resources	and	dia-
monds	in	the	Russian	Arctic	 is	appropriated	exclusively	
by	the	federal	power.	Priority	state	control	and	regulation	
are	exercised	with	respect	to	such	strategic	industries	as	
fuel	and	energy,	transport	and	communications.	
At	the	same	time	there	are	examples	of	a	considerable	
reduction	in	the	level	of	state	control,	when	corporations	
exert	 such	 considerable	 influence	 (financial,	 political,	
etc.,)	over	region	development,	that	the	area	is	virtually	
privatised	together	with	 its	 institutional	 infrastructure,	
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with	 the	 entire	 territory	 turning	 into	 a	 “quasi-corpora-
tion”.	
One	 can	 thus	 see	 an	 intensification	 of	 the	 transition	
from	direct	interference	where	the	state	acts	as	both	a	reg-
ulator	and	an	entrepreneur	in	respect	of	the	principles	of	
indirect	management.	The	influence	is	redistributed	both	
between	companies	and	the	state	and	between	different	
levels	of	power.	One	of	the	tools	of	such	indirect	influence	
is	establishing	formal	ecological	and	social	 restrictions	
for	corporations.	
Privatising resources
Individual	 Transferable	 Quotas	 (ITQ)	 are	 quotas	 or	
quota	shares	allocated	to	fishermen	or	fishing	vessels	in	
such	a	way	that	the	rights	can	be	utilised,	sold	or	rented	
out	by	the	holder	of	the	right.	What	may	once	have	been	
a	public	 resource	 is	 thus	 turned	 into	a	 form	of	private	
ownership.
The	 introduction	of	 the	 system	was	a	 reaction	 to	 the	
experiences	 of	 over-fishing	 and	 over-investment	 under	
former	 management	 systems.	 Inventors	 claim	 that	 the	
system	should	be	an	efficient	fisheries	conservation	ena-
bling	fishermen	to	plan	fisheries	activities	over	the	longer	
term.	It	has	been	argued	that	ownership	of	a	certain	share	
of	a	fish	stock	could	therefore	be	considered	to	favour	a	
more	sustainable	utilisation	of	the	stock.	Others,	howev-
er,	argue	that	this	perception	of	the	disadvantages	of	the	
former	systems	and	advantages	of	the	ITQ	system	has	to	
be	taken	with	some	reservation.	
A	major	issue	here	is	the	extent	to	which	the	expected	
adapting	of	fisheries	capacity	to	the	fishing	opportunity	
in	the	ITQs	system	will	be	real.	“Upgrading”	–	discarding	
undervalued	fish	in	order	to	get	a	higher	market	price	for	
the	landed	catch	–	would	be	a	negative	side	effect	of	the	
system.	Only	being	allowed	to	land	a	certain	catch	under	
conditions	where	market	prices	are	low	might	bring	the	
quota	holders	to	undertake	such	unsustainable	actions.	
The	consequences	of	the	ITQ	system	in	Iceland	are	dis-
cussed	in	box	29.	
Another	potential	effect	of	the	ITQs	could	be	capital	
concentration	 as	 wealthier	 fishermen	 look	 for	 oppor-
tunities	 to	purchase	others’	quotas	while	 the	desire	 to	
reduce	transport	costs	through	improved	market	access	
may	lead	to	physical	concentration	in	the	larger	towns.	
In	 addition,	 a	 side	 effect	 here	might	 be	 the	 closure	 of	
coastal	fisheries	unless	other	means	of	regulation	are	in-
troduced.	In	most	market	economies	such	consequences	
are	regulated	by	public	policy	measures,	and	the	case	of	
Iceland	is	a	good	example	of	the	complexities	involved	
here	(see	box	30).
ITQ	management	has	been	emphasised	as	a	system	that	
focuses	 more	 on	 the	 regulation	 of	 economic	 efficiency	
than	on	resource	efficiency.	It	might	provide	the	highest	
yield	per	capital	input,	but	this	does	not	necessarily	mean	
the	highest	yield	for	society.	One	advantage	of	small	scale	
fisheries	here	is	that	not	only	the	most	valuable	resources	
are	involved	but	also	that	less	valuable	fishing	opportuni-
ties	would	be	utilised,	because	spending	a	day	on	fishing	
and	returning	with	low	value	fish	would	be	better	than	
returning	home	without	any	fish.	In	the	context	of	large	
scale	fisheries	what	counts	is	the	outcome	of	a	2–3	week	
trip,	and	here	it	is	not	the	daily	catch,	but	what	has	been	
caught	during	the	whole	trip,	that	matters.	
Economic	efficiency	 is	 important	 in	fisheries	where	a	
rational	handling	of	catches	is	fundamental	to	the	eco-
nomic	result.	And	what	is	emphasised	by	critics	of	the	ITQ	
system	is	that	the	concentration	of	quotas	in	individual	
hands	limits	the	availability	of	fishing	resources	to	many	
smaller	 places,	 and	 eventually	 leads	 to	 the	 disappear-
ance	of	this	livelihood	from	these	communities.	Several	
alternatives	to	the	ITQ	system	exist,	for	instance	the	Com-
munity	Quota	systems	where	privatisation	is	not	based	on	
individuals	but	delegated	to	communities/municipalities	
(see	box	30).	
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ITQ – Individual Transferable Quotas – in 
reality means the privatisation of the ex-
pected outcome of renewable resources, 
primarily fish. An Individual Transfer-
able Quota (ITQ) system implies that 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) is allocated 
between a predefined and fixed number 
of quota holders. Quota holders can 
buy or sell, lease or rent quotas at the 
market place. There are no geographical 
requirements connected to ITQ, which 
means that the owner can fish out of any 
port. 
 In the beginning quotas for different 
species were introduced to provide an 
overall measure of sustainable fisheries, 
further it was to ensure a more optimal 
use of the resource and more convenient 
behaviour by the fishermen compared to 
other types of allotments of rights. The 
opening and closing of fisheries during 
specific time periods or until the quota 
has been fished by the total group of 
fishermen could result in over-invest-
ments in equipment in order to be the 
first to catch as much as possible, while 
it was allowed. By owning a defined part 
of the total quota it is possible to catch it 
when convenient, and with lesser techni-
cal resources. 
 The introduction of such a system 
in Iceland was related to the country’s 
ability in 1976 to claim ownership of its 
BOX 29: ITQ 
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coastal oceans after the Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
when it was decided that countries had 
consented to allow a 200 mile Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ). The ITQ system 
was established in 1984, altered several 
times until it assumed its final form in 
1990. Pros as well as cons have been 
stressed in relation to the system, and 
very often there is a clear political divide 
between the two groups of persons. 
 In addition to increasing efficiency 
in effort and capital expenditures, an 
ITQ system provides an estimate for 
measuring the value of the fish stock 
and thus the option of arranging loans 
based on expected outcomes and funding 
for improvements and fleet renewal. In 
cases of overcapacity the market process 
will induce less efficient vessels to be 
withdrawn while the most efficient will 
remain. Thus fishing will be conducted 
in a cost-effective manner. The “cons” 
include the following issues: As the quota 
system limits quantity, quality is left as 
the primary means of increasing profits 
by means of discarding lower value fish. 
With the option of selling the quotas 
there has been a tendency towards the 
concentration of the quotas in fewer 
hands; Due to the high costs involved 
in obtaining a quota, newcomers face 
major problems in entering the market. 
As most profit is gained by delivering 
the fish directly to the larger markets, 
the concentration of quotas in the larger 
harbours has been the result. If quota 
rights are given to vessel owners’ groups, 
those who will not receive compensation 
include crew members and the various 
suppliers and receivers. In a worst case 
scenario fishery-dependent communities 
can collapse with the loss of a quota right 
to fish. 
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Delegation of authority
During	the	last	ten	years	important	changes	in	the	power	
and	responsibility	of	the	administrative	structures	of	the	
various	Nordic	countries	have	been	introduced.	The	rea-
sons	for	this	are	many	and	include,	an	ageing	population,	
extensive	 service	needs,	more	 effective	 service	produc-
tion	and	delivery	and	maintaining	strong	local	autonomy	
and	democratic	accountability.
The	starting	point	for	governance	reform	in	the	Nordic	
countries	 is	both	functional	and	democracy-related,	re-
lating	in	particular	to	service	provision	needs,	but	also	to	
efficiency	concerns	in	public	sector	governance.	The	pres-
sures	in	respect	to	service	provision	needs	have	resulted	
in	a	variety	of	reform	processes	and	pilots	being	imple-
mented	where	 on	 the	 national	 level	 the	 organisational	
form	selected	is	a	Committee	on	Public	Sector	Responsi-
bilities,	or	some	other	similar	body,	which	seeks	to	clarify	
the	division	of	responsibilities	between	different	levels	of	
the	administrative	system	(where	multilevel	governance	
occurs)	and	by	so	doing,	enhance	the	capacity	of	the	pub-
lic	sector	to	renew	itself.	
Another	expression	of	the	need	to	restructure	is	the	aim	
to	improve	the	innovation	capacity	at	the	various	differ-
ent	 levels	 of	 governance	while	 seeking	 to	 clarify	 func-
tional	specialisation	in	such	a	way	as	to	build	on	a	clear	
division	of	responsibilities	between	the	local	and	central	
government	levels	in	particular.	
On	the	central	government	level,	the	issue	is	most	often	
articulated	in	terms	of	the	cross-sectoral	development	of	
central	government	services	and	national	 level	govern-
ance.	In	most	cases	such	territorial	reform	processes	are	
generally	separated	from	these	more	intra-governmental	
processes.	These	cross-sectoral	perspectives	should	how-
ever	be	discussed	together	with	the	multi-level	territorial	
considerations	as	issues	of	scale,	function	and	political	
organisation	as	all	are	equally	relevant	for	territorial	gov-
ernance.
The	largest	reduction	has	been	in	Greenland	where	the	
number	of	municipalities	was	reduced	from	the	18	 that	
have	existed	 since	WWII	 to	 four.	The	 structural	 reform	
agenda	of	the	early	21st	century	in	Iceland	and	the	Faroe	
Islands	 has	 also	 largely	 been	 dominated	 by	municipal	
mergers.
Iceland	has	a	two-tier	 territorial	system,	with	no	re-
gional	level.	In	terms	of	governance	and	policy	innova-
tion	it	is	in	many	ways	one	of	the	most	interesting	Nor-
dic	countries	and	 it	has	been	a	keen	policy	 innovator,	
strongly	 influenced	by	many	New	Public	Management	
ideas.	
Public	debate	in	Iceland	has	been	dominated	by	the	is-
sue	of	municipal	mergers.	The	realities	of	the	settlement	
structure	and	population	size	to	landmass	ratio	however	
generally	 render	 regional	policy	 and	 territorial	 govern-
ance	questions,	nationally-speaking	at	least,	irrelevant.	
The	 degree	 of	 centralisation	 and	 concentration	 in	 the	
capital	Reykjavik	is	also	a	major	factor	here.	
The	number	of	municipalities	has	however	fallen	in	re-
cent	years,	reflecting	the	extensive	process	of	municipal	
mergers	that	have	taken	place.	The	role	of	the	local	au-
thorities	has	also	changed,	becoming	more	complex	and	
now	embracing	primary	schools	and	social	services.	The	
major	share	of	the	municipalities’	work	entails	the	man-
agement	of	primary	education,	a	local	authority	area	of	
responsibility	since	1996.	
The	main	objective	of	the	reform	process	in	recent	years	
has	been	to	strengthen	the	municipalities	in	such	a	way	
that	they	would	be	better	able	to	provide	public	services.	
In	Iceland	the	debate	has	focused	on	bringing	about	the	
reform	of	local	authorities	such	that	they	could	become	
strong	enough	 to	adopt	new	 tasks	and	 responsibilities,	
which	 in	 the	 Icelandic	 case	would	 be	moved	 from	 the	
state	to	the	local	level.	
The	aims	of	the	local	authority	reform	are	similar	to	
those	of	the	other	Nordic	countries	on	the	one	hand,	but	
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Community Quotas (CQ) or Commu-
nity Development Quotas (CDQ) is a 
system where the rights to renewable 
resources – primarily fish – are allotted 
to communities. Consequently the 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) is allocated 
between a predefined and fixed number 
of communities. In some situations 
Quota holders can buy or sell while in 
most situations they are only allowed 
to lease or rent quotas on the market 
place. The Quota is therefore geograph-
ically located.
Community Development Quotas have 
for some years been an important 
regional policy tool in Alaska. The 
programme was introduced in 1992. All 
Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands quotas 
are allocated to eligible communities. 
 According to the National Marine Fish-
eries Service this programme provides 
eligible western Alaska villages with the 
opportunity to participate and invest 
in fisheries, to alleviate poverty and 
provide economic and social benefits 
for residents and to achieve sustainable 
and diversified local economies in the 
area.
 Community Quotas can be held by 
municipalities, regional organisations 
or other groups representing the com-
munity. The quotas allocated to the 
communities ensure they have access to 
an important economic resource. Capital 
generated by such programmes can 
enable them to modernise and to help 
diversify regional fisheries, build and 
maintain the necessary infrastructure 
and also to help address additional is-
sues such as the promotion of educa-
tion. 
	 A number of problems have however 
arisen here. While it is possible for the 
community to lease out the quota to for 
instance large scale organisations in 
Seattle, and thereby gain revenue, the 
original intention of the system was to 
maintain fisheries as a viable activity in 
the community and this then tends to 
disappear. Similarly, when the quotas 
are caught and processed on-board this 
limits the jobs available on land. As the 
quotas allotted to the communities are 
of limited size, in most cases they do not 
provide enough resources to maintain 
a continuous level of production. Con-
sequently many communities choose 
to use a labour force from, for instance, 
South East Asia during the weeks or 
months allotted to the fishing. 
BOX 30: COMMUNITY QUOTAS 
also	in	some	ways	rather	different,	on	the	other.	This	is	
particularly	 so	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 increased	 decen-
tralisation	sought	in	the	provision	of	public	services	in	
order	to	render	clearer	the	division	of	tasks	between	the	
central	government	and	state	authorities	and	local	gov-
ernment.	
At	the	same	time	however	an	increase	in	the	local	level	
share	 of	 public	 consumption	 remains	 a	 significant	 end	
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goal.	 Thus	 the	 services	 that	 have	 been	 considered	 as	
suitable	for	decentralisation	have	included	areas	that	in	
many	cases	come	under	the	ambit	of	“local	level	respon-
sibilities”	in	the	other	Nordic	countries,	e.g.	basic	health	
services	or	care	for	the	elderly.	
In	Norway	a	 consistent	 trend	 towards	 increasing	 the	
degree	of	public	sector	functional	specialisation	can	be	
found.	On	the	territorial	level	this	has	perhaps	been	most	
visible	in	the	establishment	of	specialised	state	regions,	
each	having	distinct	 responsibility	 for	only	one	 limited	
function.	This	is	also	an	area	where	pressure	for	reform	
has	emerged,	as	 the	call	 for	 regional	and	structural	 re-
form	in	the	Norwegian	case	originated	at	the	local	level	
in	response	to	the	desire	to	simplify	the	decision-making	
process	 and	 improve	 service	 provision	 while	 bringing	
these	issues	closer	to	the	citizen.	
As	 is	 the	case	 in	Sweden,	discussion	has	 focused	on	
the	number	of	regions	to	be	reduced	(leaving	somewhere	
between	 five	 and	 seven	 regions).	 There	 have	 however,	
been	equally	strong	arguments	made	within	the	current	
government	for	a	structure	with	10–12	regions,	but	with	
an	increasing	degree	of	power	and	responsibility.	Those	
who,	on	the	other	hand,	call	for	fewer	regions	often	seek	
to	decouple	the	debate	on	regionalisation	from	that	on	the	
decentralisation	of	administrative	tasks.	The	number	of	
regions	is	however	to	be	drastically	reduced.	
The	 State	 level	 in	 Norway	 is	 directly	 represented	 at	
the	regional	level	through	the	County	Governors’	offices,	
while	the	municipalities	represent	the	autonomous	local	
government	 administration.	 Both	 levels	 of	 administra-
tion	receive	part	of	their	revenues	through	local	taxation,	
fees	and	local	business	management,	and	part	from	al-
locations	from	the	central	authorities	and	other	public	in-
stitutions.	The	county	municipalities	(fylkeskommunene)	
represent	 a	 traditional	 administrative	 division	 dating	
back	almost	 ten	centuries.	During	 the	Viking	age	 local	
fylkesting	 (county	 councils)	 commanded	 great	 power	
with	this	system	of	local	self-government	and	they	con-
tinued	to	evolve	throughout	the	Middle	Ages.	
Local	governance	in	the	Faroe	Islands	has	tradition-
ally	been	intimately	associated	with	rural	development	
(bygdamening).	As	a	consequence	of	 the	economic	cri-
sis	of	the	1990s,	the	structural	commission	set	up	in	re-
sponse	itemised	regional	development	(økismening)	as	
a	strategy	to	provide	more	economic	dynamism	for	the	
islands.	
In	Greenland	the	Home	Rule	Authority	set	up	a	Struc-
tural	Reform	Commission	in	2003	with	a	mandate	to	as-
sess	the	division	of	tasks	and	responsibilities	between	the	
Home	Rule	Authority	and	the	municipalities,	where	the	
keyword	was	the	“delegation”	of	responsibility	from	cen-
tralised	to	the	municipal	authorities.	In	order	to	increase	
efficiency	in	the	public	sector,	the	commission	proposed	
a	major	overhaul	of	the	municipal	structure,	reducing	the	
number	of	municipalities	from	18	to	4.	Municipal	mergers	
in	Greenland	have	produced	some	of	the	world’s	largest	
municipalities	in	terms	of	territorial	coverage.	
The	reform	processes	have	raised	interest	in	“best	prac-
tice”,	and	the	exchange	of	experiences	etc.	It	is	generally	
understood	that	the	Nordic	countries	provide	a	relevant	
and	appropriate	context	 for	 such	comparisons,	as	 their	
policy	contexts,	geography,	functional	division	of	tasks	
etc.,	are	sufficiently	similar	to	warrant	such	comparison.	
Activities	in	relation	to	regional	and	sub-national	experi-
ments	are	moreover	ongoing	in	Sweden,	Norway	and	Fin-
land	and	here	comparisons	and	the	identification	of	best	
practices	remain	a	fruitful	basis	for	further	governance	
reform.
Privatisation of the housing sector
An	enduring	characteristic	of	the	Arctic	has	surely	been	
the	high	level	of	public	involvement	in	the	housing	sec-
tor.	Recent	decades	however	have	witnessed	increasing	
levels	of	private	ownership	promoted	by	a	number	of	ra-
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tionales.	First	of	all	the	question	of	the	delegation	of	re-
sponsibility	away	from	the	public	sector,	represented	by	
the	state,	the	region	or	the	municipal	authority	to	the	indi-
vidual	through	their	individual	ownership	of	dwellings.	
Secondly	the	desire	to	build	up	of	local	wealth	which	was	
expected	to	encourage	and	promote	local	independence	
from	public	decisions	often	taken	outside	the	community.	
In	addition	to	these	rationales	issues	such	as	the	attach-
ment	of	the	labour	force	to	the	settlements,	providing	a	
financial	background	for	individuals	in	pursuing	future	
goals	 by	 means	 of	 their	 own	 finances	 etc.,	 have	 been	
among	the	most	frequently	discussed	questions.	
Case Russia
One	 of	 the	 major	 recent	 developments	 in	 the	 Russian	
economy	has	been	the	reform	of	the	housing	sector.	This	
is	 important,	given	 that	changes	 in	 the	housing	sphere	
have	a	marked	influence	on	the	macroeconomic	situation	
as	a	whole	–	since	expenditures	in	connection	with	hous-
ing	are	responsible	for	considerable	proportions	of	both	
the	 federal	and	 the	 regional	budgets.	At	 the	same	 time	
the	construction	of	new	houses	 is	considered	to	be	one	
of	the	main	ways	of	stimulating	economic	growth,	on	the	
one	hand	through	the	generation	of	local	capital,	and	on	
the	other	due	to	the	perception	that	local	ownership	also	
adds	to	local	responsibility	(see	box	31).
The	Russian	housing	reform	process	began	in	the	mid-
dle	of	1990s	as	did	many	of	 the	other	recent	reforms	in	
Russia.	The	main	goals	and	tasks	of	these	reforms	were	
formulated	in	the	legislation	“Principles	of	Federal	Hous-
ing	Policy”	(1992)	and	within	the	acts:	Federal	Programme	
“Dwelling”	(1993),	and	the	Concepts	of	Housing	Reform	in	
the	Russian	Federation	(1997).	
The	goals	of	the	reforms	included	the	establishment	
of	a	free	market	for	houses,	the	improvement	of	housing	
quality	and	 the	general	 improvement	of	housing	serv-
ices.
The	 reduction	 in	 budget	 expenditures	 for	 communal	
and	housing	services,	through	the	establishment	of	a	free	
market,	aims	at	increasing	the	level	of	housing	quality,	
improving	housing	services	while	enabling	an	overall	re-
duction	to	be	made	in	federal	and	regional	budget	expen-
ditures.	In	order	to	achieve	the	reform’s	goals,	four	major	
policies	were	planned:	
•	 The	privatisation	of	dwellings.	
•	 The	de-monopolisation	of	the	communal	and	hous-
ing	services	market	through	a	liberalisation	of	both	
demand	and	supply.
•	 Changing	the	state	subsidiary	policy	in	two	ways	1)	
A	gradual	reduction	of	state	subsidies	for	housing	
and	communal	services,	and	2)	A	transition	from	
subsidising	municipal	communal	services	to	subsi-
dising	low-income	people
•	 A	rise	in	prices	for	communal	and	housing	services	
aimed	at	increasing	the	attractiveness	of	this	type	of	
business
The	federal	government	was	interested	in	the	rapid	priva-
tisation	of	housing.	In	the	Soviet	period	all	multi-dwelling	
buildings	were	state	or	municipal	property.	The	object	of	
private	property	ownership	was	therefore	only	buildings	
considered	to	be	single	dwellings.	
In	1991	however	the	new	Law	on	Dwelling	Privatisation	
was	adopted	and	special	state	agencies	were	established	
throughout	 the	country	 to	oversee	 it.	Property	rights	 to	
individual	dwellings	were	given	 to	 the	 tenants	without	
payment	and	the	tenants	only	paid	the	costs	of	issuing	the	
documents	 of	 ownership	–	 showing	 that	 the	 dwellings	
had	become	their	private	property.	But	after	the	private	
sector	 appeared	 in	 households	with	 individual	 objects	
of	property,	tenement-houses	were	also	beginning	to	be	
split	up.	Flats	became	legal	units,	with	economic	and	le-
gal	liability.	Still,	even	if	there	was	no	ownership	but	only	
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Since 1990 it has been possible to 
establish housing cooperatives in both 
villages and towns in Greenland. In the 
villages a housing cooperative consists 
of at least 4 houses and in towns of less 
than 6 dwellings. These houses could 
be apartment buildings, townhouses, 
terraced or semi-detached dwellings. 
The Greenland Government may, in spe-
cial circumstances, allow cooperative 
housing construction or that acquired as 
single houses or duplexes.
 A housing cooperative is finance by 
the individual members themselves 
holding 5% of the costs. The Green-
land government and the municipality 
provide mortgage free loans of 50% of 
the total construction costs, half by the 
government and half by the municipal-
ity. The remainder of the total construc-
tion costs should be provided through 
self-financing loans.
 The housing cooperatives has become 
a popular type of accommodation in 
Greenland, and today a large number 
of housing associations in major towns 
along the coast are in charge of close to 
1,000 dwellings. Still more housing co-
operatives are waiting to be built, while 
others are being formed. 
 Changes in the legislation are con-
stantly increasing  the level of flexibility 
in order to promote the housing coop-
erative and enable it to create its own 
housing. This type of housing provides a 
number of advantages in Greenland, and 
is for many the most realistic opportu-
nity to build their own home, thereby 
strengthening the private economic 
sector through the need for saving. 
Share Housing is helping to create more 
responsibility and thus a better level 
of maintenance in terms of the hous-
ing stock. This in turn has a significant 
impact on value retention.
BOX 31: NEW HOUSING IN GREENLAND
Private – Public relations
143
usu fruct	rights	to	flats	during	the	Soviet	Period,	the	rights	
of	“user-ship”	also	encompassed	rights	such	as	rent	sup-
port	helping	to	realise	income	entitlements,	registration	
of	grandchildren	which	enabled	 inheritance	 rights,	flat	
exchange	 options,	 including	pro forma	marriages,	 and	
the	 registration	of	 relatives,	 enabling	 the	 realisation	of	
other	rights.
In	many	ways	individual	rights,	in	this	regard,	at	least	
up	until	the	late	1980s	were	more	or	less	informal	inter-
ests	which	could	be	 seen	as	a	 legal	 framework	defined	
through	a	common	property	perspective.	This	however	
gave	way	to	the	Law	on	Dwelling	Privatisation	through,	
on	the	one	hand,	the	legalisation	of	actual	regulations	en-
couraged	by	a	reduction	in	transaction	costs,	and	on	the	
other,	through	the	definition	of	a	new	set	of	legal	relation-
ships	and	property	rights.	
According	to	the	law,	flats	in	multi-dwelling	buildings	
could	be	the	property	of	different	owners.	These	owners	
at	the	same	time,	received	additional	property	rights	or	
so-called	“common	property	of	the	multi-dwelling	build-
ing”,	which	included	such	things	as	the	walls,	the	roof,	
sanitation	 system,	 land,	 etc.	The	common	property	be-
came	jointly	owned	by	all	dwelling	owners	in	a	specific	
building	encompassing	also	 the	corresponding	mainte-
nance	responsibility.	Hence,	the	privatisation	of	a	dwell-
ing	entails	serious	consequences	 for	 the	 tenants.	There	
are	consequences	not	only	through	the	disposal	rights	of	
the	flat,	but	also	through	the	possibilities	for	the	disposal	
of	adjacent	land	and	responsibility	for	the	maintenance	
of	the	building.	
Passing	property	rights	to	the	current	tenants	therefore	
included	the	transition	of	management	responsibilities.	
Before	the	change	management	of	the	building	was	con-
ducted	by	a	special	municipal	company.	Now,	according	
to	 the	Housing	 Code	 (2004),	 responsibility	 for	 housing	
management	 had	 been	 turned	 over	 to	 an	 assembly	 of	
dwelling	owners.	This	new	organisation	was	supposed	to	
put	in	place	one	out	of	three	possible	forms	of	manage-
ment	schemes:
•	 Direct	management	by	the	dwelling	owners.	
•	 An	association	of	dwelling	owners,	a	housing	co-
operative,	or	another	form	of	consumers’	co-opera-
tive.
•	 A	private	or	municipal	management	company.
Every	dwelling	owner	of	a	specific	house	should	be	offi-
cially	informed	of	when	an	assembly	is	held	(date,	time,	
place	 and	 agenda).	An	assembly	 is	quorate	when	more	
than	50%	of	the	dwelling	owners	of	the	house	are	in	at-
tendance.	
In	accordance	with	the	Housing	Code,	all	dwelling	own-
ers	are	required	to	participate	in	the	management	and	as-
sembly	of	the	house.	If	an	assembly	is	not	convened,	or	if	
there	is	no	quorum,	the	municipality	appoints	a	manage-
ment	company	to	be	responsible	for	the	management	of	
the	house.
The	housing	reform	seems	to	be	one	among	many	re-
forms	in	Russia	that	remain	far	from	complete.	Some	of	
the	goals	of	the	reform	have	been	reached.	A	free	market	
in	 private	 dwellings	 has	 been	 established	 and	 tenants	
have	participated	actively	in	dwelling	privatisation.	The	
northern	region	is	however	still	lagging	behind	the	Rus-
sian	average	in	both	the	rate	of	privatisation	and	the	vol-
ume	of	housing	construction.	
The	acquisition	of	property	rights	 for	many	people	 is	
not	associated	with	new	rights	and	responsibilities.	For	
a	 majority	 of	 people	 dwelling	 privatisation	 may	 only	
be	a	possibility	to	devolve	the	financial	responsibilities	
and	not	the	decision	rights.	On	the	whole,	therefore,	the	
process	of	housing	reform	may	eventually	evolve	in	a	di-
rection	which	 is	 somewhat	contrary	 to	 the	 inhabitants’	
initial	 expectations.	At	 the	 same	 time	people	generally	
do	not	think	of	 themselves	as	being	participants	 in	the	
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The privatisation of the former state 
owned housing stock over the last decade 
or more represents a major change in the 
Russian context. The share of privatised 
dwellings reached a level of 50% by the 
beginning of 2000 and has now reached 
77% in Russia in general. The level in 
northern regions is indicated in the table 
below.
 The difference between the average 
Russian level and that for the northern 
regions occurs for various reasons. In the 
case of the Murmansk region a number of 
restricted military towns remain, and in 
general, people employed by the military 
are not interested in privatisation since 
the employment is time-limited and char-
acterised by temporary residence. Hence, 
the level of dwelling privatisation is very 
low in these towns. 
 The Koryakia, Chukotka and Evenkia 
regions, where the low level of privatisa-
tion is connected with a lack of demand 
for dwellings, represent another case. 
However, as a whole, it is difficult to 
give an unambiguous evaluation due to 
the slow increase in dwelling privatisa-
tion in the north. A case study on the 
public evaluation of the consequences 
of the housing reform was conducted 
in the town of Apatity, in the Murmansk 
region in 2006. The survey involved 500 
households. Most people (44%) reported 
that they privatised their flats “for their 
children”. Some people (27%) wanted to 
move, which was easier after privatisa-
tion. It was generally a surprise, that as 
much as 17% perceived privatisation to 
be “a good investment”. Other answers 
BOX 32: NEW HOUSING IN RUSSIA
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included statements like “I want to 
have my own property”, “I want to be an 
owner” or “property is better than noth-
ing”. 
 Among municipal tenants, there were 
people who wanted to privatise their 
dwellings but for various reasons were 
not able to do so. Around 22% did not 
have the necessary money, while 20% 
did not have the time, and another 10% 
were afraid of high taxes. However, 50% 
of tenants thought that they should do it 
as an investment for their children, while 
a total of 24% of tenants were simply not 
interested in privatisation. Thus we can 
infer that around 75% of the population 
are interested in privatisation. 
So in reality, both the state and the 
sampled respondents were in favour 
of privatisation. This enabled the state 
to carry out the process quite quickly. 
Consequently, in Apatity in the middle of 
2007, around 73% of dwellings had been 
privatised. 
 Housing reform created expectations 
in terms of improvements in housing 
services,  new forms of housing services, 
new options for participation in house 
management, and a reassessment of 
security issues. Nevertheless, the results 
of the housing reform are far from what 
people expected. Hopes were high 
regarding improvements, but reform was 
accompanied by a fear in rising prices. 
The outcome was however rather disap-
pointing in respect of improvements, 
while the only expectation fulfilled was 
the rise in prices!
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reform	process	nor	do	they	think	they	possess	the	ability	
to	change	the	course	of	events.
Case Greenland
The	public	sector	plays	a	significant	role	in	the	housing	
market	 in	 Greenland.	 For	 decades	 there	 has	 basically	
been	no	open	market	as	almost	all	dwellings	and	most	
houses	have	been	owned	either	by	the	state	or	by	the	mu-
nicipality.	One	major	consequence	of	this	has	been	a	situ-
ation	where	rent	has	generally	been	subsidised.	Another	
has	been	a	housing	shortage	and	long	waiting	lists.	In	ad-
dition,	the	demographic	trend	places	additional	pressure	
on	 the	 housing	market	 with	 the	 current	 housing	 stock	
estimated	to	require	a	growth	of	one	quarter	in	order	to	
cover	likely	future	housing	demand.	In	addition,	there	re-
mains	a	considerable	need	to	renovate	the	already	exist-
ing	housing	stock.	
Another	problem	with	housing	privatisation	in	Green-
land	is	the	question	of	financing.	The	costs	are	high	and	in	
most	cases	this	will	be	a	significant	problem	for	most	peo-
ple	seeking	to	borrow	the	necessary	capital.	Since	1990	
however	it	has	been	possible	to	develop	housing	coopera-
tives	in	both	villages	and	cities.	In	the	settlements	a	hous-
ing	cooperative	is	required	to	consist	of	at	least	4	houses	
and	in	towns	of	more	than	6	dwellings.	The	houses	con-
cerned	can	be	apartment	buildings,	townhouses	or	close/
low	construction,	but	the	Greenland	Government	may	in	
special	 circumstances	 also	 allow	 cooperative	 housing	
constructed	as	single	houses	or	duplexes	(box	32	provides	
further	details	on	housing	developments.
The	main	problem	area	–	financing	–	is	undertaken	by	
means	of	co-financing	by	the	individual	members	them-
selves	 with	 a	 share	 of	 5%.	 In	 addition	 the	 municipal-
ity	and	the	government	provide	debt	and	mortgage-free	
loans	of	50%	of	the	total	construction	costs.	The	loan	is	
also	provided	–	half	from	the	government	and	half	from	
the	municipality.	The	remainder	of	the	total	construction	
costs	are	covered	by	mortgages	taken	out	by	the	coopera-
tive	 association	 (box	 28	 highlights	 some	 of	 the	 experi-
ences	of	privatisation	in	Greenland).
Case Nunavut
Nunavut	has	a	total	of	8,077	(2001	Census)	units	for	a	pop-
ulation	of	approximately	30,000	persons	with	the	private	
rental	market	being,	in	addition,	rather	limited.	The	Nu-
navut	Housing	Corporation	(NHC)	has	about	4,400	public	
housing	units	and	approximately	1,200	staff	units.	More	
than	60%	of	the	approximately	18,000	tenants	in	public	
housing	are	on	 income	support.	Local	Housing	Organi-
sations	(LHO)	allocate	public	housing	at	the	community	
level	and	these	LHOs	answer	to	locally	elected	Boards	or	
Councils.	Applicants	in	Core	Housing	Need	are	point-rat-
ed	and	placed	on	a	waiting	list	for	a	unit.	
Rents	are	heavily	subsidised	due	to	extremely	high	util-
ity	costs.	For	example,	a	three-bedroom	unit	would	costs	
in	excess	of	$1800/month	to	operate.	Rents	are,	however,	
set	 according	 to	 income.	Minimum	 rent	would	be	 from	
$60.00	per	month	with	 the	maximum	being	set	at	28%	
of	income.	
As	a	consequence	of	 the	policy	 there	seems,	more	or	
less,	to	be	a	perpetual	housing	shortage	and	the	constant	
construction	of	more	public	housing	units	will	not	fix	the	
problem	as	indeed	was	noted	by	the	2010	Nunavut	Eco-
nomic	 Outlook.	 According	 to	 the	 report	 the	 territory’s	
housing	 shortage	 will	 become	 a	 permanent	 feature	 of	
life	unless	Nunavut	makes	“significant	changes”	to	 the	
way	it	approaches	the	housing	issue.	The	reason	for	the	
increased	demand	is	that	the	territory’s	young	population	
puts	demands	on	the	government’s	housing	supply	that	it	
simply	cannot	meet	drawing	funds	away	from	other	areas	
of	need	and	adding	to	the	overall	operations	and	mainte-
nance	budget.
To	fix	this,	Nunavut	needs	more	people	who	are	finan-
cially	independent,	which	means	a	stronger	wage-based	
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economy,	more	 job	 opportunities	 and	more	 education,	
skills	and	labour	mobility.	A	key	element	here	would	be	
a	stronger	and	more	competitive	private-sector	residen-
tial	construction	sector,	more	home	ownership	incentives	
and	more	stringent	rules	and	regulations	for	social	hous-
ing	tenants.	Another	option	would	be	to	seek	an	“alterna-
tive	housing	market	model”	through	policy	mechanisms	
that	make	private	housing	available	to	larger	numbers	of	
people.	
In	 2009,	 Nunavut’s	 total	 housing	 stock,	 public	 and	
private,	stood	at	9,041	units.	Of	those,	4	183	were	govern-
ment-owned	 homes	 and	 1,359	 were	 government-leased	
homes.	About	54%	of	Nunavut’s	population	lives	in	gov-
ernment-subsidised	public	housing.	About	99%	of	these	
public	housing	tenants	are	Inuit.

Renewable energy and 
the Green Economy
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Continued	energy	consumption	based	on	non-renewable	
carbon	and	hydrocarbon	sources	is	generally	understood	
to	be	responsible	for	some	of	the	major	changes	in	the	Arc-
tic’s	natural	makeup.	Compared	to	the	generation	of	CO2	
from	the	industrialised	and	industrialising	countries	the	
output	of	CO2	 from	the	Arctic	may	seem	to	be	 insignifi-
cant.	On	the	other	hand,	the	Arctic	is	one	of	the	regions	in	
the	world	most	influenced	by	the	adverse	effects	of	global	
CO2	emissions.
Many	regions	in	the	Arctic	are	among	the	largest	con-
sumers	of	hydrocarbons	per capita,	and	moving	from	non-
renewable	 to	 renewable	energy	 resources	 is	 recognised	
to	be	a	 long	 term	process.	The	problems	are	contrasted	
through	the	maps	13	and	14,	showing	the	current	increase	
in	generation	of	electricity,	and	the	share	of	renewable	en-
ergy	as	of	today.	It	is	quite	obvious	that	new	technologies	
are	needed	which	are	able	to	sustain	the	Arctic	climate,	
while	also	recognising	the	fact	that	changes	in	consump-
tion	patterns	and	price	structures	must	be	implemented	
in	order	to	promote	a	shift	in	development	focus.	This	di-
lemma	is	elaborated	further	in	box	33.	
The	concept	of	“green	development”	is	for	many	con-
sidered	 synonymous	 with	 development	 in	 the	 Arctic.	
Living	in	the	Arctic	once	meant	relying	on	local	resourc-
es	or	simply	perishing.	To	what	extent	is	the	Arctic	ready	
to	move	further	along	this	path?	This	question	presents	
both	a	political	and	a	practical	challenge.	The	Arctic	is	
also,	like	the	rest	of	the	world,	increasingly	dependent	
on	imports,	where	distances	and	transport	costs	–	pri-
marily	due	 to	 the	amount	of	hydrocarbons	used	–	are	
critical	issues.	
Energy	is	a	key	component	 for	development.	A	major	
problem	here	is	the	fact	that	the	Arctic	is	among	the	most	
sparsely	populated	areas	in	the	world	with	a	significant	
problem	 in	 establishing	 energy	 related	 infrastructures.	
Many	 of	 the	 energy	 systems	 are	 therefore	 “energy	 is-
lands”,	 which	 adds	 to	 the	 complexity	 in	 introducing	
several	of	 the	renewable	 resource	options.	Photovoltaic	
electricity	may	be	an	option	during	the	summer	months	
but	needs	year-round	supplementation.	Access	to	wind-
based	energy	may	be	abundant	in	some	regions	but	can-
not	function	as	a	stand-alone	system	when	the	backbone	
of	 energy	 supply	 is	 absent.	 The	 question	 of	 storage	 is	
crucial	in	this	context.	While	there	are	good	ideas	avail-
able	(as	outlined	in	box	34)	and	in	the	status	of	access	to	
renewable	energy	in	the	Arctic	there	remains	a	long	way	
to	go	here.	
While economic development in devel-
oped countries is increasingly consid-
ered to be  de-coupled from energy 
consumption, the general pattern for the 
Arctic over the last decade has seen a 
marked increase in electricity consump-
tion. For a few regions data has not been 
available for the time series, and they 
are marked in white. Otherwise the col-
our scale indicates the level of increase 
or decrease. In Chukotka, Nunavut and 
in one of the Norwegian regions produc-
tion has declined and in a couple of 
Russian regions – Sakha and Murmansk 
– the increase has been rather limited. In 
the other regions a larger increase has 
taken place, with Iceland, the Faroe Is-
lands, NWT, Yamalo-Nenets, Nenets and 
Finnmark Fylke in Norway experiencing 
increases of over 3%. In some cases the 
increased generation of electricity has 
been connected to an increased focus on 
renewable energy resources, primarily 
hydropower and wind power. The cur-
rent situation regarding types of energy 
is presented in map 14. 
MAP 13: PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN ELECTRICITY GENERATION 2000–2010
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Status of access to renewable energy
ALASKA
Alaska	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 three	 separate	 energy	 re-
gimes:	Rural	Alaska,	South-central	Alaska	and	Southeast	
Alaska.	
In	rural	Alaska	many	villages	are	 in	 fact	 in	deep	cri-
sis	due	to	high	energy	costs.	People	are	migrating	to	hub	
communities	and	the	rail	belt,	and	many	towns	are	clos-
ing	municipal	offices	because	it	is	too	expensive	to	keep	
buildings	lit	and	heated.	Consequently,	the	basic	social	
support	systems	here	are	in	serious	decline.	
South	Central	Alaska	is	heavily	dependent	on	supplies	
from	Cook	Inlet	gas.	The	majority	is	used	locally,	while	
around	a	third	is	exported.	The	level	of	gas	supply	is	how-
ever	soon	expected	to	be	insufficient	to	satisfy	domestic	
demand.	A	proposed	gas	pipeline	from	the	North	Slope,	
with	 a	 spur	 to	 South-Central,	 should	 be	 completed	 by	
2013.	This	will	improve	the	situation.	
In	 Southeast	 Alaska	 communities	 are	 connected	
through	a	common	grid	system	which	allows	them	to	be	
supplied	 by	 low	 cost	 energy	 from	 the	 Southeast	Hydro	
projects.	 The	 suppliers	 are	 The	 Thomas	Bay	 and	 Swan	
Lake-Tyee	hydropower	plants	which	are	able	to	provide	
energy	for	the	Southeast	region.	In	addition	they	are	able	
to	export	excess	energy	to	BC	Hydro	in	British	Columbia,	
Canada,	thereby	generating	a	much	needed	financial	in-
put	to	the	region.	Income	from	state-owned	transmission	
lines	will	provide	the	funds	necessary	to	build	the	South-
east	Intertie	connecting	all	of	the	Southeast’s	communi-
ties	by	 2030	 thus	 enabling	a	 substantial	portion	of	 the	
Alaskan	population	to	have	access	to	a	renewable	energy	
supply.	
In	2008,	 the	Alaska	State	Legislature	established	the	
Renewable	 Energy	 Fund	 (REF)	 to	 reduce	 dependence	
on	hydrocarbons	and	promote	investment	in	renewable	
energy	across	Alaska.	At	present	nineteen	wind-turbine	
The different sources of electricity 
generation in the Arctic have been sub-
divided into four classes: Fossil fuels, 
Hydropower, Wind and other Renewable 
sources, and Nuclear energy. 
The fossil fuels are either large scale 
coal, gas or oil-based generators, gen-
erating electricity to a larger grid which 
is often connected to other generating 
systems. Or it is small scale diesel or 
gas generators just connected to a local 
network supplying typically a municipal-
ity, a town or a village. 
 Hydropower is usually a large-scale 
dam-based system though river-based 
floating generators are also in use in 
the Arctic as are small scale dam-based 
systems.
 Wind power is currently the most 
widely used renewable generating 
system, but photovoltaic systems also 
exist, mainly as energy contributors to 
single houses. As generators of heat 
and electricity biomass systems have 
also become more common in the Arctic, 
for instance by combusting household 
waste or by means of wood pellets, 
often using waste material from the 
timber and pulp and paper industries. 
And finally geothermic energy is also 
utilised. Iceland is the acknowledged 
leader here though the potential does 
exist for its use in a few other places 
across the Arctic. Finally nuclear power 
is present in two regions, Chukotka 
where it provides a third of the energy, 
and in Murmansk region where more 
than 50% of electricity is generated by 
means of nuclear power. 
 In many parts of the Arctic energy sys-
tems function as “islands” in isolation, 
i.e. without connection to other energy 
systems. This makes the energy supply 
vulnerable to breakdowns just as many 
of the renewable energy sources have 
a temporal characteristic, for instance 
wind not blowing constantly, and there-
fore the need for local backup systems.
MAP 14: GENERATION OF ELECTRICITY BY SOURCE
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projects	have	been	completed.	Six	of	these	projects	are	in	
Kotzebue,	and	the	total	installed	capacity	here	is	approxi-
mately	10,559	kW.	Of	these	projects,	the	largest	and	least	
expensive,	on	an	installed-kW	basis,	is	the	Pillar	Moun-
tain	project	on	Kodiak.	
CANADA
Canada	boasts	being	world’s	leading	producer	of	hydro-
electricity	and	with	a	production	level	at	about	6%	of	the	
As emphasised by Greenland’s Prime 
Minister, Mr. Kuupik Klejst, Greenland 
both can and will take its share of the 
responsibility for protecting the environ-
ment and maintaining sustainability. 
At the same time he emphasises that 
climate talks are complicated because 
they have an impact on global political 
and economic power and particularly on 
the right to development for the poorer 
parts of the globe. It is important to take 
the oath of developing countries and 
respect their historic right to develop-
ment and to do something about the 
uneven distribution of global resources 
if a new, binding, climate agreement is 
to be reached. 
 The people of Greenland have voted 
in favour of self-government, which 
will take over more and more areas of 
responsibility from Denmark. But this 
requires that Greenland creates a more 
stable and healthy economic foundation 
than it currently has. Today, fishing is 
the most important source of income, 
followed by a block grant from the Dan-
ish state. The hope is that the country’s 
management of climate change in the 
long term will be the leveraging factor 
that gives autonomous government 
greater meaning. It is recognised that 
there is still space for improvement, 
the most important in this respect 
being renewable energy in the form of 
hydropower that will soon account for 
more than half of the country’s total 
energy supply. Greenland is also looking 
at other renewable energy sources, 
while the country’s own energy utility 
company is researching into hydrogen 
technology for energy storage. Energy 
savings are also on the national agenda. 
For example, in 2012 Greenland will be 
the first country to have 100% cover-
age with remote monitoring of energy 
meters which help end users keep 
control of their energy consumption and 
encourage them to reduce it.
 The virtually inexhaustible supplies 
of energy from hydropower, obtained 
from fresh water lakes on the inland 
ice, means that Greenland can supply 
energy-demanding industry with green 
energy. One such project currently 
under way is the establishment of an 
aluminium smelting plant. In the future, 
the people of the world will continue to 
require industrial products, but they will 
demand cleaner and more environmen-
tally friendly products. Greenland can 
deliver this, and even though the new 
industry will increase the country’s own 
emissions of CO
2
, it will be an advantage 
in a global context. 
 Greenland’s Government, in accord-
ance with the Copenhagen Declaration 
notified the UN Climate Secretariat that 
Greenland will reduce greenhouse gases 
by 5% by 2020 compared to emissions 
in 2007 except for mining activities and 
energy-intensive industries, and will 
continue to develop renewable energies 
up to 2020 to cover more than 60% of 
Greenland’s energy requirements with 
renewable energy.
BOX 33: GREENLAND’S RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE
global	energy	supply	is	the	fifth	largest	producer	of	en-
ergy	in	the	world.	
Canadian	energy	policies	reflect	the	constitutional	di-
vision	of	powers	between	 the	 federal	government	and	
the	 provincial	 governments.	 Therefore	 the	 two	 must	
coordinate	their	energy	policies.	The	five	regions	in	the	
arctic	area,	Yukon	Territory,	Labrador,	Northwest	Terri-
tories,	Nunavut	and	Nunavik	in	Quebec,	may	face	com-
parable	climatic	and	environmental	conditions	but	are	
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The hydrogen and fuel cell plant that 
will be established at the Nukissiorfiit 
headquarters in Nuuk, are to function 
as an experimental plant giving Nukis-
siorfiit specific experiences in both the 
production and the use of hydrogen. The 
plant will produce hydrogen based on 
electricity from the hydro power plant 
in Nuuk, and the hydrogen will then be 
used for supplying energy for Nukis-
siorfiit’s headquarters. The plant will 
also help increase public awareness in 
respect of hydrogen and fuel cells in 
Greenland. The plant is supplied by H2 
Logic and consists of a hydrogen elec-
trolysis system that uses electricity to 
split water into hydrogen. The hydrogen 
is then stored for later use in a fuel cell 
where it is converted into electricity and 
heat. Waste heat from the hydrogen pro-
duction process and the fuel cell is used 
for local heating while the electricity is 
supplied to the grid or used in Nukis-
siorfiit’s headquarters.
 The plant also includes a compression 
and distribution system that enables the 
storing of the hydrogen under pressure 
in distributable bulks. In this way the 
hydrogen can be distributed to other cit-
ies and settlements in Greenland where 
it can be used for local energy produc-
tion. The plant has also been prepared 
for a future upgrade with a hydrogen 
refuelling station, enabling the use of 
hydrogen as fuel for transport.
BOX 34: STORING RENEWABLE ENERGY
also	exposed	to	a	rather	different	mix	of	critical	energy	
needs.	
Hydroelectricity	is	dependent	on	rising	oil	prices	and	
hydrocarbons	and	holds	the	promise	of	a	sustainable	en-
ergy	source	for	future	generations.	Most	of	the	Canadian	
Arctic	 region	 is	populated	 sparsely	by	 indigenous	peo-
ples.	 The	most	 isolated	 places	 are	 outside	 the	 national	
grid	 and	 currently	 depend	 on	 power	 supplied	 by	 local	
diesel-fired	 generation	 or	 local	 natural	 gas	 resources.	
The	only	alternative	energy	source	for	these	towns	is	cur-
rently	biomass	production.	
At	present	some	87%	of	the	Yukon’s	electricity	needs	
are	met	by	hydroelectricity	and	13%	from	thermal	sourc-
es.	Diesel	is	used	for	communities	located	off	the	electri-
cal	grid	as	well	as	in	situations	where	there	is	not	enough	
hydroelectricity	to	meet	the	demand.	A	small	amount	of	
electricity,	less	than	1%	comes	from	wind.	
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Labrador	produces	enough	energy	for	its	own	use	and	
exports	far	more	to	consumers	outside	the	province.	The	
main	source	is	hydropower,	first	of	all	from	the	5,428	MW	
Churchill	Falls	Hydroelectric	Generating	Station,	in	addi-
tion	there	are	a	few	isolated	systems	on	the	coasts	receiv-
ing	their	power	from	diesel	generators.	
In	Northwest	Territories	energy	sources	derived	 from	
renewable	 energy	 forms	 are	 primarily	 generated	 from	
hydro	and	wind	power.	Approximately	70%	of	the	total	
electricity	generated	 for	Northwest	Territories	 residents	
and	communities	is	from	hydroelectric	power.	According	
to	the	Canadian	National	Energy	Agency	the	majority	of	
the	Northwest	Territories’	world-class	hydro	potential	is	
not	yet	developed.	 In	 fact,	only	0.5%	of	Northwest	Ter-
ritories	potential	11,000	megawatts	has	been	developed.	
Like	Nunavut,	Northwest	Territories	also	rely	heavily	
on	refined	petroleum	to	fuel	the	generators	that	power	its	
remote	communities.	A	significant	amount	of	natural	gas	
is	used	for	room	heating	and	electrical	generation	in	Inu-
vik	and	Norman	Wells.
Nunavut	 region,	 despite	 its	 proven	 potential	 energy	
resources,	 is	 currently	 dependent	 on	 imported	 energy.	
In	the	future	there	will	be	a	need	to	use	energy	more	ef-
ficiently	and	to	diversify	Nunavut’s	energy	sources.	This	
includes	the	refurbishment	of	existing	diesel	generators	
and	the	construction	of	the	territory’s	first	hydroelectric	
BOX 35: WOOD PELLETS – SWEDEN-FINLAND-CANADA
Wood pellets are among the least ex-
pensive way of meeting the increased 
demand for renewable energy. Burning 
pellets releases the amount of carbon 
that would have been emitted in 
nature when they die and decompose, 
and restored when new forest re-grow. 
The process is therefore regarded as 
largely carbon neutral, and currently 
competitive in relation to pricing. 
The pellets are pricier than coal but 
less-expensive than for instance solar 
panels or wind turbines. Large forest 
areas of the Arctic and sub-Arctic 
serve as excellent reservoirs for this 
kind of energy storage.
 Power generation and district heat-
ing based on wood chips and other 
biomass products have thus become an 
important source of energy in the North. 
In Rovaniemi the community are in the 
process of establishing a new power 
plant. When completed the  plant will be 
fuelled with logging waste, tree stumps 
and woodchips made from small trees 
from young forests, and be able to pro-
vide a substantial contribution to both 
the district heating system of the town, 
and to the generation of electricity. 
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power	station.	It	was	originally	planned	for	completion	in	
2012	though	it	is	more	likely	now	that	this	will	slip	to	2015.	
The	major	 consumer	 of	 electricity	 in	 Nunavut	 is	 the	
local	 government,	 followed	 by	 commercial	 buildings,	
public	housing,	and	local	communities.	The	public	sector	
purchases	around	37%	of	all	petroleum	products	used	for	
heating	buildings	and	generating	hot	water.	This	means	
that	 the	 local	 government	 also	becomes	 the	 largest	 in-
direct	consumer.	And	as	Iqaluit	 is	 the	government	city,	
around	 12	million	 litres	 of	 fuel	 are	 used	here	 annually	
to	generate	electricity.	This	is	one-third	of	the	total	con-
sumed	for	electricity	generation	in	Nunavut.
In	Nunavik	Hydro-Québec	is	the	main	provider	of	elec-
tricity.	Due	to	the	relatively	isolated	situation	for	most	of	
the	settlements	their	energy	supply	is	based	on	an	off-grid	
system	powered	by	diesel,	with	23	facilities	with	a	total	
capacity	of	122	MW.	Since	the	late	1970s	there	have	been	
several	suggestions	regarding	 the	possibility	of	supple-
menting	 the	 diesel	 generators	 with	 renewable	 alterna-
tives.	The	first	–	and	 so	 far	 the	only	–	wind	 turbine	 in	
the	region,	with	a	capacity	of	65	KW,	was	established	in	
Kuujjuaq	in	1986	and	continued	producing	until	it	was	re-
moved	and	handled	over	to	an	educational	institution	in	
the	Gaspee	region.	Recently,	however,	the	idea	of	combin-
ing	the	diesel	generators	with	 larger	wind	turbines	has	
come	up	again.	And	with	the	possibility	of	Hydro-Quebec	
 The plant will be able to fulfil the need 
for an increase in district heating capacity 
by means of a CO
2
 neutral system. The 
use of local fuels, primarily forest chips 
and peat, could mean a direct increase 
in annual employment figures by 1,000 
man-years – if a new big power plant in 
the city of Rovaniemi and a biodiesel 
refinery in the city of Kemi were imple-
mented the forest energy potential of La-
pland would be more effectively utilised. 
In comparison, the direct increase in 
employment figures during the operation 
of a nuclear power plant is estimated to 
be approximately 400–500 man-years. 
 Efficient utilisation of wood fuels can 
reduce emissions by about 30-40% from 
the current level significantly supporting 
the achieving the objectives of Finland’s 
and the EU’s climate and renewable 
energy policy. Currently renewable 
energy already accounts for over 90% of 
all electricity produced in the region of 
Lapland.
 Wood pellet-based energy supply does 
not require large scale operations. An 
example of a small scale installation is 
the system installed at the campus of the 
University of Northern British Columbia 
in Prince George, Canada, illustrating the 
multiple benefits that can occur when a 
community is engaged with the academic 
and operational goals of a campus. UN-
BC’s bioenergy project currently consists 
of two components: a wood pellet system 
and a biomass gasification system cur-
rently under construction. In both cases, 
the fuel is from the local forest industry, 
either in the form of wood pellets or 
residue from sawmill operations. Both 
systems also heat water, which integrates 
with the existing systems on campus to 
heat the buildings and provide hot water 
on campus. The wood pellet system 
burns pellets to produce heat while the 
gasification actually converts biomass to 
a synthetic gas that is then burned.
 In recognition of the achievements 
of the system The Association for the 
Advancement of Sustainability in Higher 
Education (AASHE) has selected UNBC’s 
bioenergy project for its ability to con-
nect teaching and research to campus 
operations, while serving as a model for 
communities and other campuses. The 
system not only provides a sustainable 
energy system for the campus. For north-
ern communities, the bioenergy project 
shows how future energy supply in areas 
with access to biomass may provide a 
sustainable energy supply.
megatrends
158
extending	their	power	grid	to	the	settlements	in	the	re-
gion	 a	 better	 opportunity	 to	 replace	 the	 old	 generators	
with	renewable	replacements	has	presented	itself.
FINLAND
The	abundant	hydropower	energy	resources	of	Lapland	
have	long	enabled	it	to	produce	energy	for	its	own	needs	
as	well	as	 for	 the	 rest	of	Finland.	Lapland	also	utilises	
local	wood	fuels,	peat	and	waste	 liquor	 from	the	 forest	
industry.	Wood	pellets	 have	become	a	worldwide	 com-
modity	 inspired	 by	 Finland,	 and	 have	 also	 become	 an	
important	resource	in	the	boreal	parts	of	the	North	(see	
box	35).	
According	 to	 Finland’s	 energy	 agency,	 Lapland	 pro-
duces	more	energy	than	it	needs	and	renewable	energy	
accounts	 for	 over	 90%	of	 electricity	 production.	 In	 the	
future,	energy	consumption	in	Lapland	will	primarily	be	
dependent	on	the	development	of	industry	and	the	serv-
ice	sector.	Forecasted	investments	such	as	the	Tornio	steel	
mill,	mining	projects	and	growing	tourism	will	increase	
energy	consumption	significantly.	There	is	also	a	plan	to	
build	a	nuclear	power	plant	in	Lapland.	
GREENLAND
Greenland	has	become	increasingly	focused	on	the	use	
of	renewable	energy	in	its	energy	supply.	The	Greenland	
icecap	is	the	world’s	largest	freshwater	reservoir	and	it	
constitutes	an	ideal	source	for	generating	hydroelectric	
power,	and	it	is	estimated	that	Greenland	has	a	hydro-
power	 gross	potential	 of	 approximately	 800,000	GWh	
per	year.	
Today,	however,	most	of	the	power	generated	is	based	
on	diesel	based	generators.	One	of	 the	 reasons	 for	 this	
is	 the	“island”	structure	of	 the	settlements	with	no	on-
land	connections,	and	with	power	supply	thus	far	only	
based	on	local	production.	Establishing	a	common	grid	
for	several	of	the	larger	settlements	would	be	extremely	
expensive,	so	solutions	to	the	broader	problem	have	been	
directed	to	the	individual	settlements.
In	this	context	more	than	15	large	potential	sites	for	hy-
droelectric	power	stations	for	both	consumer	and	indus-
trial	purposes	have	been	pinpointed.	Estimations	show	
that	this	could	comprise	a	total	potential	of	13,000	GWh.	
The	most	attractive	industrial	hydropower	potentials	are	
located	 along	 the	western	 edge	 of	Greenland’s	 ice	 cap,	
between	62	and	68	degrees	north.	In	this	region	the	vast	
interior	contains	a	potential	for	each	reservoir	of	some-
where	between	600–2,500	GWh	per	year.	4–5	reservoirs	
are	seen	as	being	particularly	attractive,	namely,	Taser-
siaq,	Imarsuup	Isua,	Søndre	Isortup	Isua	and	Tasersuup	
Isua.	
It	is	a	political	objective	to	reduce	fossil	fuel	imports.	
Research	 is	 ongoing	 into	 the	ways	 in	which	Greenland	
can	 accommodate	 the	 energy	needs	 of	 power-intensive	
industry	 by	 supplying	 clean	 and	 cheap	 hydroelectric	
power.	As	in	other	parts	of	the	Arctic	the	option	of	export-
ing	energy	through	energy	requiring	products	is	actively	
under	consideration.	Thus,	the	international	aluminium	
industry	is	currently	investigating	the	investment	poten-
tial	of	Greenland.
Greenland’s	supply	of	fresh	water	also	forms	the	basis	
for	an	ambitious	plan	to	look	into	the	potential	of	estab-
lishing	a	hydrogen	industry	and	what	it	has	to	offer.	An	
important	question	in	this	context	concerns	the	options	
for	storage,	an	issue	which	is	discussed	more	fully	in	box	
34	above.
ICELAND
Iceland	 is	 generally	 viewed	 as	 a	 leader	 in	 green	 en-
ergy,	 in	 technical	 development,	 utilisation	 and	 edu-
cation.	The	country	has	ample	potential	 to	expand	 its	
hydroelectric	 and	 thermal	 power-supplies.	 Nearly	 all	
of	Iceland’s	electricity	comes	from	geothermal	or	hydro	
power.	According	to	the	government,	the	ultimate	chal-
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lenge	would	be	to	turn	the	entire	island	into	a	carbon-
free	society.	
Some	twenty	years	ago	a	consultation	body	was	formed	
between	 energy	 companies	 and	 the	 environmental	
authorities	 to	 facilitate	 compromises	 in	 future	 energy-
projects.	The	municipalities	have	 long	had	a	 legislative	
role	and	such	powers	have	increased	through	new	plan-
ning	laws.	
The	legislation	on	EIA	(Environmental	Impact	Assess-
ment)	was	introduced	in	1993	based	on	the	European	di-
rective,	and	has	influenced	project	decisions	and	project	
design.	The	power-market	was	deregulated	at	the	begin-
ning	of	2005.	Up	to	that	time	Landsvirkjun	–	the	national	
Energy	Agency	–	had	a	legal	obligation	to	fulfil	electrical	
demand	in	Iceland.
In	2007,	geothermal	energy	provided	about	66%	of	pri-
mary	energy	in	Iceland.	Some	of	it	is	distributed	directly	
to	buildings	through	extensive	district-pipe	systems,	with	
around	90%	of	 the	housing	stock	geothermally	heated,	
while	9%	is	heated	with	electricity	and	1%	with	oil.	
In	 2008	 Iceland’s	 total	 installed	capacity	of	hydro-
electric	power	was	1,880	MW,	generating	75.5%	of	the	
country’s	electricity	production,	while	 the	 remaining	
24.5	%	was	produced	primarily	by	geothermal	power	
plants.	
In	 2008,	 the	power	 intensive	 industries	used	around	
90%	of	all	electricity	produced	in	Iceland.	Most	of	the	hy-
dropower	plants	are	owned	by	Landsvirkjun,	the	National	
Power	Company,	Landsvirkjun currently	has	16	power	sta-
tions,	of	which	13	are	hydro-power	stations,	two	geother-
mal	power	stations	and	one	a	natural-gas-fired	station.	
Krafla	 and	 Bjarnarflag	 are	 geothermal	 power	 stations.	
Blanda,	Búrfell,	Fljotsdalur,	Hrauneyjafoss,	Laxá,	Sigal-
da,	Sog	and	Sultartangiand	Vatnsfell	are	all	hydropower	
stations.	Straumsvík	is	the	natural-gas	fired	station.
Landsvirkjun	 has	 recently	 finalised	 one	 new	 hydro-
power	station	in	eastern	Iceland,	the	Karahnjukar	Hydro-
power	Project;	named	after	two	nearby	mountains.	It	will	
be	the	largest	power	station	in	Iceland	and	will	provide	
690	MW	of	power	to	the	Alcoa	aluminium	plant	in	Rey-
oarfjorour.	
NORWAY
In	the	Norwegian	Arctic	area,	there	are	6	regions:	Sval-
bard,	Bjørnøya,	Jan	Mayen,	Nordland,	Troms	and	Finn-
mark.	Already	in	the	early	1900s	hydroelectric	power	was	
the	main	source	of	the	energy	in	Norway	and	in	particular	
used	by	heavy	industry.
In	northern	Norway,	hydro-electricity	is	the	most	im-
portant	source	of	power.	The	plants	are	connected	to	the	
Northern	European	grid,	via	both	Sweden	and	southern	
Norway.	
The	market	and	 the	current	price	of	electricity,	 to	an	
increasing	extent,	decide	how	the	reservoirs	of	stored	wa-
ter	are	run	through	the	year,	or	years,	for	the	multilayer	
storages.	Similarly,	 those	years	with	problems	in	filling	
the	reservoirs	also	impact	the	price	level.	
Spitzbergen	has	coal-mines	which	are	mainly	used	for	
exports.	Locally	the	community	is	totally	dependent	on	
coal	and	oil.	However,	there	are	ongoing	experiments	to	
produce	CO2	neutral	electricity	based	on	coal.	The	Chi-
nese	in	particular	are	interested	in	these	experiments.	Oil	
drives	all	transport	needs,	it	might	slowly	be	replaced	by	
LNG	(gas),	which	pollutes	less	in	the	local	Arctic	environ-
ment,	but	is	still	hydrocarbon-based.
The	Norwegian	government	has	tried	to	develop	green	
energy	also	in	the	Arctic	regions.	Alternatives	are	avail-
able:	In	the	sub-arctic,	as	in	the	3	northern	provinces	of	
Nordland,	Troms	and	Finnmark,	hydropower	is	the	main	
source	of	energy,	but	usage	of	wind	and	tidal	current	en-
ergy	are	increasing.	This	is	also	the	case	for	small	scale	
hydropower	facilities.	
Significant	 barriers	 however	 exist	 to	 the	 transition	
from	 non-renewable	 to	 renewable	 energy	 in	 this	 area.	
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Climate	 is	 the	 biggest	 issue:	 frost	 and	 icing	 remain	 a	
problem	 for	wind	 turbines	 and	 aridity	 for	 hydropower.	
The	nuclear	option	has	been	favoured	by	the	Russians.	
In	the	sub-Arctic	solar	energy	(photovoltaic)	might	be	an	
alternative	–	 from	February	 to	November,	 but	 here	 the	
infrastructure	 and	 the	 institutional	 arrangements	may	
prove	to	be	something	of	a	constraint,	two-way	measur-
ing	instruments	and	new	rules	for	electricity	companies	
are	needed	so	that	house	owners	can	sell	their	generated	
energy	to	the	companies	–	as	with	similar	schemes	in	Ger-
many	and	Switzerland.	
At	the	same	time	it	is	very	important	to	underline	that	
in	 northern	Norway	 and	Russia,	 petro-exploration	 and	
production	is	really	only	now	being	developed.	A	major-
ity	of	the	new	discoveries	are	likely	to	be	gas.	With	the	ar-
gument	that	gas	is	cleaner	than	oil,	gas	will	realistically	
be	the	“big”	alternative	in	the	next	25	years.	Ferries	and	
boats,	taxis	and	buses,	indeed,	are	all	in	the	process	of	
transferring	to	gas.
In	September	2010,	Norway	and	Russia	signed	an	ini-
tial	agreement	on	the	EEZ	zone	and	shelf	sea-border	after	
four	decades	of	negotiations,	paving	the	way	to	open	up	
the	potentially	oil-	and	gas-rich	region	for	offshore	explo-
ration.	In	this	context	the	oil	industry	says	the	waters	near	
the	 Lofoten	 and	 Vesteraalen	 islands	 in	 the	 Arctic	 now	
have	 the	best	prospects	off	Norway	 for	oil	and	must	be	
tapped	to	prolong	the	oil	bonanza	as	output	from	mature	
oilfields	declines.
An	industry-backed	survey	published	in	January	2010	
showed	most	 Norwegians	 favour	 an	 impact	 study	 that	
could	pave	the	way	for	the	opening	up	of	a	pristine,	fish-
rich	Arctic	area	to	oil	activities	 in	order	to	prolong	Nor-
way’s	energy	boom.	
Environmentalists	 say	 that	 any	 spill	 in	 the	 hitherto	
unspoiled	region	would	be	disastrous	for	its	diverse	eco-
system.	A	number	of	opinion	polls	in	recent	months	have	
suggested	that	Norwegians	are	split	down	the	middle	on	
Arctic	drilling	and	 the	 issue	was	a	major	 theme	 in	 last	
year’s	general	election.
RUSSIA
Russia	plans	to	develop	vast	hydrocarbon	reserves	locat-
ed	in	the	country’s	Arctic	region.	Projects	are	currently	
developing	slowly	mostly	due	to	the	lack	of	funding	for	
the	 huge	 investments	 required.	 In	 January	 2010,	 Rus-
sia’s	Natural	Resources	Minister	Yuri	Trutnev	proposed	
to	ease	the	possibilities	for	foreign	participation	in	off-
shore	energy	projects	in	the	Russian	Arctic	regions.	An	
important	reason	for	this	was	that	the	two	state	energy	
companies	Gazprom	 and	Rosneft	 needed	more	 foreign	
capital.	
The	amount	of	money	the	two	companies	are	currently	
investing	in	the	development	and	exploration	of	fields	is	
not	enough	to	develop	them	within	any	reasonable	time-
frame.	From	the	official	side	it	has	been	suggested	that	the	
Russian	government	itself	should	select	foreign	partners	
for	such	projects,	rather	than	letting	Rosneft	and	Gazprom	
handle	this	themselves.	
With	regard	to	the	Yamal	Nenets	and	northern	Krasno-
yarsk	regions,	Russia	will	need	increased	production	to	
compensate	 for	an	anticipated	decline	 in	production	 in	
other	regions	over	the	same	period.	This	information	was	
distributed	in	the	summer	of	2010	by	the	Russian	Energy	
Ministry,	Victor	Khristenko.
According	 to	 statistics	 from	 the	Ministry	of	Energy	a	
total	of	314.2	million	barrels	of	crude	oil	was	pumped	in	
July,	 2010.	The	plan	here	 is	 to	 further	 increase	 the	out-
put	of	gas	condensate	by	an	additional	35.7	million	tons	
a	year,	or	717,000	barrels	a	day.	This	will	be	in	both	the	
Yamal	Nenets	region	and	the	northern	part	of	the	Kras-
noyarsk	region.	
The	Kola	energy	systems’	installed	capacity	is	the	sec-
ond	largest	in	the	north-west	of	Russia	(after	Leningrad	
region)	and	the	largest	in	the	world	beyond	the	Polar	Cir-
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cle.	Its	total	capacity	is	3	758	MW.	The	Kola	system	consists	
of	17	hydro	power	stations,	5	heating	stations	(operating	
on	fossil	fuel),	the	only	tidal	power	station	in	Russia,	and	
the	Kola	nuclear	power	plant	(NPP).	Centralised	electric-
ity	supply	covers	50%	of	 the	territory	of	 the	region	and	
more	than	99%	of	its	population.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 there	 are	many	 outlying	 villages,	
which,	due	 to	significant	distance	and	small	electricity	
consumption	levels,	are	not	covered	by	centralised	sup-
ply	and	which	instead	get	their	energy	from	small	diesel	
power	plants	with	a	power	of	8–500	kW.	Their	total	power	
is	estimated	to	be	nearly	5	MW.	
Kola NPP	 produces	about	60%	of	 the	electricity	 con-
sumed	in	the	Murmansk	region.	The	region	itself	is	an	en-
ergy	surplus	region,	so	a	portion	of	the	energy	produced	
is	sold	to	the	Archangelsk	region	and	to	the	Republic	of	
Karelia.	The	energy	is	distributed	there	through	the	unit-
ed	grid.	
The	main	objective	of	 the	Russian	energy	strategy	 in	
the	coming	years	is	to	attain	a	better	mix	of	fuel	and	en-
ergy,	aiming	at	enhancing	the	competitive	ability	of	Rus-
sian	energy	production	and	services	on	the	world	market.	
For	this	purpose	the	long-term	energy	policy	should	con-
centrate	on	 energy	 safety,	 energy	 effectiveness,	 budget	
effectiveness	and	ecological	energy	security.
According	 to	 the	 Russian	 Energy	 Ministry,	 Yamalo-
Nenets	is	the	richest	region	of	Russia	in	terms	of	hydro-
carbons:	 its	 share	of	confirmed	Russian	 reserves	of	hy-
drocarbons	is	70%	for	gas	and	18%	for	oil	and	condensate.	
Fully	92%	of	the	gas	and	18%	of	the	oil	produced	in	Russia	
comes	from	this	region.
Today	there	are	229	oil	and	gas	fields	in	Yamal.	Initial	
total	resources	of	natural	gas	in	the	region	(including	the	
Kara	Sea)	are	estimated	 to	be	 125.3	 trillion	cu.	m,	with	
only	14	trillion	cu.	m	produced	today.	This	is	slightly	more	
than	11%	of	the	total	resource	base	and	about	30%	of	the	
industrial	gas	reserves	of	the	region.
At	present,	Yamal	reserves	allow	a	production	of	630–
650	billion	cu.	m	of	gas	per	year.	The	yearly	capacity	of	
the	region	in	gas	production	could	however	exceed	700	
billion	cu.	m	given	full	use	of	the	reserves,	implementa-
tion	of	advanced	scientific	technologies,	mass-scale	geo-
logical	exploration	and	sufficient	capacity	 in	 respect	of	
the	gas	pipeline.	
There	 are	 seven	 oil	 and	 gas	 refining	 enterprises	 in	
Yamal:	Gazprom	Pererabotka	Urengoy,	Gubkin	refinery,	
Noyabrsk	 refinery,	 Novatek-Yurkharovneftegaz	 (metha-
nol	production	unit),	Novatek-Purovsky	 refinery,	Taras-
ovsky	refinery,	Purnefteprodukt	refinery.	
Over	4	billion	cu.	m	of	associated	oil	gas,	about	10	mil-
lion	 t	 of	 gas	 condensate	and	about	 57,000	 t	 of	 oil	have	
been	produced	in	the	region	since	2008.
There	are	also	plans	to	put	up	seven	oil	and	gas	depos-
its	for	auction	soon,	a	deputy	head	of	the	regional	admin-
istration,	Vladimir	Vladimirov,	said	in	June	2010.
FAROE ISLANDS
The	 main	 energy	 production	 in	 the	 Faeroe	 Islands	 is	
fossil-based	such	as	natural	gas,	bunker	fuel,	petrol,	and	
other	hydrocarbon-based	products.	The	oil	consumption	
on	land	and	at	sea	is	essentially	the	same.	At	sea,	most	
oil	is	used	by	the	fishing	fleet,	while	on	land	oil	is	used	to	
produce	electricity	and	heat,	and	for	transport.	According	
to	the	National	Statistical	Authority	of	the	Faroe	Islands	
the	major	part	of	the	oil	is	related	to	fisheries	as	the	fish-
ing	fleet	consumes	44.4%	of	 the	oil	while	other	vessels	
consume	 another	 3.5%	while	 10.6%	 is	 related	 to	 other	
types	of	transport.	Households,	public	institutions,	retail	
and	 service	businesses	and	 industry	 together	 consume	
28.4%.	Renewable	energy	resources	and	the	burning	of	
refuse	represent	some	9%	of	the	energy	consumption	on	
land.	
Looking	at	electricity	production,	 total	production	 in	
2009	was	275	538	MWh	of	which	a	little	more	than	60%	is	
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District heating is produced on a larger 
heating plant or power plant, which 
supplies a wide range of heat. At the 
centre of the heating systems are 
combined heating and power generat-
ing plants where the main part of the 
generated heat is distributed to heat the 
connected households, while in the con-
nected power generators excess heat is 
converted into power. This ensures the 
maximum use of the provided energy. 
 Diesel may be one supply to the plant, 
but in some of the larger towns, heat 
from municipal waste incinerators is fed 
into the network. After production the 
heat is distributed to the customers in 
the form of hot water through insulated 
pipes, a pipe for delivery and a return 
wire. Approximately 2–10% of the en-
ergy is lost in this process. 
 All buildings which receive the heat-
ing are installed with a central heating 
system where the heat is transferred 
from the network to the building›s heat-
ing and hot water system. Transfer takes 
place in a heat exchanger which ensures 
a suitable temperature and that the heat 
is transported from one system to the 
other without direct connection between 
the two systems.
 Even if there is heat loss in the 
distribution system, the advantage of 
this system is that you get the maximum 
energy utilisation efficiency when using 
both heat output and power generation. 
Between 85% and 94% of the energy 
content is utilised when the production 
of district heating is at its peak.
Waste incineration is based on house-
hold waste and waste products from 
local production, the building industry, 
and other sources of burnable materi-
als. Also included are oil residues from 
the processing of fish and shrimp at the 
local fish factory, since waste products 
from the industry are heat treated so 
that any oil residue can be extracted.
 By the waste plant the waste material 
is sorted for recycling and incineration. 
Moreover discarded non-combustible 
materials (iron, other metals) and 
products which if burnt may generate 
hazardous gases and waste products 
(light bulbs, batteries, medicine resi-
dues, paint residues, etc.,) are sent to 
Denmark for further processing. After 
combustion the generated ash is sent to 
the Danish cement industry since fly ash 
is an important element in this process.
BOX 36: DISTRICT HEATING AS A COMBINED SOLUTION TO ENERGY AND WASTE – THE GREENLAND AND FAROE 
ISLANDS CASES
generated	by	thermal	power	plants	while	a	third	is	hydro-
power	based,	and	around	5%	comes	from	wind	energy.	
The	 land-based	 consumption	 of	 electricity	 is	 gener-
ally	projected	to	increase	by	2%	per annum.	Using	these	
projections	consumption	 in	2015	 is	predicted	 to	be	300	
GWh.	Recently	the	installation	of	plants	generating	heat	
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for	district	heating	in	combination	with	electrical	power	
generation	based	on	the	incineration	of	waste	materials,	
has	become	a	new	element	in	the	North,	and	also	on	the	
Faroe	Islands	(see	box	36).	
SWEDEN
In	Norrbotten,	northern	Sweden	about	15	TWh	(terawatt	
hours)	is	produced	yearly,	which	represents	about	11%	of	
Sweden’s	total	production	of	electric	power.	The	energy	
sector	is	highly	developed	and	out	of	its	250,000	inhabit-
ants	no	less	than	4,000	earn	their	livelihoods	in	the	ener-
gy	sector.	Considerable	energy	resources	however	remain	
available	for	further	development.	These	include	sources	
such	as	wood,	crops	 for	biomass	production,	and	wind	
power	in	mountain	and	coastal	areas.	In	addition	the	vast	
open	areas	provide	the	opportunity	to	make	use	of	geo-
thermal	heating/cooling	systems,	as	well	as	of	the	waste	
heat	flow	from	the	large	base	industries	in	the	region.	
Ms	 Kristina	 Leufstedt,	 press	 manager	 for	 Vattenfall,	
one	 of	 Europe’s	 leading	 energy	 companies,	 said:	 “The	
countries	in	the	Arctic	region	where	Vattenfall	operates,	
Finland	 and	 Sweden,	 have	 a	 quite	 significant	 share	 of	
renewable	energy	in	their	electricity	system,	mainly	hy-
dropower”	and	according	to	her:	“in	Sweden,	the	electric-
ity	system	is	based	on	hydro	power	and	nuclear	power,	
which	 generates	 a	 stable	 supply	 of	 electricity	with	 low	
emissions.	This	stable	and	affordable	base	load	has	his-
torically	 provided	 competitive	 advantages	 to	 Sweden’s	
energy	 intensive	 industry	 but	has	 also	 encouraged	 im-
proved	energy	efficiency	throughout	the	industry.”	
On	the	issue	of	dependency	on	hydrocarbons	in	respect	
of	these	areas,	Ms	Leufstedt	notes:	“Many	industrial	proc-
esses	in	Sweden	now	use	electricity	instead	of	fossil	fuels,	
significantly	reducing	the	primary	energy	input.	The	con-
sumption	patterns	across	days	and	seasons	vary	 in	 the	
Arctic	region	due	to	weather	conditions,	which	is	catered	
to	by	the	regulating	capacity	of	hydro	power.”
In	 1998	 one	 of	 the	 world’s	 major	 energy	 producers	
Vattenfall AB,	set	up	its	first	wind	turbine,	a	600	kW	MK	
IV	turbine	from	the	Danish	company	Bonus Energy A/S	
thus	 contributing	 to	 a	path	 that	was	 to	 become	 funda-
mentally	 important	 in	 terms	of	Swedish	energy	supply.	
The	turbine	was	equipped	for	Arctic	conditions	and	situ-
ated	at	Suorva	in	northern	Sweden,	producing	a	total	of	
1,710	MWh	of	electricity	during	its	first	year	of	operation.	
To	work	successfully	in	the	prevailing	Arctic	conditions,	
wind	turbines	have	been	modified	to	withstand	low	op-
erating	temperatures	and	ice	accumulation	on	the	rotor	
blades	which	 is	one	of	 the	biggest	problems	with	wind	
energy	in	the	Arctic	regions.	The	system	was	designed	to	
operate	at	 temperatures	down	to	20ºC	below	zero,	with	
the	lowest	temperature	so	far	being	-37ºC.
A Greener Economy
The	need	to	“green	the	economy”	has	become	an	impor-
tant	issue	for	many	countries,	and	the	OECD	seems	to	be	
taking	a	lead,	focusing	in	particular	on	renewable	energy	
and	“green	production”	 in	remote	regions.	Many	of	 the	
perspectives	brought	forward	in	this	context	are,	moreo-
ver,	applicable	as	development	issues	in	the	Arctic.
The	current	impetus	to	green	the	economy	reflects	three	
major	 concerns:	 the	need	 to	 tackle	climate	change	and	
other	environmental	problems;	the	desire	to	strengthen	
energy	security	by	reducing	dependence	on	imported	oil	
and	gas;	and	the	need	to	stimulate	job-creation	in	many	
rural	areas,	particularly	in	the	aftermath	of	the	economic	
and	financial	crisis.	The	first	two	points	are	compatible	
with	higher	prices	for	energy,	the	third	is	harder	to	rec-
oncile.
The	emphasis	on	job	creation	is	justified	by	positive	em-
ployment	 impact	 forecasts	 and	 several	OECD	countries	
have	identified	“green	power”	as	a	major	rural	develop-
ment	 opportunity.	 Examples	 include:	 Spain	 (solar	 and	
wind);	England	(off-shore	wind	and	wave);	and	Finland	
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(forest-based	cellulosic	ethanol	and	wood	co-generation).	
However,	despite	the	positive	forecast	and	current	region-
al	specialisation,	there	is	no	sound	evidence	concerning	
the	positive	impact	“green	power”	may	be	having	on	rural	
economies	or	about	the	potential	of	green	energy	to	be	a	
major	driver	of	rural	development.
The	impact	the	transition	towards	a	“green	economy”	
will	have	on	labour	markets	should	not	be	underestimat-
ed	especially	in	rural	areas.	For	instance,	the	stricter	en-
vironmental	regulations	needed	to	encourage	the	use	of	
renewable	energy	might	well	act	as	a	“job-killer”,	reduc-
ing	the	net	number	of	jobs	in	a	given	rural	region.	Hence,	
to	assess	the	impact	of	green	power	on	rural	economies,	
both	the	macro	and	the	local	levels	should	be	taken	into	
account	in	the	analysis.	
At	 the	macro	 level	 the	 issue	 is	 net	 new	 jobs,	 as	 evi-
denced	in	a	rise	in	the	participation	rate	or	a	fall	in	the	
structural	unemployment	rate.	To	what	extent	will	green	
power	displace	other	jobs?	How	much	will	green	energy	
jobs	 displace	 jobs	 in	 the	 traditional	 power	 supply?	 If	
green	power	is	more	expensive	how	many	jobs	will	be	lost	
due	to	lower	GDP?	
At	the	local	level,	the	key	question	is	to	understand	how	
many	jobs	are	associated	with	each	specific	project.	Cer-
tain	 jobs	will	be	 in	operation	and	maintenance	 (O&M),	
while	others	will	be	in	the	construction	of	the	required	fa-
cilities.	As	a	consequence,	both	temporary	and	long-term	
jobs	will	be	created	in	the	regions.	
If	employment	creation	is	the	overriding	aim	of	the	pol-
icy,	a	thorough	assessment	of	employment	effects	should	
thus	focus	on	job	multipliers,	the	backward	and	forward	
linkages	green	power	can	generate	at	the	regional	level,	
and	 income	 effects.	 Power	 generation	 typically	 creates	
relatively	few	local	jobs	and	has	small	local	job	multipli-
ers.	It	is	a	capital-intensive	activity	and	has	low	linkages	
to	 the	 local	 economy.	 This	 is	 especially	 true	 for	 those	
forms	of	renewable	generation	that	rely	on	free	energy	in-
puts,	like	wind	and	sun.	
Conversely,	indirect	job	creation	at	provincial/state	or	
national	 level	can	be	significant.	For	 instance,	a	region	
can	specialise	in	the	production	of	component	manufac-
turing	for	renewables.	Finally,	displacement	effects	at	the	
national	level	can	offset	many	of	the	green	power	effect	
jobs.
Due	to	the	lock-in	dynamics	that	may	take	place	at	the	
national	 level,	 some	 regions	win	 (becoming	home	 to	 a	
“green	 power”	 supply	 chain)	 and	 others	 lose	 (gaining	
only	power	generation	with	limited	or	no	linkages	to	the	
local	economy).	
The	timescale	for	national	and	local	specialisation	is	
crucial	here.	Green	power	 is	 largely	displacing	existing	
generation	modes	of	conventional	energy.	The	faster	the	
displacement	takes	place,	the	greater	the	industry’s	an-
nual	installations	and	economic	impact	in	terms	of	jobs	
and	output,	but	the	shorter	the	window	of	displacement	
becomes.	After	the	displacement	takes	place,	there	is	only	
replacement,	so	the	industry	shrinks	unless	it	can	export.	
All	 countries	 undertaking	 renewable	 developments	
anticipate	export	activity;	 it	 is	unlikely	 that	all	of	 their	
ambitions	can	be	satisfied.	Moreover,	developed-country	
forecasts	 may	 need	 to	 take	 better	 account	 of	 develop-
ments	in	China,	whose	increasing	specialisation	in	green	
energy	 production	 could	 influence	 specialisation	 pat-
terns	in	other	regional	and	national	economies.
Northern approaches
For	Iceland	–	rich	in	natural	energy	resources	–	the	2008	
economic	 crash	 has	 dramatically	 changed	 the	 way	 it	
wants	to	exploit	 its	energy	reserves.	Experts	argue	that	
greed,	impatience	and	short-sightedness	dominated	deci-
sions	on	the	country’s	energy	planning	before	2008.	Now,	
a	recent	report,	commissioned	by	the	country’s	Depart-
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ment	of	Industry,	argues	that	a	new	energy	policy	for	Ice-
land	should	prioritise	profitability,	sustainability	and	na-
tional	gain.	Energy	is	seen	as	the	key	to	Iceland’s	welfare.
The	Atlantic	 island’s	natural	energy	reserves	 include	
hydro	and	geothermal	power.	However,	a	large	amount	of	
the	energy	produced	is	sold	cheaply	to	heavy	industry	–	
mainly	aluminium	plants	–	much	to	the	discontent	of	the	
Icelandic	population	who	are	still	struggling	to	recover	
economically	after	2008.	Even	aluminium	plants	 in	Af-
rica	pay	more	for	the	energy	they	use	than	the	plants	in	
Iceland.	
Similar	discontent	among	the	Icelandic	people	recently	
pushed	the	Icelandic	government	to	expropriate	a	power	
plant	from	a	Canadian	company.	In	the	immediate	after-
math	of	the	economic	crash,	the	rights	to	exploit	the	geo-
thermal	reserves	on	a	peninsula	in	south-western	Iceland	
for	the	next	65	years	were	sold	at	a	giveaway	price	to	the	
Canadian	company.
Norway,	despite	being	rich	in	oil	and	gas,	feeds	much	
of	 its	 electricity	demands	with	hydropower.	One	of	 the	
main	energy	discussions	at	the	moment,	however,	is	still	
whether	or	not	to	give	the	go-ahead	for	new	oil	and	gas	
exploitation	 at	 sea	 in	 northern	Norway.	 The	 area	 is	 an	
important	spawning	ground	for	cod	and	therefore	crucial	
for	Norway’s	 large	 fishing	 industry.	 So	 far,	 the	 current	
three-party	government	coalition	has	been	unable	to	find	
a	balance	between	two	of	the	country’s	main	industries	–	
fishing	and	petroleum.
Finland	and	Sweden,	on	 the	other	hand,	are	 looking	
at	 building	 new	 nuclear	 power	 plants.	 In	 Finland,	 for	
example,	Helsinki	recently	took	two	major	decisions	on	
shaping	the	country’s	energy	for	the	future:	Firstly,	to	in-
crease	the	country’s	domestic	renewable	energy	sources;	
and	secondly,	to	construct	new	nuclear	power	plants.	The	
motivation	behind	those	two	political	decisions	was	in-
creasing	global	warming	and	the	wish	for	self-sufficiency	
in	 energy	 and	 employment.	 For	 Finland,	 energy	 inde-
pendence	is	the	primary	factor	as	regards	energy	policy.
Despite	 the	 open	 Nordic	 electricity	 market,	 Finland	
aims	to	keep	the	production	of	most	of	the	energy	used	
within	 the	country.	 If	not,	 the	Finnish	 fear	 it	 could	be-
come	dependent	on	energy	 from	 its	 eastern	neighbour,	
Russia.
Across	the	border	in	Sweden,	a	thirty-year-old	ban	on	
the	building	of	new	nuclear	reactors	was	recently	reversed	
–	a	move	that	divided	the	Swedish	population.	Building	
new	nuclear	power	plants	will	increase	Swedish	produc-
tion	of	domestic	energy.	Some	50%	of	Sweden’s	energy	
comes	 from	 10	nuclear	 power	plants	which	 are	 around	
30–40	years	old	and	which,	at	present,	only	work	at	63%	
of	their	capacity.	
Furthermore,	Swedish	hydropower	 is	also	one	of	 the	
country’s	big	energy	sources.	But	the	amount	of	hydro-
electricity	depends	on	 rainfall.	Hence,	when	 rainfall	 is	
scarce,	coupled	with	a	high	energy	demand,	Sweden	must	
buy	energy	at	higher	prices	–	sometimes	from	abroad	–	
leaving	consumers	and	energy	intensive	industries	with	
soaring	energy	bills.	Sweden	is	also	looking	at	introduc-
ing	more	renewable	energy	 into	 the	Swedish	electricity	
grid	–	mainly	in	the	form	of	wind	power.	More	than	1,000	
wind	power	plants	will	be	built	 in	the	country	over	the	
next	few	years	at	the	price	of	70	billion	Swedish	kronor.
Saving energy and turning waste into a resource
The	AEA’s	Rural	Power	System	Upgrade	(RPSU)	in	Alaska	
is	a	programme	which	aims	to	replaces	obsolete,	 ineffi-
cient	diesel	powerhouses	with	 regulatory-compliant	 fa-
cilities	that	employ	new	diesel	and	control	technology	in	
rural	 Alaskan	 communities.	 These	 improvements	 have	
increased	diesel	fuel	efficiency	by	20%–50%,	saving	hun-
dreds	of	thousands	of	gallons	of	fuel	to	date.	
The	RPSU	programme	also	offers	technical	and	emer-
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gency	assistance	to	over	130	isolated,	rural	villages,	and	
has	a	 longstanding	relationship	with	the	Alaskan	rural	
utilities	and	local	native	organisations.	The	Village	End-
Use	Energy	Efficiency	Programme	helps	communities	to	
achieve	significant	progress	toward	energy	efficiency	by	
replacing	 or	 installing	 energy-efficient	 lighting,	 switch	
boxes,	 motion	 sensors,	 set	 back	 thermostats,	 weather	
stripping,	and	low	mass	boilers.
The	inflow	of	consumption	goods	to	the	Arctic	in	com-
bination	with	a	more	urban	lifestyle	provides	the	Arctic	
with	large	amounts	of	“junk-food”	which	is	a	problem	in	
itself.	The	imports	also	generate	substantial	amounts	of	
waste	materials.	The	traditional	waste	management	pro-
cedures	with	 low	 temperature	 burning	 on	 large	 dump-
sites	is	thus	no	longer	feasible	given	the	health	challenges	
associated	with	this	approach,	namely,	the	generation	of	
dioxin	and	similar	 toxic	 fumes,	 thus	constituting	a	sig-
nificant	environmental	threat.	Similarly	the	discharge	of	
untreated	sewage	serves	as	a	potential	health	hazard	and	
source	of	drinking	water	contaminant.
Increasingly,	 the	 conversion	 of	 waste	 into	 useable	
products	 has	 become	 an	 important	 alternative.	 In	 the	
symbiosis	 approach	 waste	 material	 from	 one	 sector	 is	
considered	a	resource	in	another,	which	means	that	the	
regeneration	and	re-use	of	some	products	and	increased	
use	 of	 recyclable	materials	 provide	 a	 new	 approach	 to	
waste	management,	while	 the	conversion	of	other	non-
recyclable	materials	is	converted	into	energy.	
One	way	 to	achieve	 this	 is	 through	 the	generation	of	
biogas,	 where	 sewage	 fractions	 and	 biomass,	 for	 in-
stance	waste	material	from	fish	processing,	can	provide	
an	important	input.	Another	is	the	controlled	burning	of	
materials	in	district	heating	systems	where	the	energy	is	
extracted	and	burning	takes	place	at	high	temperatures	
which	 together	with	filters	contribute	 to	 the	prevention	
of	 the	generation	of	 toxic	 fumes.	 It	adds	 to	a	 limitation	
of	non-renewable	energy	resource	consumption	and	en-
sures	 a	 cleaner	 environment.	 But	 such	 approaches	 are	
costly	and	require	continuous	monitoring	by	skilled	staff	
in	order	to	be	successful.


A question of  
accessibility
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The	Arctic	region	is	becoming	increasingly	dependent	on	
connections	 between	 people,	 through	 communication	
networks	and	through	ground-,	air-,	and	sea-based	trans-
portation	networks	–	 from	 resources	 to	processors	 and	
consumers	–	by	air	and	sea,	pipelines,	and	power-grids.	
In	 this	 context	 the	 Arctic	 does	 not	 differ	much	 from	
most	of	the	rest	of	the	world,	with	three	significant	excep-
tions:	The	distances,	the	sparsely	populated	areas,	and	
the	 problems	 generated	 through	 the	 geographical	 and	
seasonal	variations	in	accessibility.	The	distances	from,	
and	 the	 problems	 of	 accessibility	 to	 the	major	markets	
contribute	 to	 constraining	 economic	 development	 per-
spectives.	
And	the	distribution	of	the	sparse	population	between	
many	 more	 or	 less	 isolated	 places	 poses	 further	 hin-
drances	in	connection	with	the	establishment	of	a	proper	
infrastructure,	just	as	it	provides	many	challenges	in	es-
tablishing	proper	health	care,	education	and	other	basic	
services.	Besides	being	more	difficult	to	justify	because	of	
the	small	numbers	of	people	being	served	the	remoteness	
and	nature	of	accessibility	is	at	the	same	time	more	costly.	
The	complexity	of	the	accessibility	question	is	illustrated	
on	map	15	which	shows	settlements	and	ports	as	well	as	
major	inland	transport	routes.	
Therefore	 the	 prospects	 for	 Arctic	 communities	 are	
not	as	positive	as	in	many	other	parts	of	the	world.	For	
this	reason,	transportation	within	and	beyond	the	region	
has	generally	been	dependent	on	the	most	expensive	so-
lutions	–	primarily	air	travel.	Moreover,	there	are	no	in-
dications	that	this	kind	of	connection	will	in	the	future	
become	less	expensive.	
As	 already	 discussed	 in	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 book,	
one	 consequence	 of	 this	 has	 been	 a	 delocalisation	 of	
many	economic	activities	as	well	as	the	residence	of	the	
population	to	places	providing	the	most	favourable	ac-
cess,	with	 increasing	urbanisation	as	an	obvious	con-
sequence.	
Access	by	the	sea	has	always	been	important	in	spite	
of	the	limitations	imposed	by	sea	ice	and	harsh	weather	
conditions.	The	–	in	this	context	–	positive	consequences	
of	warming	 in	 the	Arctic	would	be	an	 increased	use	of	
marine	transport.	This	may	help	to	alleviate	the	isolation	
of	some	Arctic	communities	 if	 future	 transport	systems	
could	serve	as	connections	between	the	places.	The	prob-
lem,	however,	is	the	size	of	the	places	in	combination	with	
the	costs	of	maintaining	transport	routes.	In	that	context	
the	vessels	used	in	international	transportation	would	be	
far	too	large	and	costly.
The map shows the overall characteris-
tic of transport in the Arctic except for 
connections by air. Besides the existing 
major shipping routes by country the 
existing ports are also shown. And on-
land transport is illustrated by means of 
the major roads and main railways, as 
well as the rivers where transport is tak-
ing place. Finally the distribution of all 
populated places is shown. What is obvi-
ous is on the one hand a relatively dense 
network of ports and sea routes, and on 
the other, the vast areas not connected 
by roads, or only road connections open 
for transport during winter time, just 
as railroads are only available in very 
few parts of the Arctic. And land-based 
transport lines mainly run North-South, 
providing limited connections across 
the regions. Connections, therefore, are 
rather unequally distributed and thus 
travel of any sort remains a challenge for 
many of the region’s inhabitants. 
MAP 15: TRANSPORT ROUTES IN THE ARCTIC
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More	important	here	would	probably	be	a	continuation	
of	the	rise	of	the	internet,	wireless	devices,	and	other	in-
formation	and	communications	technologies.	They	con-
nect	Arctic	communities	with	one	another	and	with	other	
regions,	providing	opportunities	for	a	number	of	services	
for	instance	in	relation	to	education,	health,	and	business	
development	not	least	simply	by	connecting	people.	Map	
16,	showing	GSM	coverage	in	the	Arctic,	illustrates	that	
even	when	not	connected	by	physically	by	boat,	 rail	or	
road,	 that	communication	 is	still	an	option,	at	 least	 for	
most	places.	As	presented	in	box	37	the	Arctic	has	clearly	
become	a	member	of	 the	new	globalised	community	of	
communication.	
While	average	temperature	 increases	may	reduce	sea	
ice	levels	and	make	transport	both	safer	and	easier	the	
melting	of	permafrost	has	numerous	negative	effects	on	
land;	making	for	an	unstable	base	for	housing,	ground-
based	transportation,	pipelines	and	power-grids.	More-
over,	while	 there	has	been	much	discussion	about	how	
commercial	ships	should	move	through	the	Arctic,	which	
routes	to	choose,	how	to	minimise	risks	and	transporta-
tion	time,	there	has	been	very	little	focus	on	transporta-
tion	needs	within	 the	Arctic.	For	 instance	 in	 relation	 to	
the	question	of	how	to	access	the	resources,	to	bring	the	
machinery,	 labour	force	and	goods	required	in,	and	ar-
range	 the	 shipment	 of	 produce	 out	 of	 the	 region	when	
there	are	problems	with	road	access,	the	thawing	of	per-
mafrost,	ice-	and	snow	cover	is	then	actually	a	significant	
problem	for	the	maintenance	of	year	long	connections.	In	
the	context	of	new	economic	activities	 such	as	 tourism	
the	question	of	having	the	necessary	facilities	to	service	
cruise	ships	adds	to	the	list	of	problems	that	need	to	be	
taken	care	of	in	relation	to	the	future	transportation	in-
frastructure.	
For	communities	to	take	advantage	of	the	new	activi-
ties	when	resource	industries	are	expanding,	more	tour-
ists	 are	arriving,	 and	new	marine	 service	activities	 are	
required,	it	is	clear	that	the	Arctic	communities	will	re-
quire	a	new	marine	infrastructure.	Northern	municipali-
ties	need	stable	long-term	funding	but	they	simply	do	not	
have	the	resources	required	to	put	this	in	place.	Moreover,	
such	an	infrastructure	creates	a	growth	in	demand,	not	
only	 for	 transportation	 and	 communication	 networks,	
but	also	for	other	basic	services	such	as	the	management	
of	solid	waste,	sewage,	power	and	water	and	increasingly	
also	access	to	recreational	areas	and	leisure	time	facili-
ties.	
Similarly,	 resources	 are	 also	 required	 to	 construct	
and	 maintain	 the	 necessary	 information	 technology	
infrastructure	 which	 services	 the	 new	 physical	 infra-
structure.	If	the	trans-shipment	of	goods	between	cargo	
vessels	does	become	a	 routine	practice	 in	 the	North	a	
While physical transport by sea or on 
land is limited, access by means of tel-
ephone is often referred to as a means 
of communication that helps overcome 
some of these obstacles. As shown on 
the map telephone access is definitely a 
good option here. But as shown, access 
remains highly unequal, both due to the 
distribution of networks, and especially 
due to inherent limitations in these net-
works. Only the larger towns and nearby 
villages provide a reasonably dense 
network, and only a small fraction of the 
Arctic is provided with 3GSM coverage. 
As such, access to a number of services 
which could be useful in connection 
with overcoming some of the physical 
problems, for instance social networks 
independent of computers, remains 
limited. Contrary to what is provided by 
means of the telephone system, internet 
access is generally available for a larger 
part of the population in the Arctic, a 
situation discussed further in box 39. 
MAP 16: GSM COVERAGE IN THE ARCTIC
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Arctic Europe has for more than 300 
years had its own mail route system. In 
the 1690s the Danish-Norwegian mail 
route system was extended to include 
Vardøhus in the most north-eastern part 
of northern Norway. 
 In Greenland, the central colonial 
administration established a Greenlandic 
language newspaper as early as in 1861. 
The newspaper, Atuagagdliutit, is still 
published and is today one of the Arctic’s 
oldest newspapers. The newspaper›s 
very first issue included probably the 
world’s first coloured newspaper illustra-
tions.
 The history of wired telecommunica-
tion in the Arctic began in Alaska in 1900. 
That year the US Army Signal Corps 
began to build the Washington-Alaska 
Military Cable and Telegraph System. In 
1903 Alaska was linked by wire to the 
rest of the United States with the follow-
ing words: “Alaska is now open to civilisa-
tion”. Commercial and non-military traffic 
was only partly allowed.
 The first Arctic radiotelegraphy sta-
tion system was constructed in Novo-
Mariinsk (today named Anadyr) in Russia 
in 1912. It was a Russian Navy station 
with a 40-metre mast. The station was 
constructed as one of several stations 
that covered the Russian Arctic Ocean 
coast and islands, from Franz Josef Land 
in the Barents Sea to Wrangel Island in 
the Chukchi Sea. 
BOX 37: HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE HISTORY OF COMMUNICATION IN THE ARCTIC
new	port	infrastructure	will	be	needed	to	service	these	
vessels	and	to	ensure	that	adequate	repair	facilities	are	
in	place.
Sea transport
Since	the	turn	of	the	century	climate	change	has	had	an	
important	impact	on	accessibility	by	sea.	In	recent	years	
the	area	of	Arctic	sea-ice	has	contracted	substantially.	At	
the	same	time	new	findings	show	that	the	ice	thickness	
has	decreased	by	10–15%	while	predictions	for	2040	(and	
perhaps	earlier)	suggest	 that	easier	ocean	access	 to	 the	
resources	of	the	Arctic	will	be	available.	The	consequence	
of	 this	 is	 that	maritime	activity	may	 increase	as	obser-
vations	 show	 that	 the	 opening	 of	 new	 shipping	 routes	
around	the	margins	of	the	Arctic	Basin	would	make	ship-
ping	feasible	and	result	in	a	situation	where	ships	in	the	
Arctic	could	operate	successfully	where	previously	opera-
tions	were	difficult	and	expensive.	Resources	could	thus	
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 In 1936 the telecommunication system 
in Alaska was reorganised as the Alaska 
Communication Systems (ACS, later 
Alascom) but military communications 
still had first priority. In 1946, the first 
telephone system was established, and 
civilian access increased. Only from 1971, 
when Alascom was formed, did Alaska’s 
telecommunications however become 
commercially, rather than military based.
 In 1972 Telesat Canada launched its 
first Anik satellite which covered the 
North American Arctic including the west 
coast of Greenland, making Canada the 
first country in the world to have a satel-
lite in geostationary orbit for domestic 
communications purposes.
 In the 1970s, a UHF network connected 
Greenland internally. This network was 
modernised and digitalised in 1996 and 
Greenland became the second nation in 
the world with a 100% digital telecom-
munication network backbone system. 
Greenland›s neighbour to the east, 
Iceland, had as the first nation reached 
that goal only a few months earlier. 1996 
was also the year access to the Internet 
was established in Greenland.
be	more	 easily	 exploited	 in	 areas	where	 once	 this	 had	
been	extremely	difficult.	
This	has	 led	 to	 increasing	 concern	 in	 respect	 of	 eco-
nomic	activity	for	example	in	much	of	the	Atlantic	part	
of	 the	Arctic	 region.	The	Arctic	 sea	 routes	may	become	
the	key	to	an	extensive	increase	in	the	level	of	economic	
activity	 which	 may	 have	 a	 substantial	 socio-economic	
impact	 in	 the	Arctic	 and	 Sub-Arctic	 regions.	 Increased	
access	raises	several	questions	such	as	sovereignty	over	
shipping	routes	and	seabed	resources,	security	and	safety	
both	for	the	new	activities	and	their	impact	on	the	activi-
ties	already	 there,	 for	 instance	 commercial	fishing,	 the	
hunting	of	marine	wildlife	 by	 indigenous	people,	 tour-
ism	and	existing	shipping.	In	addition,	increased	access	
to	shipping	routes	and	resources	entails	a	higher	risk	of	
environmental	degradation,	significantly	impacting	the	
environment,	such	as	marine	mammal	migration	and	the	
introduction	of	alien	invasive	species	in	the	region.	
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It	is	not,	however,	only	global	warming	and	the	enor-
mous	deposits	of	natural	resources	that	will	ensure	the	
Arctic	 region’s	 importance	 in	 the	 world	 of	 the	 future.	
Its	central	location	in	geographical	terms	and	the	short	
direct	 sea	 routes	 to	 the	main	population	 centres	of	 the	
globe,	still	predominantly	located	in	the	northern	hemi-
sphere,	are	a	 significant	asset	here.	Arctic	 resource	de-
velopment	will	go	hand	in	hand	with	the	opening	up	of	
shipping	routes	in	the	Arctic	Ocean	as	well	as	shipping	
on	the	increasingly	ice-free	rivers	that	run	north	into	the	
Arctic	Ocean.	
Increased	marine	access	has	implications	for	national	
and	regional	governments	which	will	be	called	upon	for	
services	such	as	 icebreaking,	 ice	charting	and	forecast-
ing	as	well	as	emergency	preparedness,	and	several	stud-
ies	conclude	that	oil	spills	and	other	industrial	accidents	
could	have	serious,	long-lasting	effects	in	a	high-latitude,	
cold	 ocean	 environment.	 Despite	 preventive	 measures	
such	 as	 improved	 boat-building	 standards,	 “spill	 re-
sponse	operations”	are	more	complex	and	demanding	in	
ice-covered	waters	and	effective	response	strategies	have	
yet	to	be	developed	while	better	port	facilities	and	operat-
ing	procedures	in	relation	to	oil	spills	are	also	required.	
Tourism 
Cruise	 liners	generally	 sail	under	flags	of	 convenience.	
In	some	cases	they	do	not	follow	national	regulations	on	
environmental	standards,	national	fees,	renovation	costs	
for	attractions	and	ports,	wastewater	taxes,	income	taxes	
etc.	The	cruise	industry	can	also	easily	shift	ports	leaving	
local	communities	with	unused	and	costly	infrastructure	
installations	and	failed	businesses.	As	a	result,	many	lo-
cal	communities	are	reluctant	to	try	to	effectively	regulate	
cruise	operations	for	fear	of	reprisals.	The	national	regu-
lation	of	tourist	operations	is	more	effective	and	efficient.	
The	 cruise	 industry	 has	 not	 been	 critically	 assessed	
in	 the	Arctic	with	a	view	 to	 limiting	 its	potentially	det-
rimental	effects.	Cruise	ships	are	believed	by	some	to	be	
a	destructive	form	of	 tourism,	with	few	benefits	to	host	
destinations	and	many	negative	environmental	impacts	
such	as	carrying	capacity	problems	in	over-visited	attrac-
tion	spots,	pollution,	waste	management	and	the	need	for	
a	highly	developed	infrastructure.	As	already	addressed	
by	several	scholars	this	issue	could	become	a	serious	con-
cern	in	the	Arctic	context	where	the	vulnerable	ecosystem	
balance	can	easily	be	threatened.	
Global	warming	quickly	facilitates	access	to	previous-
ly	secluded	villages.	Some	studies	of	 indigenous	com-
munities	have	 found	many	 residents	 are	not	prepared	
for	mass	tourism	and	are	still	highly	dependent	on	the	
environment	for	survival	in	both	a	physical	and	a	cul-
tural	sense.
Despite	 these	 potentially	 problematic	 implications,	
cruising	remains	the	most	convenient	means	of	access	to	
the	Arctic’s	 coastal	 communities.	Since	 cruises	 include	
accommodation,	they	reduce	the	strain	on	small	villages	
that	are	often	unprepared	to	accommodate	tourists.	Lo-
cals	can	instead	focus	on	selling	arts	and	crafts,	conduct-
ing	performances,	communicating	traditional	knowledge	
and	providing	guiding	services	for	day	visitors.	Cruises	
can	also	be	a	provisional	solution	for	tour	operators,	who	
consider	the	Arctic	industry	as	being	too	young	to	fully	
support	land-based	tourism	activities	for	a	long	period,	
but	still	want	to	organise	trips	that	can	be	beneficial	to	
these	communities.	
The	greater	potential	for	collisions	in	the	North	Atlantic	
and	the	Greenland	Sea	as	the	number	of	polar	expedition	
rises	during	accessible	periods	has	drawn	attention	to	a	
number	 of	 new	 governance	 challenges.	 The	 additional	
pressure	 from	 tourist	 flow	has	 generated	 a	 response	 in	
the	form	of	various	ideas	in	respect	of	different	forms	of	
conservation.	While	community-based	conservation	for	
the	sake	of	the	polar	bear,	arctic	national	wildlife	refuges	
and	 bear-human	 safety	 plans	 have	 been	 discussed	 in	
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Social media and especially Facebook 
has become an integral part of their 
daily life for many people in the North. 
The technique is good for low band-
width, a critical mass has been reached, 
the concept appeals to the well-known 
impersonal spread of information 
(“someone has said …”), and people 
can stay in contact in spite of the huge 
distances involved.
 Several politicians in Greenland com-
municate intensively through Facebook. 
The member of the Danish Parliament 
for Greenland Juliane Henningsen is 
one of the most popular. She has 4 973 
friends, which is about 9% of the total 
population in Greenland. This gives 
her – and other politicians – potentially 
a very strong outreach. Indeed, it was 
through Facebook that Juliane Hen-
ningsen recently announced a marked 
change in her private life.
 The private business sector has also 
adopted Facebook. The only internet 
news provider, sermitsiaq.ag is exten-
sively using Facebook for interactivity 
with its readers. Photos of specific 
events are requested on Facebook from 
among the 3 368 friends of the website. 
The municipal office responsible for 
nurturing new business entrepreneurs in 
the municipality communicates primarily 
through Facebook. Invitations for cast-
ings for film actors are spread through 
Facebook, and so on.
The broader private use of Facebook 
shows a generally high ICT literacy 
among many of the users. The group of 
experienced users of course includes 
many people born after 1990 (the Inter-
net generation), but also significantly 
older users – aged 50+ – are both dedi-
cated and advanced users. This reflects 
the fact that Greenland has never really 
experienced significant age-differentia-
tion in respect of ICT use.
BOX 38: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA – THE FINNISH AND GREENLAND CASES
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the	US	and	Canada,	European	ideas	have	focused	on	the	
designation	of	wildlife	refuges,	national	parks	and	even	
marine	protected	areas	to	safeguard	animals	and	the	en-
vironment,	including	the	perspectives	of	indigenous	peo-
ple,	hunters	and	fishermen.
The	prospect	of	Arctic	tourist	spots	continuing	to	grow	
in	 popularity	 heightens	 the	 risk	 of	 social	 and	 environ-
mental	stress	on	natural	habitats,	wildlife	and	indigenous	
peoples.	This	prospect	has	generated	numerous	sugges-
tions	for	the	formation	of	an	Arctic	Tourism	Association.	
The	formation	of	a	European	Arctic	Tourism	Association	
(EATA)	to	manage	Europe-based	tourism	to	the	Arctic	has	
also	been	suggested	(Ecology	Institute	2010).
The	creation	of	an	International	Arctic	Tourism	Asso-
ciation	(IATA)	has	also	been	raised	with	 the	 IAATO/In-
ternational	Association	of	Antarctic	Tour	Operators	being	
a	role-model	in	this	respect.	As	suggested	by	the	expert	
group	behind	the	EU	Arctic	footprint	and	policy	assess-
ment	report	(2010),	their	role	would	encompass	managing	
all	tourism	in	the	Arctic	thus	contributing	to	the	simplifi-
cation	and	more	effective	management	of	tourism	in	the	
region.
Russia	 is,	 from	a	 geographical	 perspective,	 the	most	
important	stakeholder	in	Arctic	marine	governance.	Af-
ter	a	significant	change	of	heart	and	a	move	away	from	
traditional	positions	Russia’s	new	geopolitical	vision	 is	
no	longer	that	of	the	“isolated	heartland”	but	is	instead	
one	of	a	strong	maritime	state	that	draws	its	strength	from	
its	arctic	coast	and	vast	arctic	watershed.	
Russia	perceives	security,	ocean	and	coastal	resources,	
northern	transportation	infrastructure	and	regional	eco-
nomic	development	in	the	Arctic	watershed	to	be	the	most	
important	aspects	in	development.	Though	not	explicitly	
mentioned,	tourism	is	part	of	at	least	three	of	the	above-
mentioned	categories.	
Russia	 held	 the	 chairmanship	 of	 the	 Arctic	 Council	
during	 the	 period	 2007–2009.	 The	 priority	 of	 the	 Rus-
sian	Chairmanship	was	 to	 ensure	 sustainable	develop-
ment	in	the	Barents	Region	with	an	emphasis	on	social	
and	economic	factors,	linking	this	closely	to	compliance	
with	environmental	requirements	while	also	supporting	
indigenous	peoples.	An	action	plan	was	developed	by	the	
working	group	on	culture	for	the	period	2008–2010	sup-
porting	various	studies	on	indigenous	peoples’	cultures	
and	other	cultural	events	of	different	kinds	(films,	festi-
vals	folklore,	music	and	exhibitions	etc).	
So	far	then	there	is	reason	to	be	optimistic.	In	Decem-
ber	 2010	 seven	 of	 the	 eight	Arctic	 nations	 came	 to	 an	
agreement	on	search	and	rescue	in	the	ocean	and	avia-
tion	zones	of	 the	North	Atlantic	and	 the	Arctic.	About	
50	 experts	 from	 the	USA,	Denmark,	 Finland,	 Iceland,	
Canada,	Norway,	Russia	and	Sweden	met	in	Reykjavik	
with	a	representative	from	the	International	Air	Trans-
port	Association	(IATA)	to	draw	up	a	contract	respond-
ing	to	the	perceived	need	to	coordinate	efforts	on	search	
and	rescue	in	the	Arctic	Ocean	and	its	associated	avia-
tion	space.	This	agreement	includes	designated	search	
and	rescue	zones	divided	into	the	individual	nations’	re-
sponsibility.	It	will	be	signed	at	the	Arctic	Council	meet-
ing	in	Nuuk,	in	May	2011	(Icelandic	ministry	of	foreign	
affairs,	16.12.2010).
Internet access
Ubiquitous	 low	cost	communications	 technology	(espe-
cially	mobile	phones	and	mobile	internet)	will	change	the	
relationship	between	citizens	and	states.	This	is	a	truly	
global	trend,	with	map	16	on	the	distribution	of	mobile	
telephone	coverage	clearly	illustrating	that	it	has	being	a	
significant	factor	in	“connecting”	the	Arctic.	At	the	same	
time	it	also	shows	the	uneven	distribution	of	opportuni-
ties	for	this	type	of	communication.	The	future	for	inter-
net	access	is	discussed	in	box	39.
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As	in	the	rest	of	the	world	we	now	see	in	the	Arctic:
•	 an	ongoing	convergence	between	communication	
devices,
•	 growing	capacity	on	the	communication	network	
systems,
•	 a	liberalisation	of	the	provision	of	access	to	commu-
nication	systems,
•	 increasing	digitalisation	of	the	public	administra-
tion,
•	 growing	and	widespread	use	of	social	platforms.
It	has	 long	been	supposed	 that	 improvements	 in	com-
munication	opportunities	 in	 the	Arctic	would	provide	
a	valuable	tool	in	and	be	a	major	contributor	to	sustain-
able	 development,	 capacity-building,	 human	 health	
and	welfare	 in	the	region,	and	that	 it	would	be	essen-
tial	that	residents	in	the	Arctic	be	given	access	to	cost-
effective	 telecommunications	 systems	 with	 sufficient	
carrying	capacity.	The	extent	to	which	these	initiatives	
prove	sufficient	and	whether	 they	are	able	 to	generate	
the	expected	outcomes	remain	unanswered	questions,	
as	does	that	of	whether	they	may	even	have	an	adverse	
effect.	
In	the	Nordic	Countries,	for	instance,	the	expansion	of	
broadband	 internet	 connections	has	 taken	place	 at	 the	
same	time	as	the	out-migration	of	both	population	and	in-
dustries	has	speeded	up.	In	a	survey	on	the	consequenc-
es	 of	 broadband	 development	 among	 rural	 companies	
dependent	 on	 customer	 interaction,	 several	 companies	
have	indicated	that	access	to	broadband	internet	instead	
of	 attracting	 new	 business	 activities	 has	 taken	 busi-
nesses	away	from	the	sparsely	populated	areas.	Similar	
processes	have	been	seen	with	other	infrastructure	con-
structions.	New	roads	and	tunnels	not	only	provide	better	
access	to	remote	communities,	but	also	new	options	for	
leaving	these	places.	
Current	digital	communication	systems	are	hugely	ex-
pensive	to	research	and	develop.	As	such,	they	can	only	
be	developed	within	economies	much	larger	than	those	
in	the	Arctic.	To	get	a	backbone	network	with	a	minimum	
level	of	capacity	up	and	running	takes	a	critical	mass	of	
customers	to	effectively	ensure	a	healthy	economic	return	
is	made	by	investors.	This	presents	a	significant	challenge	
to	most	Arctic	societies.	Not	only	are	the	sizes	of	the	local	
populations	relatively	small	but	the	basic	cost	of	building	
and	running	a	backbone	network	is	much	higher	in	the	
Arctic	then	almost	anywhere	else.	
Huge	distances	between	numerous	small	and	sparsely	
populated	communities	together	with	challenging	physi-
cal	conditions	is	the	reality	for	many	in	the	Arctic	with	
a	significant	lack	of	coverage	over	vast	areas	and	a	con-
tinuing	lack	of	fibre-optical	networks	in	many	inhabited	
areas.	
Available	information	on	the	various	communications	
systems	 is	 lacking	 and	 little	 in	 the	way	 of	 locally	 pro-
duced	information	is	available.	This	means	that	little	or	
no	information	is	produced	in	local	languages.	The	rea-
son	is	structural	and	can	be	understood	in	relation	to	the	
fact	that	a	“critical	mass”	of	customers	simply	does	not	
exist	in	these	relatively	small	communities.	
Other limitation to access?
Nowhere	in	the	Arctic	can	any	politically	defined	limita-
tions	in	the	access	to	the	digital	means	of	communication	
be	 observed,	 but	 in	 some	 areas	 socio-economic	 limita-
tions	undoubtedly	remain	an	issue.	This	type	of	limita-
tion	 is	primarily	due	 to	charging	systems	based	on	 the	
amount	of	 traffic.	With	 this	charging	structure	 it	 is	dif-
ficult	to	define	the	expense	per	month,	and	thus	people	
tend	to	minimise	their	communication	traffic.	
In	some	areas	in	the	Arctic,	in	principle,	access	to	the	
Internet	does	exist,	but	the	traffic	speed	is	so	slow	or	so	
unstable	that	it	is	in	practice	almost	unusable.	The	socio-
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Access to internet has become one of 
the most important means of communi-
cation worldwide. This is also the case 
in the Arctic. The internet is a medium 
with which we can view information from 
anywhere in the world. Documents from 
the World Wide Web and various other 
services such as instant chat, email are 
available through the internet. As its 
use has become more popular, there 
has been an increase in the speed of 
the internet and also a reduction in the 
cost. This has made it possible for many 
people to benefit, and the internet has 
made many activities much easier. The 
medium is used for almost all purposes, 
even with important issues such as 
education and government organisa-
tions. The map shows the current situ-
ation regarding internet access in the 
Circumpolar North. 
BOX 39: INTERNET ACCESS
cultural	limitations	are	also	visible	primarily	in	relation	
to	 the	 level	of	education,	 the	 level	of	 ICT	skills	and	the	
level	of	linguistic	competence.	The	level	of	education	and	
of	ICT	skills	in	general	are	not	the	most	significant	issue	
here,	rather	it	is	linguistic	skills,	or	the	lack	thereof,	that	
remains	an	important	limiter	here.	
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In	 the	 future	we	will	 see	 less	dependence	on	ground	
station	 based	 networks	 and	 more	 accessibility	 to	 high	
speed	wireless	satellite	network	systems.	Arctic	societies	
will	continue	to	lag	behind	in	terms	of	such	innovations	
and	will	ultimately	have	to	depend	on	a	fall	in	prices.	The	
delay	in	access	to	new	gadgets	and	technical	progress	will	
however	continue	to	shrink.	Most	likely,	we	will	see	new	
systems	 developed	 and	 they	 will	 demand	 even	 higher	
speed	 capacities.	 The	 Arctic	 societies	 with	 their	 small	
populations	will	in	this	respect	be	a	number	of	steps	be-
hind,	never	quite	reaching	the	general	global	level	of	con-
nectivity.	
Demographic	research	in	the	Arctic	has	demonstrated	
a	link	between	education	and	mobility.	The	better	educat-
ed	people	are	the	more	mobile	they	tend	to	be.	One	of	the	
visions	associated	with	digital	communication	systems	is	
that	they	should	be	able	to	provide	more	and	better	educa-
tion	to	remote	and	small	settlements.	If	better	e-learning	
systems	 can	 cover	 more	 settlements	 generating	 better	
opportunities	for	young	people	in	the	remote	areas,	then	
it	might	also	contribute	to	a	more	mobile	youth	in	these	
remote	settlements,	which	in	itself	will	probably	only	pro-
vide	a	further	spur	to	emigration.	
Other	reasons	encouraging	this	likely	increase	in	emi-
gration	 include	 the	 lack,	 in	 such	 small	 settlements,	 of	
suitable	and	challenging	jobs	and	career	opportunities.	
With	better	education	it	follows	also	that	better	linguistic	
skills	will	also	be	developed.	When	moving	from	mono-
lingual	to	multi-lingual	the	invisible	barrier	in	terms	of	
limitations	to	mobility	in	the	form	of	poor	linguistic	skills	
will	no	longer	restrain	young	people	from	moving	to	new	
places	perhaps	even	well	beyond	the	Arctic,	and	the	new	
social	media	(presented	in	box	40)	will	expand	their	inter-
connectivity.	
Access	 to	 qualified	 e-learning	 will	 undoubtedly	 in-
crease	the	likelihood	of	young	people	choosing	to	move	
from	these	small	places	to	larger	settlements.	Again,	de-
mographic	 research	 in	 the	Arctic	here	 is	of	 the	highest	
interest,	as	it	tends	to	suggest	that	in	the	beginning	it	is	
likely	to	be	the	teenage	girls	and	younger	women	who	will	
abandon	the	smaller	settlements.
The	global	communications	network	also	forms	a	sin-
gle	huge	commercial	market.	This	means	that	in	Arctic	so-
cieties,	from	the	smallest	settlement	to	the	largest	Arctic	
metropolis,	everyone	should	have	an	equal	opportunity	
to	sell	or	buy	services	and	goods	on	a	global	scale.	Here	
only	 ones	 own	 imagination	 set	 the	 limits.	 The	 unique	
combination	of	access	to	products	globally	and	detailed	
knowledge	of	the	market	locally	is	socio-economically	a	
potential	“gold	mine”	for	the	good	entrepreneur.	
Higher	 accessibility	 to	 the	 communications	 network	
will	–	in	principle	–	be	to	the	benefit	of	the	use	of	local	
languages,	but	there	is	a	risk	that	the	production	of	 in-
formation	 in	 the	 local	 languages	 will	 be	 too	 slow,	 too	
unprofessional,	too	unstable	and	too	limited	for	the	local	
population	to	benefit	from	this.	
Growing	access	to	the	network	of	global	communica-
tion	will	affect	both	actors	and	content.	The	actors	will	
improve	 their	 navigation	 and	 ICT	 skills	 and	 their	 criti-
cal	sense	and	the	local	providers	of	content	will	increase	
their	production	of	information.	This	points	to	improving	
conditions	for	more	fully	elaborated	democratic	societies	
but	access	in	itself	will	not	produce	societies,	in	the	Arc-
tic	or	anywhere	else.	Growing	access	to	digital	networks	
and	 to	 information,	 combined	 with	 rising	 competence	
levels	in	respect	of	using	this	information,	represents	a	
slowly	developing	megatrend	across	the	globe.	A	critical	
point	here	may	be	to	what	extent	the	local	authorities	in	
charge	of	the	local,	regional	or	national	communications	
systems	support	this	to	the	benefit	of	the	general	public.
Voluntary or forced involvement
The	compound	effects	of	 the	 impact	of	numerous	 inter-
related	components	–	causing	an	increase	in	Arctic	tour-
megatrends
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The infrastructure in the Arctic is gener-
ally characterised by two issues: Insular-
ity and Predominantly One-directional 
linkages. In principle there are four 
possible means of transportation: Air, 
Sea, Road and Railway. In most of the 
Arctic, however, few of these options 
are available in relation to interaction 
between the Arctic regions, and in 
some cases there are even differences 
in availability through the year. Almost 
all trade connections go North-South, 
taking resources out of the Arctic, and 
consumer goods into the region. This is 
a pattern that has existed for a century 
or more, and even the last 30 years 
have shown that while there have been 
several attempts to open up for alterna-
tives, many of them have only lasted for 
short periods of time simply because of 
the limited volume, which was deemed 
BOX 40: PROBLEMS WITH VIABLE INTER-ARCTIC TRANSPORT CONNECTIONS ICELAND/GREENLAND/FAROE/
CANADA
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insufficient to maintain economically 
viable connections.
 The ICC has emphasised the need to 
promote trade activities in the North 
by establishing a task force on trade 
initiatives. Similarly a statement from 
Canada from 2011 emphasised that the 
goal is to continue to seek trade and 
investment opportunities that would 
enhance its trading ties with other Arctic 
states. Recently a free trade agreement 
with the European Free Trade Associa-
tion (EFTA) member countries has been 
implemented, an agreement that has the 
potential to enhance trade and invest-
ment between the northern regions of 
the respective countries. It is emphasised 
how this might create trade ties with 
other Arctic states as well. One of the 
instruments has been the upgrading the 
Port of Churchill, Manitoba, to facilitate 
increased export options as well as 
promoting the flow of two-way trade with 
other northern ports. 
 The question is, however, what the re-
alities may be. Even if the opening of the 
Polar Sea for international transportation 
in principle enables a closer connection 
between the Arctic countries it is not very 
likely that it will result in any substantial 
increase in transport relations. The Arctic 
regions, while large in terms of land 
areas, are very small population-wise, 
and the costs of establishing a network 
of harbours in combination with the costs 
of making stopovers for the small ex-
changes of goods and passengers make 
the substantial increase in such activities 
rather unlikely.
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With the option of low cost film making 
the potentials of taking advantage of 
local talents has become an asset for 
northern communities. The company 
Tumit	Production in Greenland is an ex-
cellent example of what may represent 
a future trend. The company  consists of 
three persons, Aka Hansen, Malik Kleist 
and Angajo Lennert-Sandgreen. 
 Aka has been working on short films, 
documentaries and TV projects since 
2003. The first steps in becoming a 
professional producer were taken in 
2007 with a view to responding to the 
interests of young people and especially 
to those who would normally not be 
seen or heard. After presenting some of 
the first productions at the workshop 
“NUFF” (Nordic Youth Film Festival) in 
Tromso in June 2008 the next steps were 
the production of a number of docu-
mentary programmes as well as being 
involved in the production of a series of 
television programme “Inuusuttut	Silar-
suaat” which was intended to entertain 
young people in an educational way. 
Aka has most recently directed and  two 
documentaries, “Green	Country” and 
“Double	Impact”, while she produced 
and wrote the screenplay for the comedy 
movie “Hinnarik	Sinnattunilu” along 
with Malik Kleist and Angajo Lennert-
Sandgreen. Aka’s strengths lie in 
producing, cutting and writing screen-
plays. Aka is also a producer on Tumit	
Productions next big feature film project 
with the working title “Iliveq”.
 Malik has worked on short films, 
short stories, films, documentaries, 
music videos and TV since 1999. He was 
trained as an AV technician at media 
school (2000–2004) and worked at the 
National TV initially as a student intern 
from 2000 and later as operations 
engineer from 2004 to 2009, where 
he mainly worked as a photographer, 
editing technician, sound technician and 
technical coordinator. At the National 
TV, he has worked in recent years with 
youth programmes but has also made 
documentaries as well as music videos. 
Malik and Aka joined forces in connec-
tion with documentary films such as 
“Green	Country” and “Double	Impact” 
and the comedy movie “Hinnarik	Sinnat-
tunilu” and most recently has worked in 
conjunction with Aka Hansen and Angajo 
Lennert-Sandgreen on their most recent 
productions where he has been adept at 
photography, rock, sound technique and 
script writing.
 Angajo became involved with the 
team in 2009 in connection with the 
film “Hinnarik	Sinnattunilu” which he 
directed and starred in, while also writ-
ing the screenplay for it with Aka Hansen 
and Malik Kleist (Tumit	Production) .
The three documentaries: “Green	Land” 
– “Double	Effect” – “The	World	is	listen-
ing” – all focus on Greenland’s youth 
and their relationship with the ongoing 
climate change and are available from 
the website: www.nordregio.se/films.
BOX 41: NEW LOCAL PRODUCTIONS – GREENLAND
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ism	–	raises	the	question	of	whether	this	is	voluntary	or	
forced.	Globalisation	has	a	penetrating	effect.	Places	that	
succeed	 in	 drawing	 the	 world’s	 attention	 do	 so	 based	
primarily	 on	 an	 ability	 to	 “tap	 into”	 an	 increasingly	
communications-centred	“consumerist”	civilisation.	For	
those	who	market	 tourist	destinations	 the	ability	 to	 at-
tract	“desirable”	socio-economic	groups	already	rests	on	
new	skills	based	on	thinking	socially,	interactively	and	
passionately.	 The	numerous	waterfalls	 of	 invented	and	
widely	used	social	media	will	undoubtedly	have	a	signifi-
cant	effect,	most	likely	in	a	form	of	cooperative	combina-
tion	between	social	networking	sites	and	next	generation	
mobile	phones.	
As	 most	 studies	 of	 psycho-social	 behaviour	 on	 the	
net	 have	 shown,	 hierarchies	 of	 social	 media,	 specifi-
cally	 aimed	 at	 travel	 will	 have	 gained	 importance	 in	
mediating	what	are	considered	the	most	exciting	places	
to	visit	based	on	 the	 interaction	of	users,	with	 the	pro-
fessionalised	hints	of	opinion	makers.	The	ability	of	lo-
cal	developers,	marketers	and	tourism	businesses	alike	
to	understand	how	technology	drives	 interest	 in	tourist	
spots,	identifying	elusive	points	of	attraction	on	the	net	
and	taking	advantage	of	it	for	one’s	own	benefit,	will	be	
crucial.	This	is	to	some	extent	already	happening,	i.e.	in	
relation	 to	 the	build-up	on	Greenland	and	 the	 counter-
campaign	against	the	shock	of	the	Eyjafjallajökull	erup-
tion	in	spring	2010,	in	Iceland.
The	future	of	the	media	landscape	as	market	makers	
become	 more	 aggressive	 (or	 invasive)	 in	 penetrating	
every	available	channel	of	air,	sound,	image	and	space	
will	likely	also	have	a	counter-effect	on	some	groups	of	
potential	travellers.	Observers	have	pointed	to	the	ten-
dency	for	the	return	of	slow	travel	as	one	means	of	reac-
tion	to	a	stressful	instant	day-to-day	world.	Undertaking	
meaningful	travel,	like	volunteering,	or	taking	a	trip	in-
volving	more	than	just	sight-seeing,	by	getting	involved	
in	different	types	of	NGO-activities,	on	a	farm,	in	hunt-
ing	or	 raising	awareness	of	 the	 environment	 etc.,	will	
most	likely	also	be	part	of	the	new	tourist	experience	in	
the	Arctic.	

New positions in the  
global system
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The	Arctic	is	no	longer	an	isolated	or	remote	region.	It	is	
a	member	of	the	global	society,	often	at	the	centre	of	glo-
bal	attention	and	is	fundamentally	influenced	by	global	
changes,	 just	as	the	globe	has	an	increasing	interest	 in	
what	 is	happening	 in	 the	Arctic.	There	 is	clearly	now	a	
growing	multi-level	process	of	cooperation,	stewardship	
for	the	region	and	various	modes	of	partnership	within	
the	“New	Arctic”.	There	is	also	a	real	need	for	new	data,	
knowledge,	and	information	on	numerous	questions	and	
issues,	for	instance:	What	lies	in	store	for	the	“New	Arc-
tic”?	 How	 should	 cooperation	 be	 structured?	 How	 can	
the	national	interests	of	the	Arctic	and	non-Arctic	States	
aspiring	to	have	a	say	in	Arctic-related	decision-making	
processes	as	well	as	access	to	its	resources	be	better	co-
ordinated?	How	can	the	challenges	of	Arctic	social	and	
economic	development	be	better	addressed	in	the	light	of	
new	levels	of	accessibility?	What	are	the	emerging	chal-
lenges	and	opportunities?	In	which	areas	should	human	
and	financial	 capital	 be	best	 invested?	And	how	 legiti-
mate	 is	 the	 science	 in	 its	 support	 for	 existing	 develop-
ments	in	the	Arctic?
The	 magnitude	 of	 changes	 occurring	 in	 the	 Arctic	
region,	 including	climate	change	and	estimates	of	po-
tential	 new	 riches	 have	 generated	 a	 number	 of	 devel-
opments	 resulting	 in	 increased	 action	 among	 several	
Arctic	states	in	asserting	their	claims	across	the	region.	
These	developments	have	also	prompted	a	discourse	by	
other	interested	stakeholders	over	a	variety	of	Arctic	is-
sues.	Regardless	of	 the	existence	of	numerous	general	
agreements	between	the	Arctic	states,	unilateral	efforts	
by	 several	 states	 to	buttress	 their	 regional	 claims	and	
geopolitical	 interests	and	 the	persistence	of	a	number	
of	unresolved	legal	and	political	matters	all	 interested	
parties	 should	 continue	 to	 seek	 new	modes	 of	 regime	
governance	in	the	Arctic.	
The	 policies	 undertaken	 by	 the	 governments	 of	 the	
various	 Arctic	 states	 and	 sub-national	 entities	 in	 han-
dling	matters	of	security,	sovereignty	and	development	
questions	that	affect	the	Arctic’s	basic	economic,	social,	
political,	and	environmental	settings	necessarily	bring	to	
the	fore	questions	relating	to	the	involvement	and	role	of	
sub-national	entities	in	the	future	of	the	Arctic.	
Existing	 academic	 and	 political	 discourse	 on	 Arctic	
matters	indicates	that	differing	approaches	and	views	ex-
ist	on	who	should	control,	own	or	benefit	from	various	ar-
eas	of	Arctic	development	and	how	cooperation	and	pos-
sible	partnerships	should	be	enhanced.	The	state	of	Arctic	
affairs	 and	a	new	geopolitical	 framework	are	 currently	
marked	by	several	challenges	heightened	by	uncertainty,	
climate	change,	globalisation	and	the	shifting	geopoliti-
cal,	security,	economic,	and	international	significance	of	
the	region.	These	challenges	have	re-shaped	perceptions,	
concerns,	legal	disagreements	and	political	cooperation	
among	several	Arctic	states	and	others.	
Growing	 legal	 and	 political	 discourse	 over	 emerging	
and	clashing	Arctic	interests	and	the	rebirth	of	a	public	
focus	on	the	North	have	generated	a	necessity	for	more	
coherent	Arctic	policies	and	responses	 to	Arctic	 issues.	
These	trends	have	crystallised	in	the	actions	of	a	number	
of	 actors	 among	 the	 Arctic	 and	 non-Arctic	 states,	 su-
pranational	 institutions	 like	 the	 EU,	 sub-national	 enti-
ties,	indigenous	collectivities	and	other	residents	of	the	
North,	all	of	whom	are	eager	 to	have	a	greater	stake	 in	
the	region’s	political	development,	the	re-distribution	of	
resources,	legal	claims,	collaboration,	dialogue	and	nu-
merous	 other	 vital	 activities.	 Several	maps	 throughout	
the	book	have	contributed	valuable	 information	 in	 this	
regard.	For	 instance	box	15	on	resources,	maps	7	and	8	
on	protected	areas	and	zones	of	marine	activity,	box	29	
on	international	sea	boundaries,	and	maps	15	and	16	on	
transport	routes	and	GSM	coverage.	
The	growing	activities	in	the	Arctic	reveal	that	we	are	
in	the	midst	of	a	fundamental	transformation	which	will	
continue	to	affect	the	future	of	the	region,	its	citizens	and	
New positions in the  global system
189
developments	 beyond	 the	 Arctic	 rim.	While	 the	 Arctic	
states	seem	to	agree	on	a	number	of	important	and	funda-
mental	questions,	the	current	situation	also	points	to	the	
growing	number	 of	 environmental,	 social	 and	 cultural	
concerns	on	impacts	of	this	transformation	on	“northern-
ers”	and	indigenous	residents.	It	amplifies	the	necessity	
to	find	reasonable	solutions	to	the	problems	raised	by	the	
need	for	sustainable	development,	environmental	stabil-
ity,	security	and	human	capacity-building	in	the	region	
for	the	benefit	of	current	and	future	generations.	In	this	
context	 the	 recognition	 of	 both	 new	 stakeholders	 and	
new	activities	 is	 important.	So	 in	addition	 to	 the	previ-
ous	maps,	 this	section	 includes	 two	further	maps.	Map	
17	 shows	 the	 delineation	 of	 international	 cooperation	
institutions	in	the	Arctic,	emphasising	the	fact	that	both	
older	and	newer	institutions	are	working	on	Arctic	issues,	
usually	cooperatively.	While	map	18	highlights	the	distri-
bution	of	“University	of	the	Arctic”	member	institutions,	
the	result	of	a	decade	of	fruitful	emphasis	on	cooperation	
in	education	as	a	means	of	creating	new	opportunities	in	
the	Arctic.	
As	indicated	above,	the	ongoing	transformation	points	to	
a	number	of	issues	that	will	undoubtedly	contribute	to	the	
shaping	of	future	discussions,	these	include;
•	 new	geopolitics,	including	new	security	and	Arctic	
policies,	the	tackling	of	current	and	emerging	envi-
ronmental	issues	and	Arctic-related	jurisdictional	
disagreements;
•	 new	resource	development,	including	the	“race”	for	
control	of	potentially	lucrative	untapped	resources,	
energy	supplies	and	exploitation	of	renewable	
stocks;
•	 new	shipping	routes	and	issues	of	navigation	and	
transportation	in	the	Arctic,	including	matters	of	
marine	regulation,	pollution,	search	and	rescue	
activities,	marine	and	bio-security,	Arctic	Ocean	
governance	and	biodiversity;
•	 new	frontiers	for	knowledge,	i.e.	intellectual,	scien-
tific,	and	knowledge-based	technologies,	research	
and	cooperation;
•	 new	approaches	to	Arctic	governance,	including	
innovation	in	governmental	practices,	plausible	
solutions	to	issues	of	accountability,	transparency,	
conflict	and	liability;	the	human	rights	approach	
to	Arctic-related	matters;	new	governance	arrange-
ments	for	northerners	as	part	of	their	broader	sus-
tainable	future,	devolution	processes,	etc.;
•	 new	vision	of	the	challenges	and	concerns	to	come,	
including	the	resolution	of,	or	feasible	solutions	
for,	existing	legal	disagreements	and	prospects	for	
building	an	adequate	level	of	capacity	to	respond	to	
Arctic	issues	locally	and	globally.	
The Pillars of Development
The	 identification	 of	 current	 gaps	 and	 challenges	 and	
the	preparation	needed	to	deal	with	forthcoming	issues	
which	present	both	problems	and	opportunities	in	respect	
of	Arctic	development.	This	 is	an	ongoing	development	
and	continues	to	grow	in	the	form	of	the	rapid	evolution	of	
Arctic-related	 legislation	and	Arctic-oriented	 legislative	
policies.	Currently,	major	areas	of	concern	will	continue	
to	form	the	crux	of	geopolitical	and	legal	attention	in	the	
years	to	come.	Several	of	them	have	been	touched	upon	in	
the	previous	chapters,	and	in	a	nutshell,	those	areas	can	
be	summarised	as	follows:
•	 Environment	relating	to	matters	of	climate	change,	
environmental	protection,	conservation	of	the	
environment	and	resources,	usage	of	the	precaution-
ary	approach,	environmental	impact	assessments,	
multilateral	environmental	agreements,	monitoring,	
pollution,	oil	spill	prevention	and	response	meas-

New positions in the  global system
191
ures.	In	this	context	also	issues	in	relation	to	the	
preservation	of	biodiversity	should	be	mentioned	as	
well	as	questions	of	ecosystem-based	management	
where	interaction	and	impact	on	and	by	humans	
remain	relevant	issues.	Issues	of	animal	welfare,	the	
mitigation	of	and	protection	from	invasive	species	to	
the	Arctic,	and	the	preservation	of	species	that	are	
under	threat	of	extinction	should	also	be	included	
here.	
	 	 The	Arctic	is	something	of	a	“barometer”	of	glo-
bal	change;	changes	in	the	Arctic	environment	have	
implications	for	global	systems.	Thus,	impacts	from	
emergent	and	current	activities	such	as	shipping	or	
tourism	require	further	consideration	with	respect	
to	the	Arctic’s	fragile	eco-system.	Emerging	envi-
ronmental	hazards	and	concerns	in	and	beyond	the	
Arctic	and	the	complex	connections	between	Arctic	
ecology	and	global	systems	related	for	instance	to	
the	risk	of	oil	spills,	the	impacts	of	the	Arctic	haze	or	
the	ramifications	of	global	environmental	changes	
for	the	region	with	regard	to	POPs	or	PCBs,	impose	
new	demands	on	the	framework	of	Arctic	govern-
ance.	
•	 Resources	include	various	questions	of	rights,	
ownership,	access,	economic	benefit	distribution,	
sharing,	extraction,	exploration,	sustainable	man-
agement,	subsistence,	conservation,	the	impacts	of	
industrial	development,	etc.	For	instance	questions	
such	as	the	following:	what	are	the	options	for	the	
control	of	various	resources	in	the	region?	Are	exist-
ing	legal	instruments,	for	instance	the	UN	Conven-
tion	on	the	Law	of	the	Sea,	sufficient	or	is	more	bi-lat-
eral	or	multi-lateral	diplomacy	and	legal	cooperation	
needed,	particularly	in	respect	of	the	negotiation	of	
Arctic-specific	treaties	or	agreements	–	i.e.,	on	Fish-
eries?	Should	the	emphasis	here	be	on	the	enhanced	
“soft-law”	instruments	declarations	and	resolutions	
of	various	Arctic	bodies?	In	relation	to	the	latter	the	
Arctic	Council	is	currently	working	on	the	develop-
ment	of	an	obligatory	search	and	rescue	agreement,	
something	which	is	expected	to	be	endorsed	in	May	
2011.	
	 	 Geographical	questions	are	also	important,	for	
instance:	Where	is	resource	development	likely	to	
progress	and	what	measures	should	be	taken	to	
ensure	proper	environmental	protection	and	the	sus-
tainable	use	of	those	resources?	What	significance	
or	value	would	the	resources	bring	to	peoples’	living	
in	the	Arctic:	e.g.,	bio-resources,	water,	genetic	
resources,	impact	on	fisheries,	marine	mammals	and	
terrestrial	eco-systems?	And	what	are	the	prospects	
for	non-renewable	resources,	including	offshore,	and	
in	this	context	what	are	the	pros	and	cons	of	such	a	
development	for	wildlife	and	humans	and	do	they	
impose	challenges	on	traditional	activities?	The	role	
of	environmental	organisations	and	NGOs	in	dealing	
with	resource-specific	developments	on	how	to	share	
existing	resources	is	undoubtedly	an	important	
question	also	in	this	regard.
•	 Marine	and	airspace	access	for	shipping,	navigation,	
transportation	and	air	communications	raises	ques-
The Arctic is rich in organisations promoting cooperation 
across countries, regions, and institutions. The map shows 
the basic “geography” the various organisations cover 
and at the same time provides a list over most of the major 
organisations involved. 
MAP 17: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE 
ARCTIC
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tions	over	the	development	of	an	adequate	and	ef-
ficient	Arctic	shipping	regime	which	would	promote	
security,	reliability,	the	cultural	sustainability	of	the	
Arctic	peoples	and	safety	within	the	context	of	the	
growth	of	trade/commercial,	tourism,	and	military	
shipping	in	the	Arctic	Ocean.	
	 	 The	operation	of	such	a	regime	will	require	more	
effective	Arctic	Ocean	governance,	and	several	
recommendations	on	this	were	issued	by	the	Arctic	
Marine	Shipping	Assessment	Report	produced	by	the	
Arctic	Council	in	2009.	In	addition,	various	experts	
have	advocated	several	recommendations	to	make	
the	2009	International	Maritime	Organisation’s	Po-
lar	Code	legally-binding.	Airspace	issues	also	form	
a	developing	area	of	research	and	scientific	interest	
in	the	Arctic	particularly	in	respect	of	pollution	and	
technological	innovation.	
•	 Governance	addresses	a	number	of	areas	listed	here	
in	this	document,	but	mainly	focuses	on	institu-
tions,	modes,	structures	and	governmental	prac-
tices,	novelty	in	governance,	self-government	and	
devolution	processes.	In	addition	there	are	still	unre-
solved	or	emergent	political	and	legal	disagreements	
and	challenges	in	connection	with	Arctic	sover-
eignty	remain	thebeing	concerns	by	of	some	states.,	
In	addition,	claims	to	resources	and	the	extension	of	
continental-shelves,	maritime-boundary	questions,	
political	views	or	partnerships	on	certain	Arctic	is-
sues	and	cooperative	processes,	security	issues,	and	
not	the	least	the	question	of	the	need	for,	and	value	
of,	binding	commitments	versus	“soft”	declarations	
in	the	region	are	all	important	questions.	
•	 Human	development	as	the	overarching	theme	relat-
ing	to	all	of	the	above.	For	instance	the	question	of	
local	participation	in	ecosystem-based	management,	
the	meaning	of	resource	rights,	ownership,	access,	
economic	benefit	distribution,	and	sustainable	
management.	Additional	questions	however	related	
in	particular	to	the	consequences	of	an	increase	
in	Arctic	transport,	and	safety	issues	relating	to	
the	growth	of	trade/commercial,	tourism,	and	the	
continuing	military	presence	in	the	region	are	also	
important	here.	The	value	that	change	would	bring	
to	peoples	lives	in	the	Arctic,	connected	to	ques-
Counting in terms of “heads”, i.e. how 
many persons are directly involved in 
cooperation activities, one of the more 
successful organisations is definitely the 
University of the Arctic. It is a non-profit 
cooperative network of universities, col-
leges, and other organisations commit-
ted to higher education and research in 
the North, sharing resources, facilities, 
and expertise to provide post-secondary 
education relevant and accessible to 
students and communities of the North. 
The network includes more than 120 in-
stitutions, and involves students at un-
dergraduate as well as graduate levels, 
often connected through joint research 
activities between the participating 
institutions. Web-based programmes 
and exchange arrangements, where 
students from one institution are able to 
take part of their education at another 
institution in another part of the Arctic, 
provide both insight and experiences 
within the context of the marked differ-
ences that can exist across the Arctic, 
and thus contribute to the skills and 
knowledge needed in connection with 
further development in the Arctic. 
MAP 18: UNIVERSITY OF THE ARCTIC MEMBER INSTITUTIONS
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tions	of	local	involvement	and	future	perspectives	
in	relation	to	Arctic	sovereignty	is	also	an	important	
question	here.
	 	 The	framework	of	development	is	marked	by	com-
plexity	and	operates	at	several	levels.	It	is	partially	
explained	by	the	growing	number	of	stakeholders	
engaged	in	Arctic	affairs	and	seeking	to	pursue	their	
many	interests	at	local,	sub-national,	national,	re-
gional	and	global	scales.	Depending	on	their	agenda	
and	jurisdictional	capacity	these	stakeholders	em-
ploy	different	approaches	in	addressing	Arctic	issues	
based	on	unilateral,	bi-lateral	or	multi-lateral	polices	
or	a	combination	of	all	three	seeking	to	develop	
international	and	regional	cooperation	on	Arctic-
specific	matters,	whereas	most	Arctic	stakeholders	
protect	their	national	interests	first.	
	 	 Despite	the	apparent	desire	of	the	Arctic	states	to	
continue	to	promote	their	national	interests	this	does	
not	suggest	that	unilateral	action	is	more	success-
ful	than	bi-	or	multi-lateral	approaches	at	achieving	
results.	In	other	words,	despite	differences	in	the	
priorities	of	the	various	national	policies	and	the	
interests	of	the	Arctic	states	in	the	region	all	Arctic	
stakeholders	and	others	are,	to	a	certain	extent	
interdependent	sharing	common	areas	of	concern	
or	benefits	that	may	be	best	delivered	by	means	of	
multi-lateral	cooperation	and	diplomacy.	
	 	 Thus,	the	tendency	to	share	common	concerns	
for	the	region	and	the	exercise	of	stewardship	and	
multi-layered	collaboration	is	likely	to	continue	de-
spite	the	continuing	differences	in	national	interests	
reflected	through	the	various	interpretations	made	
of	the	outcome	of	the	Ilulissat	(Greenland)	2008	and	
Chelsea	(Quebec)	2010	meetings.	The	general	trend	
is	that	all	Arctic	states	–	with	or	without	direct	ac-
cess	to	the	Arctic	Ocean	–	will	need	to	cooperate	on	
matters	of	vital	significance	for	the	region,	they	all	
share	responsibility	for	the	Arctic	and	this	can	best	
be	realised	in	the	fostering	of	dialogue,	partnerships	
and	collaboration.	
	 	 In	light	of	the	continuous	transformations	that	
affect	life	in	the	North	it	is	no	surprise	that	seven	
of	the	eight	Arctic	states	have	recently	issued	new	
or	revised	Arctic	strategies/policies,	e.g.,	Norway	
–	2009	update,	Denmark	and	the	Russian	Federa-
tion	–	2008,	USA	and	Iceland	–	2009,	Canada	and	
Finland	in	2010	while	Sweden	may	also	do	so	in	the	
near	future.	Moreover,	each	Arctic	state	is	trying	to	
find	its	own	strong	voice	or	special	role	or	niche.	For	
example,	Finland	is	working	on	generating	a	greater	
“think-tank”	capacity	on	Arctic	matters,	Russia	is	
trying	to	re-invent	its	role	in	the	region	and	to	be-
come	more	pro-active	in	addressing	matters	of	Arctic	
collaboration,	etc.	
	 	 Denmark,	Sweden	and	Finland,	as	EU	members,	
will	need	to	take	notice	of	the	EU’s	Arctic	policy	
which	is	currently	under	development,	raising	ques-
tions	also	about	the	roles	of	Norway	and	Iceland	
which	have	European	Economic	Area	agreements	
with	the	EU,	although	Iceland	has	now	begun	acces-
sion	negotiations	with	the	EU.
	 	 In	the	light	of	Greenland’s	self-governance	and	
its	special	arrangements	with	the	EU,	the	role	of	
this	Arctic	entity	may	become	pivotal	in	the	future	
particularly	if	Greenland	is	to	become	a	new	Arctic	
state.
	 	 In	this	new	geopolitical	reality	several	non-Arctic	
States	including	China,	Japan,	S.	Korea,	and	supra-
national	entities	like	the	EU	have	also	expressed	an	
interest	in	Arctic	politics,	policies	and	developments.	
The	EU	has	in	fact	made	several	statements	and	
commissioned	studies	to	show	that	despite	the	lack	
of	geographic	proximity	except	for	the	3	EU	Arctic	
States,	it	has	its	own	place,	expertise	and	role	to	play	
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as	far	as	the	Arctic	region	is	concerned,	something	
that	is	mentioned	in	the	EU	Arctic	strategy	state-
ments	2008–2010	and	other	related	reports.	
Arctic and non-Arctic actors 
This	new	geopolitical	reality	suggests	that	this	growing	
level	of	interest	from	non-Arctic	actors	is	likely	to	contin-
ue	and	that	all	Arctic	states	will	have	to	find	a	balance	in	
addressing	matters	of	cooperation	with	non-Arctic	states;	
they	will	also	need	to	find	better	venues	in	collaborating	
with	their	sub-regional	entities,	 indigenous	groups	and	
all	“northerners”,	and	with	each	other.	For	instance	Rus-
sia	has	been	labelled	by	many	observers	as	an	important	
partner	for	various	initiatives,	including	energy	security	
matters	in	Europe.	Despite	varying	opinions	on	Russia’s	
ambitions	 and	 stance	 on	 the	 Arctic,	 recently,	 Russian	
politicians	have	reiterated	the	country’s	desire	for	further	
international	cooperation	and	peaceful	dialogue	on	Arc-
tic	matters.	The	changes	that	we	are	witnessing	are	tak-
ing	place	at	such	a	rapid	speed	that	policy	statements	and	
strategies	cannot	really	be	seen	as	definitive,	indeed,	they	
often	express	only	a	declaration	of	intent	or	interest	and	
cannot	really	ever	fully	reflect	on	changing	conditions.	
The	growing	and	urgent	desire	to	address	various	so-
cial	ills	and	compensate	for	the	inadequate	levels	of	hu-
man-capital	in	many	Arctic	communities	is	a	trend	that	is	
likely	to	continue	to	put	pressure	on	local,	sub-regional	
and	national	governments.	The	new	partnership	arrange-
ment	between	EU	and	Greenland	(box	42)	illustrates	that.	
Despite	differences	in	governance	(self-governance)	mod-
els	within	the	Arctic	states	which	are	pre-conditioned	by	
a	variety	of	factors,	for	instance	differing	stages	of	politi-
cal	and	constitutional	development,	colonialism	and	de-
colonisation,	socio-economic	predicaments	in	place,	etc.,	
there	are	several	issues	of	concern	that	often	form	the	core	
of	the	discourse	on	governance.	These	questions	include	
matters	of:	
Institutional	capacity	and	political	development	e.g.,	
legitimacy,	 transparency,	 liability,	 efficacy,	 innovation,	
workability,	 quality	 and	 the	 facilitation	 of	 the	 existing	
and	 emerging	 governance	 structures,	 challenges	 with	
the	implementation	of	contemporary	political	and	legal	
agreements,	etc.;
Northern	economic	development	including	formal	and	
informal	economies,	sustainability	and	fiscal	autonomy	
related	to	the	infrastructure	and	fiscal	arrangements	that	
define	the	patterns,	structures	and	the	nature	of	govern-
mental	economic	policies	and	financial	instruments;	is-
sues	 of	 resource	development	 and	 sustainability,	 juris-
dictional	 capabilities	of	northerners	 on	fiscal,	 resource	
and	economic	development;
Human	 capacity,	 community	 “wellness”	 and	 social	
stability	including	the	dealing	with	social	ills	that	affect	
many	northerners;	matters	of	education	that	are	closely	
connected	to	the	needs	of	human	capacity-building	in	the	
North	and	the	filling	in	gaps	in	the	workforce	by	northern-
ers;	the	raising	of	a	new	cohort	of	Northern	leaders	who	
will	be	able	to	embrace	local	and	Indigenous	values	and	
could	best	represent	the	interests	of	their	communities	in	
various	fora;
Jurisdictional	capacity	and	the	legal	scope	of	govern-
ance	and	land-claims	arrangements	related	to	matters	of	
legitimacy	and	the	adequacy	of	existing	arrangements	for	
northerners;	 limitations	of	existing	 jurisdictional	capa-
bility;	 the	 resilience	and	adaptive	capacity	of	Northern	
governments	 to	meet	 the	challenges	posed	by	environ-
mental	 change	 or	 globalisation;	 devolution	 processes	
and	 the	 nature	 of	 inter-governmental	 cooperation,	 the	
non-implementation	 of	 existing	 arrangements	 and	 the	
challenge	 of	 fiscal	 dependency	 on	 external	 grants	 and	
governmental	 subsidies;	 fiscal	 flexibility	 and	 self-reli-
ance	–	the	problem	of	the	reconciliation	of	autonomous	
authority	with	financial	dependency	on	national	 trans-
fers/government	expenditures	and	sectors.	
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The	challenges	faced	by	northerners	clearly	transcend	
the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 circumpolar	 region	 and	 thus	 re-
quire	 substantial	 transnational	 cooperation.	 The	 likely	
trend	here	is	that	the	nature	of	such	cooperation	is	going	
to	be	“thickened”	by	the	ongoing	evolution	of	the	institu-
tional	governance	complex	that	has	come	into	existence	
over	the	last	two	decades	for	instance	the	Northern	Fo-
rum,	the	Barents	Euro-Arctic	Council,	the	Arctic	Council,	
etc.;	 it	will	be	further	influenced	by	the	advanced	posi-
tion	of	 indigenous	peoples	 in	Arctic	 institutional	struc-
tures	and	the	stronger	international	engagement	of	sub-
national	 entities	 in	 dealing	with	 educational,	 cultural,	
environmental,	health,	commerce	and	other	matters	that	
do	not	breach	traditional	areas	of	jurisdiction	claimed	by	
BOX 42: NEW PARTNERSHIPS – NEW RESOURCES?
New positions in the  global system
197
Access to valuable minerals and raw 
materials in the Arctic has been under-
lined time and again as a future asset in 
connection with the ongoing changes in 
climate. e Questions over the availability 
of human resources, however, should be 
included here in any future debate.
In the summer of 2006 a new partnership 
agreement between Greenland and the 
EU was established, replacing a previous 
arrangement. Using the concept of “Part-
nership” is a political statement that the 
parties because of historical, political, 
economic and cultural ties and relations 
want to continue thus extending coopera-
tion in a variety of areas. 
 The previous arrangement was based 
on rights to access to fish resources. 
The EU compensated Greenland for 
this access to the fisheries grounds in 
Greenland’s waters by transferring a 
yearly amount of around 50 million Euro 
without any strings attached. Debate has 
raged, however, over the extent to which 
the arrangement was advantageous for 
Greenland or for the EU. For many years 
it was a major concern of the fisheries 
organisation in Greenland that valuable 
resources were being lost and not prop-
erly compensated for. 
 In a Joint Declaration it is stated that 
Greenland›s interest in enhanced coop-
eration, besides fishing, is in the fields 
of education and employment, mineral 
resources, energy, tourism, culture and 
climate research. And that Greenland 
has a general interest in continued 
cooperation to ensure a continuation 
of the financial support from the EU. 
The EU›s interest in the arrangement is 
emphasised as being bound up with a 
desire to contribute to the sustainable 
development of the Overseas Countries 
and Territories (OCT). There are also ge-
ostrategic considerations here as well as 
the possibility of enhanced cooperation 
in research and development on northern 
maritime routes and Greenland›s exclu-
sive economic zone, fisheries, marine 
environment, climate change and alterna-
tive energy sources.
 The Partnership Agreement aims to 
broaden and strengthen relationships 
between Greenland and the EU. The 
agreement provides for cooperation in 
the economic, financial, investigative, 
educational and cultural fields. Financial 
support is obtained by transferring funds 
that have thus far been distributed to 
Greenland to pay for fishing rights has 
especially been delegated to education 
becoming another important compo-
nent in the future development process. 
Through the Partnership, Greenland 
gets annually approximately 25 million 
Euros in budget support earmarked for 
extraordinary educational efforts. As a 
yearly obligation Greenland describes 
what initiatives should be emphasised 
in relation to educational planning in the 
coming year and what goals are expected 
to be achieved. 
 It is important to note that this is 
the first time that the Commission has 
proposed a cooperation agreement with a 
single OCT, which goes beyond the exist-
ing OCT system framework. It may how-
ever indicate that these new partnership 
arrangements will make an important 
contribution to further cooperation with 
other Arctic regions in the future. 
states	or	international	organisations.	Box	42	illustrates	an	
example	of	the	new	approaches	to	cooperation	that	might	
be	valuable	in	the	future.
	
Management from the inside – out 
Currently,	 despite	 increasing	 and	 often	 productive	 co-
operation	 among	 various	Arctic	 actors	 and	 the	 various	
forms	of	Arctic	collaboration	outlined	in	maps	17	and	18:	
globally	via	the	UN,	regionally	via	the	Arctic	Council,	in	
European	terms	through	the	EU,	functionally	in	the	Nor-
dic	Council	of	Ministers,	 the	 Inuit	Circumpolar	Council	
ICC	 etc.,	 and	 sectorally	 the	 role	 of	 education	 through,	
for	instance,	the	University	of	the	Arctic,	and	the	grow-
ing	number	and	strength	of	different	regional	networks	
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and	 regimes,	 the	 institutional	 complex	 of	 the	 Arctic	 is	
however	 still	 marked	 by	 fragmentation	 and	 character-
ised	as	nascent.	This	situation	is	expected	to	continue	as	
we	deal	with	a	growing	number	of	initiatives	at	the	non-
governmental,	 governmental,	 inter-governmental,	 sub-
national,	sub-regional	and	supra-national	 levels	within	
and	beyond	the	Arctic	that	challenge	the	efficiency	of	this	
complex.	
Should	then	the	primarily	informal	structure	of	many	
Arctic	institutions	and	their	grounding	in	the	“soft-law”	
approach	be	modified	to	more	conventional	institution-
al	forms?	The	current	web	of	soft-law	declarations	and	
informal	actions	 is	often	challenged	 in	 the	meeting	of	
current	challenges.	The	activities	of	NGOs,	for	instance	
the	ICC,	also	point	to	the	efficacy	of	informal	strategies	
in	fostering	the	rights	of	indigenous	peoples	and	Arctic	
diplomacy.	
At	the	same	time,	existing	examples	of	hard	law	instru-
ments	in	relation	to	the	Arctic	such	as	the	Agreement	on	
the	Conservation	of	Polar	Bears;	 the	UN	Convention	on	
the	Law	of	the	Sea	of	1982	(UNCLOS);	the	Convention	on	
Biological	Diversity,	etc.,	are	also	beneficial	for	particular	
issues	of	Arctic	governance.	
It	is	no	accident	that	the	Arctic	Council,	despite	being	
a	 “soft”-law	 issuing	 body,	 is	 currently	 working	 on	 the	
binding	search	and	rescue	agreement.	It	is	expected	that	
the	role	of	this	policy-shaping	entity	may	evolve	towards	
being	a	more	substantial	and	influential	body	which	will	
eventually	become	of	vital	importance	for	the	Arctic	and	
beyond.	
One	of	the	most	important	trends	in	Arctic	governance	
relates	to	the	ongoing	devolution	processes	in	Greenland	
and	Nunavut.	Despite	some	commonalities	in	relation	to	
the	 desire	 for	 sub-national	 authorities	 to	 assume	more	
responsibilities	for	their	lives	through	the	transfer	of	es-
sential	jurisdictions	–	e.g.,	resources,	from	the	centre	to	
sub-national	governments,	in	each	Arctic	entity	devolu-
tion	has	its	own	variables	dealing	with	the	particularities	
of	local	and	national,	constitutional,	economic	and	politi-
cal	settings.	Thus,	generalisations	on	this	subject	are	not	
particularly	helpful.	
It	is	clear,	however,	that	in	each	area,	high	hopes	are	
raised	in	connection	with	devolution	as	it	is	expected	to	
bring	about	a	more	prosperous	and	sustainable	 future	
for	local	peoples.	This	trend	also	highlights	the	chang-
ing	 relationships	 between	 former	 colonisers	 and	 the	
colonised,	who	by	using	the	methods	and	strategies	of	
the	former	colonisers,	have	advanced	to	a	new	level	of	
political	identity,	maturity	and	diplomacy	and	are	able	
to	achieve	goals	by	means	of	constructive	negotiation,	
persuasiveness	etc.,	while	putting	in	place	a	new	vision	
for	their	homelands.	
A	number	of	political	and	legal	challenges	and	trends	
have	thus	now	come	to	the	fore	in	relation	to	the	need	to	
adopt	adequate,	science-based,	responsible	policies.	Pol-
icy-making	decisions	regarding	the	Arctic	region	cannot	
be	realised	in	isolation,	there	is	also	now	a	strong	empha-
sis	on	dialogue	and	possible	partnerships	with	various	
Arctic	stakeholders.	
New trends and tendencies 
The	Arctic	has	entered	into	a	new	era	of	transformation	
regionally,	nationally	and	globally.	Thus,	the	novel	ten-
dency	in	respect	of	quickly	concluding	long	unresolved	
legal	and	political	disagreements	as	soon	as	possible	is	
set	to	continue.	This	is	clear	from	Canada	and	the	USA’s	
“agreement	 to	 disagree”	 approach	 to	 control	 over	 the	
North-West	Passage	or	the	need	to	resolve	the	maritime	
boundary	issue	in	the	Barents	Sea;	or	from	Canada	and	
Denmark’s	“agreement	to	disagree”	over	the	ownership	
of	tiny	Hans	Island	which	may	potentially	become	impor-
tant	from	a	resource	or	strategic	view	point.		
Multilevel	collaboration	with	regard	to	the	Arctic	cov-
ers	questions	of	the	Law	of	the	Sea,	search	and	rescue	ca-
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pacities,	shipping	and	navigation,	scientific	cooperation	
on	data	collection	relating	to	claims	on	the	extension	of	
continental	shelves	by	some	Arctic	states,	a	holistic	ap-
proach	 to	 the	 development	 and	 management	 of	 Arctic	
fisheries	and	other	marine	and	terrestrial	resources,	envi-
ronmental	protection	and	security	matters,	cooperation	
on	 the	assertion	of	 sovereignty	and	 stewardship	 in	 the	
Arctic,	cultural,	linguistic	and	educational	collaboration,	
as	well	as	initiatives	on	dealing	with	the	pros	and	cons	of	
climate	change,	etc.	As	indicated,	there	are	many	models	
of	collaboration	available,	but	each	form	is	intertwined	
with	several	others.	Thus,	the	continuing	tendency	will	
be	to	provide	efficient	and	multi-dimensional	collabora-
tion	for	the	benefit	of	the	whole	region	and	the	rest	of	the	
globe.	
Other	tendencies	deal	with	the	emerging	militarisation	
of	the	region	and	demonstrations	of	military	power	by	a	
number	 of	 the	Arctic	 states	 through	 improved	military	
vessels,	 new	 icebreaker	 fleets	 and	 equipment,	military	
activities	 in	 the	“High	North”,	enhanced	air	patrolling,	
for	the	assertion	of	Arctic	sovereignty,	control	and	pres-
ence	in	the	region.	After	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	and	the	
opening	of	the	region	to	multi-lateral	cooperation,	the	re-
cent	wave	of	militarisation	is	indicative	of	the	fact	that	de-
spite	improved	openness,	dialogue	and	partnerships	on	
many	 issues,	 including	 trans-national	 collaboration	on	
security	issues,	it	is	of	the	utmost	significance	for	Arctic	
States	to	foster	their	military	capabilities	and	have	lever-
age	on	this	matter	if	required.	
The	desire	to	develop	advanced	military	technologies	
then	is	a	trend	that	will	undoubtedly	continue.	For	a	va-
riety	of	reasons,	employment	of	the	principle	of	demili-
tarisation	which	was	entrenched	in	the	Antarctic	Treaty	
of	1959	is	impossible	in	the	Arctic.	It	should	however	be	
emphasised	that	this	trend	towards	militarisation	is	hap-
pening	within	legitimate	frameworks	under	the	banner	
of	the	protection	of	national	interests	and	stability	in	the	
region	in	the	light	of	terrorism	and	other	significant	se-
curity	threats.	
Other	matters	concern	questions	relating	to	the	neces-
sity	for,	or	the	benefits	of,	binding	regional	commitments	
–	e.g.,	an	all-Arctic	Treaty,	Charter	or	a	Constitution,	etc.	
Debates	 on	 this	 issue	 are	 not	 new	 and	 they	 resurface	
within	the	academic,	political	and	legal	discourse	from	
time	to	time.	Over	the	past	decade	or	more	several	state-
ments	have	been	made	by	various	Arctic	bodies	and	the	
EU	on	the	need	for	an	Arctic	Treaty	–	a	 legally	binding	
instrument.	The	possibilities	of	such	a	treaty	are	subject	
to	ongoing	policy	developments	and	discourse.	
On	the	one	hand,	the	current	web	of	“soft”-law	instru-
ments	mainly	produced	or	concluded	by	various	Arctic	
forums	or	which	can	be	issued	by	other	actors	often	prove	
to	be	effective	in	addressing	various	Arctic-related	mat-
ters.	On	the	other	hand,	despite	the	various	pros	and	cons	
attached	to	having	an	Arctic	Treaty,	the	matter	of	legally	
binding	arrangements	in	the	Arctic	versus	soft-law	instru-
ments	is	complex.	As	noted	previously,	both	approaches	
are	valid	and	can	be	beneficial	to	the	resolution	of	specific	
Arctic	matters.
The	opponents	of	the	Arctic	Treaty	support	the	devel-
opment	 of	 several	 legal	 regimes	which	will	 substitute	
for	such	a	Treaty	e.g.,	Human	Rights,	Arctic	Fisheries,	
Shipping,	 Environmental,	 Marine	 Scientific	 Research,	
Search	and	Rescue,	Minerals,	regulations,	etc.	Consen-
sus	also	exists	among	the	Arctic	Ocean	States	 that	ex-
isting	international	law	instruments	are	sufficient	e.g.,	
UNCLOS,	and	there	is	no	further	need	for	such	a	Treaty.	
The	proponents	of	such	a	Treaty	argue	that	it	is	needed	
as	a	form	of	further	stability	and	enhanced	cooperation	
in	the	area	which	is	marked	by	a	nascent,	ad-hoc	insti-
tutional	complex	and	gaps	in	the	regulation	of	certain	
all-Arctic	areas.
The	 trend	will	be	 towards	 the	usage	of	both	soft-law	
and	hard-law	approaches	 in	 the	 resolution	of	Arctic	 is-
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sues.	A	 lot	will	depend	here	on	the	political	will	of	 the	
Arctic	states	to	foster	any	sort	of	development.	
Potentially	emerging	or	current	disagreements	among	
some	Arctic	states	and	others	over	Arctic-specific	matters	
stimulate	discourse	and	attract	international	attention	to	
the	need	for	a	special	Arctic	legal	regime.	It	remains	to	be	
seen	whether	any	kind	of	a	binding	all-Arctic	agreement	
will	however	be	feasible.	
Arctic resources revisited 
The	growing	global	demand	for	fossil-fuel	resources,	se-
cured	energy	supplies	and	 the	continuing	desire	of	 the	
oil	companies	 to	explore/exploit	new	fields	 in	northern	
waters	places	a	renewed	focus	on	the	Arctic.	Ongoing	ten-
sions	exist	between	the	need	for	exploration	or	exploita-
tion	and	the	conservation	or	management	of	resources	in	
the	region	which	require	effective	governance.	Resource	
development	 is	 required	 to	be	 conducted	 in	 the	 frame-
work	of	stewardship,	a	greater	emphasis	is	placed	on	sus-
tainability	and	the	principle	of	inter-generational	equity	
as	well	 as	 the	development	of	 various	enterprises	with	
long-term	economic	potential.	
Conservation	 and	 management	 strategies	 are	 ex-
pected	to	be	able	to	respond	to	emerging	risks	as	well	
as	possible	environmental	and	safety	issues.	Increasing	
national	and	international	maritime	and	terrestrial	re-
source	activities	 require	 improved	measures	 to	ensure	
the	protection,	operation,	maintenance,	planning,	mon-
itoring	and	preservation	of	existing	resources.	They	also	
suggest	the	need	for	further	inquiry	into	the	adequacy	
of	existing	mechanisms	e.g.,	environmental	impact	as-
sessments,	the	meeting	of	technological	requirements,	
impacts	on	indigenous	lands	and	livelihoods,	 impacts	
on	wildlife	and	fauna,	the	fragile	Arctic	ecological	bal-
ance,	sharing,	etc.	
Resource	development	in	the	region	implies	substan-
tial	 investments	 of	 financial,	 technological	 and	 intel-
lectual	 capital,	 which	 is	 expensive,	 does	 not	 always	
guarantee	quick	economic	 returns	and	 is	 complicated	
by	risks	caused	by	the	severe	Arctic	climate	and	testing	
geographic	conditions.	Thus,	the	problem	of	attracting	
public	and	private	capital	nationally	or	globally	through	
favourable	taxation	regimes,	less	complicated	systems	
of	regulatory	control,	or	other	incentives	remains	a	chal-
lenge	for	many	Arctic	nations.	The	focus	on	investment	
in	improved	technology,	alternative	sources	of	energy,	
efficient	energy-saving	equipment,	safe	marine	vessels,	
ice-breakers,	 or	 on	 scientific	 research	 or	 communica-
tion	and	transportation,	can	deliver	enhanced	benefits	
in	the	long	run	as	opposed	to	a	concentration	on	short-
term	profits.	
Investment	on	the	human-capacity	building	of	north-
erners,	indigenous	peoples,	governments	and	entrepre-
neurs	 in	 the	region	is	crucial	 for	 its	sustainable	 future.	
Options	for	resource	development	however	vary	depend-
ing	 on	 the	 type	 of	 resources	 concerned.	 With	 respect	
to	fisheries,	one	suggestion	 is	 to	employ	an	eco-system	
based	management	approach	via	a	 regional	agreement	
on	fisheries.	The	development	of	an	adequate	scientific	
plan	for	Arctic	fisheries	could	be	important,	thus	address-
ing	the	challenges	of	illegal,	unreported,	and	unregulat-
ed	fishing	and	 the	conduct	of	sustainable	fisheries	due	
to	growing	concerns	for	the	over-exploitation	of	fish	and	
marine	Arctic	resources.	
One	 final	 question	 here	 concerns	 that	 of	 identify-
ing	which	areas	are	 likely	 to	see	 resource	development	
expand	 further	 in	 the	years	 to	come?	 It	 is	not	however	
possible	to	speculate	further	on	such	matters,	as	Arctic	
resource	developments	vary	significantly	across	the	re-
gion.	Given	the	scarcity	of	some	resources	on	world	mar-
kets	however,	aside	from	the	current	focus	on	untapped	
fossil-fuels	and	minerals	in	the	Arctic	both	off-shore	and	
inshore,	one	strategically	important	resource	in	the	area	
is	water.	
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In	this	regard,	questions	of	ownership,	resource	ben-
efits,	and	the	legal	status	of	icebergs	originating	in	one	
Arctic	jurisdiction	but	floating	into	another	may	become	
important;	thus	raising	the	issues	of	the	value,	protection	
and	usage	of	 fresh	 ice,	snow	and	water	resources	with-
in	 Arctic	 areas,	 especially	 in	 light	 of	 ongoing	 climatic	
change,	waste	management	requirements	and	pollution	
issues.	
Another	 area	 of	 interest	 concerns	 biological	 resourc-
es,	 bio-prospecting	 and	genetic	 resources	 as	 they	 each	
present	promising	possibilities	in	the	development	of	new	
sources	 of	 energy,	 new	 pharmaceutical	 products,	 food	
and	other	industries.	These	will	undoubtedly	become	in-
creasingly	 interesting	 for	various	Arctic	and	non-Arctic	
stakeholders.	Given	ongoing	climate	change	some	Arctic	
areas	may	see	a	benefit	in	terms	of	agricultural	and	for-
estry	resource	developments	as	well	as	from	the	develop-
ment	of	aquaculture	resources.
Across	the	region	greater	emphasis	will	be	placed	on	
alternative	sources	of	energy	–	e.g.,	the	production	of	en-
ergy	from	waste	which	is	in	great	abundance	in	many	Arc-
tic	communities.	All	kinds	of	tourism	related	to	e.g.	cli-
mate	change,	eco-,	extreme	tourism,	spot-hunting,	etc.,	
are	likely	to	become	more	important	in	relation	to	matters	
of	environmental	protection	and	economic	possibilities.	
There	 is	no	doubt,	however,	 that	 resource	development	
in	the	region	cannot	be	tackled	without	proper	measures	
of	sustainable	use,	management	and	protection;	thus,	a	
holistic,	eco-system	management	approach,	the	employ-
ment	of	the	precautionary	principle	and	of	the	principle	
of	 inter-generational	equity	are	squarely	on	the	current	
agenda	 of	 various	 environmental	 agencies	 and	 NGOs	
while	 also	 being	 actively	 taken	 into	 consideration	 by	
governments	across	the	region	in	the	exercise	of	their	re-
source	and	wildlife	management	and	development	poli-
cies.	
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The	complexity	and	rapidity	of	the	social,	economic,	le-
gal	and	geopolitical	changes	that	are	taking	place	in	the	
Arctic	region	requires	substantial	international	efforts	to	
share	stewardship	and	concern	for	this	ecologically	frag-
ile	area	which	retains	a	vital	importance	for	all	residents	
of	the	North,	the	many	Arctic	and	non-Arctic	stakeholders	
and	for	the	globe	more	generally.	
The	 Arctic,	which	 is	 richly	 endowed	with	 resources,	
fully	engaged	in	new	frontier	research	for	scientific	and	
intellectual	capital/knowledge	and	highly	diverse	is	be-
coming	 gradually	 integrated	 into	 global	 developments.	
This	however	presents	both	challenges	and	opportunities	
for	the	potential	prosperity	of	some	Arctic	communities,	
creating	conflicts	over	interests	between	developers	and	
indigenous	peoples	and	disagreements	in	relation	to	the	
most	basic	issues	of	power	and	control.
These	general	geopolitical	trends	indicate	that	we	are	
dealing	with	a	work	in	progress	and	that	significant	effort	
will	need	to	be	made	to	ensure	stability,	peaceful	coop-
eration	 and	 the	 exercise	 of	 good	 governance	 practices.	
The	Arctic	is	not	just	a	source	of	resources,	a	strategic	re-
source	base	for	geopolitical	power	or	the	avenue	for	new	
shipping	routes,	it	is	the	homeland	for	many	peoples	and	
a	region	of	increasing	concern	at	several	levels	and	where	
this	is	likely	to	be	the	case	for	many	years	to	come.	
Thus,	 the	 “new”	 geopolitical	 framework	 can	 be	 ad-
dressed	only	in	conjunction	with	other	areas	that	affect	
various	 questions	 of	 Arctic	 politics,	 law,	 knowledge,	
Perspectives
205
environment,	 development,	 and	 governance.	 In	 other	
words,	despite	the	existing	diversity,	the	development	of	
increasingly	 integrated	 and	 proactive	 policy	 approach-
es	and	the	sharing	of	common	concerns	are	likely	to	be	
highly	beneficial	in	dealing	with	the	region,	although	for	
those	parts	of	the	North	which	remain	unclaimed	first	of	
all	the	status	of	High	Seas	and	control	over	the	North	Pole	
or	unresolved	current	legal	disagreements	shall	continue	
to	be	the	focal	point	of	intensive	geopolitical	interest.	
As	mentioned	already	in	the	introduction	to	the	book,	
generalisations	are	not	always	plausible	as	each	aspect	
of	 the	 dynamics	 requires	 a	 detailed	 analysis	 and	may	
present	its	own	particularities.	The	impact	of	unforeseen	
global	processes	or	unexpected	developments	therefore	
should	 be	 taken	 into	 consideration.	 It	 is	 nevertheless	
hoped	 that	 this	 book	 will	 be	 useful	 for	 policy-makers	
from	across	the	region	and	beyond.	The	megatrends	sug-
gested	here	are	trends	that	are	deemed	so	powerful	that	
they	have	the	potential	to	transform	society	across	social	
categories	and	at	all	levels	from	the	individual	and	local	
players	to	global	structures.	They	will	change	our	ways	of	
living	and	thinking.	Hopefully	dissemination	of	the	state	
of	knowledge	and	information	on	the	various	processes	
of	transformation	connected	with	policy,	governance	and	
physical	and	economic	evolution	in	the	Arctic	will	also	
benefit	other	parts	of	the	globe.
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